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ABSTRACT 
'rhis study is concerned with the development of a distinct and collerent 
tradition of thought on the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The strength 
of this tradition was such that, in a significant number of cases, it actually prevented 
theologians from being able to see the real issues before them. When theolozians in 
the thirteenth century come to put forward their interpretations of the statement on the 
Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, they are severely hampered in 
their ability to do so because of their preoccupation with an argument about the divine 
essence which is, at the most, tangential in the Lateran decree itself. Their 
interpretations are so wide of the mark as to constitute nothing less than a case of 
collective rn is understanding. 
This raises questions about rationality and hermeneutics which are not as easily 
answerable as they first appear. The difficulty arises because it is just possible to 
discern a conceptual link between the skewed interpretation offered by these 
theologians and the issues addressed in the Lateran decree as they appear to us today. 
It is almost as if theologians considered their version to be legitimate because they 
saw an intrinsic link between the issues of divine unity and divine generation, thý 
main concerns of the decree and academic theologians respectively. 
What gives credence to this possibility is that these issues were themselves 
often inseparable in the development of trinitarian theology in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. Much of the coherence of the tradition of academic theology of 
the Trinity derived from a recurrent preoccupation with the question of whether the 
divine essence begets. In certain crucial instances, the answer to this question was 
determined with reference to the doctrine of divine unity. I'lie idea was that the 
generation of the essence would impair irretrievably the absolute unity of essence 
which was beginning to emerge as the dominant view of divine wifty. 
The Lateran Council's statement on the doctrine can only be understood within 
this wider theological context. It is no longer possible to attribute this statement to 
Pope Innocent III's wish to bolster the authority of Peter Lombard. hinocent himself 
borrowed from Joachim's trinitarian theology, making it almost inconceivable that he 
would have later wished to condemn the same theologian. Only by giving less 
attention to the personalities involved and more to the issues themselves can we 
realise the full significance of the theological controversies of this period. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity was at the cutting edge of medieval 
thought. It was both one of the moving forces as well as one of the principal 
'beneficiaries' of the system of thought generally known as medieval scholasticism. 
The logical complexity of the doctrine was particularly suited to the kind of syllogistic 
argumentation which became one of the hallmarks of the scholastic approach, much 
to the chagrin of many an ecclesiastic. The theology of the Trinity thus enjoyed 
significant points of contact with the techniques and concerns of the disciplines of 
logic and grammar in its attempt to mediate between the often conflicting demands 
of language, meaning and metaphysical truth. For as well as being concerned with the 
very nature of God and his inner life, trinitarian theology also deals with what we can 
both know and say about his being; and because the doctrine lies at the heart of the 
Christian confession of faith, was the subject indeed of the first ecumenically 
recognised creed, it has traditionally been one of the most volatile, and consequently 
creative, areas of discussion among theologians. The Middle Ages, when theology had 
the kind of status accorded to the experimental sciences today, was no exception to 
this. In their discussions on the Trinity, medieval theologians repeatedly ventured into 
previously unexplored territories which were of crucial significance to other scholars; 
and this applies not only to common concerns, such as the debate on universals, but 
also to problems of methodology. One is therefore justified in making the audacious, 
though (I hope) not presumptuous claim, that to write a history of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is to examine the very dynamic of 
scholastic thought itself. 
This is not to reduce medieval trinitarian theology to a mere device by which 
we can observe the much more interesting and significant phenomenon of 
scholasticism, even if only to establish whether or not that term adequately describes 
the various institutions, problems and methods usually designated by it. It is not 
simply the exterior form of a set of ideas and problems which just happens to be 
theological in content. On the contrary, trinitarian theology infon-ns as much as it is 
informed by scholastic thought. Many of the questions addressed by academics during 
8 
this period, though they were not the direct result of speculation about the Trinity 
(many were as old as philosophy itself), assumed acute significance because of the 
way in which they impinged upon the doctrine. 
Making the connection with the development of scholastic thought, therefore, 
is simply an attempt to place discussions on the Trinity within their social and 
intellectual contexts. In this sense, this study is primarily historical insofar as it seeks 
to describe the emergence of a distinct tradition of thought on the Trinity in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries without imposing value judgements about correct 
doctrine. My aim (retrospectively) was to identify a set of interrelated problems in 
trinitarian theology and then to trace their treatment by a succession of theologians 
within a very definite social context. The criteria of selection were not the originality 
and lasting significance of the writings, which would have meant extensive discussion 
of works such as Saint Anselm of Canterbury's Monologion and Richard of Saint- 
Victor's De trinitate. This study is not, in other words, an overview of the major 
thinkers on the subject. Instead, I was interested in those authors who could be seen 
to be taking up previously discussed points, irrespective of the originality of their 
insights; in writings which are important not because they change the direction of 
trinitarian theology, but rather because they engage very specifically with well- 
established arguments and share a common body of material with other writings. 
Precisely in those texts, in other words, which are derivative (though not just 
derivative) and contingent upon what is being said and written elsewhere. 
This may seem to be drawing unnecessary attention to the universally 
acknowledged fact that all writing is to some extent dependent on what has been 
written before, a phenomenon which may be described as genre, influence or 
intertextuality depending perhaps on where one wants to put the author. ' But this 
having been established, it is surely necessary to identify precisely what form such 
dependency may take. I am less concerned with questions of direct or indirect 
influence, a fairly well-studied type of dependency, than with subscription to a 
'See J. Clayton and E. Rothstein, 'Figures in the Corpus: Theories of Influence and Intertextuality', in J. I 
Clayton and E. Rothstein edd., Influence and Intertextualiti, in Literai: v ffistoiýý (Univ. of Wisconsin, 1991), 3-36. 
This is one of the few intelligent discussions in an othenvise impenetrable (at least to the non-specialist) debate 
about a term which promises much but delivers little. Also illuminating and stimulating is U. Eco, The Role of the 
Reader. Evj)lorations in the Setniotics of Text-ý (London, 1979). pp. 21-2. 
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common body of ideas and methods which are not necessarily traceable to any one, 
unique source. By limiting myself to those works which share many of the same 
preoccupations and frame them using recognisably similar ten-ns and arguments, I have 
hoped to trace the transmission of ideas about the Trinity and thereby say something 
not only about the development of the doctrine, but also about the actual mechanisms 
propelling that development. It is for this reason that I believe the results of my 
research constitute an original contribution not only to the history of medieval thought, 
but also to our understanding of the nature and formation of intellectual traditions in 
general and to the formation of Christian doctrine in particular. The emphasis is very 
much upon continuity, and only upon innovation insofar as any innovation is in turn 
appropriated by others to become part of a common approach. 
This criterion of continuity has also determined the chronological limits of the 
thesis. I begin in the late eleventh century with the controversy between Anselm of 
Canterbury and Roscelin of Compi&gne on the orthodoxy of Roscelin's description of 
the three Persons as three res. For Anselm, Roscelin's description seemed to 
jeopardise the fundamental principle of trinitarian theology established in the West 
since Augustine's De trinitate: the crucial distinction between unity and trinity, 
essence and Person upon which coherent discussion of the doctrine was absolutely 
dependent if one God were to be three coequal and consubstantial Persons. From the 
beginning, then, language played a central role in arguments about the Trinity and was 
to be a recurrent preoccupation throughout twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions. 
Hence the reason for the interdependent development of trinitarian thought with logic 
and grammar. 
The arguments brought to bear by Roscelin, known to us chiefly through 
Anselm's polemical writings against him, had at least one major consequence for 
subsequent developments. They exposed in acute terms the vulnerability of traditional 
explanations of the Trinity to questions from logically-minded theologians or, as some 
critics saw it, logicians with a smattering of theology. Just what does it mean to say 
that one God or essence is three Persons when each of those Persons is equally and 
individually God, and without there being three gods? 'Me problem itself was not 
really new but the same one of identity of substance and distinction of Person which 
had plagued early defenders of the consubstantiality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
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And perhaps it would not have been an enduring one had it not been for the 
emergence of permanent institutions expressly devoted to posing and solving such 
problems. It is not enough that Roscelin was a brilliant and original thinker, if indeed 
he was. For his questions to have any lasting impact or resonance among 
contemporaries there had to be a corresponding ability, reason and opportunity to 
grapple with them. The rise of the cathedral schools, and eventually of a university 
in Paris, together with the emergence of professional theologians, satisfied these 
conditions. Students were trained to read and to think critically, to find gaps in 
authoritative texts. They considered it worthwhile to do so, firstly, because the 
problems they confronted were genuinely interesting and important to them, but also 
because the status of the theologian in Christian society was increasing in significance. 
A career in teaching remained the province of a very few. But for many more, a 
certain allure attached to a theological education, which they thought would serve 
them well in later life. Finally, the schools provided the opportunity for all this to take 
place. They allowed for teaching on a large scale and, like any institution, opened the 
way for a standardisation of intellect ual practices. The emergence of a doctrinal 
consensus in the twelfth century is in this respect not dissimilar from the previous 
single greatest formation of doctrine, in the third and fourth centuries. In the earlier 
period the introduction of an official orthodoxy promulgated with imperial authority 
at the Council of Nicea was a means of imposing unifon-nity of faith upon the 
disparate teachings of the various schools and theological traditions throughout the 
Empire. The difference in the twelfth century was that this regulation was effectively 
self-imposed. The clarification of the doctrine issued by the Fourth Lateran Council 
was only feasible because theologians had themselves already reached a consensus on 
the major issues. 
The challenge laid down by Roscelin, to bring some logical coherence to the 
doctrine, was taken up most successfully by his one-time pupil, Peter Abelard. 
Abelard's approach was to develop a theory of signification which allowed him to 
explain why ten-ns which seemed to be of the same type could not always be used in 
the same contexts. The main instance of this problematic was provoked by the terms 
'God' and 'essence ; and the main illustration was why it was permissible to say 'God 
begot God' but not 'essence begot essence', or rather, why 'God begot God' did not 
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necessarily imply 'essence begot essence'. 11iis focus was not an arbitrary one. It is 
no accident that these propositions both concern one of the most important elements 
in twelfth-century trinitarian theology, the Father's generation of the Son. `17hey were 
the semantic counterpart to the ontological problem of how Father and Son could be 
distinct by property but the same (and numerically the same) in essence. For it was 
precisely this identity of essence which suggested that if we can conceptualise the 
Father's generation of the Son as God begot God, there is no reason why we cannot 
say essence begot essence since 'God' and 'essence' indicate the same reality. T'he 
generation of the Son from the Father's very essence or substance thus seemed to 
provide the key to the problem of identity and difference in God: the Father had 
brought forth a being which was essentially the same as himself and yet which was 
in some manner distinct. 
Discussion of this problem dominates Abelard's Theologia. The debate about 
the respective legitimacy of the propositions 'God begot God' and 'essence begot 
essence' was the semantic form which it assumed. If 'God begot God' did not imply 
even, on the grounds of identity of essence, that God had begotten himself or another 
God but that the Father who is God begot the Son who is God, why was it not 
permissable to say 'essence begot essence' for the same reason. What was the 
difference between 'God' and 'essence'? 
Abelard did not provide a fully comprehensive solution or at least not a 
solution which proved acceptable to contemporaries. Much of his discussion centred 
on long and complex analogies which earned the condemnation of William of Saint- 
Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux. But Abelard's semantic approach in general and his 
particular emphasis upon the question of the Father's generation of the Son proved to 
be of more lasting significance. In his Sentences Peter Lombard placed this question 
at the very beginning of his discussion of God. 'nie Lombard himself did not 
contribute any new insights to the semantic problem but brought a greater clarity to 
the discussion. He raised more succinctly than Abelard, though not in a fully 
formulated way, the problem of the relationship between the doctrine on divine 
generation and on divine unity. The guiding assumption of the Lombard's discussion 
of whether or not the divine essence begets is his definition of 'essence' as the reality 
or nature common to the three Persons, the summa quaedam res. The identification 
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of the essence with this ultimate reality precluded any possibility that the essence 
could be begetting. For if that were the case then it would follow that the essence 
begot itself. And as Abelard had already pointed out, according to the principle 
established by Augustine, no thing could beget itself, could be its own cause. The 
interdependency of the doctrines of divine generation and divine unity had been 
implied by Roscelin and was presupposed by Abelard, but receives its sharpest 
treatment from Peter Lombard. 'Mis conceptual linkage may perhaps have elicited no 
further comment had it not been for Joachim of Fiore's attack some years later. 
Joachim's objection to the Lombard's concept of divine unity as a quaedam summa 
res was the immediate occasion for the detailed clarification of the doctrine of the 
Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council, but the roots of the decree lie much 
deeper in the twelfth century. 
The Sentences represent a landmark in twelfth-century theology. This fact is 
so well established it is almost a platitude. a statement which seems to require little 
further investigation. But as with so many platitudes its full significance can only be 
grasped upon deeper reflection and inquiry. For this statement is so important and yet 
so impenetrable in its bare form that it actually demands extensive examination to be 
in any way meaningful. Since the pioneering studies of continental scholars between 
the wars this has been an all too rare undertaking. One of the supplementary aims of 
my research, therefore, has been to ascertain the precise nature of the work's 
importance for trinitarian theology and to chronicle in greater detail the mechanisms 
of its transmission throughout the second half of the twelfth century. The chapter on 
Peter Lombard is thus an essential lynchpin in the argument for continuity in 
trinitarian theology. By examining its points of contact with preceding authors and its 
incorporation into the very structure of the study of theology in the second half of the 
twelfth century, I hope to show how and to what extent the Sentences served as a 
mediator of earlier debates and a constant point of reference for theologians in the 
later period. 
The presence of the Sentences as a common denominator in the study of 
theology was one factor in the development of a distinct method, which may broadly 
be defined as a consensus, in trinitarian theology in the later twelfth century. In 
addition we can identify a whole range of assumptions shared by these authors which 
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take up and expand upon the complex of questions surrounding the issue of divine 
generation. A problem of interpretation arises at this point. Theologians persisted in 
their discussion of why 'God begot God' was valid but not 'essence begot essence' 
even though there is little evidence of anyone actually maintaining that the essence 
begot. Much of this has simply to do with the repetitive nature of scholasticism, 
whereby blocks and sequences of argument are copied in their entirety. Once a given 
problem had entered the discussion it would probably never be solved definitively. 
Instead it would evolve and mutate into a series of additional problems. At this point 
the original issue would become fossilised without becoming detached from the entire 
corpus. This accounts for the in-built tendency of scholastic theology to pile up 
arguments for and against a particular proposition. No argument is definitive inasmuch 
as no argument can answer or anticipate all possible counter- arguments. The result is 
that no single argument is ever sufficient, nor should it be, since that would defeat the 
very rationale of finding new, more satisfactory ones. Each problem thus becomes an 
archeology of questions and arguments, layered one upon the other, and 
interconnecting like a complex rock fon-nation. The result is that some of the 
problems, like some of the layers of rock, are remote and unyielding; but they cannot 
be discarded without destroying the unity of the entire structure. 
To a considerable extent this seems to be the case with the propostions 'God 
begot God' and 'essence begot essence'. Originally the task had been to explain why 
the first but not the second was true. The answer was that no thing begets itself. But 
this raised the further problem of why 'God begot God' did not imply that something 
begot itself whilst 'essence begot essence' did. This in turn focused attention on the 
signification of the terms 'God' and 'essence' and on signification theory in general. 
This proved to be a minefield which theologians could not easily traverse. The original 
question was thus turned on its head. Signification theory was no longer merely the 
tidy solution to the paradox of why two terms which referred to the same reality could 
not be used in the same way. Instead the propositions 'God begot God' and 'essence 
begot essence' became the main illustrations of why the meaning of 'God' and 
'essence' was such a perennially fascinating and perplexing issue. That is why the 
debate about the signification of these terms could not be entirely divorced from the 
problem which had given rise to it even though that problem itself seemed utterly 
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exhausted. 
Virtually all the theologians of the second half of the twelfth century who 
discuss these issues discuss them in a way which presupposes a set of shared 
assumptions about theological language and valid argumentation. Adopting a phrase 
from Giuseppe Angelini's study of Prepositinus of Cremona, I have described this 
approach as grammatical theology. Although I shall in effect be talking about the same 
phenomenon as most scholars mean by scholasticism, 'grammatical theology' is 
intended as a more analytically precise description of the nature of scholastic thought. 
Scholastic theology strictly speaking implies nothing more than the academic 
atmosphere of the schools and the practice of the quaestio, and not only means 
different things to different people but has acquired a number of negative meanings. I 
Grammatical theology is more precise and less prejudicial in its connotations. It 
suggests an emphasis upon the structure and nature of language as a fundamental 
principle of the theory and practice of theology, of talk about God. Nothing new about 
that in itself, except the extreme degree to which it was taken. The technical precision 
and sophistication of this methodology was enough to distinguish it qualitatively from 
previous efforts. The analysis of words in their context (supposition) and the 
categorisation of words according to type (signification) provided theologians with a 
complete system of question, answer and explanation. This was a system of thought 
which could be adopted effectively and with little modification by any thinker trained, 
as most theologians were, in the disciplines of logic and grammar. 
It is the adoption of this approach by a significant enough number of 
theologians which in my view justifies talk of the emergence of a consensus in 
trinitarian theology during the later twelfth century. This consensus was one of the 
preconditions for the statement on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council. 
It is this body of opinion, really quite uniform despite the presence of various 
'schools' of thought, which probably lies behind Joachim's condemnation, or which 
at least presupposes it. Traditionally scholars have attributed Joachim's condemnation 
2 See D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (2nd edition; London. 1988), pp. 79-84; B. B. Price, 
Medieval Thought. An Introduction (Oxford, 1992)), pp. 120-1. For an excellent survey, which comes down firmly 
on the defining role of methodolo A gy, see 
L. M. de Rijk. La philosol)hie au ino ven dge (Leiden, 1981; trans. 1985). 
pp. 82-6. An older view emphastd the application of reason to revelation as the defining characteristic. See M. 
Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastichen Methode 2 vols. (Freiburg, 1909-11) 1, pp. 36-7 and M. de Wulf, 
24-5) 1. pp. 11-30. Histoire de la philosolMie inMiji-ale 2 vols. (5th edition; Louvain. 19. 
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to the inititative of Pope Innocent III but this hypothesis is no longer tenable. It is 
certainly reasonable to assume that Innocent's studies at Paris in the 1180s would have 
left him with a natural bias towards Peter Lornbard and that this would account for 
his condemnation of Joachim of Fiore's attack on the Paris theologian. However, I 
have established that Innocent himself borrows from Joachim's trinitarian theology in 
a way which makes it extremely difficult to conceive of him actively seeking out 
Joachim's condemnation. ' If Innocent did not initiate the proceedings against Joachim, 
an altemative might be to look towards theologians at Paris. The Pope's invitation for 
submissions to the Council may have been taken up theologians aware of Joachim's 
attack and anxious that it might bring further disrepute to the emerging university so 
soon after the condemnation of Almaric of B&ne. 
My argument for a Paris initiated and orchestrated condemnation is again only 
an hypothesis and one not without its own problems. Nevertheless, I think it provides 
a more satisfactory, if still inadequate, explanation than the one traditionally proposed 
by scholars which stresses the social and political loyalties of the main protagonists. 
More than just sweeping away an older view, however, I hope my argument opens up 
the decree to its intellectual context. The theological issues addressed in the decree 
were real ones, not simply trumped up for the sake of securing Joachim's 
condemnation. These issues have a history and a context which are relevant to our 
understanding of the decree. Modem theologians have recognised the theological 
significance of the decree; historians have considered its social and political context. 
But to my knowledge no one has examined the decree in its most expansive fon-n, 
taking in its social, intellectual and historical contexts. This was the object of my 
detailed study of the decree. In particular, I wanted to emphasise its theological 
complexity which accounts for the difficulty of arriving at a single, definitive reading. 
The decree can only be approached through its relationship to a series of other texts, 
its meaning activated from within a system of texts. Perhaps this is what theorists 
mean by intertextuality. 
The decree and its interpretation by academic theologians in the thirteenth 
century represents a case study in the phenomenon of intellectual tradition and 
'See my forthcoming article. 'Did Innocent III Personally Condemn Joachim of FioreT, F'Iorewia (1993). 1 
16 
misunderstanding. The vast majority of theologians seem to miss the main point of 
Joachim's condemnation entirely, concentrating instead on an issue apparently raised 
only incidentally in the decree. They do not discuss the doctrine of unity of collection, 
of reducing divine unity from a unity of essence to a unity of will, for which Joachim 
was condemned, so much as the question of whether or not the divine essence begets. 
They proceed as though Joachim had attacked Peter Lombard because he disagreed 
with the Lombard's view that the essence did not beget. In fact, Joachim had attacked 
the Lombard's view because he objected to his concept of the essence as a quaedam 
summa res. But thirteenth-century commentators virtually ignore this point, which is 
resoundingly clear in the decree, and instead attribute Joachim's condemnation to his 
position that essence begot essence. 
We would naturally think this a most obscure and inexplicable interpretation 
if we did not already know about the consistent role this question had played in 
trinitarian theology since at least the time of Peter Abelard. Knowing this as we do, 
we can see how scholastic theologians were in a sense hampered by the legacy which 
they inherited from their predecessors, by the fact that they belonged to a distinct and 
continuous theological tradition in which the centrality of this question was taken for 
granted. They are unable to engage with the decree outside the complex of arguments 
about why the essence did not beget, and read into it their own concerns and 
preoccupations. Thus the intellectual tradition to which they belong leads them 
fundamentally to misinterpret the Lateran decree. 
To stop here, however, would be to deny any validity to thirteenth-century 
interpretations, to dismiss them as wrong, even if wrong for rational and 
understandable reasons to do with the intellectual preoccupations of their authors. 
' In 
that case, we align ourselves with romantic hermeneutics by claiming greater authority 
for the interpretation of the detached scholar than for that of the involved 
contemporary, we claim 'to understand the author better than he understood himself'. 
5 
1 would argue, however, that we have to allow for the possibility that these 
'Cf. Q. Skinner's comments on rationality, in Meaning and Context Quentin Skinner and h& Critics, ed. J. 
Tully (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 236-59. 
5W. Dilthey. 'The Development of Hermeneutics', in W, Dilthev. Selected Writings, ed. and trans. H. P. 
Rickman (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 259-60. For an accessible survey of hermeneutics, see J. Bleicher. Conteinporarv 
Henneneutics. Henneneutics as Method, Philosojyki7 and Critique (London, 1980). 
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theologians, precisely because of their proximity to the decree, can tell us who are so 
far removed from it, something about its meaning, not to mention the immediate 
intellectual context to which it belonged. '17he reason for doing so is not simply out of 
a liberal sense that everyone must be given their due. That would be a rather pointless 
exercise. It is because there are grounds for thinking that a connection between the 
issues of unity of collection and the essence as begetting is implicit in the decree, 
whether actually implicit according to the intentions of those who drafted it or implicit 
according to what could reasonably be inferred by the theology of the time. For the 
Council not only condemned Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection, but also 
eliminated any position which entailed the generation of the essence either as a 
counterpart to Joachim's own position or as a further alternative to the Lombard's 
quaedam summa res. 
But any attempt to apportion due value both to thirteenth-century 
interpretations and to modem accounts, which can see how those interpretations were 
historically conditioned, seems doomed to failure. Hen-neneutic philosophy attempts 
precisely this. Instead of setting up text and interpreter as providing separate and 
competing solutions to the same textual problem, hermeneutics conceives of the act 
of interpretation as a dialogue in which the text and the interpreter are equally open 
to be questioned by one another. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading 
exponent of this philosophy, it is only iii the genuine encounter with the radical 
otherness of the text, through the foregrounding of our own prejudices, that we can 
recognise the truth of the text over and above our expectations of it. 6 For example, 
the expectation that a text should be complete and internally consistent (what Gadamer 
calls the fore-conception of completeness) is one of the governing principles of any 
interpretation; it is only when this condition of completeness is not fulfilled, 'when 
the attempt to accept what is said as true fails', that we attempt to explain the text 
with reference to its historical context, as the temporary eclipse of the truth of the 
matter by the author 9s inability to see beyond his own immediate situation. 7 The 
historian interrogates the text in much the same way as a lawyer cross-examines a 
'Truth and Method (2nd edition; London, 1989). pp. 269,361-2. 
7 Ibid., p. 294. 
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witness, forcing it to yield information which is not immediately forthcoming. 8 
But historians cannot detach themselves from the tradition through which the 
text they wish to understand is mediated. Although it may seem that the true meaning 
of a text can only be known when it is far enough removed from the interpreter's own 
concerns not to engage his personal interest - it has, in other words, become of merely 
historical interest - to approach a text with this attitude is already to prejudge its 
potentiality for truth, to close it off and make it an object of academic curiosity. ' 
Thus instead of attempting to exchange momentarily our horizon for the horizon of 
the past, Gadamer talks of understanding as the result of the fusion of these two 
horizons. 'O This is the dialogue of question and answer in which the interpreter, 
rather than naively reproducing meaning, actually creates it. " Temporal distance 
from our area of inquiry certainly endows us with a wider view but 'the discovery of 
the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished'. 12 
This process of the on-going recovery of meaning implies, however, that 
although a definitive interpretation will always be beyond our reach, each generation 
of interpreters and each new interpretation approximates ever more closely to the truth 
of the text, as 'all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning 9.13 
Thus the idea of progressive clarification of the meaning of a text seems to conflict 
with Gadamer's further assertion that each appropriation of meaning simply offers a 
different point of view: 
Every appropriation is historically different: which does not mean that each one represents only an 
imperfect understanding of it. Rather, each is the experience of an 'aspect' of the thing itself. " 
Wid., p. 338. 
9Ibid., pp. 298,302-4. This is one of the criticisms of Skinner*s contextualist approach. See Tully ed., Meaning 
and Context, esp. pp. 156-75,204-17. 
'OTruth and Method, pp. 304-7. 
"Ibid., pp. 362-79. 
'198. "'Ibid., p2 
"Ibid., p. 298. 
"Ibid., p. 473. 
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Gadamer thus seems to fudge the issue of whether one interpretation is better than 
another, whether we can legitimately describe a particular interpretation as a 
misinterpretaion. True, he admits the possibility of misunderstanding defined as the 
f ailure to achieve the 'harmony of all the details with the whole' (the hen-neneutic 
circle). '5 But by claiming to detect when misunderstanding has cu d, we oc 3ýe 
unavoidably claim greater authority for our own interpretation. This would seem to 
lead us back to our original difficulty of judging between conflicting interpretations 
of the same text. 
A slightly different approach is taken by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur who 
stresses the indeterminacy of meaning, particularly in writing. But like Gadamer, 
Ricoeur tends to dodge the question of misunderstanding. On the one hand, he 
maintains that the distanciation produced by writing, whereby the writer and the reader 
do not share the same concrete reality characteristic of spoken discourse, disqualifies 
us from judging the meaning of a text according to the intention of the author. 16 The 
text detaches itself from both the author and the original audience: 
In short, the work decontextualises itself, from the sociological as well as from the psychological point 
of view, and is able to recontextualige itself differently in the act of reading. It follows that the 
mediation of the text cannot be treated as an extension of the dialogical situation. For in the dialogue, 
the vis-d-vis of discourse is given in advance by the setting itself; with writing the original addressee 
is transcended. The work itself creates an audience, which potentially includes anyone who can read. 17 
On the other hand, although every reading includes an unavoidable rewriting and 
reconstruction of meaning, no text is entirely autonomous, entirely at the mercy of 
whatever meaning a particular interpreter may wish to impose upon it. " According 
to Ricoeur's concept of appropriation, although a text has no definitive meaning, the 
act of interpretation may draw out the intended trajectory of meaning and thereby 
"Ibid., p. 291. 
16& The Hen-neneutical Function of Distanciation', in P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essavs 
on Language, Action and Interpretation. ed. and trans. J. B. Thompson (Cambridge, 1981), 131-44. 
17 'Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology', in Henneneutics and the Human Scienca, p. 91. 
"'Writing as a Problem for Literary Criticism and Philosophical Hermeneutics', in A Ricoeur Reader: 
Reflection and Imagination, ed. M. J. Val&s (New York. 1991). 320-37. 
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fulfil the potential of the text. " This is possible precisely because no text is an 
enclosed, self-contained entity like a discarded pebble (Ricoeur's analogy) with no 
connection or relationship to any other object. 20 But what are we doing when we 
identify the intended trajectory of meaning if not claiming greater authority for our 
interpretation, as sanctioned by the text, than other conflicting interpretations? We are, 
in other words, saying that we have understood where someone else has 
misunderstood. 
The problem is thus how to balance the interpretation of thirteenth-century 
theologians, which seems to be a fairly clear-cut case of misunderstanding, with the 
hermeneutic principle that every reading within a particular tradition brings new 
insights to its subject matter and is part of an on-going dialogue. Hermeneutic 
philosophy does not provide a satisfactory resolution of this dilemma. It betrays a 
tendency to slide between being totalitarian and libertarian; between the attribution of 
authority to the historically detached reading and the democratisation of readings. 
Consequently, it fails to recognise the centrality of the issue of misunderstanding for 
the whole hermeneutic undertaking. 
My own solution to the immediate problem at hand betrays the same tendency 
of wanting to have my cake and eat it. I would argue that thirteenth-century 
interpretations of the decree are an instance both of misunderstanding, which we can 
see and explain historically, and of a truth which we cannot see except through 
agonising reflection on the deep but subtle coruiection between the issues of divine 
unity and divine generation. There is no doubt that these theologians tend not only to 
ignore the main issues involved in Joachim's condemnation, but actually invent 
arguments which are nowhere present in the decree. At the same time, their proximity 
to the issues provides them with a deeper understanding of the interrelationship 
between the Lombard's quaedam summa res, the doctrine of unity of collection for 
which Joachim was actually condemned and the view that essence begets essence. 
There is always a point in trinitarian theology where one aspect of the doctrine 
threatens to merge into another and where one's position on a given issue has 
"'What is a Text? Explanation and Under-standing'. in, 4 RicoeurReader, p. 61; 'Appropriation. in ibid., 86-98. 
20'Writing as a Problem for Literary Criticism', p. 3215. 
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implications for a series of other issues. Firstly, Joachim's condemnation for 
conceiving of divine unity as nothing more cohesive than a unity of collection among 
the Persons would, according to the theology of the time.. tend to affect his view of 
the essence relative to the Father's generation of the Son. If Joachim had no proper 
conception of the essence apart from the three Persons. no conception of unity of 
essence, it would be entirely consistent for him to have held (even though he did not) 
that essence begot essence, just as God begot God and the Father begot the Son. 
Secondly, the decree itself lays the foundation for thirteenth-century interpretations by 
eliminating the view that essence begets essence as a further potential alternative to 
the Lombard's quaedam summa res. Theologians in the thirteenth century saw that it 
was valid to discuss the decree in terrns of essence begets essence because the 
connection between the issues of divine unity and divine generation was itself implied 
in the decree. And the issue was further complicated by Peter Olivi's insistance in the 
late thirteenth century that the decree does not rule out the doctrine that the essence 
begets. He at least saw no contradiction between the quaedam summa res and the 
essence as begetting. 
This arcane world of thought was far removed from the beliefs and preoccupations of 
most people. But given a proliferation of both heretical and evangelical movements, 
it was important from the pastoral point of view that the central doctrine of Christian 
faith should be unimpeachable. 
The detailed study of the development of trinitarian theology is also important 
as a case study in intellectual history. In a general way, I hope that my research will 
help to demonstrate the vibrancy and creativity of medieval theology. Part of the 
reason why the subject has not previously received the attention which it deserves is 
a consequence of the distinction scholars make between medieval philosophy and 
medieval theology. Of the numerous volumes written on 'medieval philosophy', 
whether by anti-Catholic rationalists or Christian apologists, very few deal with 
theological subjects . 
21 Many of the great pioneering works on medieval thought 
21F. Van Steenberghen, Introduction d Pitude de la philosophie inidiji, ale (Louvain, 1974), pp. 46-62 on the 
rationalist and Catholic schools which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. 
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devote themselves first and foremost to the problem of universals as if theological 
problems did not exist or had nothing to do with discussions on universals. There is 
an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption that the debate on univerals was the 
highpoint of intellectual endeavour in the twelfth century. 22 This is compounded by 
a sense that any progress in medieval thought was in spite, not because, of 
Christianity. 23 
Following in the tradition of Etienne Gilson, there have some been attempts 
to reverse this rather dismissive attitude to medieval theology. Gilson warned of the 
danger of introducing a false separation between philosophy and theology: 
toute histoire de la philosophie au moyen äge prýsuppose la d&ision d'abstraire cette philosophie du 
milieu thýologique oü elle a pris naissance, et dont on ne peut la sýparer sans faire violence ä la realite 21 historique. 
Gilson himself was not entirely immune from this tendency. His definition of Christian 
philosophy as 'the use made of philosophical notions by the Christian writers of those 
times' begs the questions of how meaningfully we can in any case speak of purely 
philosophical ideas distinct from their use by theologians in theological contextS. 25 
An approach more consistent with the claims of the sources has recently been 
proposed by John Marenbon. 26 Marenbon points out the artificiality and drawbacks 
inherent in the approach which divorces, for the sake of coherence, the ideas of 
medieval thinkers from the theological context and intention which govern them. 27 
He goes so far as to assert, rightly in my view, 'that revealed religion, so far from 
being an obstacle to philosophical speculation, encouraged some of its most profitable 
22Especially B. Haurýau, De la philosophie midijiale 2 vols. (Paris, 1850), pp. 30-46 identifies the distinctive 
feature of scholastic philosophy as the question of universals. 
2'F. Picavet. Esqu&sed'unehistoiregin6raleetcoinl. 7aridesphilosophesm4ýdijvales (2nd edition-, Paris, 1907), 
p. 179; F. Van Steenberghen, ArLýztotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism (Louvain, 1955), pp. 26-33. 
24La philosophie au moven dge. Des origines patrbaiques d la fin A XIVe siecle (2nd edition; Paris, 1944), 
p. 8. 
2'Foreward to Historv of Chr&tian Philosopkv in the Middle Ages (London, 1955). Similarly, Ae Spirit of 
Mediaeval Philosopkv. (New York, 1936), p. 37. 
"Early Medieval Philosopkv (480-1150). An Introduction (2nd edition; London, 1988); Later Medieval 
Philosophv (1150-1350). An Introduction (London, 1987). 
27 
ý Ibid., pp. 87-9. 
23 
28 developments'. But so convinced are we that medieval thought was shackled by its 
adherence to a system of dogmatic beliefs, that Marenbon's statement seems almost 
reckless. Yet it is actuallv no different in its presuppositions from the sober and 
uncontroversial view that we cannot understand, for example, Marx's theory of 
historical development without reference to his political beliefs; that his political 
beliefs, indeed, inform and expand his understanding of history. 
What seems so different about medieval theology is that it simultaneously 
embraces two concepts which are problematic for twentieth-century rationalism: 
'Middle Ages' and 'theology'. It is very difficult for even the most impartial scholar 
to overcome fully the connotations of sterility and dogmatism which these words 
generally evoke in our culture. One option for historians might be to take the 
contextual approach to its logical conclusion by, at least occasionally, taking medieval 
theology rather than philosophy as the starting point. nere are of course difficulties 
here as well, though they are not the usual ones of having to explain why medieval 
philosophy is not the same as modem philosophy. Instead, we would have to stress 
that theology in the Middle Ages is not synonymous with the bland repetition of 
endless doctrinal formulations, and be extra alert to the temptation to describe 
developments as though they were somehow inevitable. But surely the resulting shift 
in emphasis from philosophy to theology is worth the risk of a certain teleology 
entering into the account. It may seem that what is at issue is no more than a name 
(philosophy or theology) but it is a name which often determines what we expect from 
the sources and from the studies written about them. All labels and expressions are 
limiting in one way or another. 'lliat is why I would suggest that we need a greater 
variety of them if our understanding of the intellectual history of the Middle Ages is 
to be more nuanced. 
'Earlv Medieval Philosopkv, pp. xiii-. xiv. 
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11 OUTLINE OF THE DOCTRINE 
Any consideration of the development of thought on the Trinity from its 
beginnings will necessarily be somewhat schematic given the enon-nity and complexity 
of the subject. Nevertheless, highlighting some of the major themes in the history of 
trinitarian theology will serve as an introduction and point of reference for the more 
detailed discussion that will follow. 
The very notion of development in Christian doctrine is one which is widely 
accepted among scholars today, including theologians. ' The concept of development, 
which goes back to Newman's seminal essay on the subject, is one which embraces 
change as a necessary means of clarifying what the Church believes. 2 But we also 
find the idea among the first Christian theologians, particularly with reference to a 
fully worked out concept of the Trinity, which, although perhaps immanent, is not 
explicit in the Bible. The technical language which eventually came to be so 
indispensable to rational thought on the Trinity is virtually non-existent in the Bible. 
Patristic and medieval theologians who used non-biblical terminology were thus open 
to the charge of innovation incompatible with what the Bible itself permitted. 
At the heart of the Christian confession of faith was the incarnation and 
revelation of the Son of God through the person of Jesus Christ. ' It was precisely the 
question of Christ's status which sustained the brunt of attacks on Christians by other 
groups; a philosophically defensible doctrine was therefore a matter of some urgency. 
During the first four centuries the main issues proved to be: (1) Was the Son of God 
divine in the same way as the Father? (2) If so, how could this be reconciled with the 
'On the question of development in general. see J. Pelikan. Development of Christian Doctrine. Some Historical 
Prolegomena (New Haven-London, 1969): Historical Theology. Continuitv and Change in Christian Doctrine 
(London, 1971); B. Lonergan, 7he Way to Nicea. A Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theologv, trans. from 
the first part of De Deo Trino by C. O'Donovan 0 964: trans. London, 1982). 
20. Chadwick, From Bossuet to Neivman. The Idea Qf Doctrinal Development (Cambridge, 1957); Pelikan, 
Development ql'Christidn Doctrine, pp. 12-24. 
'For references in the New Testament to Jesus as the Son of God, see A. W. Wainwright, The Triniti, in the 
New Testament (London, 1962), pp. 171-95; E. J. Fortmann. The Triune God. A Historical Stuitv of the Doctrine of 
the Trinitv (Grand Rapids, Michegan, 1972), pp. 11,17-18.25-7. On the New Testament witness in general, see 
DTC 15.2,1571-1605; B. de Margerie, La Trinitj chr6tienne dans Phistoire. Th6ologie Historique 31 (Paris, 1973), 
pp. 28-89. 
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monotheism of the Old Testament? 
Scripture was not much help in resolving these questions. The Old Testament 
provided no direct reference to a Son or another beside God. On the contrary, the God 
of the Old Testament was unequivocally a single God: Hear, 0 Israe4 the Lord our 
God is one Lord (Deut 6,4). Cryptic allusions to plurality in God had to be elaborated 
in the light of the New Testament revelation. The most important Old Testament 
passages in early Christian exegesis and in the Middle Ages were Gen 1,26 (Let us 
make man to our image and likeness) ;4 Gen 18 which describes Abraham's encounter 
with three men whom he addresses as one; Is 6,3 Woýy, hoýy, hoýy, the Lord God of 
hosts); and Prov 8,22 (The Lordpossessed mefrom the beginning of his ways, before 
he made anythingfrom the beginning). All of these were taken as oblique references 
5 to plurality in God. 
Even the New Testament yielded little in the way of clarification, since it gave 
no account of Christ s ontological relationship with his Father. It only hinted at some 
possible interpretations, most notably Jn 10,30 Y and the Father are one) and Jn 14, 
28 (the Father is greater than & both of which were exploited by opposing parties 
in later controversies. 6 As for the occurrence of trinitarian formulas, in which Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit are referred to conjointly, these are few and far between. 7 The 
most explicit was the baptismal formula of Mt 28,19 (Going therefore, teach ye all 
the nations: baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Hoýy 
Ghost). On the other hand, although no philosophical definition of the ontological 
relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is provided, there is, depending upon one's 
starting position, scope for a metaphysical interpretation of their salvific mission 
'J. E. Sullivan, ne Image of God. The Doctrine of Saint Augustine and its Influence (Iowa, 1963), pp. 165-95; 
R. Javelet, Image et ressemblance au douddine siecle. De saint Anseline d Alain de Lille 2 vols. (Paris, 1967). 
'DTC 15.2,1547-63; J. Lebreton, Histoire de dogine de la Trinitj des origines au concile de Nick 2 vols. (7th 
edition, Paris, 1927) 1. pp. 552-8; Wainwright, The Trinitv in the Neu, Testament. pp. 23-9; de Margerie. La Trinitj 
chr9tienne, pp. 21-4. 
'R. P. C. Hanson. The Search. for the Chr&tian Doctrine ol'God. The Arian Controver,, zv 318-381 (Edinburgh, 
1988), pp. 835-6. 
7 '141-7. But see Wainwright, The Triniti, in the New Testament. pp. " 
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relative to the world: ' no doctrine, but a problem. ' There is no explicit trinitarian 
formula but an implicit trinitarian 'ground-plan' or 'pattern' from the beginning. 'o 
Early theologians did not attempt to force Scripture to say what it patently does not 
say, that there is one God who is three coequal and consubstantial Persons, that there 
is unity in Trinity, but undertook to evolve a doctrine within a continuing tradition of 
reflection upon Scripture. 
Several important factors stand out in this process of elucidation. An integral 
part of the Cluistian understanding of God from the beginning was the devotional 
practice of baptism. The baptismal fon-nula of Mt 28,19 was adopted as an invocation 
to the Trinity in many early Christian texts. " During the baptismal rite itself the 
trinitarian formula was underlined through the act of triple immersion and an 
interrogation of faith which usually contained a strong trinitarian element. 12 Indeed, 
before the first ecumenical council at Nicea issued the first official statement of 
doctrine on God, this baptismal interrogation, although not a declaratory act, was the 
nearest thing to a Christian profession of faith. " The very word symbolum itself 
originally referred to these triple baptismal interrogations and was thus particularly 
connected with the Trinity. 14 
Scholars also recognise the important interaction of Greek philosophy and 
Christian thought in these centuries. Much debate has focused on whether Christian 
8 The position of I Breck, 'Les formules liturgiques trinitaires dans le Nouveau Testament', in A. M. Triacca 
and A. Pistoia edd., Trinitj et liturgie, Conf&rences Saint-Serge XXXe semaine d'&udes liturgiques, Paris 28 juin- 
ler juillet 1983. Bibliotheca Ephemerides Liturgicae, subsidia 32 (Rome, 1984), 37-50. 
Vainwright, The Trinitv in the New Testament. p. 4. 
'OJ. N. D. Kelly, Eariv Christian Creeds Ord edition-, London, 1972), pp. 22-6. 
" Lebreton, Histoire du dogine de la Trinit6 IL pp. 135-8; J. Dani6lou, Histoire des doctrines chritiennes avant 
Nicge 3 vols. (Paris, 1958-78) 1, pp. 38-40,378; J. Quasten. Patrologv 3 vols. (Utrecht. 1950-60) 1, pp. 23-39; Kelly, 
Ear4v Christian Creeds. pp-368-434; de Margerie, La Trinitj chr9tienne, pp. 91-4. 
12 Lebreton. Histoire A dogine de la Trinite 11, pp-141-60. 
1311)id.. p. 172; Kelly, EarýV Christian Crceds, pp. 30-61. 
"Ibid., p. 58. 
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theology is simply a version of Greek philosophy, a hellenisation of the Bible. 15 Of 
course the picture is not as straightforward as this and several (usually avowedly 
Christian) scholars have vigorously challenged this view of Christianity as passiveh. 
receiving Greek thought without transforming it in the process. 16 
Others emphasise the eclectic nature of Christian sources. 'Mus it is perhaps 
not until the Cappadocian Fathers of the later fourth century that we can truly speak 
of Christian Platonism. 17 Nevertheless, Christians could be justified in borrowing the 
insights of pagan philosophy given that they were only mediated by the Greeks, not 
actually conceived by them. 18 Many, they argued, had in any case been derived 
directly from Moses and the Old Testament. '9 Greek philosophy was merely a 
method and tool exploited by Christians for their own objectives; it did not have the 
final word on the Christian understanding of God . 
20 rnie parallel with the later period 
is clear, though it should not be pushed too far: in every period the cross-fertilisation 
between Christian doctrine and the 'secular' disciplines is not only unavoidable but 
absolutely necessary if new questions and answers are to be fon-nulated in a way 
which is meaningful to contemporaries. 
The influence of Platonic philosophy can already be discerned in the work of 
"Tbe views of H. A. Wolfson, The Philosopky of the Church Fathers Ord edition; Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 
p. vi and A. von Harnack, Outlines qf the Historv of Dogyna (London, 1957). Also strong on the Greek-Christian 
synthesis, H. Chadwick, Earty Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition. Studies in Justin, Clement and 
Origen (Oxford, 1966) and the various essays in A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge Historv of Later Greek and Earty 
Medieval Philosoj. 74v (Cambridge, 1967). 
ýor 
a more nuanced view of the issue of hellenisation, see I Pelikan, 
The Christian Tradition. A H&tory of the Development of Doctrine. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition 
(100-600) (Chicago, 1971), pp. 45-55. 
16 Dani6lou, Histoire des doctrines chritiennes Il. p. 279; G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (2nd edition; 
London, 1952). pp. xiii-xv. 
17 A. H. Armstrong, 'The Self-Definition of Christianity in Relation to Later Platonism'. in Hellenic and 
Christian Studies (London, 1990), pp. 81-2; Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, p. 862 and 'The 
Achievement of Orthodoxy in the Fourth Century A. D. % in R. Williams ed., The Making of Orthodoxiý Essavs in 
Honour of Henrv Chadwick (Cambridge, 1989). pp. 147-50. On the other hand, J. M. Rist. 'Basil's "Neoplatonism": 
Its Background and Nature', in P. J. Fedwick ed., Basil Qf Caesaria: Christian, Huinanka, Ascetic (Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1981), 137-220 questions the traditional view of Basil as a Christian 
Platonist. 
"On the various reasons justifying the use of Greek philosophy adopted by Justin and Clement of Alexandria, 
see Dani6lou. Histoire des doctrines cWtiennes 11, pp-42-72. 
'9Chadwick, Eariv Christian Thought, pp. 13-15. 
'ODaniýlou. Histoire des doctrines chritiennes 11, pp. 279-96 on Clement. 
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Philo of Alexandria (25 BC-50 AD) whose 'remarkable synthesis' was the first 
attempt to bring the precision and clarity of Greek thought to bear on the Bible . 
2' His 
concept of the Logos as an emanation of divine reality issuing from God and thus in 
some sense distinct from him allowed for the possibility of a mediation between God 
and his creation which did not compromise divine transcendance . 
22 The crucial role 
attributed to the Word-Logos in the Gospel of Saint John may be of Philonic 
origin . 
21 This concept, chanelled through Philo and the Middle Platonists, was 
24 adopted and elaborated upon by early Christian writers. It is central to the theology 
of Justin Martyr (d. 163/7), as well as Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) and his 
pupil Origen (c. 185-254). 25 
But in the Platonic scheme of thought where the supreme being is utterly 
transcendant the role of the Logos as the mediator between God and creation almost 
inevitably entails a hierarchical scale of being, particularly when the Logos exists 
primarily for the sake of creation rather than as an integral part of the divine life. 26 
There is a similar tendency towards subordination in Christian thought of the 
second and third centuries which was further compounded by the trend in exegesis to 
"J. Dani6lou, Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1958), p. 143. The literature on Philo is vast, especially the 
mammouth study by H. A. Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosopkv in Judaism, Christianitv and Islam 
2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1941). 
22 Dani6lou. Philon, pp. 156-7-, A. H. An-nstrong and R. A. Markus, Chrbaian Faith and Greek Philosopkv 
(London, 1960), pp. 17-18, H. Chadwick, Thilo and the Beginnings of Christian Tbought', in Armstrong ed., 
Cambridge Historv of Later Greek, pp. 143-4. 
"A. Loissy, Le quatrieme 6vangile (Paris, 1903), pp. 120-2 and Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinitj I, 
pp. 496-7,636-44 argue that the meaning of the term is nevertheless transformed; R. Bultmann, The Gospel ofJohn: 
A Commentarv (1964; trans. Oxford, 1971), pp. 19-36 proposes a Gnostic origin. 
'Wolfson, Philosqpýv of the Church Fathers, pp. 177-286 stresses the Philonic origin of the concept. Pelikan, 
Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp. 186-9 sees little resemblance between Philo and Christian thinkers. L. W. 
Barnard, Justin Martvr. MY Life and Thought (Cambridge. 1967), pp. 85-110 is inclined to minimise if not reject 
Philo's direct influence. 
25 Chadwick, 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought', pp. 168-92; Lebreton, Histoire A dogme de la 
Trinitj 11, pp. 430-2, E. F. Osborn, Justin Maqvr, Betrýge zur historischen Theologie 47 Mibingen, 1973), pp. 28-32; 
J. Lebreton, 'La th6ologie de la Trinit6 chez C16ment d'Alexandre', Recherches de Science Religieuse 34 (1947), 
55-76,142-79; S. R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria. A Studi, in Christian Platonbun and Gnosticbun (Oxford, 1971), 
pp. 199-212. 
26 -ns ed., ibg rv of For example, Plotinus (205-70). See A. H. Armstrong, 'Plotinus', in An trong Ca n rid_ e Histo - Later Greek, pp. 236-41 and The Real Meaning of Plotinus *S Intellfigible World (OxforcL 1949). 
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assimilate the Logos and the Spirit to angel S. 27 This hierarchy is further accentuated 
by the distinction between the immanent and the expressed Logos, the one referring 
to the eternal Logos and the other to the Logos brought forth for the purpose of 
creation. 28 It is not clear, however, how far pagan philosophy was responsible for this 
subordinationist solution in Christian thought on God. 29 Ilie subordination of the Son 
to the Father is associated in particular with Origen but it would be truer to say that 
Origen actually goes further than his predecessors in establishing the Son's claim to 
divinity through his eternal generation from the Father. 30 Indeed subordination only 
becomes a heterodoxy in view of subsequent developments; before the Council of 
Nicea in 325 it was a feature of all theology. 31 
The course adopted by Arius (d. 336) was one attempt among several to 
circumvent the threat posed to divine unity and transcendance by the Son's divinity 
and, as recent studies have emphasised, was part of a more general process of working 
out a viable and satisfactory doctrine of God. 32 Nicea was, after all, 'an awkward 
reminder of the extent to which the Church had not fully decided what it was 
saying'. 33 
Arius contended that the Son could not possibly be coeternal with the Father 
or begotten from his substance since this would mean that God himself had suffered 
through the Incarnation. It followed from this that the Father was superior to the Son 
27 Dani6lou, Hbaoire des doctrines chritiennes I, pp. 167-98. 
28Prestige, God in Pattj-ýztjc Thought, pp. 123-4 but argues for a Stoic origin of Christian usage. 
29 Markus and Armstrong, Christian Faith, pp. 20-2 discern evidence for a correspondence between Christian 
and Platonic subordination. But in the 'The Self-Definition of Christianity', pp. 94-6 Armstrong modifies his 
previous position with the proviso that any subordinationist tendency is just as strongly anticipated in the New 
Testament. 
'ODani0ou, HLaoire des doctrines chritiennes 11, pp. 344-53; R. Williams, Arius. Heresv and Tradition (London, 
1987), pp. 137-40. 
3'De Margerie. La Trinitj chritienne, p. 114; Hanson. 'T'he Achievement of 011hodoxy', p. 153. 
32Will iams. Arius and especially Hanson, Searchfior the Chr&tian Doctrine of God. 
33Williams. Arius, p. 236. 
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and had produced him through an act of will, not from his nature. 14 He objected most 
acutely to the implication of a material, physical process which he regarded as an 
unavoidable consequence of his opponents' insistance on the Son's generation from 
the Father's substance. '5 It is interesting that many of the controversies of twelfth- 
century debates should also revolve around this same question of the Father's 
generation of the Son. 
But for various reasons, political as well as doctrinal, the Arian solution was 
repellant to many strands of opinion within the Church. In this respect, Nicea's 
authorisation of the term homoousios (the same in substance; made of the same kind 
of stuff) to describe the Son's relationship to the Father was recommended by its very 
ambiguity which allowed it to be used against Arius without dividing his opponents 
16 in the process. Recent attempts to pin down the meaning of the term as used at 
Nicea suggest that it was much looser than the numerical identity of Father and Son 
which characterised its later usage. '7 The Council's declaration that the Son was born 
from the Father's substance and was homoousios (consubstantial) with him actually 
raised more questions than it solved. 38 
Although for subsequent generations the Nicene faith came to represent the 
formal endorsement of the doctrine of consubstantiality of Father and Son, in the sense 
of the numerical identity of one substance, it is probably true to say that it was less 
concerned with the question of divine unity than with simply proclaiming that the 
Father and the Son were God in the same sense of God, that they were equal . 
39 It is 
no surprise, therefore, that the Nicene Creed did not settle the controversy over 
340n Arius' teachings as distinct from 'Arianism', see C. Stead, 'The Platonism of Arius', Journal of 
Theological Studies 15 (1964), 16-31; Williams, Arius. 29-32; Hanson, Searchfior the Christian Doctrine of God, 
pp. 3-18. In general, Pelik-an, Einergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp. 191-200; W. G. Rusch. The Trinitarian 
ControversV (Philadelphia, 1980). 
35Williams, Arius, pp. 98,143. 
36C. Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford. 1977), pp. 242-66. 
'7Ibid: Hanson, Search for Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 190-202. 
"Concilioruin, p. 5: lesum Christum filitirn dei, nattim de patre, hoc est de substantia patris. deum de deo. 
lumen de lumine, detim vertim de deo vero, natum non facttun, unitis substantiae cum patre, quod. Graeci dictint 
homousion'. 
" 13. '9Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.. 
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Christ's divinity and had hardly even begun to deal with the Holy Spirit. T'he central 
figure in the post-Nicene phase of doctrinal development was Athanasius of 
Alexandria (295-373) who campaigned throughout his career for the establishment of 
a Nicene orthodoxy as he understood it. 
The precise meaning of homoousios also looms large in the work of the three 
Cappadocian theologians, Basil of Caesaria (330-379), his younger brother Gregory 
of Nyssa (d. 394) and their friend Gregory of Nazianzus (329-90). 40 Through their 
clarification of the meaning of the terms homoousios, ousia and hypostasis, the 
Cappadocian theologians 'were together decisively influential in bringing about the 
final form of the doctrine of the Trinity'. 4' They stated that there is one ousia and 
three hypostases, thus distinguishing clearly for the first time what was proper to unity 
and what to trinity by breaking with the tendency of their predecessors to use these 
42 two terms as synonyms. Basil defined the ousia as that which is common to the 
three h ostases (individually subsistent things) but which does not exist apart from ýYp 
them. He thus veered towards a generic understanding of the Trinity, which placed the 
ousia as the general and the hypostasis as the particular. 43 This is not, however, to 
be confused with the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary 
substance, between the individual and the universal as two types of substance, since 
there is little evidence of knowledge of this distinction among Christian writers before 
the end of the fourth century. 44 
The Cappadocian solution to divine simplicity was a viable alternative to 
Neoplatonic subordinationism. Instead of distinguishing between an absolute and a 
lower unity which earlier theologians had identified with God and the Logos, they 
emphasised the coequality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the pure being of the 
'01. P. Sheldon -Will iams, 'The Greek Christian and Platonist Tradition 
from the Cappadocians to Maximus and 
Eriugena', in Armstrong ed., Cainbridge H&torv of Later Greek, pp. 425-56, - Hanson, Searchfior the Christian 
Doctrine of God, pp. 676-737. 
"Ibid.. p. 676. 
"Wolfson. Philosol, 74v of the Church Fathers, p. 318-22, Pelik-an, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp. 219- 
25, Hanson, Search fior the Chr&tian Doctrine of God. pp. 181-90. 
43 DTC 15.2.1671-8; Hanson, Search. for the Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 734-7. 
'Stead, Divine Substance, p. 114. 
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divine ousia. 'ý The solution arrived at during the emergence of a consensus in the 
fourth century was the introduction of a radical opposition not between Father and 
46 Son, but between God and creation . This had the advantage of preserving divine 
transcendance and the doctrine of consubstantiality. 
The Cappadocian contribution was also crucial in clarifying the neglected 
47 
problem of the Holy Spirit's relationship to God. There was nothing inevitable 
about this except that the Holy Spirit's inclusion in the baptismal fon-nula served as 
a constant reminder of its special status. 48 Only Gregory of Nazianzus was prepared 
to state categorically that the Holy Spirit was God, rather than merely of equal honour 
with Father and Son. 49 When the Council of Constantinople issued its creed in 381 
it reflected these developments by proclaiming the Spirit's procession from the 
Father-, 
- 
50 
Although this thesis is concerned purely with the Latin doctrine of the Trinity, 
it is necessary to trace its elaboration and definition by Greek theologians since this 
is indispensable to the development of the doctrine in the West. At this stage indeed 
it is well to remember that the Latin tradition is part of the Greek, and even with 
Augustine there is no definite break. In my discussion of Latin trinitarian theology, 
therefore, I shall be taking it for granted that the Latin theologians whom I shall be 
discussing share many things in common with their Greek predecessors and 
counterparts. What I shall primarily be concerned with, however, is the emergence of 
a tradition of Latin trinitarian theology, both as it differs and depends on the Greek, 
since it is this that will be the basis of medieval discussions. 
Before considering the subject in any detail this would seem to be a good place 
to broach the question of the relationship between Greek and Latin theology. This 
45jbid., pp. 163-4,186-9. 
46Williams, Arius, p. 242. 
47 Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition. pp. 211-18, Hanson, Search, for the Chrbaian Doctrine of God, 
pp. 772-90. 
'8Ibid., p. 739. 
49jbid., pp. 780-1. 
50 Conciliorum. p. 2)4: 'et in spiriturn sanctum, dominum et vivificatorem. ex patre procedentern, cum patre et 
filio coadorandurn et conglorificandurn'. 
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issue is not only pertinent to the present discussion but often accounts for the 
assessment of modem scholars in classifying 'heretical' N-lews on the Trinity in the 
twelfth century as Greek rather than Latin in orientation. In many cases they are 
drawing on, explicitly or not, de Rýgnon's ambitious schematisation of Greek and 
scholastic (Latin) approaches to the Trinity. 5' According to de Rýgnon, in scholastic 
thought, the fundamental matter is the common nature upon which individuality is, as 
it were, superimposed; in the Greek scheme, conversely, the common nature cannot 
be conceived apart from its inherence in each individually subsistant Person. " The 
circurnincession or mutual immanence and penetration of the Persons is here the 
principle establishing their unity. 5' 
De R6gnon's purpose was not to downgrade one approach in favour of another, 
but to show that each has its advantages and disadvantages. The Latins are in danger 
of collapsing the Persons into the nature (Sabellianism) and the Greeks of destroying 
54 divine unity by creating three separate individuals (tritheism). It is this assessment 
of a Greek tendency towards tritheism which has clouded subsequent studies. Little 
allowance has been made for the fact that each tradition contained a number of 
approaches or that any tendency among Latin theologians to play down divine unity 
was not necessarily due to Greek influence. The simplistic application of the 
Greek/Latin dichotomy has been particularly lamentable for our understanding of 
twelfth-century theology. Alleged tritheists such as Gilbert of Poitiers and Joachim of 
Fiore are placed in the Greek tradition whilst 'orthodox' theologians such as Peter 
Lombard remain faithful to their Augustinian ii-d-ieritance. Indeed the great weakness 
of de R6gnon's thesis is that his assessment of the Latin tradition is based almost 
exclusively on later scholasticism, particularly Thomas Aquinas, even though, as Karl 
Rahner remarks, it was not until the time of Aquinas that the so-called Latin 
"T. de Rýgnon, Etudes de thjologie positive sur la Sainte Triniti 4 vols. (Paris, 1892-8). 
5'Ibid. 1, p. 285. See the New Catholic Encvc1opedia (Catholic Univ. of Arnercia, Washington, 1967) 3, p. 880 
for virtually the same classification. 
`De Rýgnon. Etudes de thjologie positive I, pp. 335-435. 
"Ibid., p. 366. 
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-15 conception had an exclusive monopoly. No one is denying that there are different 
emphases within the Greek and Latin traditions, just the existence of only one Latin 
approach which ran uninterruptedly from Augustine to Aquinas and that any 
divergence from this dominant strand can be accounted for with reference to Greek 
theology. 56 
Let me now turn to the emergence of a Latin trinitarian theology. The starting 
point must be the output of the North African theologian Tertullian (d. after 220), 
generally recognised as the founder of Latin thought on the Trinity. 57 Tertullian's 
principal achievement in the area of theological language has been defined as 'un 
effort de fixation et d'adjustement bien plut6t que de n6ologie'. 58 Unmistakably his 
most important work in this respect was his Adversus Praxean written against the so- 
called Monarchianist view of God which denied any real distinction between Father, 
59 Son and Holy Spirit. 
Perhaps Tertullian's most widely acknowledged contribution to trinitarian 
language was his use of the term trinitas, thought to be the first of its kind, to signify 
not just three but the collection of three in some kind of unity. 60 On the one hand, 
Tertullian avoided as far as possible any suggestion of division by frequently 
associating trinitas with unitas ; 61 on the other, he made trinitas the term for 
15 K. Rahner, The Trinitv (1967; trans. London, 1970), p. 17- 
56 Augustine himself was heavily indebted to Greek theology. See, for example, A. H. Armstrong, 'St. Augustine 
and the Eastern Tradition', Eastern Churches Quateril, 5 (1943), 157-67. On Augustine's use of the Greek Fathers 
in original and translation, see B. Altaner, Kleine patrist&che Schrýften (Berlin, 1967). 
"Tertullian's language has been the subject of mammouth studies by R. Braun, Deus Chrigtianorum. 
Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien (2nd edition; Paris, 1977), J. Moignt, TWologie trinitaire 
de Tertullien 4 vols. (Paris, 1966-9). In general, T. D. Barnes, Tertullian. A Historical and Literarv Studv (Oxford, 
1971). 
58Braun, Deus Christianorum, p. 550. 
59For text and trans., E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas (London, 1948). On Monarchianism and 
later Sabellianism. see Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp. 176-82. 
6OBraun. Deus Christianoruin, pp. 151-7; Moignt, Thiologie trinitaire IV, p. 243. 
6'Bratin, Dcus Christianorum. pp. 156-7; Adv. Prax. 1.1. p. 91: 'unitatern in trinitatern disponit'. ibid. 12, p. 101: 
'Si te adhuc numents scandalizat trinitatis quasi non connexae in unitate sirnplici'; ibid: 'pluraliter pronuntiavit 
Faciamus et Nostrain [... I ex unitate trinitatis, loquebatur'. 
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12 designating dkýtinctio in God. 
More difficult to pin down is Tertullian's understanding of substantia and 
unitas substantiae. He seems to follow contemporary philosophical usage by 
assimilating substantia to its Greek equivalent ousia . 
6' The meaning of unitas 
substantiae is more elusive; it is not possible to say whether this expression designates 
a numerical or a generic unity. 64The important point is that Tertullian consistently 
65 
opposes substantia to another term critical for Latin theology, persona. Persona 
refers to what is proper and distinct in God and as such has a natural affinity with 
66 
proprietas and distinctio. Tertullian says that the substance which became the Word 
is the persona of the Son and, commenting on Gen 1,26, that 'Scripture distinguishes 
, 67 among the Persons . But, argues Moignt, lie falls short of inaugurating persona as 
a truly theological concept because he ornits a definition of its ontological status. 68 
On the question of the Father's generation of the Son, Tertullian states clearly 
that the Son (and Holy Spirit) proceed from the Father's substance, a position which 
is important for his concept of unitas substantiae . 
69 Tertullian was innovatory, 
moreover, in his use of material analogies to convey the possibility of a process of 
generation which did not destrey unity -a shoot proceeding from the root of a tree, 
a spring from its source, a ray of light from the sun: 
Everything that proceeds from something must of necessity be another beside that from which it 
proceeds, but it is not for that reason separated [ ... 
I In this way the Trinity, proceeding by intermingled 
"2Adv. Prax. 11. p. 100: 'scriptitrae omnes et demonstrationem et distinctionem trinitatis ostendant'. On 
trinitarian uses of distinctio, see Moignt, lVologie trinitaire IV, p. 76. 
63 Braun, Deu-v Christianorum. pp. 176-83. 
64Moignt, Ajologie trinitaire II, p. 380,95; W, p-234- 
65Ibid. 11, p. 636. 
'Braun, Deus Christianorum, pp. 237-9. 
67Adv. Prax. 7. p. 96: 'quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico personarn et illi nomen filii vindico'; 
ibid. 12, p. 101: 'denique sequens scriptura distinguit inter personas'. 
68 Wologie trinitaire IL p. 644. 
69jbid.. p. 380, III, p. 1055; Adi% Pray. 4, p. 92: 'Ceterum qui filium non aliunde deduco, sed de substantia patris, 
nihil facientern sine patris voluntate, omnem a patre consecuturn potestatem. quomodo possum de fide destruere 
monarchiam quarn a patre filio traditam in filio servo? hoc mihi et in terlium gradum dictum sit. quia spinturn non 
aliunde puto quarn a patre per filium. 
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and connected degrees from the Father, in no respect challenges the monarchy. 70 
Tertullian's sources were both Greek and Latin but it is in his work as an innovator 
rather than as a translator that his importance lies. 'Me most important works in 
transmitting the Nicene orthodoxy to Latin Cluistendom were Hilary of Poitiers' De 
trinitate 7' and the De s nodis, both completed before his return to Poitiers from , ýY 
Phrygia. 72 Hilary was an ardent defender of the Athanasian line on the eternal 
generation of the Son. 73 In the De trinitate, his preferred term for what is one in God 
is natura; he rarely uses essentia except in translation of the Greek ousia. 74 In the 
De synodis, Hilary states that Nicea in no way introduced any diversity of essentia or 
natura between Father and Son . 
7' He opposes homooeusios (similis essentiae) to 
76 homoousios (unius essentiae) . He almost never uses persona. The absence of a 
consistent ten-n for designating what is three results in a conceptual confusion which 
is compounded by his use of substantia to designate both oneness and threeness. This 
problem was addressed by subsequent writers, most notably Augustine. 
Hilary's defense of the Nicene faith was taken up Ambrose (d. 397), Bishop 
of Milan and Jerome (d. 419/20), translator of the Hebrew Old Testament and the 
Greek New Testament. Neither were original in their thought on the Trinity but were 
nevertheless crucial in consolidating the acceptance of the Nicene-Athanasian position 
in the West. In his De fide ad Gratianum, Ambrose followed Hilary in rarely using 
persona though he does adopt it in a crucial statement at the beginning of the work 
where he says that 'Father and Son are one (unum), not by confusing the Persons, but 
"Adv. Prax. 8, p. 97, trans. pp. 139-40: 'omne quod prodit ex aliquo secundurn sit eius necesse est de quo prodit. 
nec ideo tamen est separaturn [... ] ita trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a patre decurrens et monarchiae nihil 
obstrepit'. 
7'Not the original title. See De trinitate 2 vols., ed. P. Smulders, CCSL 62-62A (Tumholt, 1979-80) 62, pp. 6-8. 
"Hanson. Searchfor the Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 463-5. 
731bid., p. 473. 
,4p. Smulders, La doctrine trinitaire de S. Hilaire dc Poitiers. Analecta Gregoriana 32 (Rome. 1944), pp. 282-5. 
7'PL 10.505A: 'Caeterwn omnis superior sermo in nullo Patrem et Filium essentiae ac naturae diversitate 
discrevit'. 
76PL 10.534A. 
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by unity of n ature,. 77 He also remarks that between Father and Son there is 'an 
expressed distinction of generation'. 78 
Before Augustine, Jerome probably did more than anyone else to secure the 
acceptance of the term persona. In the years leading up to the second ecumenical 
council at Constantinople in 381, there took place a series of heated exchanges 
concerning the relative merits of the expressions tres personae and tres hypostases and 
which centered on the schism in the church at Antioch between Bishop Paulinus who 
favoured the former and the exiled Bishop Meletius who insisted upon the latter. 79 
Jerome was to play a decisive role in the dispute since he happened to be in Antioch 
at the time. 'O In 376 Jerome wrote to Pope Damasus (366-384), who had himself 
used the expression in 374,8' arguing strongly for the tres personae formula. 82 He 
argued that the tres hypostases formula was dangerous and misleading since everyone 
understands hypostasis as a synonym for ousia. 'It should be sufficient for us to say 
one substance and three subsisting, perfect, equal and coetemal Persons 9.83 
The most important and enduring contribution to the development of Latin 
trinitarian theology in the Middle Ages is undoubtedly Augustine's De trinitate, 
written during the first quarter of the fifth century. "Although the terms had been 
used before, it was his exposition of the essentia -persona distinction which came to 
be adopted by subsequent writers and which was particularly important in the twelfth 
century. Moreover, it was Augustine's use of the Aristotelian categories of substance 
'1.9, PL 16.531A. 
7'Defide ad Gratianum 1.16, PL 16.532C. 
79A. de Halleux, "'Hypostase" et "personne" dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca 375-381)', Revue 
d'histoire ecclisiastique 79 (1984), 313-69,625-70. Less detailed but very clear is de R6gnon, Etudes de thdologie 
positive 1, pp. 195-215. 
80J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome. His Life, Writings, and Controversies (London, 1975), pp. 38,52-8. 
81DZ n. 144, p. 63 in a letter to eastern bishops: 'omnes uno ore unius virtutis. unius maiestatis, unius divinitatis, 
unius usiae dicimus Trinitatem, ita ut inseparabilem potestatem. tres tamen adseramus personas'. 
'2PL 22.355-8. 
"PL 22.357: Sufficiat nobis dicere unarn substantiam. tres; personas stibsistentes perfectas, aequales. 
coaetemas'. 
84Ed. W. J. Mountain, 2 vols., CCSL 50-50A (Turnholt. 1968). 
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and relation which proved so effective in explaining in what sense Father and Son 
were distinct if not according to substance. 
The work divides into three pails along lines that were to prove significant for 
the Middle Ages. The first section (Books I-IV) considers scriptural proofs, both Old 
and New Testament, for the Trinity; the second establishes the doctrine on purely 
rational grounds (Books V-VH); and the third constitutes a lengthy and complex 
exposition on the various images and vestiges of the Trinity in man. 85 The second 
section is by far Augustine's most significant methodological contribution to Latin 
trinitarian theology. In addition, his distinction between scriptural and rational proofs 
came to be used as a convention for justifying the very act of writing about the Trinity 
at all. For although Scripture provides the basis for sound, orthodox doctrine, rational 
argument is also needed to defeat the logical objections of heretics, such as those of 
the Arians with which Augustine deals. '6 This principle was provided with its 
exemplary treatment in the twelfth century by Abelard who undertook to disprove the 
facetious objections not of heretics, but of pseudo-dialecticians; but it is also used in 
a justificatory as well as structural sense by Peter Lombard in his Sentences. Indeed, 
it becomes the rationale for theology itself. 
Augustine's entire conception of the Trinity, in particular his understanding of 
divine unity and simplicity, was profoundly influenced by his previous association 
with Manichean religion. He finally rejected the Manichean view of God as a material 
87 being in f avour of the Neoplatonic concept of a non-composite divine being. He 
thus set up a radical opposition not only between God and creation but additionally 
between divine simplicity and immutability on the one hand, and compositeness and 
85 E. Hill, 'St Augustine's De Trinitate. The Doctrinal Significance of its Structure', Revue des itudes 
augustiniennes 19 (1973), 277-86.1 shall not be discussing Augustine's so-called 'psychological' doctrine of the 
Trinity. On this, Sullivan, 7he Image of God. 
'6De trin. 1.4, CCSL 50, p. 31.11-14, PL 42.822: 'Sed primurn secundum auctoritatem scripturarum sanctarum 
utrum ita se fides habeat demonstrandum est. Deinde si voluerit et adivuerit deus, istis garrulis ratiocinatoribus'. 
87 Confessions VII. 20 (London, 1961), p. 154. On Augustine's Neoplatonism, see P. Henry, Plotin et Voccident, 
SSL 15 (Louvain, 1934), pp. 63-145, P. Henry, 'Augustine and Plotinus', Journal qf Theological Studies 38 (1937), 
1-23; JJ. O'Meara, The Young Augustine (London. 1954). pp. 131-42; R. Jolivet, Saint Augustine et le njo- 
platonisin chr6tien (Paris, 1932); L. Grandgeorge, Saint Augustin et le n&-platonism, Biblioth&que de I'Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes. Sciences religieuses 8 (Paris, 1896), T. A. Wassmer. 'The Trinitarian Theology of Augustine and 
his Debt to Plotinus', Harvard Theological Review 53 (1960), 261-8, M. F. Sciacca, Saint Augustin et le 
niplatonisine (Louvain, 1956). 
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88 mutability on the other. Moreover, because God does not change there can be no 
accidents in him. 89 The concepts of immutability and mutability come to designate 
two polarities of existence between which there is no true communication or likeness. 
But it is Augustine's distinction between essence and Person, substance and 
relation, as categories of analysis which constitutes his greatest achievement. Unity of 
essence was to be judged according to substance and trinity of Persons according to 
relation. This means that with respect to himself each Person is spoken of according 
to substance, but with respect to one another they are spoken of according to relation, 
thus avoiding introducing a distinction of substance among the Persons. 90 And 
because these relations are eternal, they are not accidents. 9' This settles the further 
problem of why we can say 'the Father is God', 'the Son is God', 'the Holy Spirit is 
God 9, but not 'three gods', since whatever is stated with reference to substance is 
always stated in the singular. 92 
Augustine elaborates this distinction during the important middle section in 
which he refutes the Arian argument that 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' must refer to 
substance since there are no accidents in God. 9' From this it follows that there are 
two substances in God since 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' are opposite. Augustine's 
response is to formulate a theory of relation which succeeds in avoiding any positing 
of accidents in God which would be incompatable with his simplicity. 94 The concept 
of relation was not a current one in Latin theology, though it had been anticipated by 
88A. Trap, &, La no. -ione del inutabile e dell'immutabile secondo SantAgostino (Tolentino, 1959). 
89De trin. V. 5. CCSL 50, p. 209.16, PL 42.913: 'Nihil itaque accidens in deo quia nihil mutabile aut arnissabile'. 
9ODe trin. V. 7. CCSL 50, p. 212.41-9, PL 42.915. 
9'De trin. V. 6, CCSL 50, p. 211.19-22. PL 42.914. 
92De trin. V. 9, CCSL 50, p. 216.35-7, PL 42.917: 'Quidquid ergo ad se ipsurn dicitur deus et de singulis personis 
ter dicitur patre et filio et spiritu sancto, et simul de ipsa trinitate non pluraliter sed singulariter dicitur'. 
9'De trin. V. 7. CCSL 50. p. 211.1-12. PL 42.914. 
"Esp. De trin. V. 8, CCSL 50, pp. 214-15, PL 42.916. See I. Chevalier, S. Augustin et la pens& grecque. Les 
relations trinitaires, Collectanea friburgensia 24 (Fribourg en Suisse. 1940); idem, 'La thýorie augustinienne des 
relations trinitaires'. Dims Thomas 18 (1940), 317-84. 
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some of the Cappadocian theologians whom Augustine had probably read. '5 But if 
the identity of essence is to be spoken of according to substance and the distinction 
of Persons according to relation, what of the Persons themselves? Augustine explains 
the use of the term as a pure linguistic necessity. In disputes with heretics it was 
9 96 essential to have a term which answered the question 'three what? . We can say 
'three Persons' but not 'three gods' because whilst Scripture forbids the latter., it does 
not prohibit the fon-ner. 97 But in that case why is it not perTnissable to say 'three 
essences which is also not forbidden in Scripture. 98 At this point Augustine is forced 
to fall back on the excuse that pure necessity requires that we say something. 99 
Augustine simultaneously denies that persona is a relative term and yet this is 
precisely how he uses it. '00 Whilst there may still be some confusion as to the 
ontological status of persona, Augustine has nevertheless gone a long way to solving 
the difficulty by distinguishing between absolute and relative names. 
More than any other author, Augustine also provides a wealth of material for 
later discussions on the Father's generation of the Son. His maxim that no thing begets 
itself was one of the fundamental principles in trinitarian theology from Roscelin 
onwards. 'O' He also discussed at considerable length one of the cornerstones of the 
doctrine, the phrase from the Nicene Creed, 'God from God', which was itself the 
source of later discussions about the orthodoxy of 'God begot God" but not 'essence 
begot essence'. Related to this was the problem posed by the special attribution of 
9'Chevalier. S. Augustin etlapensiegrecque, pp. 127-63. Altaner, Kleine patrbaischeSchriften, pp. 269-85,319- 
20,325-6 disputes Chevalier's thesis. On the Cappadocian use of the concept of relation as the distinguishing 
property of the three kypostases, see Wolfson, Philosol-7ki, of the Church Fathers, pp. 338-42, de Margerie, La 
Trinitj chr6tienne. pp. 186-91. 
96 De trin. V. 10. CCSL 50, p. 217.8-11, PL 42.918: 'Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia 
humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur'. Also De 
trin. VII. 7, CCSL 50, p. 255, PL 42.939. 
97 De trin. VII. 8. CCSL 50, p. 258.94-7, PL 42.941. 
98De trin. VII. 8. CCSL 50, p. 258.97-9, PL 42.941. 
99De trin. VII. 9. CCSL 50, p. 259, PL 42.941-2; De trin. VII. 11, CCSL 50. p. 262.28-33, PL 42.943. 
'ooChevalier. S. Aiqustin et la pensie grecque. pp. 61-5. 
20: 'Qui autem putant eitis esse potentiae deum ut seipsum ipse 'OlDc trin. 1-1, CCSL 50, p. 28.32-6, PL 42. K 
genuerit, eo plus errant quod non solum deus ita non est sed nec spiritalis, nec corporalis creatura. Nulla enim 
omnino res est quae se ipsum gignat ut sit'. 
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wisdom to the Son Q Cor 1,24) which could be taken to mean that the Father was 
not wisdom in his own right but only by virtue of the Son. This would in turn lead 
to the utterly absurd conclusion that, since there is no distinction in God between 
being and being wise, the Father exists only by virtue of the Son whom he begot. 102 
The sixth century brought further consolidation and development. In the De 
fide ad Petrum of Fulgentius of Ruspe (467-533), attributed to Augustine throughout 
the Middle Ages, the distinction between persona and substantia or essentia is 
commonplace: 'And so Trinity refers to the Persons of the Father and of the Son and 
of the Holy Spirit, unity to the nature 9.103 
This period also witnesses the composition, probably in Spain, of the so-called 
Athanasian Creed or Quicumque as it is known from its opening words. '04 This text 
enjoyed a particularly extensive influence throughout the Middle Ages as it was used 
to instruct the clergy and found its way into the liturgy. 105 Further evidence of the 
development of a Western trinitarian theology also comes from Spain in the form of 
the creeds of the various councils of Toledo held from the fifth to the seventh 
centuries. The Toledan creeds are notable for their extremely well-balanced and 
succinct formulations of unity and trinity in God. 106 Perhaps the most important of 
these is the eleventh Council of Toledo (675) which was widely disseminated 
throughout the Middle Ages and which may have served as a model for the decree on 
the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council. 107 The creed of this council draws 
upon a considerable range of authors, including Isidore of Seville (d. 636), Fulgentius 
of Ruspe, the sixth Council of Toledo and, above all., Augustine. Most importantly it 
102 De trinNII. I. CCSL 50, p. 245, PL 42.933; De trin. VII. 2, CCSL 50, p. 249, PL 42.936. 
'03PL 65.675B. 
'04J. N. D. Kelly. The Athanasian Creed (London, 1964), pp. 17-20 for the text. 
'05Ibid., p. 42. 
106v 
, or example, Toledo 4 held in 633, DZ n. 485, p. 165: 'Secundum divinas Scripturas et doctrinam, quam a 
sanctis Patribus accepimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unius deitatis atque substantiae confitemur; in 
personarum diversitate trinitatem credentes, in divinitate unitatem praedicantes. nec personas confundimus nec 
substantiam separamus'. 
107Dz -8. J. Madoz, Le swnbole du Xle concile de n. 515-32, pp. 175 ToIdde. Scs sources, sa date, sa iwleur, SSL 
19 (Louvain, 1938). pp. 144-56 for examples of its use in the Middle Ages. 
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affirms Augustine's doctrine of relation among the Persons. 'O' The semantic 
distinction between essence and Person is also firmly in place: 
For when we say that the Father himself is not he who (quenz). is the Son, reference is made to the 
distinction of Persons. But when we say that the Father himself is u is the Son, the Son 
himself that which (quod) is the Father, the Holy Spirit that whic (quod) is Father and Son, reference 
is made to the nature by which God is, or is shown to pertain to substance, because they are one in 
substance. For we distinguish the Persons but do not separate the deity. Therefore we acknowledge the 
Trinity in the distinction of Persons, and confess unity on account of the nature or substance. '09 
All of these conciliar proclamations are essentially Augustinian in orientation, as is, 
not surprisingly, the section on the Trinity in Isidore of Seville's Eymologide, which 
stands very much within Toledan tradition. "O The most original and influential 
thinker on the Trinity after Augustine was, however, Boethius (d. 524), also the 
translator of Aristotle's logical works. Boethius considered at length the problem of 
identity and difference in a God where there was absolute identity of essence among 
the Persons and yet where the Persons were not identical in every respect. Like 
Augustine, Boethius framed the problem very much in terms of the Aristotelian 
categories of substance and accident and how these must be modified when applied 
to God. The statement 'the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God' did 
not mean that there were three gods; it was not an enumeration, but a reiteration of 
the same thing. "' Yet although Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the same, they are 
not identical. ' 12 For Boethius the relations among the Persons are constitutive of 
their very being and for that reason cannot possibly be accidents. But the predication 
of relation does not alter the essence of the Persons because the relationship is already 
'08DZn. 528, pp. 176-7. Madoz, Lesymboledu Xle concilede Tolede, pp. 56-9 established Isidore of Seville 
(PL 
82.2710 as the direct source here. 
'09DZn. 530-1, p. 177: 'Cum dicimus non ipsumessePatremquemFilium, ad personarumdistinctionemrefertur- 
Cum autem dicimus ipsurn esse Patrem quod Filium, ipsum Filiurn quod Patrem. ipsum Spiriturn Sanctum quod 
Patrem et Filium, ad naturam, qua Deus est, vel substantiam perlinere monstratur, quia substantia unum sunt; 
personas enim distinguimus, non deitatem separamus. Trinitatem igitur 
in personarum distinctione agnoscimus; 
unitatem propter naturarn vel substantiam. profitemur'. 
110VIIA PL 82.271-2 
"'De trinitate III, trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, Boethius. The Theological Tractates, Loeb Classical 
Library (2nd edition: London, 1973), p. 14. 
"'De trin-III. p. 16 
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presupposed by the pure fact of the existence of more than one Person. ' 13 
Without wishing to belittle the achievement of other theologians before the 
eleventh century, I propose to draw my survey to a close at this juncture. It is not that 
trinitarian theology was static during this period, but simply that it has little bearing 
on dicussions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Disputes did occur. In the eighth 
century a lively debate was sparked off by the view, mainly held by some Spanish 
bishops, that although the Son was God by nature, as man he was God by 
adoption. ' 14 More pertinent to later developments was the ninth-century controversy 
between Hincmar of Reims amd Gottschalk of Orbais concerning Gottschalk's 
description of God as trina deitas. ' 15 These authors were rarely cited in the later 
period and for that reason are not immediately relevant to the scope of my thesis. In 
terms of continuity it is only from the late eleventh century that the sustained 
discussion of the same complex of issues can begin to be identified. 
"3De 
trin. V, pp. 24-8. 
114 J. Pelikan. The Christian Tradition. 3, The Growth of Medieval neologi, (600-1300) (Chicago, 1978), pp. 52- 
9. 
`J. Jolivet, Godescalc d'Orbais et la TrinW. La inähode de la tUologie ä I'jpoque carolingienne (Paris, 
1958); Pelikan, Growth of Medieval Theologi,. pp. 59-61. 
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THE BEGINNINGS OF ACADEMIC DISCUSSIONS: QUESTIONS ON 
THE TRINITY FROM ROSCELIN TO ABELARD 
I have argued that it is valid to speak of a tradition of thought and argument 
on the Trinity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which is distinct within the wider 
Latin tradition just outlined. I would emphasise that in this chapter I am concerned 
with beginnings, i. e. first identifiable instances, rather than with causes. I have left to 
one side the question of causes, why people began to discuss these issues when they 
did, since it strikes me as inseparable from the more general problem of the twelfth 
century as an epoch of unprecedented change and growth in virtually every aspect of 
medieval culture. ' In speaking of beginnings, then, my aim is to define and 
characterise rather than explain in causal terms the first instances of discussions on the 
Trinity which can be seen to have a resonance in the subsequent development of 
academic trinitarian theology and which bear, therefore, on the issue of continuity. 
A beginning is far from being a tradition. In the light of the subsequent 
direction taken in discussions on the Trinity, however, it is possible to identify those 
elements and conditions which proved to be the defining features of a distinct tradition 
of thought on the doctrine. It is worth restating these briefly. Firstly, there was the 
emergence of pen-nanent and semi-permanent centres for theological study; this was 
the essential precondition not only for the development of a sustained debate but also 
in providing the social and institutional background common to all who participated 
in it. This institutional setting was crucial for the intellectual coherence of discussions 
because theologians with this training were thereby in a position to understand one 
another - they spoke the same language, read the same texts, were practised in the 
same methods and often shared the same teachers. They were, in other words, 
discussing the same issues, communicating. 
This period also witnesses the emergence of by far and away the most 
outstanding defining characteristic of the academic approach, the logico-semantic 
'On this interaction between educational and Nvider cultural change, see W. Rfiegg, 'Thernes', in A Historv of 
the Universities in Europe. 1. Universities in the Middle A., aes, ed. H. de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 9- 
14. 
-4-5 
method in textual interpretation and problern solving. T'he concentration on the varied 
significations of the same word in different contexts as the source both of problems 
and of solutions took the form of piecemeal application in this early period, but was 
the foundation of the more systematic linguistic theology of the later twelfth century. 
This sensitivity to the necessity for technical exactitude in theological language 
accounts for such crucial distinctions as that between signification and supposition, 
which was to have such a decisive impact on the resolution of some of the more 
intractable of trinitarian questions. TI-iis more rigorous attitude to the propriety of 
theological language is also detectable in a more critical approach to the use of 
analogies which surfaces in this period, and which is also an important aspect of the 
Fourth Lateran Council's criticism of Joachim of Fiore. 
1. Anselm's di: ýpute ivith Roscelin, 
The first evidence that some thinkers were approaching the doctrine from a 
new point of departure comes, rather predictably in a study oil scholasticism, from the 
works of Saint Anselm (d. 1109), Abbot of Bec (1078-1093) and then Archbishop of 
Canterbury. I say 'predictably' because of Anselm's established position as the 'Father 
of scholasticism' and his well-known method of 'faith seeking understanding'! But 
actually it is not so much that Anselm's writings are themselves indicative of a new 
approach, as that they provide evidence of a new questioning attitude elsewhere. His 
approach, which relied little on patristic sources or the logic of question and answer, 
was not easily adaptable to the interests of subsequent writers who favoured self- 
contained and clearly demarcated problems. He had little discernible impact on the 
immediate development of academic theology on the Trinity. 
It is, rather, Anselm's confrontation with Roscelin of Compiýgne (d. 1129) 
3 
which is relevant for the academic tradition of thought on the Trinity. For Anselm, 
the articles of the Christian faith were enigmas to be illuminated in a variety of ways, 
'Much of Anselm's claim to this title rests on his importance in Grabmann's Gevchichte der vcholastischen 
Methode. For a recent account, see R. W. Southern. Saint An-ýýebn. A Portrait in a Land-, ýcqj)e (Cambridge, 1990). 
'J. Hopkins. A ComImnion to the Studi, of St. Ansebn (Univ. of Minnesota. 1972), pp. 100-8 has an excellent 
surnmaq. 
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but were certainly not to be challenged for the sake of maintaining logical consistency. 
The kind of questioning which seems to have been habitual for Roscelin, on the other 
hand, was to become a central activity of professional theologians. The systematic 
identification and resolution of logical contradictions in the Trinity which was 
characteristic of the twelfth-century scholastic approach is anticipated by Roscelin, not 
Anselm. 4 Thus in both recensions of his Elfistola de incarnatione verbi (completed 
in 1094), which was written as a refutation of Roscelin's own position on the Trinity, 
Anselm on numerous occasions inveighs against the temerity of the moder-ni dialectici 
5 who would presume to challenge such a basic tenet of Christain faith. It is no one's 
6 
place to question what the Church teaches. If the Christian proceeds from 
understanding to faith, rather than from faith to understanding as he ought, any 
understanding which he attains will be worthless, or even worse, will be contrary to 
the Catholic f aith. 7 
Our first indication of disagreement between Aiiselm and Roscelin dates from 
c. 1089, when the monk John wrote to Anselm, praising his prudence in matters of 
faith and citing an argument about the Trinity which Roscelin had put forward: 
If the three Persons are one thing only, and not three things in themselves (per se), in the same way 
as three angels or three souls for example, so that even in terms of power and will they are altogether 
the same thing, it follows that the Father and the Holy Spirit are incarnate with the Son. " 
Roscelin's argument that the absolute unity of the three Persons in one thing 
necessarily implied that all three must therefore be incarnate was simply a 
contemporary version of the age-old problem of how to distinguish between unity and 
'On Anselm's difference from later thinkers, see G. R. Evans, Ansebn and a New Generation (Oxford, 1980), 
esp. pp. 8-10. 
5 Opera Oinnia 6 vols., ed. F. S. Schmitt (Seckau-Edinburgh, 1938-61): first recension, vol. I, pp. 281-90; second 
recension, vol. 11, pp. 3-35. 
'Ep. de incam. verbi II, p. 6.10-11: 'Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quornodo quod catholica ecclesia 
corde credit et ore confitetur non sit'. 
'Ep. 136, OI)era III. p. 281.38-40: 'Nam Christianus per fidern debet ad intellecturn proficere, non per 
intellecturn ad fidern accedere, aut, si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere'. The passage is discussed by Southern, 
Saint Ansek. pp. 123-4. 
Ey. 128,01)era III. pp. 270-1: 'Si tres personae stint una tanturn res et non sunt tres res per se, sicut tres angeli , r-, - 
aut tres animae. ita tamen ut voluntate et potentia omnino sint idem: ergo pater et spiritus sanctus cum filio 
incarnatus est'. On Roscelin's ratiocinatio, see esp. El). de incarn. verbi I, p. 287.12-24. 
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trinity in God. It was becoming increasingly difficult, however, to depend solely on 
the old answers as a means of resolving such questions, at least as far as sceptics were 
goncerned. In the same letter, the monk John also accused Roscelin of rejecting the 
traditional analogy of the light and heat of the sun being distinct in one sun as a 
similitudo for unity and trinity in God. 9 In his own writings Anselm was careful to 
point out that any analogies for the Trinity which he used were far removed from any 
true likeness to it. '0 In his river analogy, lie draws a parallel between the source, 
stream and pool being one entity, the River Nile, and the three Persons being distinct 
in one God, but at the same time warns that this comparison is magna 
dissimilitudo. " This kind of conventional self-deprecation was perhaps becoming less 
convincing than it had once been. For Abelard, the analogy's imprecision was so 
outrageous that he mercilessly held it up for ridicule before his students, perhaps in 
retaliation for Anselm's justification of papal censorship which may have contributed 
to Abelard's later condemnation at Soissons. 12 Patristic-style analogies no longer 
seemed to answer the logical objections of school-trained, would-be theologians. " 
They were increasingly discredited as convincing methods of explanation. 
In his response to Roscelin, Anselm is anxious to clear himself from any 
suspicion of trying to improve or correct patristic writings. On the contrary, by making 
explicit those things about which the Fathers were silent, he actually adheres to their 
teachings. 14 More pressingly, it was felt necessary to issue some further refutation 
because Roscelin had allegedly gone back oil his promise at the Synod of Soissons in 
-16: 'Sed de tribus angelis et de tribus animabus trinitatis et identitatis similitudini Ep 128,01)era 111, p. 271.13 
isti illa sancti Augustini trinitatis et unitatis similitudo de sole, qui una et eadem res est et calorem. et splendorem. 
inseparabiliter in se habet, ornnino resistet'. On contemporary criticism of the same analogy, see Abelard, Aeologia 
Chr&dana IV. 82, ed. E. M. Buytaert, CCM (Turnholt, 1969), pp. 303-4. 
10 L'- 
r-P. de incam. verbi 11, p. 33.10-11: 'Sed quoniam ista terrena valde longe stint a stimma natura, levemus ad 
illarn ipsa opitulante mentern et in ea contemplemur'. 
"Ibid. II, p. 33.2; the complete analogy appears at pp. 31-3. 
12M T. Clanchy's argument. 'Abelard's Mockery of St Anselm'. Journal qf Ecclesiastical Histon7 41 (1990), 11- 1-23. For Anselm's justification of papal censorship, see E1.7. de incarn. verbi II, pp. 3-4. 
"G. R. Evans, 'St. Anselm*s Images of the Trinity', Journal of Theological Studies 27 (1976), 46-57. Evans, 
Anselin and a Neu, Generation, pp. 104-9 on the difference between Anselm and Abelard on this question. 
14 Ep. de incam. verbi II, p. 20.22-4: 'non quasi docendo quod doctores nostri nescientnt, aut corrigendo quod 
non bene dLxertint. sed dicendo forsitan quod tacuerunt. quod tamen ab illortim dictis non discordet sed illis 
cohaereat'. 
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1092 to renounce his views. Some of Anselm's monks gathered together Roscelin's 
statements so that Al-iselm could resolve the issue once and for all. 15 Again, Anselm 
says this by way of explanation, 'in case any one should think that I have presumed 
to imagine that the strength of the Christian faith needed the aid of my defence. 916 
Despite this collection of Roscelin's views, it is clear that Anselm had almost 
no idea what his opponent's arguments really were. The views attributed to Roscelin 
by the monk John in his original letter to Anselm are repeated in both recensions of 
the Epistola de incarnatione verbi, but most of Anselm's attack is pure conjecture. 
Throughout his arguments, Anselm regularly anticipates Roscelin's possible counter- 
arguments, with phrases such as 'perhaps he will say, I venture' or 'he will 
answer'. 17 He dismisses the possibility that Roscelin's views have been 
misrepresented, instead concluding that the evidence is weighted overwhelmingly 
against his opponent. " 
Roscelin's ultimate aim was to brhig some measure of logical coherence to the 
doctrine. '9 His only extant work is a letter to Abelard defending himself from his 
former pupil's attacks. 'O It is often unclear where Roscelin is putting forward his own 
view, that of someone else, or anticipating a possible counter-position. His assertion, 
for example, that all names spoken of God signify substance, and that it is only a case 
of linguistic convention that the Latins say three Persons and the Greeks say three 
substances, was a fairly standard explanation for the discrepancy in usage and hardly 
15 Ibid. 11, p. 5.1-4. 
'6Ibid. 11, p. 5.4-6: 'Quod rogo, ne putet aliquis me praesumpsisse quasi forlitudinem fidei Christianae meae 
existimem indigere defensionis auxilio'. 
17 For example, Ep. de incarn. verbi 1, p. 287.3-4; I. p. 289-3; 1, p. 290.24; II, p. 14.12; II, p. 17.8; II, p. 20.2; II, 
p. 24.3-7,12; Il. p. 30-11-13. 
18 Ep. de incarn. verbi I, pp. 288-9. 
'9F. Picavet, Roscelin. Philosophe et thiologien Xapres le 16gende et dapres Vh&toire (Paris, 1896), pp. 25-6. 
Also E. -H. W. Kluge, 'Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universals', Journal Qf the Histon, of Philosopkv 14 
(1976), 405-14; Southern. Saint Ansek, p. 176. 
20 L,., 
L: uL-ztola ad 
Ahaelarduin, ecL J. Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholästik, BGP7M 8.5 (Münster, 
1910), 63-80. 
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amounts to saying that the three Persons are tl-Lree res. -" He brings out the obligatory 
rhetoric about avoiding the errors of both Arius and Sabel IiUS. 22 He unequivocally 
rejects the separation of substance maintained by Arius as introducing a hierarchy 
among the Persons. At the same time lie seems to suggest that some degree of 
separation is unavoidable, as long as the Persons remain coeternal and coequal. 23 
This would presumably be the only way of avoiding the conclusion that the 
incarnation of the Son, where there is absolute unity of substance, was contingent 
upon the incarnation of the other two Persons. 
Anselm is, however, clearly ignorant of the contents of this letter. His aim is 
to show that neither of the consequences put forward by Roscelin as reported to him 
by his original informant is necessary. 24 He nevertheless takes his opponent's 
contention that the three Persons must be three res more seriously than his argument 
that all three Persons must be incarnate, and in general proceeds as though this were 
Roscefin's real position. 25 Much of Anselm's refutation, therefore, hinges on 
Roscelin's use of the word res. In his initial reply on the matter, to the same monk 
John, Anselm characterises Roscelin's novel language as either irrelevant (superflue) 
or heretical. 26 If Roscelin simply means by the expression tres res nothing other than 
the three relations pertaining among the Persons, his teaching is pointless since it adds 
no new understanding to what is already established by Christian doctrine; if, however, 
he means that the relations themselves are things, in the same sense as the one 
21Jbid., p. 72.16-20: 'Non igitur per personam aliudaliquidsignificamus, quarn per substantiam, licetexquadarn 
loquendi consuetudine triplicare soleamus personam, non substantiam, sicut Graeci triplicare solent substantiam'. 
Kluge, 'Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universals', p. 406 n. 12, takes this passage as irrefutable evidence 
of Roscelin's tritheism. Cf. Augustine, De trin. VTI. 11. CCSL 50, pp. 261-2, PL 42.943. 
22 Ep. ad Abaelardum, p. 74. 
23 ' Ibid., pp. 74-5: 'Non ergo ornnino possumus vitare separationern facere in substantia sanctae trinitatis'. 
'AEp. de incam. verbi 11, p. 20.11-13: 'Ostendendurn ergo est in quo iste fallitur, et quomodo incarnationern 
solius filii non sequitur tres personas esse tres res separatas; aut si tina stint res tres personae, omnes eas incamatas 
esse 
2'Anselm's emphasis on Roscelin's view of the Persons as per seseparatim is particularly strong in the second 
recension of the Ep. de incarn. verbi H, pp. 12-13. This emphasis is supported by Abelard's letter against Roscelin. 
which refers to his heresy as trev deos confiteri. See Peter Ahelard. Letters IV-. YJV, ed. E. R. Smits (Groningen, 
1983). P. ý '179. 
26Ep. 129, Opera 111, pp. 271-2. 
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substance which is God, either he thinks that there are three gods or he is talking 
nonsense. 27 These arguments are taken up by Abelard and other writers. 
Related to the signification of the word res, is Anselm's view that Roscelin's 
training in logic and his controversial views on universals are responsible for his 
erroneous doctrine. 28 He has been followed in this respect by modem scholarly 
opinion, which sees Roscelin's supposed tritheism, the doctrine that there are three 
gods, as the theological counterpart of his nominalism. 29TI-ie nominalist position, that 
there are no universal substances, only universal terms Yzatus vocis) predicated of 
individual substances, makes it difficult to conceive of the unity of essence among the 
Persons as a single res since there can be no one thing which is essentially in each of 
the Persons. Roscelin seems to have taken this view of divine unity on the basis that 
where there is plurality there must also be separation. 'O According to Anselm, 
Roscelin's logical misconceptions underlie his doctrinal errors: 
For how does someone, who does not yet understand how several oxes in a species are one ox, 
comprehend of the most secret and exalted nature how several Persons, each one of which is perfect 
God, are one God? And how does someone, whose intellect is blind to the distinction between an ass 
and its colour, distinguish between the one God and his three relation S? 31 
This is an extremely revealing passage for what it says about the common ground 
between debates on universals and debates on the Trinity. Roscelin's inability to 
conceive of a form of unity of the type 'ox' or 'God', in which all individuals 
possessing the nature 'ox' or 'God' respectively are united, is conditioned both by his 
27Ibid., p. 272.21-2: 'Quod si dicit tres personas esse tres res, secundum quod itnaquaeque persona deus est: aut 
tres deos vult constituere, aut non intelligit quod dicit'. 
28M. L. Colish, The Mirror of Language. A Studv in the Medieial Aeorv of Knowledge (Rev. edition; London, 
1983), p. 84 is right to stress the grammatical premises of Anselm's opposition. but it does not follow from this, 
as Colish says it does, that they are not also logical. 
29 DTC 13,2914; DTC 15.2,1713; Hefele-Leclercq 5.1. p. 365; J. Largeault. Enquete sur le nominalisine (Paris, 
1971), pp. 80-1. 
'OEp. ad Abaelardum, p. 74.17-20: 'Quornodo enim. si sic est una, ut etiarn plures sint, sicut Graeca clamat A 
ecclesia, non separatur? Ornnia enim plura pluralitatis lege separantur, quia scripturn est, quod omnis differentia 
in discrepantium pluralitate consistit'. 
31 L-., 
, -Y. de incarn. verbi 
1, p. 285.11-16: 'Qui enim nondum intelligit quomodo plures boves in specie sint unus 
bos: qualiter in illa secretissima et altissima natura comprehendet quornodo plures persona. quarum singula quaeque 
perfectus est deus. sint unus deus? Et cuius mens obscura est ad diiudicandurn inter asinum suum et colorem eius: 
qualiter discemet inter unum deum et trinam relationern eius? ' 
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denial that universals are substances and the fact that his intellect cannot rise above 
visible realities to higher spiritual truths. 12 His deficiency, therefore, is both logical 
and spiritual. Further, the concept of unity which Anselm has in mind is conditioned 
not only by the Aristotelian distinction between primary substances (individual 
subjects) and the secondary substances (genera and species) which depend upon them, 
but also by an uncompromising concept of divine unity derived ultimately from 
Augustine. " It was through this interplay between theology and philosophy that new 
questions ei-nerged. -4 
According to Anselm, then, for Roscelin res can only ever mean individual, 
not universal substance. Hence, when Roscelin says that the three Persons are three 
'things', he must mean not simply that they are distinct through relation, but separate 
in substance. In this way, he fails to maintain the fundamental Augustinian distinction 
between substance and relation, upon which the entire doctrine of the Trinity 
depended. He confuses what is common with what is proper to each Person. " 
Although he does not use the term, Roscelin's conception of divine unity is 
not unlike the collection theory of universals, whereby any degree of unity is 
contingent upon individuals being members of the same class or unit so that unity is 
always a collection of parts. 36 He says that the Trinity is one not through singularity 
but through a kind of communion . 
37 The problem with collection theory, according 
to Abelard, is that a universal cannot thereby be truly predicated of an individual, just 
12 Ibid. 1, p. 285.7-1 1: 'In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quae et princeps et iudex debet omnium esse quae sunt 
in homine, sic est in imaginationibus corporeis obvoluta. tit ex eis se non possit evolvere nec ab ipsis ea quae ipsa 
sola et pura contemplari debet, valeat discemere'. 
33CategorieS 5. ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus 11-5 (Bruges-Paris. 1961), pp. 7-13. Also Porphyry's 
commentary also trans. by Boethius, Isagoge. ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus 16-7 (Bruges-Paris, 1966). 
'4M. M. Dveedale. Abailard on Unii, ersals (Amsterdam, 1976), p. 130: 'The Trinity is one of those theological 
topics which in scholasticism forced to the stuface logical questions that might otherwise have been skirted. ' 
35 Ep. de incam. verbi 1, p. 286.14-16: Tum igitur dicit has duas personas esse duas res. quaero quid dicat ibi 
esse duas res: an id quod commune est illis, an ea. quae sunt singula propria singulis. 
'60n collection theorv, B. Maioli, Gli universaft. Storia-antologica del problema da Socrate al XII secolo 
(Rome. 1974), pp. 282-30i. 
37 Ep. ad Ahaelarduin., p. 77.1-5: 'Audisti trinitatern tinam esse propter maiestatis communionern, non propter 
maiestatis singtilaritatem, quod enim singulare est. nullo modo commune est, et quod commune est. singulare esse 
non potest. Maiestas igittir trinitatis quia communis est, quornodo singularis esse potest? ' 
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as the whole cannot be predicated of one part. 18 Similarly, tile Yýqgqge in 
theologiam. a work which fuses elements from Abelard and the Victorines, contrasts 
unity of essence with unity of collection. '9 Anselm also seems to read Roscelin's 
doctrine in this way. He anticipates Roscelin's counter- argument to the accusation that, 
in calling the Persons tres res, he has created three gods; perhaps, speculates Anselm, 
Roscelin would argue that collectively these three res are one God. But this would be 
just as unacceptable, for then 'each single Person is not God, but rather God is 
composed from three things', and thus no Person alone is God, but only the three 
together . 
40 The most perfectly simple divine nature would thereby be turned into a 
composite being. 
Given the paucity of the documention, 'unity of collection' is, in fact, the most 
accurate label that can reasonably be given to Roscelin's doctrine . In this respect, 
there are strong grounds for linking Roscelin's conception of divine unity (roughly 
defined as unity of collection) with his position on the Father's generation of the Son. 
The possibility of this conceptual linkage is provided by d passage from Roscelin's 
letter to Abelard. This passage is important for my argument that there is an essential 
continuity in twelfth- and thirteenth-century trinitarian theology because it prefigures 
the interdependency of these doctrines of divine unity and divine generation in the 
work of Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard. That interdependency also provides the 
grounds for thinking that thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree, 
though a misunderstanding, may very well have something of value to say about the 
presuppositions of the decree. If one's position on divine unity was determinative of 
where one placed the divine essence in relation to the Father's generation of the Son, 
it is not fantastic to suggest that Joachim's condemnation for unity of collection could 
reasonably also be read as a condemnation of his view that essence begot essence. 
That is, only someone with a weak concept of unity of essence could think that 
'8Logica 'Ingredientibus', p. 14, ed. B. Geyer. Peter Abaelards. Philosophische Schriften. BGPTM 21 (MiInster, 
1919-33). For an assessment of Abelard's critique, see Tweedale, Abailard on Uniiersals, pp. 113-15-, A. F. 
Freddoso, 'Abailard on Collective Realism', Journal Qf Philosopkv 75 (1978). 527-38. 
"Ecrits th6ologiques de Vicole dAbilard, ed. A. Landgraf, SSL 14 (Louvain, 1934), pp. 243-4. D. E. Luscombe, 
'The Authorship of the Ysagoge in theologiam', AHDLMA 35 (1968), 7-16 dates the work to before 1148. 
"Ep. de incarn. verbi I, p. 289.4-6: 'Ergo singula qtiaeqtie res de illis tribus, id est singula qtiaeqtie persona, 
non est dews. sed ex tribus rebus conficitur detts'. 
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essence begot essence . 
41 'Fhe following passage of Roscelin is the first indication of 
this interdependency: 
For the substance of the Father is nothing other than the Father, and the substance of the Son is nothing 
other than the Son, just as the city of Rome is Rome, and the watery creature is water. Therefore, because the Father begot the Son, the substance of the Father begot the substance of the Son. Because, 
therefore, the substance of the begettor is different from the substance of the begotten, the one is from 
the other. For the begettor and the begotten are always several things, not one, according to the doctrine 
of blessed Augustine, since 'there is absolutely no thing which begets itself. ' For the begettor is 
unbegotten, whereas the begotten is the only-begotten [... ] Therefore, we cannot entirely avoid introducing separation into the substance of the Holy Trinity. " 
It is really not possible to say whether this passage is significant in term s of the 
textual transmission of ideas, though it is well to remember that this letter was 
addressed to Abelard, who was to go on to consider at length the problem of the 
Father's generation of the Son. Roscelin states explicitly that the relationship of 
opposition between begettor and begotten cannot be accommodated by an absolute 
unity of substance. As proof he cites Augustine's maxim, the importance of which is 
difficult to exaggerate, that no thing begets itself. 43 It follows that there must be 
some measure of separation if Father and Son are to be truly distinct. What is 
important here is that positions taken on divine unity and the Father's generation of 
the Son have an almost symbiotic relation to one another. The very fact that Roscelin 
does this suggests that this connection was not just a conceptual possibility which we 
can imagine, but was one actually made by contemporaries. 
2. Abelard's approach to theology in the 'Meologia 
The so-called Theologia is Abelard's main theological work. It survives in 
three distinct versions all of which in turn underwent several revisions: the Theologia 
4'A notable exception is Peter Olivi who will be discussed in the final chapter. 
4' Ep. ad Abaelarduin, pp. 74-5: 'Nihil enim aliud est substantia patris quarn pater, et substantia f ilii quarn filius, 
sicut urbs Romae Roma est, et creatura aquae aqua est. Quia ergo pater genuit filium., substantia patris genuit 
substantiarn filii- Quia igitur altera est substantia generantis, altera generata, alia est una ab alia. Semper enim 
generans et generaturn plura sunt, non res una, secundum illarn beati Augustini praefatarn sententiam. qua ait, quia 
nulla omnino rev est quae se ipsam gignat. Et enim, generans est ingenita. genita vero est unigenita [... I Non ergo 
ornnino possumus vitare separationern facere in substantia sanctae trinitatis'. 
10. 4'De trin. l. l. CCSL 50, p. 28.32-6. PL 42. K 
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44 'Summi Boni' (TSum) or De trinitate , the Theologia Christiana (TChr) and the 
Theologia 'Scholarium' (TSch) 
. 
45 According to the most recent chronologies, their 
composition spans a period of about 22 years, between 1118 and 1140 . 
46 The earliest 
version, the TSum, was written in 1118-20 and condemned shortly after at the Council 
of Soissons in 1121. 'Me second, the TChr, was written between 1122 and 1125 in 
response to the accusations levelled at Soissons and was further revised in the 1130s. 
The third and final edition, the TSch, including its revisions, was composed between 
1134 and 1140. It was attacked by Bernard of Clairvaux and his supporters, resulting 
in its condemnation at the Council of Sens in 1140. 
Each version of the Theologia develops and modifies the themes of its 
predecessor but the basic structure remains the same. 47 In all three works, Abelard 
first establishes the doctrine of the Trinity according to scriptural authority before 
proceeding to recount logical objections. He aims most of his efforts at resolving these 
objections and at establishing a secure logical basis for the doctrine, thereby defending 
the doctrine on his opponents' own ten-ns. This tl-iree-fold structure has been identified 
as Abelard's concept of theologia, that is, the specific task, as he conceived it, of 
proceeding from the articles of faith to the refutation of objections to the Trinity, 
rather than simply talking about God in general. 48 
The main difference between the TSum and the TChr is Abelard's more 
frequent appeal to patristic authority, which seems to have been in response to the 
44This, is the title given by Abelard himself in both his letter 14, ed. Smits, p. 279 and the Historia calainitatum, 
ed. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1959), p. 83.694. See C. Mews, 'The Development of the Theologia of Peter Abelard', in 
Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirk-ung, Trierer Theologische Studien 38 (Trier, 1980), p. 184, 
and his introduction to the modem edition CCM 13 (Turnholt. 1987), pp. 17-19. 
45 References will be to the editions in the CCM. TChr, ed. E. M. Buytaert. CCM 12 (Turnholt, 1969); TSum 
and TSch, edd. Buytaert and Mews, CCM 13 (Turnholt, 1987). 
46 Mews, 'T"he Development of the Theologia', 183-98; E. M. Buytaert, 'Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine', in 
Buytaert ed., Peter Abelard. Proceedings qf the International Coiýference, Louvain May 10- 12,197 1, Mediaeval ia 
Lovaniensia 1.2 (Louvain. 1974), 127-52. 
47j. Cottiaux. 'La conception de la th6ologie chez Ab-61ard'. Revue dhistoire ecclisiastique 27 (1932), pp. 251-2. 
`8For the association of the word theologia particularly with the Trinity. F. Whaling, 'The Development of the 
Word "T'heology"', Scott&h Journal of Theologv 34 (1981), p. 298; G. Allegro, *La theologia nei trattati trinitari 
di Pietro Abeiardo'. Schede Medieiali 11 (1986). 314-30; F. Cow-th, Trinitdt in der Scholastik, Handbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte 11.1b (Freiburg, 1985), p. 31. 
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criticism levelled at Soissons that he had paid scant attention to these authors . 
49 This 
criticism also partly accounts for Abelard's decision to produce a collection of 
authoritative texts, the Sic et non. 50 The status of the Sic et non as a source book for 
subsequent authors makes Abelard's achievement in the provision of patristic 
authorities at least as important for the subsequent development of theology as his 
rational approach to theology. The final version, the TSch, is considered to be 
Abelard's most mature treatment of the doctrine of God 5' as well as the one most 
familiar to contemporaries. 52 It is concerned less with the logical problem posed by 
the Trinity, the resolution of which had dominated the previous works, than with an 
appraisal of divine attributes and omnipotence. 53 
Abelard defines the aim of his works in terms of a defence of the faith against 
the objections of pseudo-dialecticians. 54 Like Anselm in the Epistold de incarnatione 
verbi, Abelard casts himself in the role of a sincerely motivated defender of 
orthodoxy. He does not presume to teach the true faith, only to defend it from impious 
attacks . 
55 The daily proliferation of new questions demand new answers . 
56 These 
new questions can no longer be adequately answered with reference to scriptural and 
patristic authority alone. 57 If Abelard's arguments are to be meaningful and his aim 
49COttiaux, 'La conception de la. thMogie', pp. 255-6. This criticism is hinted at in the confrontation between 
Abelard and Alberic of Reims recounted by Abelard in the Hist. calam., p. 84. 
5OCottiati. x, 'La conception de la th6ologie', pp. 255-9 first established the chronology of the Theologia and the 
Sic et non on the basis of this increased use of authority. For the text, Peter Abailard. Sic et Non, edd. B. B. Boyer 
and R. McKeon (Chicago-London, 1976-7). 
5'Cottiaux. 'La conception de la th6ologie', p. 269; Buytaert, 'Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine', p. 145, Mews, 
'The Development of the Theologia, p. 193. 
"Mews, CCM 13, p. 203. 
53 Mews, 'The Development of the Theologia', pp. 190-2. 
-'4TSuin 11.4, pp. 114-15; 11.25-6, pp. 122-3; TChr IV. 71-5. pp. 297-300; TSch 11.14-18, pp. 412-14. 
55TSum 11.26. P. 123; TChr IV. 71, p. 297.1031-4: 'Non enim hoc opusculo veritatern docere sed defendere 
intendimus, maxime adverstis pseudo-philosophos qui nos philosophicis maxime rationibus aggrediuntur'. 
56TSUM 11.4, pp. 114-15; TChr IV. 72, p. 297.1042-5: 'et pro diversitate hominum vel temporum novae quotidie 
quaestiones vel imptignationes oriantur. novis quotidie rationibus resistendurn puto. et novis exorientibus morbis 
nova quaerenda remedia*. 
57 Min 11.215, p. 122.217-18: 'At quoniam neque sanctonim neque philosophorum auctoritate inportunitas 
argumentorum refelli potest'. 
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is to be carried out effectively, therefore, lie is obliged to speak in the same terms as 
those used by his opponents. M It is essential to present the Trinity in a way which 
will be plausible and comprehensible to those who attack it. " As one author has 
written of the TSum: 
The intention is not to 'prove' by logical means - that is, to verify - that any revealed doctrine of the faith is 'true'. It is merely to illustrate by the principles of a linguistic polemic (Sprachlogik) and by descriptive analogies that the content of faith statements is reasonable. 60 
This rational defence of the f aith corresponds to one of the three functions Abelard 
assigns to the use of reason in theology, the other two being the clarification of the 
61 meaning of Scripture and the reinforcement of authoritative texts. In this respect, 
62 indeed, Abelard belongs firmly within the tradition of Christian apologetics. He is 
especially in tune with a similar justification given by Augustine at the beginning of 
his De trinitate. 
Several of these pseudo-philosophers are singled out as proposing either 
particularly insidious or particularly inane objections to the Trinity. ne chief target 
of this reprobation would seem to be Abelard's former master, Roscelin of 
Compiýgne. In his letter against Roscelin, Abelard refers to him in the same language 
as his opponents in the Theologia, that is, as both a pseudo-logician and a pseudo- 
61 Christian. It may even be the case that the TSum was partly written with the 
58jbid., p. 122.218-22: 'nisi humanis rationibus eis obsistattir qui humanis rationibus invehuntur, decrevimus et 
stultis sectindurn stulticiam suarn respondere et eorum impugnationes ex ipsis artibus quibus nos impugnant 
conquassare . 
5'Ibid.. 11.26, p. 123.232-6: 'De quo quidern nos docere veritatern non promittimus, quarn neque nos neque 
aliquem mortalium scire constat, sed saltem aliquid verisimile atque humane rationi vicinum nec sacre scripture 
contrarium proponere libet adversus eos qui humanis rationibus fidem se inpugnare gloriantur'. 
"ODY. Blackwell, Non-Ontological Constructs. The f 1ý, ) , 
Tects of Abaelard's Logical and Ethical Theories on His 
Theologv: A Studi, in Meaning and Verification (Bern, 1988), p. 49. Also. W. Simonis, Trinitdt und Vernunft 
Untersuchungen zur M6glichkeit einer rationalen Trihitdtslehre bei Anselin, Abelard, den Viktorinem, A. Gfinther 
und J Frohschaminer. Frankfurter theologische Studien 12 (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 39-40. 
61 Cottiaux, 'La conception de la th&ologie'. pp. 799-821. 
62 TChr IV. 72, p. 298.1051-3: 'in antiquis temporibus sancti patres ea quae tunc adver-sum Catholicam fidem 
opponi audirent rectis diluerent rationibus'. 
63SMits 
ed.. p. 280.41. 
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specific aim of convincing students of the superiority of Abelard's trinitarian doctrine 
over that of Roscelin. 64 
Abelard's theological writings aroused considerable controversy at the time. 
Not only particular teachings but Abelard's entire approach to Christian doctrine as 
61 an existimatio rerum non apparentium seemed to threaten its solid foundations. 
Most famously, William of Saint-711iierry and Bernard of Clairvaux took exception to 
this definition of faith as an 'estimation' on the grounds that it reduced doctrine from 
the certainty of knowledge to the level of personal opinion. 66Given greater leisure, 
a man of William's education might well have admitted the necessity of conducting 
a rational defence of the faith against those who used rational arguments to attack it. 
Indeed, he seems to have come some way towards this concession through his concept 
of ratio fidei. 67 Bernard, for his part, took most of his pointers concerning Abelard's 
errors from William. His effectiveness was as a shrewd rhetorician and polemicist 
rather than as an original thinker. 68 
The campaign initiated by William of Saint-Thierry and brought to fruition by 
Bernard of Clairvaux eventually resulted in the condemnation of the TSch at the 
Council of Sens in 1140.69 Many of their criticisms came to be included in the 
64Mews, CCM 13, pp. 42-3. 
65TSch 1.1, p. 318. The same definition is also characteristic of those works which have been assigned to 
Abelard's school. See, for example, the Sententiaefibrianenses, ed. H. Ostlender. Florilegium Patristicum 19 (Bonn, 
1929), p. 1; Sententiae Hermanni, ed. S. Buzzeni, Pubblicazioni della FacoltA di Lettere e Filosofia dell'UniveristA 
di Milano 31 (Florence, 1983), p. 25.4, and PL 178.1695A. D. E. Luscombe. The School of Peter Abelard, Ae 
Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Earýv Scholastic Period (Cambridge, 1969). 
66See William's Disputatio adversus Petruin Abaelarduin, PL 180.249-82 and accompanying letter PL 182.531 - 
3, esp. PL 180.249B. For Bernard, see Ep. 190, Sancti Bernardi Opera 8 vols., edd. J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais 
(Rome, 1957-77) VIII, pp. 17-40, PL 182.1053-72; on the evolution of this letter, see J. Leclercq, 'Les formes 
successives de la lettre-trait6 de Saint Bernard contre Ab-&Iard', Revue b6nedictifie 78 (1968), 87-105. Bernard's 
letters against Abelard are conveniently collected together by A. Babolin, Bernardo di Chiaravelle. Le Lettere 
contro Pietro Abelardo (Padua, 1969). J. Jolivet, 'Sur quelques critiques de la th6ologie d'Abý&Iard% AHDLMA 30 
(1963), pp. 22-47 is excellent on the methodological differences between Abelard and his opponents. 
67 See 0. Brooke, 'The Speculative Development of the Trinitarian Theology of William of St Thierry in the 
Aenigma. fideP, RTAM 27 (1960), pp. 198-9. 
'For example, Ep. 190, PL 182.1057C, Opera VIII, p. 20.14-15: 'Videt Sanctitas vestra quomodo, isto non 
disputante, sed dementante, et Trinitas non cohaeret. et Unitas pendet'. 
69For the events see Mews, CCM 13, pp. 277-92 and 'The List of Heresies Imputed to Peter Abelard', Reiwe 
binidictine 95 (1985), 73-110. 
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nineteen capitula circulating against Abelard around the time of the condemnation. 
70 
These capitula do not seem to be an official record of the decision at Sens, but were 
drawn up by William, Bernard and Thomas of Morigny, and circulated with Bernard's 
71 letter against Abelard before the Council itself . Of these nineteen, three concerned 
trinitarian errors. The first of the capitula alleged that Abelard had attributed plena 
potentia to the Father, quaedam potentia to the Son and nulla potentia to the Holy 
72 Spirit 
. In his Apologia, written before the Council of Sens, Abelard says that 
Bernard would not have misunderstood his meaning here if he had had sufficient 
73 training in the verbal arts. Again emphasising Bernard's ignorance, Abelard retorted 
that to say wisdom is a certain power and to identify the same wisdom with the Son 
is not the same as saying that the Son is a certain power: some words which may have 
a single significatio can nevertheless change their meaning in the context of a 
particular sentence. 74 Abelard also repudiated the second charge, that he had denied 
that the Holy Spirit was from the Father's substance . 
7' The fourteenth capitulum 
accused Abelard of having attributed omnipotence specially or properly to the Father, 
on the grounds that the Father was from no other Person. This had also been the 
70For the full list see Mews, 'The List of Heresies', pp. 108-10, first established by J. Rivi6re, 'Les capitula 
d'Ab6lard condamn6s au concile de Sens', RTAM 5 (1933), 5-22. For a full discussion of their accuracy see 
Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, pp. 11542. 
71 Mews, 'The List of Heresies', pp. 96-105. 
72 A similar accusation had earlier been levelled by Walter of Mortagne, in his Epistold Gualteri de Mauritania 
Epigcopi ad Petruin Abaelarduin, ed. H. Ostlender, Florilegium Patristicurn 19 (Bonn, 1929), p. 35.7-9; also De 
trinilate, PL 209.588-9; Jolivet, 'Sur quelques critiques'. pp. 18-19. 
73 Apologia Contra Bernardum, ed. E. M. Buytaert CCM 11 (Turnholt, 1969), p. 363.134-6. 
74 Ibid., p. 363.136-46: 'Scito, itaque quae nescisti et disce quae non didicisti. quod quamvis idem sit "sapientia 
Dei" quod "Filius Dei", aut "caritas Dei" quod "Spiritus Sanctus", non tamen idern est dicere vel intelligere "Filium 
Dei esse quandam Dei potentiam" et "sapientiam Dei esse quamdam. eius potentiam", vel "Spiriturn Sanctum esse 
nuHarn Dei potentiam" et "caritatem sive amorem eius esse nullam potentiam". Saepe namque contingit, ut cum 
voces aliquae per se acceptae sint eiusdem penitus significationis, in constructione tamen positae et eisdem vocibus 
aggregatae constructionis ita sententiam variant, ut ille verus sit constructionis sensus, ille falsus'. 
"The Apologia, which only survives in fragmentary form, ends at this point. The refutation may be found, 
however, in Abelard's Cojfessiofidei 'unii, ervis'. See C. S. F. Burnett, Teter Abelard. Confessio Fidei "Universlý ": 
A Critical Edition of Abelard's Reply to Accusations of Heresy', MS 48 (1986). p. 134. Burnett suggests that the 
Confessio may be a profession of faith circulated by Abelard before Sens. 
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principal charge at Soissons in 1121 at which William of Saint-T'hierry, who first 
initiated the proceedings against Abelard, had been present. 76 
Abelard's belief that the Cluistian faith could be rationally explained if it had 
to be, and his opponents' belief that it could not, was almost bound to lead him to 
make assertions about God which gave the appearance of diminishing divine 
ineffability, our sense of awe at the mystery of God's being. It was this confidence 
which so disturbed Bernard and William. The novelty of Abelard's enterprise was 
sensed, moreover, not just by monastic critics but by critics from within the schools. 
Abelard's main opponents at the Council of Soissons in 1121, where the TSum was 
condemned and publicly bumt, were other masters. Master Walter of Mortagne, later 
Bishop of Laon (1154-74), also reproached Abelard in about 1135 for his audacity for 
presuming to obtain a perfect knowledge of God. 77 
Concern about Abelard's views on the Trinity was also to do with the success 
of Abelard's teachings. It is well known that he commanded an enormous influence 
among students in the schools, who, because of their common approach to theology 
and their espousal of particular doctrines, together constituted something of a 
' school'. 78 Abelard's particular brand of trinitarian theology, most notably his 
attribution of power, wisdom and goodness to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
respectively, was also adopted by such authors as Peter Lombard, Robert of Melun 
and Richard of Saint-Victor. 79 Potentially much more threatening, though, than this 
body of Abelardian writings and also more apparent than Abelard's more indirect 
influence upon subsequent theology, was the penetration of Abelard's method and 
ideas into the ecclesiastical hierarchy itself. In the letter which accompanied his 
Disputatio, William of Saint-Thierry referred to the fact that Abelard's doctrines even 
76 Mews, CCM 12, p. 56. 
77Ep. Gualteri ad Abaelardum. p. 35.4-7: 'Quis autern orthodoxus de fide catholica tractaturus non veritatern, 
sed sensurn opinionis suae promittat exponere? Quis etiam audiens non veritatern, sed opinionern promitti, fidern 
audeat sequentibus adhibere? ' 
78 See Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, esp. pp. 145-68. 
791bid., pp. 263,287,302. Also Mews, CCM 13. pp. 264-6 on Abelard's influence on the Lombard. 
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found their adherents at Rome. 'O Among Abelard's pupils could be ranked such 
prominent figures as Master Guy of Castello, cardinal-priest of St Mark and the future 
Celestine 11 
1.81 and Hyacinth Boboni, who was to become Celestine 111.82 A further 
candidate, although there seems no way of establishing this with certainty, is Pope 
Alexander 111.8' 
I Logical and grammatical problems about the Trinhy 
Abelard attributes the contemporary debate on the Trinity to impious questions 
posed by logicians: 
They attack the trinity of Persons with reference to the unity of essence and, on the other hand, go to 
great lengths to attack, on the grounds of the diversity of Persons, the identity of essence. " 
They are not satisfied with what the Church teaches on the Trinity. Instead, they find 
only logical inconsistency in the concept of the triune God. For surely the distinction 
of names in the Persons merely indicates a difference in words not things. " And if 
this is not the case, and it is a real distinction, does that not mean that in God there 
is a threefold substance. 86 If there is complete identity in God between substance and 
Person, either there is one Person because one substance, or three substances because 
'OPL 182.53IBC: 'Petrus enim Abaelardus iterurn. nova docet, nova scribit; et libri eius transeunt maria., 
transiliunt Alpes; et novae eius sententiae de fide, et nova dogmata per provincias et regna deferuntur, celebriter 
praedicantur, et libere defenduntur: in tantum ut in curia Romana dicantur habere auctoritatem'. 
" Luscombe. The Schoo I of Peter Abelard, pp. 20 - 1. 
82jbid., pp. 22-3. 
83j T. Noonan, 'Who was Rolandus'. in K. Pennington and R. Somerville edd., Law, Church and Societv. 
Essqys in Honour qf Stephan Kuttner (Univ. of Pennsylvannia, 1977), 27-48 questions the traditional identification 
of Roland. the canon lawyer influenced by Abelard, with Alexander 111. 
84TSum 11.43, p. 128-390-4: 'Quo in loco gravissime et dif ficillime dialectorum questiones; occurrunt. Hi quippe 
ex unitate essentie trinitatern personarurn impugnant ac rursus ex diversitate personarum idemptitatern essentie 
oppugnare laborant'. TChr 111.89, p. 230.1143-6. For Abelard's rendering of the objections. see TSum 11.44-62, 
pp. 129-34; TChr 111.90-114, pp. 230-6. 
"TSum 11.44, p. 129; TChr 111.90, p. 230. 
86TSUM 11.46, p. 129; TChr 111.92, pp. 230-1. 
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three Persons. " These objections are restatements of Roscelin's original paradox: if 
there is absolute unity of substance, all three Persons must be incarnate (Sabellianism); 
or, if the Persons are really distinct, unity of substance cannot be binding (Arianism). 
Such questions surface constantly in subsequent writings. 
Logicians also find fault with the imprecision of traditional theological 
language, for example, the expression 'triune God'. According to the rules of normal 
language it should mean three gods or tl-wee substances since triune is simply an 
enumeration of three. 88 It does not make sense to say that there are three distinct 
Persons each of whom is substance and God, and not also say that there are three gods 
or three substances. Surely the two are simply different ways of saying the same thing, 
particularly since the plural noun is nothing other than the addition of its singulars. 89 
The question is why do we say three Persons and not three gods or three substances 
when each of the three Persons is that very same God and divine substance. 90 
Logical sense would also require that because 'the Father is God' and 'God is 
eternal', it follows 'the Father is eternal'. Similarly, it should follow 'the Father is 
God 9, 'the Son is God' and thus 'the Father is the Son'. 9' This rule must apply more 
particularly to God than to anything else since God is so uniquely singular. Just 
because, for instance, an individual man Socrates has many qualities and diverse forrns 
inhering in him, does not mean that he is many persons. Socrates is a single, concrete 
essence, not a universal and thus all statements predicated of him refer to the same 
substance. Yet in God, who is utterly simple and has nothing in common with 
composite forrns, there is this awkward distinction of Persons. The objection Abelard 
is here reporting ultimately asks: surely divine simplicity, the absence of forrns in God 
87TSum 11.47, pp. 129-30; TChr 111.93, p. 231. Cf. Atigustine, De trin. VII. 8, CCSL 50, pp. 257, PL 42.940-1; 
VIL 11, CCSL p. 262.28-30, PL 42.943: 'Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus sicut unam essentiam 
et unum deum, sed dicimus tres personas, curn tres deos aut tres essent essentias non dicarnus'. 
"TSum 11.52, p. 131; TChr 111.98, p. 232. 
'9TSum 11.53. p-131, TChr III. 100, p. 232. 
'OTSum 11.54, p. 131; TChr 111.101, p. 232. 
"TSum 11.59-61, pp. 132-4; TChr 111.106-8, p. 234. The ultimate source of this rule is Aristotle, Categoriev 3, 
p. 6 Ob 10-15), but it is firmly rooted in logical textbooks, esp. those connected with Boethius' De topicis 
differentibz. See Abelard's Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Rev. edition, Assen, 1970), p. 352.31-3; E. Stump, Dialectic 
and it,, z Place in the Dei, elopment of Medieml Logic (Cornell. 1988). 
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and the fact that even in created things all predicative statements refer to the same 
substance, require that the Father is identical with the Son. 'ne problem is again 
inspired by Roscelin's paradox that where Father and Son are the same unique and 
individual substance, if the Son is incarnate, so too is the Father. 92 
Since all of these objections derive from the same inability to accept a 
distinction of Persons compatible with an undivided substantial unity, Abelard 
responds to them all in more or less the same way. All of his answers are predicated 
on a theory of identity and difference which allows him to distinguish between 
93 
essence and Person. For much of this Abelard is indebted to Porphyry's Isagoge 
and Boethius' De trinitate. 94 Accordingly, the Persons are distinct not by substance, 
but by definition and proprium, just as a sword and a blade or this animal and this 
man have the same substance. 9' And since 'Person' and 'essence' do not have the 
same definition, it does not follow that there is one Person because one essence or 
three essences because three Persons. 96 It would be absurd to say that the Father is 
the Son because then we say that the proprium of the Father is the proprium of the 
Son, 'that is, to be the Father and to be the Son is the same thing by definition'. 97 
Apart from which, traditional usage forbids us to say thiS. 98 Furthermore, he says that 
argument from the predicate, which holds that when the predicate of a proposition is 
92 TSum 11.61, p. 134; TChr HI. 108, p. 2-34. 
93 TSum 11.81-102, pp. 141-50; TChr 111.137-63, pp. 246-55; 7Sch 11.94-100, pp. 44-6. Cf. Logica 'Nostrorum 
Petitioni', ed. Geyer, pp. 558-60. See Blackwell, Non-Ontological Constructs, pp. 210-15. On Abelard's use of 
essentia and substantia, see I Jolivet, 'Notes de lexicographie abOardienne', in Pierre Abilard, Pierre le 
Vinirable. Les courants philosophiqes, litt6raires et artistiques en occident au inilieu A XIIe siecle, Abbaye de 
Cluny 2-9 juillet 1972 (Paris 1975), pp. 542-3 who concludes that the two terms are used synonymously. 
9'Mews, * The Development of the neologia', p. 184. On the question of Abelard's influences, it is interesting 
to note that his approach is not unlike that found in a question on the Trinity attributed to his teacher, William of 
Champeaux. See 0. Lottin, Psychologie et inorale aux. YIIe et. YIIIe siecles, V, Probldmes de Phistoire littiraire: 
L'icole dAnsehne de Laon et de Guillautne de Chainpaux (Louvain, 1959), pp. 192-4. 
95TSum 11.103, p. 150.963-70: 'sicut eadem est substantia ensis et gladii vel huius hominis et huius animalis. 
Sunt tarnen ab invieern diverse persone, id est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ad similitudinem eorwn que diversa 
sunt secundum diffinitiones, eo videlicet quod, cum eadem pentius essentia sit pater que est filius vel spiritus 
sanctus, aliud tarnen proprium est patris, in eo scilicet quod pater est, et aliud filii et aliud spiritus sancti'. 
96TSuin 111.1 -4, pp. 157-8; TChr TV. 1-8, pp. 266-9. 
97TSum 111.29, p. 170.384-6. Cf. TChr IV. 34, p. 280.514-15 whereproprium has been replaced bypersona. 
9'TSum 111.33. pp. 171-2; TChr IVAL p. 283. 
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in turn the subject of another, it follows that its predicate may be joined to the subject 
of the first proposition, only applies in cases of essential identity, not identity of 
propria. 99 This concept of the propria of the Persons helps Abelard explain why the 
incarnation of the Son does not entail the incarnation of the other two Persons. There 
is a unity of operation of the Trinity in the world, in which some works (incarnation) 
are appropriated to particular Persons (the Son). 10" The doctrine usually noted as 
characteristic of Abelard is his attribution of the different propria of power, wisdom 
and goodness to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively. 101 But it is no less true 
that for Abelard the traditional mode of distinction for the Persons through the 
properties of unbegotten, begotten and proceeding is integral to his understanding of 
the doctrine. 102 It is in fact in these ten-ns that Abelard discusses the question of 
divine generation, thus moving closer to a resolution of the problem of unity and 
trinity in God. 
The problem with Abelard's solution, as contemporaries noted, was that it 
tended to reduce the Persons to mere aspects of the same reality. This is particularly 
true of Abelard's recurrent use of the analogy of the three grammatical persons which 
described the same individual according to different perspectives. 'O' Otto of Freising 
identifies a similarly inappropriate analogy in that of the three parts of a proposition 
(non bonis usus exemplis) as the grounds for Abelard's condemnation at Soissons in 
1121204 He attributes this Sabellianism, to Abelard's nominalism. '05 Otto's reading 
99TSum 111.41-2. p. 175; TChr rV. 56-7, pp. 289-90. 
'OOTChr IV. 68-9, pp. 296-7. Similarly, Hugh of Saint-Victor, De sacramends. PL 176.373-6; Walter of 
Mortagne. De trinitate, PL 209.58OC; Robert of Melun. Questiones de epistol& Pauli, ed. R. M. Martin, SSL 18 
(Louvain, 1938). pp. 26-7. 
'O'TSuin 11.103, p. 151.972-3: 'proprium est patris posse, filii discemere. spiritus sancti benignum esse'. 
102 TSuin 11.30, pp. 124-5; TSuin 11.104, p. 151.974-6: 'Propriwn etiam patris est a seipso esse, ut diximus, et 
coetemurn sibi filitim etemaliter gignere, filii gigni a solo patre, spiritus sancti procedere tantum ab utroque*; TSch 
11.102, p. 457.1513-16: 'licet eadem essentia sit pater et filitis aut spiritus sanctus, alia est tamen proprietas patris, 
secundum quod scilicet generat, alia filii secundtun quod generatttr, et alia spiritus sancti secundtim quod procedit'. 
103 TSuin 11.108-9. p. 153; Min 111.3, p. 158.46-50, TChr fV. 3, p. 267.47-53; TSum 111.22, p. 167.312-20; TChr 
IV. 26, p. 277.387-96. Criticised by Cardinal Laborans, 01)uscula, ed A. M. Landgraf, Florilegium Patristicurn 32 
(Bonn, 1932). p. 62.4-5: 'Ait enim: in g-rammatica unus idemque, tit Cicero, est persona prima et secunda et tertia 
ex alio atque alio. ' 
104 Gesta Friderici L hnperatorbz. Scriptores Rerum Germanicanim, MGH 46 (Hanover-Leipzig, 1912) 1.49, 
p. 69.25-7: 'Sicut eadem oratio est propositio. assumptio et conclusio, ita eadern essentia est pater et filitts et spiritus 
sanctus'. See Min 111.16. p. 165.245-9. 
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of the condemnation, however, bears little resemblance to Abelard's account. He is 
probably thinking less of the events at Soissons than of Bernard and William's more 
recent criticisms. In particular, his assertion that the Persons are not merely vacua 
nomina but res distinctas suggests this. "6 In addition, Otto's application of the 
expression reY distinctas to the Persons, so reminiscent of the erroneous doctrine 
attributed to Roscelin, reveals a fundamental lack of understanding of recent 
discussions. and the new sensitivity to the need for technical precision in language 
about God. 
4. Abelard'S dispute with Alberic of Reims on the Father's generation of the Son 
For Abelard the question of how the Son is begotten from the Father is perhaps 
the most crucial question in twelfth-century trinitarian theology. It constitutes the most 
significant obstacle to a coherent doctrine of trinity and unity in God. For only a 
satisfactory doctrine on divine generation can in the end account for a real and 
meaningful distinction among the Persons, since it is the act of generation which alone 
establishes the grounds for distinction. 
The importance of this undertaking is further underlined by the fact that the 
majority of trinitarian errors listed by Abelard derive from an inability to understand 
how the Persons can be distinct without this undermining divine unity and simplicity. 
The Son is consubstantial with the Father, a point which had been established since 
the fourth century. Also uncontroversial was that the Son was divine essence begotten 
from the Father, that is, the Son received his essence from the Father. 'flie unsettling 
question in the twelfth century, however, was how to distinguish in this respect 
between essence and Person. The inviolability of divine simplicity and unity seemed 
to require that whatever can be said of the Father can also be said of the Son on the 
grounds that both Father and Son possess the same essence, a train of thought leading 
105 Ibid., p. 69.19-20. The charge of Sabellianism is reasserted in the DTC 1,45-6 and 15.2.1713. though 
rejected by Cottiaux. 'La conception de la th6ologie', p. 810 and Jolivet. 'Sur quelques critiques', pp. 13-14. 
"'William, PL 180.253C, cites against Abelard's view that the names of the Persons are improperly applied 
to God, the assertion of Ambrose. Non sunt nuda hacc noinina. sed operatric& i-irtutbz indicia. 
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to Sabellianism. On the other hand, maintaining a rigid distinction between essence 
and Person held the danger of destroying divine simplicity in one way or another. 
It was Roscelin who had first formulated this paradox, with his proposition that 
if the three Persons were one thing the Father must be incarnate, or, if only the Son 
was incarnate, it followed that the three Persons were three distinct res. Another 
version of this failure to distinguish between different terms used to describe God 
arose at the Council of Soissons in 1121 and is mentioned in all versions of the 
Theologia: the view which Abelard attributes to Alberic of Reims (d. 1141) that 'God 
begot God' necessarily implies (1) 'God begot himself'; (2) 'substance begot 
substance ,. 107 Abelard's lengthy response to Alberic's position attempted to show 
that the Father's generation of the Son was not incompatible with a numerical unity 
of substance; that divine unity was not jeopardised by divine generation. In many 
ways, Abelard's semantic approach anticipates subsequent developments towards the 
theory of supposition. 
In his own bitter recollection of his condemnation at the Council of Soissons 
in 1121, Abelard accused his main opponents, Alberic and Lotulph of Lombardy, of 
acting purely out of jealousy. 108 He says that they struggled to find a genuine basis 
for a condemnation. As a last resort, they cited Abelard's allegedly exclusive 
attribution of omnipotence to the Father as sufficient grounds. '09 The condemnation 
itself does not seem to have been definitive, "O probably because such an apparatus 
did not yet exist. 
Abelard's rivalry with Alberic went back to their student days under Master 
Anselm of Laon (d. 1117). "' The public nature of disputation presented an ideal 
opportunity for an ambitious and confident student such as Abelard to make a name 
107TSUM 11.62, p. 134; TChr 111.109-111, pp. 235-6; IV-78. pp. 301-2; TSch 11.64, p. 440; H&t. calam., pp. 84-5; 
Sic et non, Q. 15, pp. 145-51. 
'"Hist calain., p. 83.708-10: 'Unde emuli mei vehementer accensi concilituii contra me congregaverunt, 
maxime duo illi antiqui insidiatores, Albericus scilicet et Lotulfus*. 
'09Hist. calam., p. 88.871-4: 'Ut tamen non nichil dicere viderentur. quidam de adversariis meis id 
submurmuravit quod in libro, scripturn. deprenderat solum patrem Deum omnipotentem esse'. Jolivet, 'Sur quelques 
critiques', p. 11 says there is no textual basis for the accusation. 
IIOMews. CCVf 13, pp-56-7. 
"'Luscombe. The School of Peter Abelard, pp. 179-81. 
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for himself by challenging the opinion of the master conducting the debate. ' 12 The 
result was that he had few friends. 
For his part, Alberic of Reims retained his master's emphasis on biblical 
exegesis. "' Although many sources testify to the fame and influence of his teacher, 
Anselm of Laon, the only writings which can be assigned with certainty to the latter 
are his scriptural commentaries. Nor can the collections of 'sentences' which have 
been attributed to various members of Anselm's school be necessarily relied upon as 
indicators of Alberic's own stance on particular issues. ' 14 Indeed, the whole question 
of a 'School of Laon' is notoriously problernatic, particularly the notion that a uniform 
and systematic approach to theology characterises the works of the school, if it may 
even be defined as such. ' 15 But even allowing for some common elements among 
these various writings, this is still not a secure basis for extrapolating methods and 
doctrines from them to assign to Alberic. Our knowledge of the composition of these 
texts does not permit this. Nor would it be of much use in relation to determining 
whether Alberic's dispute with Abelard had any precedent in teaching at Laon, for the 
simple reason that very few 'sentences' pertain to the Trinity, and none whatsoever 
112 J. ChAtillon, 'Ab6lard et les; Ecoles'. in Ab6lard et son temps, Acts du Colloque Internationale organis6 i 
Foccasion du 9e centenaire de la Naissance de Pierre AbOard. 14-19 Mai 1979 (Paris, 1981), 133-60. 
113j R. Williams, 'The Cathedral School of Reims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118-1136', Traditio 20 
(1964), pp. 97-100. 
'"The texts tend to take one of two forms; either collections of excerpts, of which some are attributed to 
Anselm of Laon Tiber Pancris&), or more tmiform compilations (Sententiae divinae paginae and Sententiae 
Ansebni). For the latter two, see Ansebns von Laon sisteinatische Sentenzen, ed. F. Bliemetzrieder, BGP7M 18 
(Miinster, 1919). Others may be found in various publications by 0. Lottin: 'Nouveaux fragments thWogiques de 
1'6cole d'Anselme de Laon I' RTAM 11 (1939), 242-59,305-23; 12 (1940). 49-77; 13 (1946), 202-21,261-81; 14 
(1947), 5-31,157-85; Psvchologie et morale V. 
115 On the one hand, see R. Silvain, 'La tradition des sentences d'Anselme de Laon', AHDLMA 16 (1947-48), 
1-52, who argues strongly in favour of there being a discernible structure to the writings in question, which he 
considers a function of their status as reporationes of Anselm's original Sentences. This argument was rejected by 
gested (pp. 444-5) instead that the uniformity of these works Lottin, Pvvchologie et morale V, pp. 178-83, who sug 
was due to their derivation from Anselm's biblical commentaries. More recently, see V. IJ. Flint, 'The "School of 
Laon": A Reconsideration'. RTAM 43 (1976), 89-110, who rejects the idea that any common approach is due to 
a school of Laon as such, but is a more widespread intellectual phenomenon. For a modification of this view, see 
M. L. Colish, 'Another Look at the School of Laon*. AIIDLMA 53 (1986), 7-22, who argues that the importance 
of the Laon texts lies not in their systematic approach, but in their application of techniques for the interpretation 
of conflicting authorities. 
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to the particular point of contention between Alberic and Abelard. ' 16 'Me orientation 
of these texts is overwhelmingly towards spiritual and sacramental questions. 117 
In a personal encounter which took place before the main session at Soissons. 
Alberic had confronted Abelard with his assertion in the TSum that even though 'God 
begot God' and God is unique, it did not follow that 'God begot himself'. ' 18 Abelard 
implies that this was merely another desperate ploy to find some valid basis for 
condemning his work. "9 In response to Alberic's demand that he produce some 
authority for this statement, Abelard was able to point to his own citation of 
Augustine's dictum that no thing begets itself. He then proceeded to show that 
Alberic's position led to the doctrine that the Father was his own son. In the TChr, 
Abelard explores further Alberic's line of reasoning. If God begot himself, it follows 
that a Person begot himself, which again is Sabellianism. 120 
Alberic also infers from the statement 'God begot God' that 'substance begot 
ý 121 substance . The guiding assumption here is the necessity to preserve divine 
simplicity. 'Substance begot substance', since the divine substance is unique, would 
in turn imply, says Abelard, that the same thing begot itself. But both reason and 
122 
authority reject this . 
In effect, Alberic's determination to preserve the identity of essence in God has 
led him into the age-old error of sacrificing the trinity of Persons to divine unity. In 
the twelfth century, though, as distinct from the third, the route to this error was 
through a failure to distinguish between the different significations of different words 
or the same words in different contexts on the assumption that to do so would 
undermine the identity of essence in God. Arguing from this principle, Alberic 
""The following is the closest printed by Lottin: 'Deus pater Deurn filium genuerit. non voluntate neque 
necessitate, sed natura'. See RTAM 13 (1946), p. 212. 
1170 
. Lottin, 'Notiveaux 
fragments tMologiques de F&ole d'Anselme de Laon', RTAM 14 (1947), p. 159. 
'135-6; IV. 78, pp. 301-2; TSch 11.64, p. 440. '"Hist. calain., pp. 84-5. Also TChr III. 110-11, pp. A. 
'"Hist. calain., p. 84.751-2: 'Quadam autem die, Albericits ad me animo intemptantis cum quibusdam discipuli 
suis accedens'. 
120 TChr IV. 110, p. 235. 
121 TSum 11.62. p. 134: TChr 111.109, p. 235. 
1 . 22 TSum 11.621, p. 134; TChr 111.109, p. 235 citing Augustine, De trin. I. 1, CCSL 50, p. 28.32-6, PL 42.820. 
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therefore identifies the terms 'God', 'substance' and 'Person' with one another without 
qualification. The importance of distinguisliing between the general meaning of words 
and their meaning in particular contexts is one of the governing principles of 
Abelard's response. 'God', 'substance' and 'Person' all denote the same thing, but 
they do not signify it in the same way. They cannot be substituted for each other 
indiscriminately merely because identity of essence in God requires that everything 
in God is identified completely with the divine essence. 
Abelard's approach to these interrelated problems takes the form of a theory 
of verbal signification which will allow a differentiation between how terms signify 
and the actual things which they signify. He is able to do this because he has liberated 
himself from the traditional analysis of universals in terms of genera and species in 
favour of a theory of predication based on Aristotle's principle that universals are 
those things which may be predicated of many subjects. 12' He is interested in how 
a sermo, a significant word, can be predicated of many things rather than in how it 
is that a universal inheres in many singular t1iings. In this way, he is able to avoid the 
problems which arise when conventionally nominalist or realist positions are taken 
with reference to the Trinity, for neither of these extreme positions could 
accommodate the unity-trinity balance. 124 
In his refutation of Alberic's position, Abelard adopts a number of analogies 
which convey the main point of this theory of signification. 125 In the TSum and the 
TChr these analogies consist of comparisons of the Father's generation of the Son to 
"'De interpretatione 7, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus 11 1-2 (Bruges-Paris, 1965), pp. 9-10. J. F. 
Boler, 'Abailard and the Problem of Universals', Journal of the Historv of Philosopkv 1 (1963), 37-51; J. Jolivet, 
Arts du langage et thdologie chez Abilard (Par-is, 1969). pp. 21-2,85-104, and 'Non-Rýalisme et Platonisme chez 
AbOard. Essai d'Interpretation', in Abilard etson temps, 75-95; Tweedale, Abailard on Universa&, p. 93, on which 
see, L. M. de Rijk, 'Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard. Some Criticisms of a Fascinating Venture', Vii, arium 23 
(1985), 81-97, L. M. de Rijk, 'The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the Problem of Universals'. in 
Petrus Abaelardus, 139-51; N. Kretzmann, 'The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter Abelard', in G. Constable 
and R. L. Benson edd., Renaissance and Reneual in the Tit, eýfth Centurv (Oxford, 1982), 488-511; Blackwell, Non- 
Ontological Constructs, p. 34; D. E. Luscombe, 'Peter Abelard, in P. Dronke ed., A Hbaory of Tuvoh-Century 
Western Philosop4v (Cambridge, 1988), 287-92. For Abelard's theory on universals, Philosophische Schriften, ed. 
Geyer, for the Logica 'Ingredientibus' Hft. 1-3. and his most mature solution in the Logica 'Nostroruin Petitioni 
Socioruin' Hft. 4. where only serinones not ioces are universals. 
'2'Blackwell. Non -Ontological Constructs, pp. 43-6. 
"Myn 111.51-87. pp. 179-95; TChr IV. 70-136. pp. 297-334, TSch 11.110-47, pp. 462-80. On the connection 
between Abelard's theory of signification and use of analogy, see G. R. Evans, 'Similitudes and Signification- 
Theory in the Twelfth Century, Doivnside Rei, ieu, 101 (1983), pp. 310-11. 
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that of a species from its genus, form from matter and a waxen statue from wax. In 
the TSCh this general format is retained, but the image of the waxen statue from wax 
is replaced by that of the bronze seal from bronze. '2' These comparisons are 
intended to demonstrate that the same terms can be predicated of each other both 
absolutely and relatively, that is indicating identity of essence and distinction of 
relation between two terms. 127 Thus in terms of identity, or absolute, it can be said 
that 'the waxen statue is wax' or 'the bronze seal is bronze', but in terms of relation, 
or relative, only that 'the waxen statue is from wax' and 'the bronze seal is from 
bronze'. 128 This is the same as saying that the Son is that which is the Father and 
is from the Father, but not that he is the Father; for just as the waxen statue is from 
the wax, but not therefore from itself, so the Son is from the Father, but not therefore 
from himself. 129 For this reason, when we wish to convey the notion of a 
relationship, rather than the identity of substance, the ten-ns in question cannot be 
predicated of one another absolutely, but only relatively. "O Otherwise the result is 
that something is from itself. 
The Father's generation of the Son is thus compared to examples from created 
things. For Abelard these analogies are valid because they reveal that identity of 
essence is compatible with some form of distinction through property even in created 
things. How much more, therefore, is this true of God. Abelard proceeds to adduce 
additional arguments which demonstrate that identity of essence does not unavoidably 
result in an absolute equivalence between two ten-ns in every respect. His aim here is 
"'mese analogies are adopted by works which belong to Abelard's school. See Sent. Florianenses, pp. 5,7; 
Sent. Hermanni, pp. 68,72-4, PL 178.1717,1720; SententieParisienses, ed. Landgraf, Ecrits thiologiques de Vicole 
d'Abglard, p. 9; Die Sentenzen Rolands, ed. A. M. Gietl (Freiburg, 1891), pp. 28-9; Robert of Melun, Questiones de 
epiýtolis Pauli, p. 27. 
127TSUM 111.54-61, pp. 180-3; TChr IV. 86-90, pp. 306-9; TSch 11.141-7, pp. 478-80. 
128TSCh 11.147, pp. 479-80: 'Sicut igitur in ere et ereo sigillo absoluta eorum nomina sibi per predicationern 
coniunguntur. quando videlicet eorum eandem esse substantiam demonstramus, veluti cum dicimus "es est ereurn 
sigillum" vel econverso, et similia, nec tamen eorum relativa nomina [... I sed non ipse pater est filius, scilicet sui, 
vel est spiritws sanctus, curn ipse videlicet pater non procedat ex patre, hoc est ex seipso vel filio sicut spiritus ex 
patre procedit sive filio. ' 
129TChr IV. 90, p. 309: 'eadern. inquam, proportionis ratione et in divinis personis neque Pater est Filius, hoc 
est Deus Pater genitus a se ipso, neque Filius est Pater. hoc est Deus Filius genitor siti ipsitis. ' 
"'Cf. Sent. divine pagine, pp. 9- 10: 'Cum autem dicatur vere: pater est idem quod f ilius, et e converso, non 
tamen vere dicitur: pater est filius; quod per tale simile confirmant sancti: splendor, radius et sol, ideo non tamen 
vere dicitur: radius est sol'. 
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to show that identity of substance does not mean that, where there is a distinction of 
relation, this amounts to saying that something begot itself. For instance, matter is to 
form as Father is to Son. Thus, relatively speaking, matter is not its own form, just 
as the Father is not the Son. The relationship is in each case one of begettor to 
begotten. "' No other conclusion is permissible on the grounds that no thing causes 
or begets itself. Matter and fon-n, begetter and begotten refer to one and the same 
thing in reality; but the Father is not the Son, not because Father and Son each denote 
a separate substance, but because the Father did not beget himself. 132 And thus the 
analogy of the wax and the waxen statue easily destroys the objection that the 
essential identity between Father and Son requires that if the Father begot the Son, the 
same thing begot itself. 13' For since the waxen statue which is said to be from the 
wax cannot be shown to be the same as it by definition, although it is numerically and 
essentially the same, we cannot say that the same thing is from itself. ' 34 Similarly 
with Father and Son which are distinct in terms of definition and property, though 
they are the same in essence, it does not follow from the fact that the Son is begotten 
from the Father that something is begotten from itself. 135 
Again Alberic might counter with the authority of the Nicene Creed, 'God 
from God' (dicis mihi quid Deus de Deo). 136 For since the word 'God' is a proper 
name indicating one undivided and singular substance, it must be conceded that 
131 Min 111.60-1, pp. 182-3; TChr IV. 89-90, p. 308, TSch 11.145-6, p. 479. 
132 TChr IV. 90, p. 308.1368-77: 'Eadern itaque ratione qua non licet dici quod materia ex se ipsa sit materiata, 
vel materiaturn sui ipsius sit materia, vel constituens sit constituturn ex se vel posterius se vel generans se, quarnvis; 
in talibus idern sit essentialiter materia quod materiaturn, velut hoc aes idern quod haec statua, et idern constituens 
quod constituturn, et idern pritts quod posterius. et generans quod generattun, - eadern, inquarn, proportionis ratione 
et in divinis personis neque Pater est Filius, hoc est Deus Pater genitus a se ipso, neque Filius est Pater, hoc est 
Deus Filius genitor sui ipsius'. 
133 TChr IV. 102, p. 315.1600-4: 'Quod vero obiectum est quod, quia idem si essentialiter Filius quod Pater et 
Pater generet Filium, idem generet se ipsum, hoc est quia Filius, ut diximus, est ex Patre, idem sit ex se ipso, - 
facile est quassari ex similitudine superius indticta, de cera videlicet atque cerea irnagine'. 
134 TChr IV. 102, p. 315.1619-21: 'non possit ostendi id quod dicitur esse ex illo idern esse definitione cum illo, 
non est ideo verum idern esse ex se ipso, etsi hoc idern sit essentialiter ac numero cum illo'. 
"'TChr [V. 102, p-316.1622-5: 'cum Pater et Filius diversi ab invicern sint tam definitione quarn proprietate, 
licet sint idem essentialiter, non est necesse tit. cum Filitts sit ex Patre vel generetur ex Patre, idem sit ex se vel 
generetur ex se 
136TSUM 111.62. p. 183; TChr IV. 103. p. 316. 
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something begot itself. 137 Abelard responds that God is distinct from God by 
definition or property according to the distinction of Persons. "' In the same way 
that one man is distinct from another by definition or property, but it does not follow 
from this that the same thing, man, is distinct from itself. Abelard discusses here very 
explicitly the problem of the signification of the word 'God' in a way which has a 
direct bearing on subsequent treatments of the same issue. In the expression 'God 
from God', the word 'God' has different meanings. Moreover, the placing of the 
preposition 'de', which indicates a relation between begetter and begotten, between 
'God' and 'God' shows that the Persons rather than the substance are being 
indicated. "9 This is possible because of the context, and because words are often 
transferred from their normal signification to another. 140 It is not so amazing, then, 
that in the Creed a common name such as 'God' should take on the properties of 
personal names. 141 In the context of Alberic's objection Abelard has to show that 
this transference has taken place. Alberic's contention is that 'God' signifies the divine 
essence or substance and since this is unique and individual, 'God begot God' 
necessarily implies 'substance begot substance' and 'something begot itself'. But if 
Abelard can show that in the expression 'God from God', the word 'God' does not 
signify substance but Person, he has destroyed the entire premise of Alberic's 
argument. 'niis is precisely how subsequent authors will proceed in their treatment of 
the same problem. 
In this way Abelard is able to preserve the identity of essence between the 
three Persons, thus maintaining divine simplicity, and at the same time allow for the 
distinction of the Persons through their properties. As Jolivet, defending Abelard's 
analogies from William of Saint-I`hierryýs criticisms, writes: 
137TSUM 111.62, p. 183.768-71; TChr IV. 103, p. 316.1626-32. 
138 TChr IV. 103, p. 316.1638-9. 
13'TSum 111.62. p. 183. 
140 TSuin 111.62, p. 184.782-3: 'Sepe autem voces ex adiunctis a propria significatione evocantur ad aliam'. 
"'TSuin 111.65, p. 185.824-6: 'Qtiid ergo mirum si in simbolo fidei conisnune nomen trium personarum, quod 
est deus vel lurnen. ex appositis transeat in significationern personalitim norninum'. 
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Abklard cherchait A opposer aux 'pseudo-di alectic lens' une structure logique qui fasse s'unir identit6 
et diff6rence dans un m6me sujet, tout en incluant un rapport d'origine entre les deux termes 
diff6rents. "2 
Abelard's theory of absolute and relative predication and his insistence that two things 
may denote the same substance without this implying absolute equivalence in terms 
of either one's special distinguishing property was an attempt to answer the questions 
of logicians. This semantic approach anticipates the later distinction between 
signýficatio and suppositio. Moreover, Abelard's treatment of Alberic's doctrine set the 
terms for the debate on one of the key questions in this area, whether divine essence 
(or substance) begot divine essence. His devastating refutation of Alberic's view that 
'God begot God' implies 'substance begot substance' was borrowed by subsequent 
authors and quickly became established as the prevailing orthodoxy in the schools. 
This argument was to have an exceptionally long life-span. It became so entrenched 
in academic thought on the Trinity that it proved to be the key talking point in 
thirteenth-century interpretations of the Fourth Lateran Council's statement on the 
doctrine. 
""Sur quelques critiques', p. 31. 
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IV PETER LOMBARD'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE AND ITS 
CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE 
The heated debates and personal exchanges which characterised the first half 
of the twelfth century tailed off during the second. This change in tone and intensity 
was partly a consequence of the replacement of one generation of theologians by 
another, the early pioneers by their successors. Another factor in the shift to a more 
structured and impersonal approach was the institutionalisation of study itself, 
particularly the increasing authority of the master and pivotal role of the quaestio 
technique. hi this chapter I wish to consider a further aspect, strongly interrelated to 
these two: the role of Peter Lombard's Sentences as a common source in the academic 
study of theology and as a text which infon-ns the structure of virtually all subsequent 
scholastic theological writings, irrespective of any notional allegiance of the authors 
to a particular master or 'school . 
The Sentences both reflected this tendency towards greater convergence in 
method and doctrine among theologians and at the same time were an agent in this 
process. 'Mere is no denying the work's central role, intellectually and chronologically, 
in opening the way to the doctrinal consensus of the later twelfth century. Its universal 
adoption as a theological reference work was a necessary precondition for the 
emergence of this consensus before 1215. In particular, the Lombard's concept of the 
essence as a quaedam summa res, and his related position that the essence does not 
beget, were at the centre of the Fourth Lateran Council's clarification of the doctrine. 
For the Lombard, as for Abelard, there is an implicit link between the doctrines of 
divine unity (of essence) and divine generation (not of essence) which is reflected in 
the Lateran decree itself. His position that unity of essence (quaedam sunima res) 
precludes the generation of the essence is cited in the decree and is the immediate 
cause of thirteenth-century misinterpretations. But it is also, paradoxically, the reason 
why these very same authors may be justified in their interpretation. 'Ihey almost 
exclusively discuss the question of the generation of the essence and ignore that of the 
quaedam sumnia res, but the strong connection between these two issues in the 
Sentences gave tlienn reason to think this a legtnate way of approaching the decree. 
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Peter Lombard was bom in Lombardy but made his name in France. ' In about 
1134, Bernard of Clairvaux. wrote to Gilduin, Abbot of Saint-Victor in Paris, telling 
him that the Lombard was travelling to northern France to study at the schools of 
Reims and Paris (moraretur in Francia causa studi) and entrusting him to his care. 2 
In the same letter, he explained that he had been asked by the Bishop of Lucca to act 
as the Lombard's guardian during his stay in France. This detail is of considerable 
interest for the Sentences themselves, since one of the work's most important sources 
is the anonymous Summa Sententiarum which may have been written by Otto, Bishop 
of Lucca (1138-1146). ' The Lombard's recommendation by Otto's predecessor, 
Hubert (1128-1137), is concrete evidence of his link with the town. Together with the 
Lombard's extensive borrowings from the Summa Sententiarum this suggests that if 
Otto is its author, the Lombard probably studied under him at Lucca. 4 
Peter was probably drawn to Reims by its international reputation for 
theological study, particularly under the aegis of Alberic of Reims who taught there 
until 1136. ' During his period at Reims, the Lombard may also have heard Walter of 
Mortagne, from whom he was also to borrow, lecture at nearby Laon. 6 From Reims, 
the Lombard went to Paris where he stayed until his death in 1160.7 Before his 
appointment as Bishop of Paris in 1159, he was first a canon, then a subdeacon and 
8 finally an archdeacon of Notre-Dame. in the period up to 1159, he taught at the 
school of Notre-Dame and wrote his three major works, the Glossa in Psalmos (c. 
'I. Brady in his prolegonema to Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi, Scntentiae in IV Libris 
Distinctae 1, Spicilegiurn Bonaventuram, Collegi S. Bonaventurae (Grottaferrata. 1971), p. 10*. 
2 Ep. 410, Opera VIII, p. 391.10, PL 182.619A. For the dating see D. Van den Eynde. 'Essai chronologique sur 
l'oeuvre litt&aire de Pierre Lombard', Mbzcellanea Loinbardiana (Turin, 1957), pp. 52-3. 
'F. Gastaldelli, Ta Summa Sententiärum di Ottone da Lucca. Conclusione di im dibattito scolare', Salesianuin 
42 (1980), 537-46. 
'Ibid., pp. 542-3. 
Villiams. 'The Cathedral School of Reims'. p. 102. Alberic himself, however, does not seem to have exerted 
a major influence, at least not on the Lombard's trinitarian theology. 
'L. Oll, 'Walter von Mortagne und Petnis Lombardus in ihrem Verhältnis ziteinander', Milanges Joseph de 
Ghellinck, S. J 2 vols. (GemblotLx, 195 1) 11,647-97; Bradv, prolog.. p. 14*. 
'Ibid.. p. 4ý 
'I. Brady, 'Peter Lombard: Canon of Notre-Dame'. RTIII 32 (1965). 277-95 and prol(ý, q.. pp. -)4*-5*. 
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1138), the Glossa in epiml(V Pauli (after 1-148)' and the Sentences (1155-57). 'o 
1. The Sentences: sources, organisation and niethods of interpretation 
Peter Lombard's Sentences consist of a series of quaestiones divided into four 
books according to subject. The first book deals with the Trinity and God's 
foreknowledge and omnipotence, the second with creation and original sill, the third 
with the incarnation and the fourth with the sacraments. The quaestio technique used 
by the Lombard depended on the juxtaposition and critical reading of authoritative 
texts with a view to reconciling any contradiction in them, the so-called sic-et-non 
technique developed by Abelard. Because quaestiones are the basic units which 
collectively make up the work, the sources which they draw upon are absolutely 
fundamental to its entire organisation. Furlher, the Lombard's arrangement of these 
quaestiones is by no means arbitrary; there is, at least in the first book, a discernible 
conceptual progression. Finally, the methods of interpretation which the Lombard 
adopts in his solutions again lead us back to his sources, since his solutions usually 
depend upon how he clarifies the sense of a particular passage. 
The sources of the Sentences fall into two general categories: scriptural and 
patristic sources on the one hand, and contemporary authors on the other. But ancient 
texts were often drawn from contemporary writings which cited them rather than 
directly from the original work. It is often important to identify the immediate context 
from which a passage is taken as this may help in clarifying the Lornbard's own use 
of it. The Lombard certainly used original works as his pioneering use of the recently 
translated (c. 1154) De fide orthodoxia of John Damascene demonstrates. " At the 
same time, his selection and interpretation of sources was also deten-nined by their 
most recent usage. 
Wid.. pp. 82*-8* disagrees with D. Van den Eynde's dating to 1142. Eynde had inferred this from his datin 19 
of one of Gerhoch of Reichersberg's works in which the Lombard's commentary is mentioned. See L'oeuvre 
litt6raire dc G&och de Reichersberg, Spicilegium Pontificii Athenai Antoniani 11 (Rome. 1957), p. 76. 
'OBradv. prolog., p. 32*. 
"Defidc orthodo. via: Versions qfBurgundio and Cerhanus. ed. E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, 
Text Series 8 (New York, 1955). 
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Of all patristic authors, Augustine is by far the most often cited. Some would 
even 90 so far as to call the Sentences a compilation of Augustinian citations. 12 
Accordingly, the Lombard's Augustinianism guarantees his orthodoxy. A more 
accurate picture balances the importance of Augustine's authority against Peter 
Lombard's selective use of it. " But apart from anything else, the structure of the 
Sentences bears little resemblance to the De trinitate; Augustine's three-fold division 
of scriptural proofs, rational proofs and the image of the Trinity in man is not adopted 
by the Lombard. Indeed the entire second half of the De trinitate, where Augustine 
discusses and refines his argument about the image of the Trinity in man, has been 
condensed by the Lombard into a few chapters at the beginning of the work. 14 In 
addition, the Lombard's citations indicate a strong preference for the middle section 
of the De trinitate, where Augustine meets Arian objections to the consubstantiality 
of Father and Son with a series of rational arguments and justifications. Clearly, this 
was the approach which made the most sense to anyone involved, as was Peter 
Lombard, in the twelfth-century schools. 
Most of the authoritative texts cited by Peter Lombard had already been cited 
in previous works, such as seventh-century Spanish collections or anonymous 
florilegia. 15 But contemporary theological writings unquestionably account for the 
vast majority of the Lombard's citations in Book 1. These include the Decretum (c. 
1093) and Panormia (c. 1094) of Ivo of Chartres, 16 Gratian's Decretum (1140), 17 
"F. Cavallera. 'Saint Augustin et le Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard', Archives dephilosophie 7 (1930), 
438-51. Also J. de Ghellinck, Le inouvement thiologique du -YIIe siecle (2nd edition; Bruxelles- Paris, 1948), p. 242. 
"P. Stella. 'A proposito dell'autoritA di S. Agostino nelle Sentenze di Pietro Lombard', in Miscellanea 
Lombardiana. 89-101. 
"Uent. III. 2-3, pp. 71-6. See S. Otto, Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes in der Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts, 
BGPTM40.1 Minster. 1963), pp. 202-6 on the unremarkability of the Lombard's discussion. This cursory treatment 
was common practice in the twelfth century. See Hugh of Saint-Victor. De sacrainentiý, PL 176.225; Walter of I Mortagne, Tractatus de trinitate. PL 209.584-5; Suinina Sententiaruin, PL 176.51. 
"De Ghellinck. Lc mouvewnt thjologique, pp. 1 16-18. Onflorilegia, see M. A and R. H. Rouse, 'Florilegia of 
Patristic Texts', in Les genres littiraires dans les sources thiologiques et philosophiques midiivales. Difinition, 
critique et exploitation, Actes du Colloque intemational de Lotivain-la-Netive 25-27 mai 1981 (Lotivain-la-Netive. 
1982), 165-80. 
"PL 161.59-1036 and 1041-1344. See de Ghellinck. Le mouvement thiologique, pp. 446-55. On Ivo. see P. 
Fournier and G. Le Bras, Hi, -ztoire des collection-v canoniquev en occident (Paris, 1931-32), pp. 55-114. 
17pL 187. 
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and the biblical gloss generally known as the Glossa or(linaria. " Bv far and away 
the most important, however, are Abelard*s Sic et non and Theologia and the 
anonymous Sunima Sententiarum. 
The sarne works which provide the Lombard with many of his scriptural and 
patristic citations also have the strongest bearing on the structure and content of the 
Sentences. When the Lombard takes on an entire block of citations he is often also 
adopting the very concept governing the use of those same passages in his source. 
This is certainly the case with his wholesale borrowing from Abelard of a series of 
scriptural passages which, like his source, he employs as New Testament proofs for 
the Trinity. Much the same could be said of the Lombard's extensive borrowings from 
the anonymous Summa Sententiarum, written in 1138-41, which is one of the most 
important sources for his trinitarian doctrine and was probably the most important 
reference work before the Sentences. " The Suninia was once thought to be the work 
of Hugh of Saint-Victor, but an ernerging scholarly consensus points instead to Otto, 
Bishop of Lucca, probably one of Peter Lornbard's teachers . 
20 The author also shows 
an ambivalence to Abelard not unlike the Lornbard's own. 2' 
'8PL 113-114. Generations of scholars attributed the Glossa to Walafrid Strabo (d. 849) under whose name it 
is printed by Migne, until B. Smalley argued that the Glossa is a collaborative work mainly put together by Anselm. 
of Laon. She thus also rejected the argument of H. H. Glunz, History of the Vulgate in Englandfroin Alcuin to 
Roger Bacon (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 213-15 that Peter Lombard had been responsible for arranging the Glossa in 
its final form. See 'Gilbertus Universalis, Bishop of London Q 128-34), and the Problem of the Glossa Ordinaria', 
RTAM 7 (1935), 235-62 and 8 (1936), 24-60; 'La Glossa Ordinaria. Quelques prýd6cesseurs d'Anselme de Laon', 
RTAM 9 (1937), 365-400; The Studv Ql'the Bible in theMiddleAges Ord edition; London, 1983), pp. 46-66, which 
summarizes the earlier articles. See also G. R. Evans. The Language and Logic of the Bible: The E-arlier Middle 
Ages (Cambridge. 1984), pp. 37-47. A recent challenge to this view was issued by E. Bertola, 'La Glossa Ordinaria 
biblica ed i suoi problemi'. RT4M 45 (1978). 34-78, refuted by R. Wielockx. 'Autour de la Gloss Ordinaria', 
RTAM 49 (1982), 22ý-& 
"'De Ghellinck, Le itioui, eiiient thiologique, p. 197. B. Geyer ed., Die Sententiae DAInitatis. Ein Sentenzbuch 
der Gilbertschen Schule, BGPTM 7 (Münster, 1909), pp. 10- 11; Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 198. 
For the Suinina's wide circulation, see de Ghellinck. pp. 201-2. On sources and influence, see Grabmann, Die 
Geschichte der scholästischen Methode II, pp. 301-9; A. M. Landgraf, Introduction ä l'histoire de la littirature 
thd§ologique de la scolastique naissante. Universitý de Montrýal: Publications de Finstitut d'&udes mýdiývales 22 
(Montrýal-Paris, 1973), pp. 98-102, L. Ott. 'Die Trinitätsrhat Walters von Mortagne als Quelle der Summa 
Sen, tentiaruin'. Scholastik 18 (1943), 78-90,219-39; A. Grillmeier, 'Fulgentius von Ruspe, Defide ad Petruin und 
die Suinma Scntentiaruin. Eine Studie zum Werden der frühscholastichen SyStematik'. Scholastik 34 (1959)ý 526-65. 
10 ý R. Baron. >Note stir l'ýnigmatique Summa Seiitei? tiaruiti*. RTAM 25 (1958). 26-41; 0. Lottin. 'A propos des 
sources de la Sumina Sententiaruin'. RTM 25 (1958). 42-58; Gastaldelli. Ta Suinma Sententiarum di Ottone da 
Lucca'. 
2'Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard. pp. 207-13 who revises the old view of de, Ghellinck, Le moui-cment 
thiolo, friquc, p. 197 and others that the Summa represents Ie confluent des deux courants ' of Abelard and the school 
of Saint- lv'ictor. 
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It is now well-established that the Sunin7a was the pivotal contemporary source 
22 for the Lombard's trinitarian doctrine. Again, as with Augustine, the way round the 
charge of plagiarism was to qualify the nature, if not the extent, of the Lombard's 
borrowing, by emphasizing his shrewd principles of selection and the improvements 
lie often makes upon his source. 
Peter Lombard's extensive borrowing from contemporary authors and. through 
them, of oft-cited patristic texts, allowed the transmission of many of the same 
r 
23 questions and arguments from the first to the second half of the twelfth centun . 
The assimilation of these early debates into the Sentences provided a link between the 
early and later parts of the century so that we can truly speak of continuity in twelfth- 
century trinitarian theology. 
The Lombard himself conceived of the work as a useful collection of texts. 24 
Indeed, after the Sentences there was very little new research on the Church Fathers 
until the later thirteenth century. )ý Again, the notion of the Sentences as a work of 
compilation raises the familiar spectre of plagiarism, the lazy regurgitation of other 
26 people's work . But given centuries of accumulated and unsorted material on every 
conceivable theological issue intelligent plagiarism was understandably a highly valued 
commodity in the twelfth century. The Sentences were considered a prototype of 
27 thirteenth-century compilationes . The use of the third person passive and the 
2' H. Weisweiler, 'La Summa Sententiaruin, source de Pierre Lombard', RTAM 6 (1934), 159-86; L. Ott, 'Die 
Trinit5tslehre der Suinina sententiaruin als Quelle des Petnis Lombardus*, Dij, us Thoinas 21 (1943), 159-86. 
"Ibid.. pp. 179-85 for the Lombard's use of patristic authorities found in the Suinina. 
2'See prologus, Sent., p. 4.23-6: 'brevi voltimine complicans Patrum sententias. appositis eonim testimonlis, tit 
non sit necesse quaerenti libromm numerositatern evolvere. cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore. ' 
25 See J. de Ghellinck, Tatristique et argtunent de tradition au bas moyen äge*, in Aus der Geisteswelt des 
Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Marlin Grabinann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern 
gewidmet 2 vols., BGPTM Supplementband Ill (Münster, 1935) 1, p. 41 1. 
26 A. Piltz. The World of Medieval Learnbý? (1978; trans. Oxford, 1981), p. 87 goes a bit far when, in an 
otherwise useffil summary, he describes the Sentences as 'a more ambitious version of a florilegium'. On the 
concept of originality and genius, see J. Stillinger, Multip7le Author,, zhij,? and the AtIlh of Solitarr Genius (New 
York-Oxford, 1991) who questions the whole notion of a single author which dominates all discussions ot the 
subject , vhether from the point of view of the 'death' or the 'deification' of the author. 
'A. J. Minn is, 'Late-medieval discussions of coinj. Watio and the role of the coptl; ilator', Bcitreý! ýezurGe. ýzchichte 
dcr deutschcn Sl; rache und Literatur 101 (Tfibingen, 1979), p. 394. N. Hathaway, 'Comj. Watio: From Plagiarism 
to Complliniz% Viator 20 (1989), 19-44 argues that coinjiflatio is not simply a thirteenth-century phenomenon. but 
one dating back to late antiquity. In the thirteenth century it is not a new 'genre'. so much as a more widespread 
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profuse citation of patristic authorities engenders an impersonality which tends to draw 
attention away from the author to the authorities which lie cites . 
2' But as well as 
amassing this vast quantity of material, the Lombard had to find some way of making 
it accessible to his readers-, an organizing principle which corresponded to the need for 
a rational rather than an arbitrary ordering of theological questions. 'nie Sentences 
were not the first attempt in the twelfth century at a systematic treatment of the entire 
gamut of theological issues. But the Lombard's plan was not strictly modelled on any 
single predecessor, whether theologian or canon lawyer. 29 
As a work of synthesis, the Sentences are often seen as bringing together and 
reconciling the different strands in twelfth- century theology, particularly the 
speculative and the symbolic. Espenberger inaugurated this thesis when lie defined the 
Lombard's theology as a middle way between fideism and rationalisi-n. 'o This 
assessment of the Lombard's cautious moderation has dominated subsequent 
scholarship. " According to de Ghellinck: 
En m6me temps qu'elle tirait parti de cette soif de recherche et de sp6culation, qui caract6risait le r6veil 
intellectuel de son 6poque, elle gardait une attitude fort r6serv& vis-A-vis de toute curiosit6 indiscrýte. 
Ces deux caract6ristiques lui faisaient tenir une sorte de i4a inedia entre les divers courants qui se 
parlageaient les esprits. En outre, comme nous Favons d6jA ýisinu&, le manque d'originalit& dans 
beaucoup de parties et l'ind6cision du Magister dans un certain nombre de questions, qu'il ne faut 
pourtant exag6rer, faisaient de son livre un excellent th&me ý legons, ofi pouvait se donner carri&re 
Pinterpr6tation des commentateurs. Compare aux affirmations tranch&es d'Ab6lard, ou aux 6nonc6s tr6s 
fermes de Gilbert de la Porr6e, aux pages toutes personnelles de Hugues de Saint-Victor, l'ouvrage de 
Pierre Lombard offrait de prime abord des ressources precieuses pour la facilit6 du commentaire. 32 
'literary activity'. 
28C. Viola, 'Manieres personnelles et impersonnelles d'aborder un problýme: Saint AtilIgustin et le XII siMe. 
Contribution A Fhistoire de la Quaestio', in Les genres litt6raires. 11-30; Minnis, 'Late-medieval discussions of 
compilatio'. p. 389. 
29De Ghellinck, Le inouveinent thiologique, pp. 416-510 proposed the idea that the codification of canon law 
was an essential ingredient in the composition of the Sentences. 
"J. N. Espenberger, Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus und ihre Stellung in zlt, 64(ten Jahrhundcrt, BGPTM 
3.5 (Munster, 1901), p. 104. 
"Grabmann. Die Geschichte der scholastivchen Methode II, p. 372; A. Gambaro. '11 valore dell'opera di Pier 
Lombardo': L. Ott, 'Pietro Lombardo: Personalita e Opera', S. V. Rovighi, 'Pier Lombardo e la Filosofia 
Medioevale'; E. Bertola. 'La dottri-na trinitaria in Pietro Lombardo', all in Mi, ýzcellanea Loinhardiana; also E. 
Bertola. *11 problema di Dio in Pier Lombardo', Rivista di Flo. ýfia neo-scolastica 48 (1956), 135-50; P. Delhaye, 
Pierre Loinhard. Sa vie, ses oeuvres. ýýa inorale (Paris -Montr6al. 1961); Courth. Trinitdt in der Scholastik, p. 80; 
B. Mondin. A Hbaorv (? I'Mcdiaeval Philosoj)ýv. Subsidia urbania 45 (Rome, 1991). p. 260. 
32 Le mouventent thjol(ýgique, pp. -244-5. 
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This hits the nail on the head. De Ghellinck subscribes to the via media thesis, but 
goes much further when he argues that this very moderation, or rather a noll ý-mit,,, % oil 
the part of Peter Lombard, i-neant that contemporaries now possessed a source book 
of arguments from a number of points of view, rather than a collection of one manýs 
opinions. Theologians wanted a series of arguments with which to engage, not a litany 
of personal opinions. 33 
The Lombard's method in relaying these arguments is essentially that of 
Abelard's sic-et-non method, where great stress is placed on the role of diverse 
signification. in the resolution of apparently contradictory texts. 4 This explains the 
prominence of the verbs videtur 3 -' and intelligitur" in the Lombard's explanations; 
the seeming contradiction between two authoritative texts arises when insufficient 
attention is paid to the meaning of a word in a particular context; but every 
problematic text can be understood in such a way that its true meaning is brought to 
the surface. This juxtaposition of seemingly discordant authorities lies at the root of 
the quaestio technique. 37 
The origins of the quaestio have been variously identified in the disputations 
of secular law students at Bologna ; 38 the practices of Islamic law, which could have 
"Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholästischen Methode II, p. 405: 'Indem er spek-tilativer Denker mehr in den 
Fragen als in den Anworten ist, hat er den Kommentatoren züi eigenem Nachdenken reichen Spielraum gegeben. ' 
34 See Abelard, Sic et non, prologus, pp. 89-104, esp. p. 96.185-7: 'Facilis autern plerumque controversarium 
solutio reperietur si eadem verba in diversis significationibus a diversis auctoribus posita defendere poterimus '. For 
full discussion, Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholmabýchcn Methode 11, pp. 378-84. 
35 ISent. V. 1, p. 82.4-5: 'Huic autem videtur contrarium quod Augustintis ait; ibid., p. 82.23-4: 'Praedictis autem 
videtur esse contrarium quod dicit'; ibid., p. 83.4: 'Deten-ninatio eonu-n qtiae videntur contraria'. 
36 For example. Uent. V. 1, p. 82.12: 'Ad quod respondernus, illa verba sic intelligenda esse dicentes'; ibid., 
p. 83.10: 'Qttod autem ita intelligi debeat', ibid., p. 84.15: 'Quornodc, sint intelligenda praernissa verba Hilarii'; ibid., 
p. 86.28-9: *Vehementer movent nos haec verba; quae qttomodo intelligenda sint'. 
De Rijk. La philosolMie. pp. 96-8. On authors and councils accepted as authoritative in the middle ages, see 
Ivo of Chartes. Panorinia. PL 161.1101-16. 
"'H. Kantorow-icz, 'The Quaestiones dispwatae of the Glossators', Rei, ue d'histoire A droit 16 (1939). 1-67; 
Landgraf, Introduction, p. 24 accepts that the quaestio technique developed in law before theology, but does not 
commit himself to any causal influence. Most recently. see G. Fransen, 'Les questions dispute6 dans les facult6s 
de droit', in B. C. BazAn et a]., Les questions disjmtecs et Ics questiones quodlibitiqucs dans les 
Ifacultis 
de 
Wologie. tic (Iroit et ýIe niýdecinc, Typolo. Je des sources du moven ý-e occidental -44-45 (Turnhout. 1985). ""5-77. 
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been transmitted to the West via Byzantium or Spain ; 3' and the increased availability 
of Aristotle's logical works, known collectiveiv as the Organon. " Aristotle's 
Categories and De interpretatione, Porphyry's Isagoge and Boethius' commentaries 
and own logical works (logica i,, etus) were already becoming more widely available 
in the eleventh century. 41 In addition, t-wel fth -century translations of the Prior and 
Posterior Anaýýtics, the Topics and the De sophiýticis elenchis Yogica no i, a) may have 
provided theologians with a more sophisticated apparatus for developing methods of 
argumentation. 42 The problem of origins is compounded by tile fact that tile act of 
asking questions is of course not historically specific to twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
scholastic theology, but is inherent in human nature, and the medieval method has 
precedents in antiquity. 4' But rather than being the result of some external stimulus, 
the quaestio technique was much more the product of the critical reading to which 
44 theologians began to subject their sources. Their readiýng of the works of Aristotle 
'9G. Makdisi, 'The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: an Inquiry into its Origins in Law and 
Theology', Sjxculuin 49 (1974), 640-61. For criticism of Mak-disi's thesis, especially his lack of concrete evidence 
of transmission, see Price, Medieial Thought, pp. 137-8. 
400n Aristotle's Organon, see W. and NI. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), pp. 23-112-, 
Marenbon. Earli, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 20-34. 
41 On the availability of the logica vetus in the ninth to eleventh centuries, see M. Haren, Medielal Thought 
The Western Intellectual Traditionfroin Antiquity to the 7hirteenth Centurv (2nd edition, London. 1992), pp. 88-9. 
The standard version of the Categories used from the tenth to the sixteenth century was not Boethius's translation, 
but one made at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries. See L. Minio-Paluello, 01. )uscula. The Latin Aristotle 
(Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 35-6. That the logica i, etus was truly conceived as an integral whole, at least from the 
twelfth century, is suggested by the common occurrence of Aristotle's Categories and De interl)retatione along 
with Porphyry's Isagoge in the same manuscript. See, J. Isaac, Le Peri Herineneias en Occident de Bo&e d Saint 
Thomas. Bibliothýque Thomiste 29 (Paris, 1953), pp. 38-9. 
42 For the translations of the logica noia, see B. D. Dod. *Aristoteles Latinus', in N. Kretzmann et al., 77ze 
Cambridge Histori, of Later Medieial Philosoj)ký, (Cambridge, 1982), 45-79; Minio-Paluello, Olmscula, esp. 
pp. 205-15 on James of Venice. On the translation of Aristotle in the wider context of the twelfth-century work of 
translation, see M. -T. d'Alverny, 'Translations and Translators'. in Constable and Benson edd., Rcnaissance and 
Reneival, 421-62. Certainly, a passage in John of Salisbury's Metalogicon seems to suggest that Aristotle's Toj, 7ics 
at least were an indispensable tool in effective argumentation. Metalogicon 111.10, ed. C. I. Webb (Oxford, 1929), 
p. 154. 
4'For the quaestio as both a scholarly exercise and a method of teaching in ancient Greece, see P. Hadot, *La 
pr6histoire des genres litt6raires philosophiques rnýdi6vaux dans I'AntiquiW, in Les genres littiraires. 1-9. For the 
quacstio as Ia passion de Yhomme de tout savoir', see Viola. 'Mani&es personnelles et impersonnelles', in ibid.. 
p. 14. 
4-"T'here is no really dramatic increase in copies of the Catezories, De intupretatione and Isagoge tint il the early 
thirteenth century. Nvell after the establishment of a dialectical method of questioning. See Isaac. Le Peri 
Hennencias, p-36 for the De interIvetatione. Isaac's research has been expanded upon , vith similar conclusions for 
the Categories and the lsaaoae by 0. Leivry. 'Boethian Logic in the Medieval West'. in NI. Gibson ed.. Boethius. 
His Lý1ý, Thou, ý, ht and IqlZuence (Oxford, 1981), pp. 103-4. Scholastic inethod was already well-dcfined before the 
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and Boethius, far from being a passive reception of already developed techniques, NN'as 
a productive process by which they read their own assumptions into their sources. 45 
The most distinctive feature of theological questions is this link between qu(icstio and 
lectio. 46 Hence the central importance of authoritative texts in the framing of 
questions since the practice of lectio, the use of dialectic to isolate and solve problems 
of meaning, was an extremely rich source of questions. 47 As Landgraf wrote many 
years ago, '11 ilýy a aucun doute que les questions se ranachaient d cette lectio . 
48 The 
widespread practice of the quaestio and its unifying role in academic theology will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The Lornbard's semantic approach and his application of the quaestio tecl-i-nique 
is highlighted particularly well in his treatment of various questions oil the Holy 
49 Spirit. One problem is why the Holy Spirit is called caritas and amor, when the 
Trinity as a whole is caritas and amor. -50 The apparent contradiction is one raised by 
the juxtaposition of a series of passages from Augustine's De trinitate. That the Holy 
Spirit is the love or charity of the Father and the Son is shown by Augustine's 
statement that the Father and the Son love one another through the Holy Spirit. 51 On 
the other hand, 'God is charity' (I Jh 4,16). Augustine himself provides the key to 
advent of the logica nova. See J. A. Endres, 'Ober den Ursprung und die Entwicklung der scholastischen 
Lehremethode', Philo-vophisches Jahrbuch 2 (1889), 52-9; de Rijk, La philosophie, p. 98. 
45 An excellent example is Gilbert of Poitiers . vho, in his commentaries on Boethius' Opusculd sacra, 
understands Boethius' intention to solve the question of the Trinity to be an actual quaestio. See J. Marenbon, 
'Gilbert of Poitiers', in Dronke ed.. A Histog QfTwelfih-Centurv iýcstern Philosoj, 74v% pp. 332-3. 
46 On lectio, see 0. Weijers, Terininolo, -ie des universite, ýz au XIII sidclc, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 39 
(Rome, 1987), pp. 324-5. B. C. BazAn, 'Les questions disputýes, principalement dans les facult6s de th6ologie', in 
Bazdn et al., Les que, -Wons disputies, p. 29 identifies four elements essential to the quacstio - the text, different 
interpretations of the text, the dialectical method and the regular teaching of the master. 
47 Particularly good on this, esp. the role of glosses, is A. Lang, Die theologische Prinzil7ienlehre der 
mittelalterfichen Scholavtik (Freiburg, 1964), pp. 26-33. 
`8'Quelques collections de Quaestiones de ]a seconde moiti6 du XIIe siMe. Conclusions', RT4M 7 (1935), 
p. 124. See also Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 48-9, G. Parý et al.. La i-enaissance A . 3UI si&le. Lcs icoles et 
Venseignement (Paris-Ottawa, 1933), pp. 124-5: B. C. Bazýn. 'Laquacstio disputata' inLesgenrcs littiraires, pp. 32- 
3. 
"ISeiit. X-XVIII. pp. 110-59. 
:; 0 Uent. X. l. pp. 110-11. 
51 ISent. X. 1.2. p. 1 10; citing Atigtistine, De triii. XV, 2 i, CCA 50A. p. 501 PL 42.1080. 
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the solution when lie says that the Holy Spirit is properly called charity, just as the 
Son is properly called wisdom . 
52 Peter Lornbard synthesises these passages when lie 
explains that in the Trinity caritas sometinnes refers to the common substance and 
sometimes specially to the Person of the Holy Spirit! ' And, just as the Holy Spirit 
is common to Father and Son, so it takes a common name as its own special name 
(proprium)! ' 
The same methods are employed to resolve amicably the question, in 
controversy between the Greek and Latin Churches, of the procession of the Holy 
Spirit. " Several scriptural passages demonstrate that the Holy Spirit proceeds frorn 
the Son as well as from the Father: God sent the Spirit of hi: ý; Son into your hearts 
(Gal 4,6); and the Son says of the Holy Spirit, iMom I ii,, ill sendyou from the Father 
Vn 15,26) 
. 
56 The Greeks, however, deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds frorn the Son, 
but only from the Father, and in support cite several scriptural passages as well as the 
57 councils of the early Church . To the charge levelled by the Greeks that the Latins 
are to be anathematised for having disobeyed the conciliar injunction that nothing else 
is to be taught than what is stated in the creeds, the Lombard responds that this means 
nothing contrary to Church doctrine; it was not said that nothing was to be added or 
made explicit. 58 On top of all this, says Peter, the Greeks agree with us on the 
essentials of the doctrine but simply diverge over the words used to express it. For the 
Greeks confess that the Spirit is of the Son and of the Father, which is the same as 
saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. 5' Finally, the 
Lombard rests his case on a series of citations from the Greek Fathers which, 
;2 ISent. X. 1.4, p. 111. 
53 Uent. X. 1.4, p. 111.14-16: 'in Trinitate carit&s aliquando refertur ad substantiam, quae communis est trium 
personamm et tota in sinpilis, aliquando specialiter ad perNonam Spiritus Sancti'. 
54ISent. X. 3. p. 113.20-4. 
5,5 ISent. Xl. pp. 114-17. 
ý6 Uent. XI. 1.2. pp. 114-15. 
ý7 ISentAl. 1.3. p. 115. 
i8 ISent. XI. 1.4, p. 116. 
:; g ISentAl. 21 1. p. 116.22-4: 'Sed cum non sit alitid Spiritum Sancturn esse Patris et FiIii, quam esse a Patre et 
Filio. etiam in hoc in eandem nobiscurn fidei sententiarn convenire videntur. licet verbis dissenliant. ' 
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according to his interpretation, show that Greek authorities themselves maintain that 
the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the S011.60 
Peter Lombard's methods of interpretation here are fairly convincing and his 
reconciliation of seemingly mutually exclusive points of departure is a notable success, 
though his solution owes much to the work of previous authors, especially Abelard 
and the Sumni(i Sententiarum . 
61 The examples given here are by no means exhaustive 
but merely serve to give some indication of the methods which the Lombard had at 
his disposal. 'Fhe systematic regularity with which he employs these tecl-i-niques will 
become apparent in his approach to trinitarian theology. 
2. Book I. - The Triniy 
In theology, the Trinity would seem an obvious place to start. More than any 
other aspect of Cluistian doctrine, writing on the Trinity constituted a distinct and 
well-defined tradition in Latin theology. The genre was dominated by the De trinitate 
of t1iree of the most accomplished Latin theologians, Hilary of Poitiers, Saint 
Augustine and Boethius. Their writings on the Trinity, along with the conciliar 
statements of the early Church, provided trinitarian theology with a really solid base 
to draw on. Peter Lombard was, however, the first autlior, even as late as the twelfth 
century, to begin a systematic treatise with the doctrine of the Trinity. He had an 
outstanding precedent in Abelard's Theologia, but that work was almost exclusively 
devoted to the subject of the Trinity. By placing the Trinity at the beginning of a 
theological summa, the Lombard achieved real insight. fn a conceptual as opposed to 
chronolo ical arran ernent, the doctrine of God, inseparable frorn the Trinity, naturally 99W 
held place of honour. Moreover, the doctrine was, because of its association with the 
Greek philosophical tradition via Augustine and Boethius, particularly receptive to the 
kind of speculation characteristic of twelfth-century scholarship in all fields. 
The overall structure of the first book of the Sentences very broadly follows 
the plan of the Theologia, bu4probably indicates an Abelardian inspiration rather than 
'ISent. Xl. -I. pp. 116-17. 
"Sumiria Sentoitiaruin, PL 176.52D, Abelard. TSch 11.148-60, pp-480-5. 
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a strict model. Like Abelard, the Lombard begins the work by giving a definition of 
faith which explains the order of subjects treated. Not the faith, charity and sacraments 
of Abelard, but Augustine's division of the world into things (res) and signs (si'ana), 
meaning God and everything which gives a sign of God. True, by far the bulk of the 
first distinction is taken from Augustine's De doctrina christiana (20 citations), but 
the basic structure resembles Abelard's: from him cornes the Lombard's justification 
for writing on the Trinity, the citation of the scriptural testimony, the definition of the 
doctrine in its most essential forrn and finally the systematic examination of specific 
trinitarian problems. 62 The difference lies in the Lombard's conciseness and refusal 
to digress . 
63 Where Abelard divides problems from their solutions, the Lornbard 
introduces and resolves each question in the same place. 
The Lornbard begins the discussion proper by justifying the very activity of 
64 
writing on the Trinity with a citation frorn Augustine. Its purpose, according to 
Augustine, is to teach that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God of one substance, 
that there are not three gods, but rather the Father begot the Son and thus he is not the 
Son, the Son was begotten from the Father and thus he is not the Father, and the Holy 
Spirit is neither the Son nor the Father, but their spirit, coequal to both and pertaining 
to the unity of the Trinity. 65 In other words, there is unity in the essence and plurality 
in the Persons (ut sit unitas in essentia et pluralitas in personis) . 
66 This is the 
doctrine stated ý-i its purest and simplest terms. It allows the Lombard to go straight 
to the heart of trinitarian theology, the problem of how to maintain the correct unity- 
trinity balance. Hugh of Saint-Victor cites the sarne Augustinian text but not until 
67 Book 11 of his De sacramentiy . By placing this passage at the very 
beginning of 
"2J. Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Loinbardus, Münchener theologische 
Studien II. Systematische Abteilung 22 (München, 1961). p. 12 also compares the general structure with the 
Theologia. 
63 This is also the interpretation of G. Angelini, L'ortodossia e la graininatica. Anahgi di struttura e dedurione I 
storica della tcolqgia trinitaria de Prc])ositino. Analecta GregOriana 183 (Rome, 1972), p. 66. 
'ý'ISent. II. 2'. l. p. 62. 
'5Atigtistine, De trin. I. 7, CCSL 50, pp. 34--5. PL 421.8-24. 
'lSent. II. 2.1. p. 62.19-20. 
7 PL 176.376B. 
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both his discussion of the Trinity and of the work as a whole. the Lombard throws the 
whole debate on the Trinity into relief, imi-nediately drawing attention to tile central 
issue. Again this is Abelard's approach, but the Lombard is even more to the point. 
The Lornbard proposes to proceed first by dealing with the scriptural authority 
68 on the Trinity and second by defending the faith from malicious attack . Most of the 
scriptural passages which follow are cited from Abelard's Theologia 'Scholarium6' 
and Abelard's influence is also conspicuous in the Lombard's semantic breakdown of 
certain texts. In his analysis of Gen. 1,26, Facianius hominem ad inlaainem et 
similitudinem nostram, he is particularly concerned to give the precise meaning of 
each word; ý/acidmus' and 'nostrani' signify the plurality of the Persons, and 
'imaginem' the unity of the essence. 70 But the Lombard also cites authorities in 
support of his interpretation . 
71 This gives the impression of total objectivity or 
impersonal mode of address, which no doubt accounts for the moderation with which 
the Lombard is so often attributed. Peter Lornbard is giving his opinion concerning tile 
meaning of the words no less than Abelard, and the interpratation was in any case an 
uncontroversial one, but he adduces numerous authorities to reinforce his reading of 
the scriptural text. As a result he could not be accused., as Abelard had been, of 
reducing faith to an existimati . 0.71 
The Lombard also omits any material which is not of immediate relevance to 
the central problem of trinity and unity. For example, he begins his chapter on New 
P 73 Testament proofs for the Trinity with a sentence from the Theologia 'Scholarium . 
However, where Abelard has a long section on the knowledge of the Trinity in pagan 
"8De trin. 1.4, CCSL 50, p. 34, PL 42.822; cited Uent. H. 3, p. 63. Cf. Abelard, Min 11.4. pp. 114-15,11.25-6, 
pp. 122-3; TChr IV. 71-5, pp. 297-300,7Sch 11.14-18, pp. 412-14. 
6911.69-86, pp. 346-52. 
70 ISent. II. 4.2, p. 64.11-12: 'Dicens enim Faciamus et nostrain, pluralitatern ostendit; dicens vero itnaginein, 
unitatern essentiae'. Although Abelard seems to be the Lombard's immediate source, the discussion of this 
scriptural text was well -established in the twelfth century. See the Sententie divine pagine, p. 7; Suinina 
Sententiaruin. PL 176.51A. 
7'Fulgentius. De fide ad Petrunt, PL 65.674C: and in a garbled form, Hilary, De trin. 111.23. CCSL 62, p. 96, 
PL 10.92A-B; IV. 17-18, CCSL 62, pp. 120-1. PL 10.11OC-11C. 
72Abelard. TSch 1.2. p. 318. The accusation had been levelled by William of Saint-Thierry, PL 180.249. See 
Grabmann. Die Geschichte der scholastischen Alethode 11. pp. 376-7. 
73 ISent. 11-5.1, p. 67.10-11. citing TSch 1.94. p. 356. 
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philosophers, 74 the Lombard proceeds directly to the relevant passages. Clearly 
Abelard's intention was to depict the gradual revelation of the Trinity throughout 
history, first in the Old Testament, then by Greek and Roman philosophers and 
culminating with the full revelation in the New Testament. / But the knowledge held 
by pagan philosophers is completely irrelevant for the Lornbard, since they do not 
rank as authorities on the Christian faith. This facilitates a brevity and logical 
coherence which is not a notable feature of the Theologia 'Scholariunl', or, for that 
matter, of the Sentences (c. 1152-60) of the Lombard's contemporary, Robert of 
Melun. 76 Nor indeed does Greek philosophy feature strongly in the work as a whole. 
This is perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Sentences and the 
Theologia. There are no long discussions in the Sentences on Aristotle's definition of 
substance or the different degrees of identity and difference delineated by Porphyry. 
This may also account for the Lombard's virtual rejection of Boethius, whose work 
was so fundamentally informed by pagan philosophy. 77 It is not that the Lombard 
avoids any ontological definition of terms such as essence, substance and Person, but 
he does not become embroiled in a lengthy and complex discussion. This absence of 
major digressions is characteristic of the economy of the Lombard's approach. It must 
have been a crucial element in the accessibility of the work to others who ]lad been 
similarly educated in the quaestio technique. Similarly, Peter Lombard rejects 
Abelard's controversial analogies between the Trinity and various forms of genus and 
species. 78 
The rest of Book I consists of an ordered consideration of various aspects of 
trinitarian theology, through the framing and resolution of a series of questions. This 
,4 TSch 1.94-199, pp. 356-405. 
75Simonis. Trinität und Vei7iui? li, pp. 46-53. 
76 For example, Uent. 5. XXXV, pp. 229-32,0euvres de Robert de Melun 4 vols., ed. R. M. Marlin, SSL 13,18, 
21,25 (Louvain, 1932-52). where Robert discusses at considerable length the question of whether there is a 
difference in signification between 'God' and 'Person', only to come to no firm conclusion, except to refer the 
reader to a previous discussion. All references to Robert's works will be to SSL 25 (Lotivain, 1952). 
77S. Otto, *Augustine und Boethitis im 12. Jahrhundert. Anmerk-uncren zur Entstehung des Traktates De Deo 11 -) 
ý 1. ) 
LIno', Wissenschqft und Weisheit 26 (1963), 15-26 detects different approaches between theologians. i. e. Peter 
Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers according to their preferred authorities. 
78ISent. XIX. 7-9. pp. 165-9. 
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is in accord Nvith the Lornbard's stated intention to defend the faith from impious 
questions. The very first question with which he deals is the proposition that 'God 
begot God' implies 'God begot himself or another God'. 79 Immediately, therefore. 
we enter the sernantic discussion about the term 'God'. This is crucially important in 
subsequent writings, including thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree. 
In his account of the position of Alberic of Reims, the Lombard, like Abelard and tile 
anonymous Summa Sententiarum, identifies the root of the problem in the expression 
from the Nicene Creed 'God from God. "0 The Lombard's version of Alberic's 
argument is almost identical with Abelard's. The basic apparatus, including the 
important Augustinian dictum that no thing begets itself, " was to become a 
permanent feature of twelfth- and thirteenth-century discuSSio1lS. 82 T`he Lombard goes 
on to consider the proposition, also reported by Abelard, that if 'God tile Father begot 
God', either lie begot God who is God the Father or God who is not God the 
83 Father. The only possible response is that 'God the Father begot God who is not 
the Father, ' where the correct meaning (sensus verus) is clearly God the Son. 
It is significant that the first question which the Lombard considers should 
relate to the problem of divine generation. This must surely be an indication of the 
central importance of this question in academic thought on the Trinity. It was a core 
concern because it was the point of convergence of several really key issues in 
trinitarian theology. The exact nature of the Son's relation to the Father was after all 
the very problem which had given rise to some concept of divine Trinity in the first 
place. In fact many of the early chapters of the Sentences (Distinctions IV-VII, IX- 
79 ISent. IV. 1.1, pp. 77-8. 
80 ISent. [V. 1.1. p. 78.5-6. Cf. Abelard. Min M. 62, p. 183. TChr IV. 103, p. 316; Sumina Scntcntiarum, PL 176C. 
The Summa's influence on the discussion of this question can also be discerned in the Ysae-gloge in theologialn, 
pp. 252-3 and the Sent. divinitatLýý. p. 160*. 
" 20. 8'Augtistine. De trin. I. 1, CCSL 50, p. 28.33-6. PL 4ý. 8ý 
82 For subsequent treatments of the same question in unpublished manuscripts, citing the Augustinian passage: I 
Glo, vsa, BM Royal 7F XIII. fol. 7va; Sententie Udonhz. Munich ChTi. 7622, folAra: Hubertus, Suinina. Munich CIM. 
28799. fol. 3ra; Sumina. BM Roval 9E XII, fol. 151va. Not citing Augustine: Quaestiones, BM Harley 3855, fol. 12ra 
and Paris Maz. 1708. fol. 249ra; Peter of Captia, Suinina, Munich CIm. 14508, fol. 2ra; Quaestiones. BM Royal 9E 
XIL fol. 233ra, Coininentariuin in Petri Loinhardi Sententiaruin proluguin, BN lat. 3804A, fol. 185va. Authors citing 
the Augustinian passage tend both to cite more authorities in general and to rely more on the Sentencev, from 
where they take these authorities. than their counterparts. 
"jSt-, nt. IV. 12 p. 718. See Ab-c-lard, Mir Ilf. 111. pp. 2135-6. Also Roberi of Melun. ISci7t. -4. XXI. p. 1-42. 2 
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XIII) concern thernselves with various aspects of divine generation. The longest of 
these chapters, the first chapter of Distinction V, is also the longest in Book 1. Here 
the Lombard considers the question 'whether it ought to be conceded that the Father 
begot the divine essence, or that the divine essence begot the Soil, or that essence 
begot essence, or that the divine essence in no sense begot or was begotten. ' 84 This 
was one of the most hotly contended issues in discussions on the Trinity. '5 
The genesis of this question would again seem to be in Abelard's Theologia 
and in his dispute with Alberic of Reims at the Council of Soissons in 1121. Abelard 
had ridiculed the position allegedly taken by Alberic, namely that, if divine simplicity 
was to remain intact, 'God begot God' necessarily implied 'substance begot 
, 86 substance . By the 1150s, there is little indication that the issue was causing 
divisions in any conventional sense - no author actually proposed the view that the 
divine nature begets. This suggests that we would be wrong to associate specific 
individuals or groups with the alleged disputants. 87 Rather, we are confronted here 
by one of the most distinctive features of scholastic thought, its tendency towards 
repetition and regurgitation. But such repetition was not necessarily pointless, since 
in this case the problem of 'essence begot essence' brought so clearly into focus the 
question of divine unity and trinity. It was fairly quickly established that the divine 
essence could not beget, but it remained to discover how best to explain this. 
Moreover, the certainty that the essence did not beget represented a constant in a 
shifting landscape of argument and counter- argument. Its internal logic was so secure 
that it could be used as a control for other arguments, and an argument was often 
valid only if it was compatible with the essence as non-begetting. Certainly, it was 
84 ISent. V. 1.1, pp. 80-1. 
8"For example, London BM Royal 7F XIII. fol. 129vb: 'Queritur hic si pater divinam. essentiarn genuit vel 
essentia filiurn vel essentia essentiam. vel omnino nec gentierit nec genita sit. Magna hec questio inter doctores 
contrarietatis et reptignantie atifert molestiam. Nam magister Petnis asserit nullatenus concedenclum vel quod pater 
essentiarn vel essentia filiurn vel essentia essentiarn genuerit. ' On this Breýýiariuin sententiaruin and other versions, 
A. M. Landgraf, 'FrCihscholastische Abkiir-zttngen der Senterizen des Lombarden', in Studia Medidei, alia. In 
Honorein RawnundiJosel-ihiMartin (Bniges, 1948), 171-99. Landgraf, Inti-oduction. pp. 114-15 leaves the question 
of Simon of Totimai's authorship open. 
"TSuin 11.62. p. 134; TChr 111.109, p. 235, Hist calain., pp. 84-5. 
87 0. Baltzer. Die Sentenzen dcs Petrus Lonthardus. 1hre Quellen und ihre do., umcnaeschichtliche Bedeutung 
(Leipzig. 1902). pp. 17-18 was certainly wrong to identify Gilbert as the Lombard's opponent here. 
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used by Gilbert of Poitiers and his supporters to justify the need for a distinction 
between essence and Person, as well as in support of their claim that the personal 
properties could not be predicated either of the essence or of the Persons fliernselves. 
They argued that if these distinctions were abandoned the unavoidable consequence 
would be the generation of the essence. This method of argumentation is already 
apparent in the Sentences, but achieves greater expression in subsequent works. " 
The Lornbard's treatment of the question again relies principally oil Abelard 
and especially the Summa Sententiarun7. This is a prime example of how the Lornbard 
assimilates earlier debates which are then taken up by subsequent authors, thus 
revealing the essential continuity in twelfth-century trinitarian theology. The 
Lombard's principal refutation of the proposition depends less oil the Augustinian 
dictum popularised by Abelard, that no thing begets itself, than on a question found 
in the Summa. There the author asks: 
it may be noted that since the Son is wisdom begotten from the Father, and the Father is wise by his 
o, vvn wisdoni, whether the Father is wise by the Nvisdom which lie begot from himself. " 
The author cites a series of Augustinian texts against this interpretation. Now this 
question is dealt with twice in the Sentences, once as a separate question (XXXH. 2), 
but firstly in the context of the problem presently wider consideration. The Lombard's 
solution is very similar to the author of the Summa, even though his precise selection 
of Augustinian texts differs. His main argument builds on the idea that just as the 
Father cannot have begotten his own wisdoi-n-, nor can he have begotten his own cause, 
the divine essence: 
if the Father is the begettor of the divine essence, since it is by the divine essence that lie both is and 
is God, therefore it is because lie begets that lie is and is God. T'hus not that which is begotten from 
the Father is therefore God, but the Father by the fact that he begets, both is and is God; and if it is 
so, the one begotten is the cause of the begettor being and being God, rather than the begettor the cause 
of the one begotten both being and being God. 'O 
88See section 3 of this chapter, esp. pp. 97-102. 
89pL 176.60A. 
'[Sent. V. 1.4. p. 81.16-20: 'si Pater est genitor divinae essentiae, cum ipsa essentia divina et sit et Deus sit, eo 
ergo quod generat et est et Dcus est. Ita ergo non illud quod L-eneratur est a Patre Deus, sed Pater eo quod ---encrat 
et est et Deus est, et si ita est. non -enito gignens. sed -, ignentl acnittis causa est tit et sit et Deus sit*. 
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'nie Lombard's formulation of the opposing argument as a reductio ad absurdam 
demonstrates that the doctrine that the essence begets is untenable, since in that case 
the Father would have begotten the very thing which makes him God. This makes a 
nonsense of the se4flevident truth that the begettor, not the begotten, is the natural 
cause of something. 'Fhe Augustinian citations which follow depend on an analogy 
between being and being wise which recalls the problem as it was posed in the 
Summa. Thus the Lombard cites Augustine's view that it is totally insane to suggest 
that in God, in whom being is the sarne as being wise, the Father is wise by the 
wisdom which he begot. For in order to maintain divine simplicity, we would 
consequently be in the position of saying that the wisdom which the Father begot 
caused him to be for the very reason that it also caused him to be wise. 'Tlierefore, ' 
says the Lombard, 'if the Father begot the essence by which he is, the essence which 
he begot caused him to be; therefore, lie did not beget that very essence by which he 
is. '9' The reason that the divine essence cannot beget or be begotten is that it is una 
et summa quaedam res, an absolute and unique entity; if essence begot essence then 
the same thing would have begotten itself. 92 The Lombard is clear that the essence 
cannot both be a quaedam summa res and begetting. For him the one excludes the 
other because where there is one supreme reality, if it begets, it begets itself which is 
impossible. Strictly speaking it is not absolutely necessary that this should be the case, 
and at least one theologian, Peter Olivi in the late thirteenth century, could envisage 
a doctrine whereby the essence was both a quaedam summa res and begetting. But 
Olivi is the exception, and his doctrine depends on a flexible definition of essence 
which was no longer widely accepted. In general, academic theologians took it as 
axiomatic that the quaedani suninia res implied the essence as non-begetting and vice 
versa. The interdependence of these doctrines of divine unity and divine generation 
is important in its own ten-ns, but also has a critical bearing on our understanding of 
the Fourth Lateran Council where the issue is raised precisely with reference to this 
section in the Sentences. The Council defended the Lombard's quaedam summa res 
against the unity of collection attributed to Joachim. Later commentators, however, 
9'lSent. V. 1.4. p. 81.29-31. 
92 Uent. V. 1.6. p. 82.20-1: 'curn enim una et surnma quacdarn res sit divina essentia. si divina essentia essentiam 
genuit, eadern res se ipsarn genuit. quod ornnino esse non potest'. 
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were much more interested in another, probably interrelated, alternative to the 
Lombard's position, the view that the divine essence is begetting. Having condemned 
Joachim's unity of collection, it was only natural that the Council should reject yet 
another contender to the Lombard* s quaeclani summa res, the view that essence begets 
essence. 
Thus for Peter Lombard the Persons as begetting, begotten and proceeding, and 
the essence as common are diametrically opposed theological absolutes: a Person can 
never be common and the essence can in no sense beget. Yet essence and Person are 
not for this reason ontologically distinct, as the Lombard effectively says when he 
cites Augustine's statement that three Persons are of the same essence, but are not 
from (ex) the same essence. 9' In other words, the relationship between essence and 
Person is not the same as that between cause and effect. 94 
The Lornbard's subsequent discussion on divine simplicity reinforces the logic 
of his denial that the divine essence begets. 9' He takes the classic Augustinian line 
on divine simplicity, citing him to the effect that there is no distinction in God 
between substance and quality, and no accidents in God. Great stress is placed upon 
the great distance which separates God and creation in this respect. Creatures are in 
96 no way simple, but composed of parts and subject to accidents. Only God is truly 
simple (solum Deum wre simplicem esse) . 
97 Thus the multitude of names used to 
describe God do not reflect a composite nature because they all signify one thing, the 
divine nature. 9' This section thus underlines the absoluteness of the divine essence 
and the impossibility of its self-generation. 
93 ISent. V. 2.4, p. 88.12-15; citing Au, Stine, De trin. VII. 11, CCSL 50, pp. 264-5, PL 42.945. t-It 
94 See ISent. XIX. 8, p. 166.29-30: 'Non ergo sectmdum materialem causam tres personas unam dicimus essentiam, 
sicut tres stattiae dictintur untim aurtim. ' 
9'lSent. VIII. pp. 95-103. See Schneider, Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott. pp. 25-9. 
96 ISent. VIII. 3-4. pp. 98-9- 
97 Uent. VIII. 5. p. 99.30-1. 
"ISent. VIII. 5, pp. 99-100: *Sed hoc non propter diversitatern accidentium vel partium dicit. sed propter 
diversitatern ac multitudinern nominum quae de Deo dicuntur; quae, licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant. 
scilicet divinarn naturam'. 
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3. Opposition to Gilbert oJ'Poitiers 
Because Peter Lombard does not attribute any of the arguments which lie cites 
to specific individuals, using instead the anonymous quidam or the impersonal 
queritur, identifying his opponents is not straightforward. The detached and 
impersonal tone of the Sentences tends to emphasize the consensus of opinion on any 
given issue rather than the view of any single individual. But besides his rejection of 
certain of Abelard's doctrines., it is generally thought that the Lombard's main 
objection in trinitarian theology was to the teachings and tl-leological method of 
Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-54). 99 This opposition is said to account for the 
rivalry between the 'schools' of the Lombard and Gilbert, which was to deten-nine the 
course of theology in the second half of the twelfth century and culminate in the 
Fourth Lateran Council itself. '00 One author has gone so far as to call the Fourth 
Lateran Cotuicil a reaffirmation of the prohibition issued at Reims against ally 
distinction between essence and Person-10' There is no question that the Cotuicil of 
Reims, at which Gilbert's views were implicitly condemned, generated more interest 
and controversy than any other single dispute on the Trinity. As late as tile 1190s, 
Cardinal Albinus (d. 1196/97) was moved to write to Geoffrey of Auxerre, Bernard 
of Clairvaux's secretary and one of the principal witnesses at Reims, to request his 
version of events. 102 What is questionable, however, is that the outcome of Reims 
was the single most important deten-nining factor in trinitarian theology before 1215. 
Nor can it be taken for granted that Peter Lombard was unqualified in his 
99N. M. Mring, 'Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik in der Trinit5tslehre der Porretanerschule', Wcellanea 
Lombardiana, 113-27. 
"'oDe Ghellinck-, Le inouvelnent thiolo, -ique, pp. 263-7, F. Pelster, Tetrus Lombardus und die Verhandlungen 
über die Streitfrage des Gilbertits Porreta in Paris (1147) und Reims (1148)', Miscellänea Lonibardiana, 65-73, 
A. Dondaine, Ecrits de la ý, 2etite icole ý porrýtaiiie (Paris. 1962). 
'O'Pelster, Tetnis Lombardus und die Verhandlungen fiber die Streitfragge des Gilbertus Porreta', p. 65. 
102 The letter is dated to c. 1191-92 by N. M. Hdring, *The Writings Against Gilbert of Poitiers by Geoffrey of 
Auxerre', Analecta Cistuciensia 22 (1966). p. 16. Hiiri=ng prints all of Geoffrey's writings pertaining to the events 
at Reims: a section from the Vita sancti Bernardi: the so-called Scriptura; the Libellus contra cal-)itula Gbdeberti 
(written while Geoffrey was abbot of Igny 1157-62) and the Ej)istola ad Cardinalein Albinuin. On Cardinal 
Albintts, see U. -R. Blumenthal, 'Cardinal Albinus of Albano and the D(gesta Pauperis Scolar& Albini MS. Ottob. 
Lat. 3057'. Arch&iuin Historiae Pon4flcae 20 (1982), 7-49. fn an appendix (pp. 45-9) Blumenthal casts doubt on 
the authorship of the Scripura attributed by Hiiringy to Geoffrey of Auxerre. 
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rejection of Gilbert's views. 'O' What is so intriguing is that the Lombard's 
ambivalent position on some of Gilbert's teachings actually allows some of Gilbert's 
key conceptual distinctions into the Sentences through the back door. Although the 
Lombard takes the line throughout that divine simplicity leaves no room for such 
distinctions as between the essence, the Persons and the personal properties, he 
actually concedes the necessity for some kind of mental distinction between essence 
and Person. Not only that, Peter Lombard and Gilbert agree on the fundamental 
question of the essence as non-begetting. Often when this issue is being debated, it is 
not in fact the real point in question but rather the author's trump card in proving that 
an opposing position on an entirely different matter must be false. Tlius when the 
Lombard wants to show that the Persons are identical with their properties, he has to 
face squarely the objection that, if this were the case, it would follow that the essence 
begot. 'Fhe debate about the generation of the essence was a recurrent one partly, 
therefore, because it raised a number of important questions about the meaning of 
predicative statements and the inferences which could be drawn from them. It was, in 
other words, at the heart of the problem of theological language. 
'ne Lombard's opposition to Gilbert at the Council of Reims in 1148 is 
elliptically recorded by John of Salisbury! " And despite John's suggestion that he 
may have simply opposed Gilbert out of some sense of deference to Bernard of 
Clairvaux, it is also well grounded in the Sentences. 10' The main Council had been 
convened by Pope Eugenius IH to legislate on Church reform and ecclesiastical 
discipline, which explains both the impressive attendance by ecclesiastics from all over 
"'For one thing the Lombard borrowed from Gilbert for his Glossa super epistolas Pauli. See Brady, prolog., 
pp. 76-82. M. L. Colish, 'Gilbert, the Early Porretans and Peter Lombard. Semantics and Theology', in J. Jolivet 
and A. de Libera edd., Gilbert de Poitiers et ses conteinporains, Actes du septiýme symposium europ&n d'histoire 
de la logique et de la sýmantique m&di6vales (Naples. 1987). 229-50 offers a reassessment of Peter Lombard's 
opposition to Gilbert but seems to exaggerate the parallels which she identifies between their respective positions 
on the Trinity. 
104HiStoria Pontýficalis, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (London, 1956), p. 16- The Lombard's presence is also 
recorded by Geoffrey of Auxerre, Scrigura 28, p. 35, though he is not mentioned by Otto of Freising. Colish, 
'Gilbert, the Early Porretans and Peter Lombard', p. 230 remarks that 'Peter is usually held to have been cool 
toward Gilbert. aithough no record reports his opinion at Reims. ' I take this to mean that the nature rather than 
the fact of the Lombard's opposition is unknown. 
10511i,. Zt. Pont., p. 16. Delhaye, Picrre Loinhard. p. 18. defends the integrity of the Lombard's doctrinal position. 
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western Europe and the number of surviving eyewitness accounts. "6 The accusations 
brought against Gilbert of Poitiers* trinitarian teachings were discussed at a separate 
consistory, held only after the main Council had drawn to a close. 107 The charges 
against Gilbert, delivered by his main prosecutor, Bernard of Clairvaux, are reported 
in the three principal sources for the trial, that of Otto of Freising (who did not 
himself attend Reims) '108 and the first-hand accounts of Geoffrey of Auxerre and 
John of Salisbury. 109 
The case against Gilbert floundered at the public hearing before Pope Eugenius 
111, despite Bernard's efforts to rally the opposition against him. Gilbert was 
exonerated of the charges brought against him, but at the same time the Pope ordered 
him to alter his Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate in accordance with the 
doctrines as defined by Bemard. 110 In this way, Eugenius gave implicit papal 
approval to Bernard's views. 
Examinations of Gilbert's orthodoxy have tended to focus on the first 
accusation, his alleged distinction between God and his divinity which in the eyes of 
his opponents was incompatible with divine simplicity. "' But Mring has denied that 
106 On these points, see N. M. H5ring, 'Notes on the Council and Consistozy of Rheims (1148)', MS 28 (1966), 
pp. 39-45. 
107jhid., pp. 45-7; A. Hayen, 'Le concile de Reims et Ferreur th6ologique de Gilbert de la Porr6e', AHDLMA 
10 (1935-36), pp. 39-40. No record of Gilbert's trial was included in the official acts of the Council. Hdring, 'Notes 
on the Council and Consistory', pp. 52-3; H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta. Sa i4e, son oeui, re, sa pensie, SSL 
33 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 107-8. 
'"Gesta 1.59, p. 85. Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, pp. 82-3, follows Poole in suggesting that Otto obtained his 
information by stopping off at the papal curia on his way back from the Holy Land in 1149. 
'09Hist. Pont., pp. 24-5. Cf. Geoffrey of AtLxerTe, Scriptura, pp. 31-3. According to John, Bernard set out these 
propositions at a private meeting held before the public discussion. Both Geoffrey of Auxerre and Otto of Freising, 
however, place this meeting after, not before, the main debate. See L. Cioni, 'Il Concilio di Reims nelle Fonti 
Contemporanee', Aevuin 53 (1979), pp. 298-9, who favours John of Salisbury's account. On the role of Godescalc 
of Saint-Martin in drawing tip the accusations against Gilbert, see G. R. Evans, 'Godescalc of St. Martin and the 
Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers', Analecta Praeinonstratensia 57 (1981), 196-209. Pelster, 'Petrus Lombardus und die 
Verhandlungen fiber die Streifrage des Gilbertus Porreta', p. 71 speculates (rather unconvincinglv) that Peter 
Lombard also played a role in the framing of these charges. 
'John of Salisbury, Hist. pont., pp. 24-5, Geoffrey of Auxerre, Libellia 1.1ý-14, p. 38. 
... The implications of Gilbert's view receive extensive treatment by Geoffrey of Auxerre in his Libellus tinder 
the heading. 'Forma ponebatur in deo qua detis esset et que non esset deus tit humanitas hominis forma est non 
que sit sed qua sit homo. ' ULL p. 38). Against him. Geoffrey cited Augustine, De trin. V. 11: Teus non ea. 
magnitudine magnus est que non est quod ipse tit quasi particeps eitis sit deus cum magnus est. Alioquin illa erit 
maior magnittido quam detis. ' (Libellus 11.19. p. 41, Scrij,; tura 3, p. 31); Bernard of Clairvaux. Scrinones sul)er 
'181-3, De consideratione V. 15-17.01)cra Ill. pp-479-81. Other attacks Cantica Canticoruin 80.6-8,01)cra 11, pp. ý 
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Gilbert's conceptual distinction between the substance and form of material objects, 
i. e. the thing which is white Ud quod) frorn the quality 'whiteness' Qd quo) which 
makes it so, meant that the id quo and id quod were separate in reality or that this 
distinction could be simplistically applied to God. "2 
Peter Lombard does not address this issue in the Sentences, which may explain 
why it does not feature prominently in subsequent scholastic debates. He does take 
issue, however, with Gilbert's view, without mentioning him by name, that although 
God and the divine essence can be predicated of the three Persons, the Persons cannot 
be predicated of God or the essence. Accordingly, we could say 'the three Persons are 
the divine essence', but not 'the divine essence is the three Persons. "' The principle 
behind Gilbert's argument was that since only the id quo (Paternitas) and not the id 
quod (pater) of a Person was truly predicable, it was not legitimate to say 'tile divine 
essence is the Persons'. 114 This would be like saying 'one Person is three Persons' 
since the subject-term 'God' or 'essence' would have to stand for a Person. ' 15 
include a Tractatus contra eum qui dixit quod divinitas non sit Deus, ed. N. M. Hdring, 'Two Austrian Tractates 
against the Doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers' AHDLMA 32 (1965), 127-67, which Hdring attributes to Gerhoch of 
Rechersberg (p. 135), but which may, in any case. predate Reims (p. 141). In Gilbert's defense, see especially, N. M. 
Hdring ed., 'A Latin Dialogue on the Doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers', MS 15 (1953), 243-89 and 'The Cistercian 
Everard of Ypres and His Appraisal of the Conflict Between St. Bernard and Gilbert of Poitiers', MS 17 (1955), 
143-72. 
112'The Case of Gilbert de la Porr6e Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)', MS 13 (1951), 1-40 esp. pp. 6-8. In the 
same vear another defence of Gilbert was published by M. E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the 
Trinitý asfibund in his coininentaries on Boethius. Analecta Gregoriana 56 (Rome, 195 1), who, like Hýring, argues 
that a study Gilbert's philosophical system is prerequisite to determining his orthodoxy. Most recently, Marenbon, 
'Gilbert of Poitiers', in Dronke ed., A Histori, Qf Tuvýfth -Century Western Philosopkv, 328-52 has issued a 
corrective to this assumption that Gilbert's theology derives from his philosophy. 
"'ISent. [V. 2.1-3, pp. 79-80. 
"'Hdring, 'The Case of Gilbert de la Porr&e', p. 10 and Tetrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik-, pp. 119-20, 
Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta, pp. 93-7; M. A. Schmidt, Gottheit und Trinitdt nach dein Koinmentar 
des Gilbert Porreta zu Boethius, De Trinitate, Studia Philosophia, Supplementum 7 (Basel, 1956), pp. 170-1; 
Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, pp. 146-7. This is also the reading of Geoffrey of Auxerre, Libellus 111.9, p. 49 and Otto 
of Freising, Gesta 1.52, p. 75: 'Quod theologicae personae in nulla predicarentur propositione. ' 
""Glossa, BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7vb: Tonit opinionem quorundarn concedentium tres persone stint units deus 
sed non e converso. Non enim concedunt: detis est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Videtur enim. talibus quod hoc 
concedere. sit accedere ad haeresim. Sabelli [ ... 
] si dicattir "detis est tres persone", ut "deus" sit in suppositione pro 
aliqua personartim, oportet hoc esse vertim et ita "vel pater vel filitis vel spirittis sanctus est tres persone. "', 
fragment of a short gloss on the Sentences, Bamberg Patr. 48 , fol. 73r: 'Qtiidam tamen sententiam porretani 
[... ] 
aliquam ergo rem dicis esse tres personas. Hic atitem est error Sabellianorum'. See also Alan of Lille. Summa 68, 
p. 218; Stephen Langton, Coininentarius in sententias. Dcr Sentenzenkoininentar das Kardinals Stephan Langton, 
ed. A. M. Landgraf, BGPTM 37.1 (Mfmster. 1952). p. 7. Cf. Simon of Tournai, D&1,7utationes LXXXIII. 2-3. ed. J. 
Warichez. Les dislyutations de Simon de Tournai. SSL I 'I (louvain, 1932). p. 242. See Schneider. Die Lehre voin 
dreieinigcn Gott. pp. 184-8 for other treatments. 
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Gilbert's concern was a logical one about the rectitude of predicating concrete 
individuals of a universal form. Peter Lombard, however, does not elaborate on any 
possible justification for Gilbert's position, but simply adduces a number of authorities 
against him in which the overriding concern is the primacy of divine simplicity. "' 
Others confront Gilbert's objections more directly, usually to explain why his 
argument that if the Persons were predicated of the essence, it follows the essence 
begets, was not valid. Robert of Melun deals squarely with the problem of why, if the 
essence is the Father, it does not beget, given that the Father is the Father and he 
begets. ' 17 Master Hubertus, writing in the 1190s, also realises that Gilbert's 
objection to the three Persons being predicated of the essence is an attempt to prevent 
the essence from begetting. 'niis is the argument that since it is proper to the Father 
to beget, if the Father is predicated of the essence, i. e. if we can say 'the divine 
essence is the Father, it must follow that the essence is also begetting. "' rhis 
problem shows how the necessity of avoiding the conclusion that the essence was 
begetting or begotten was often one of the driving factors in someone's argument. 
The Lombard considers another interrelated issue raised at Reims, the question 
of whether the Persons are identical with their properties. '19 Gilbert argued that the 
personal properties are not the Persons themselves but extrinsic to them. 120 The 
1160tt, 'Die Trinit5tslehre der Suinina sententiarum', pp. 175-6 suggests a direct dependence here on the Suinma, 
PL 176.59B. The same authorities are also cited by Geoffrey of Auxerre, Libellus 111.25-6, p. 51. 
117 ISent. 4. XXII, p. 144.19-27: 'At qua ratione Patris sttscipit predicationem si generans non est? Non enirn 
aliunde est quod Pater Pater est et quod divina essentia Pater est. Nam unde aliunde hoc esse possit ratione nulla 
assignari potest. Si ergo Pater inde Pater est, quia generans est. et divinam essentiam ex eodem Patrem esse necesse 
est aut Patrem non esse, citrn non sit tinde alittnde Pater esse possit. Divina ergo essentia generans esse videtur, 
aut Pater non esse. ' See U. Horst, Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun, Walberberger Studien der 
Albertus-Magnus Akademie 1 (Mainz, 1964), pp. 140-44. 
"%mma, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 8va: 'Sed divina essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ergo est 
generans, genita et procedens, ergo non est pater et filius et spirims sanctus'. See Appendix A. 2 for other 
arguments in this vein. 
119ye, 
- Bent. XXXIII. 1, pp. 240-3. Ott, 'Die Trinit5tslehre der Suinma sententiaruin', pp. 177-8 for probable 
dependence on the Suinina, PL 176.58-9. For Robert of Melun's treatment, Uent. 5.1-XX, pp. 162-201, Horst, Die 
Trinitdts- und Gottesiehre des Robert von Melun. pp. 144-52. 
"OThe Commentaries on Roethius bi, Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. N. M. Hdring (Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies Toronto. 1966) n. 43, p. 148. The author of a commentary on the Athanotian Creed attributes this and similar 
distinctions to quidain. See 'A Commentary on the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed by Gilbert of Poitiers', AfS 27 (1965), 
pp. 32-41. But for this very reason Gilbert's authorship seems doubtful; see L. O. Nielson, Theologv and Philosopki, 
in the Tweýfth Centurv. A Studv in Gilbert Porreta's Thinkin,, a and the Theological Exposition qf the Doctrine ol' 
the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180 (Leiden, 198-1), p. 44. 
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implicit papal approval given to Bernard's view, that the properties are tile Persons, 
may have influenced the course of subsequent treatments of the issue. But of much 
greater consequence was surely Peter Lombard's opposition to Gilbert's position, 
which is taken up by later authors. 121 Peter takes as his point of departure the 
problem of how the properties could be in the Persons and yet not be them. 122 He 
cites the standard authority on this question, a passage attributed to Jerome, where the 
properties are equated with the Persons and somewhat predictably concludes from this 
that they are the Persons . 
12' He is clearly referring to Gilbert when he mentions that 
some people deny that the properties are the Persons even though they are in the 
Persons. 'flieir position is that the properties are in the Persons and the divine essence 
not internally Unterius), in such a way that they are identical with the divine 
substance, but are externally joined (extrinsecus affixa). 124 One of their supporting 
arguments is that if the properties are the Persons, the Persons cannot be characterised 
by them, presumably because that would be like saying something characterises itself, 
which is meaningless. 12' Further, if the properties and the essence are identical, it 
would be difficult to see how the Persons could be distinct through their properties but 
not through their common essence; on the contrary, the fact that the Persons are 
identical in essence suggests that they would be identical in their properties also. 126 
12'See Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott, pp. 146-66 for the Glossa, Udo, Gandulph of Bologna, Peter 
of Poitiers, Prepositinus and Peter of Capua, who all follow Peter Lombard. An exception is Master Martinus who 
is Porretan in outlook. See also the anonymous Suinina. BM Royal 9E XII. fol. 150ra: 'Shnbolown fidei quo 
declarata proj)rt . etates esse personas. Ad corToborationem autern veritatis, subicimus hic simbolum fidei quod 
adversus effores magistri Gileberti porete editurn est'. In the same manuscript is a series of theological questions 
in which the question is similarly addressed at fol. 236vb: 'Non enim. videmus qucd proprietates sint in deo et non 
sint deus, cum deus simplex sit. Quarnvis porretanus magister G[ilbertus], sicut quidam asserunt in contrarium, 
docuerit quod tamen negavit, abiuravit et quaternurn scarbello frustratim discerpsit in concilio remensi coram. papa 
eugenio, sub eitis doctrina scripturn'. 
122 ISent. XXXIII. 1.1-2, p. 240. 
123 ISent. XXXIII. 1.2. p. 241. The passage in question is in fact Pelagius, PL 45.1717. 
124 ISent. XXXIII. 1.6. p. 242. Williams. The Teachhýq Qf Gilber-t Porreta, p. 68 says extrinvecus is used in the 
sense of non -subst anti al. 
125ISent. XXXIII-1.7. p. 242.13-14. Essential background here is the principle that the properties distinguish the 
Persons, ISent. YXVII. 3.1. p. 4205. 
'26[Sent. XXXIII. I. 8. p. 242.18-21. Cf. the anonymous quaestio, Munich Clm. 7622, fol. 46rb: 'Unde sciendurn 
est quod secundurn magistrurn Achardiun non sequitur si --genita sit 
divina essentia. quod sit in divina essentia. Dicit 
enim: proprietatern esse in aliquo, non est aliud nisi apropriare et distinguere ipstan ab ipso, quare cum divina 
essentia nulla propnetate distingliatur seu differat ab alio. nulla proprietate est in ea. Unde hoc dicentibus talis datur 
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Also, if these properties were in the divine essence that would mean that the same 
thing begets and is begotten which is nothing less than Sabel li anism. 127 'Fhe 
Gilbertine Sententiae divinitatis puts forward this same objection to the personal 
properties being in the essence. 12' As in the problern of whether the Persons are 
predicated of the essence, the argument that the essence is non-begetting is apparently 
being used here by Gilbert and his followers to show that the properties cannot be in 
the essence. bi both cases, i. e. 'the essence is the three Persons' and 'the essence is 
begetting, begotten and proceeding, the undesired consequence would seem to be that 
the essence begets. One of Gilbert's intentions in denying these propositions is, 
according to Peter Lombard and others, to avoid the unwelcome conclusions to which 
they would lead, namely that the essence begets. 
The Lombard's refutation of these objections does not really address the 
genuine difficulties which they raise but rests on the principle that the properties must 
be both the Persons and the essence in order to preserve divine Simplicity. 129He thus 
reveals an inability or perhaps a reluctance to recognise that some distinctions, as long 
as they remain conceptual tools, do not affect the issue of divine simplicity. He does 
make the distinction, however, that the properties are not in the essence in the same 
way that they are in the Persons. It does not follow, therefore, simply because they 
determine the Persons when they are in them, that they also deten-nine the essence if 
they are in it. And so paternity and sonship are the essence without that meaning that 
instantia ab Achardo: generatio est divina essentia, ergo distinguit divina essentia, quod falsum est. Magister Petrus 
utrumque concedit quod generatio, est divina essentia et est in divina essentia; sed quod sequitur non concedit, 
scilicet cum sola generatione dicatur quis generare, ergo divina essentia generat. ' 
127 ISent. XXXIII. I. 9, p. 243.10-13: 'Si paternitas et filiatio in Deo sive in divina. essentia stint, eadern igitur res 
sibi pater est et filius. Nam in quo paternitas est. Pater est: et in quo filiatio, Filitis est. Si igitur una eademque res 
habet in se paternitatem et filiationern, ipsa et generat et generatur'. 
12"Sent. div.. p. 160*: 'In divinasubstantia non stint, quia divina. substantia non gignit neque gignitur. sed in Deo 
esse concedi potest, quia. hoc nomen "Detis" ad titrumque se habet scilicet ad personam et ad substantiam. ' 
"9The inadequacy of his treament is suggested by the abbreviation on the Sentences, BM Royal 7F X111, 
fol. 134ra: 'Alii vero proprietates in personis esse dicunt. sed easdem personas esse, vel essentiam diffitentur, et 
his argumentis et forte aliis sententie Magistri Petri oppontint. ' See Landgraf, 'Friihscholastische Abk-iirzungen der 
Sentenzen'. pp. 178-9. 
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the essence begets or is begotten. "' 
Peter of Poitiers combines the Lombard's section on the properties and the 
essence with his arguments from Distinctions IV and V that the essence does not 
beget. "' He reinforces the Lombard's conclusions, and goes further in clarifying the 
issue with an analogy which shows just how the properties may be in the Persons and 
in the essence in different ways: a cellar contains a cask of wine, and thus the wine 
is 'in' both the cask and the cellar; yet the wine moistens the cask only, not the 
cellar. 132 In other words, the wine has a physical effect on only one of those things 
in which it is said to be. The analogy works on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction 
between first and second substance. A distinguishing quality is in both the first 
(individual) and second (common) substance, in the sense of what is signified by 
them, but it only determines the first, not the second substance. 131 Thus the 
properties of individuals are different from those of the common nature shared by 
them. 
The final issue of Gilbertine theology addressed in the Sentences was Gilbert's 
insistence on a conceptual distinction between essence and Person. Although Gilbert's 
contention that in God there must be some distinction of this type was not one of the 
four charges listed in accounts of the hearing at Reims, it was debated there. '-4 
130ISent. XXXIII. 1.10, p. 243.26-8: 'licet patemitas et filiatio sint divina essentia, cum earn non determinent, non 
ideo, potest dici quod divina essentia et generat et generetur'; citing John Damascene, De filde orthodoxia 50.1, 
p. 187. Cf. Robert of Melun, [Sent. 4. XXIII, p. 147.18-19: 'Ideo sicut persone a divina non removentur essentia, ita 
nec proprietates, et sicut persone de ea enuntiantur, ita et proprietates. Sed non quibuscumque vocibus de ipsis 
personis enuntiantur, eisdem possunt de divina essentia enuntiari. His enim vocibus: "generans", "genitus", 
"procedens", de ipsis personis dicuntur, quibus de ipsa essentia divina nequaquam enuntiari possunt. eo quod hee 
voces cum hac voce "divina essentia" copulate ad aliam transirent significationem. ' 
13 'Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis 1.27, edd. P. S. Moore and M. Dulong (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1943), p. 215.1-8: 
'Solet etiam queri an proprietates, cum sint in divina essentia, eam determinent, ut ita vere dicatur: Divina essentia 
gignit, et huiusmodi tit ita negatur de illis vocabulis que proprietates significant et copulant. Circa id huiusmodi 
solent formari obiectiones: proprietates et sunt in personis et sunt in essentia; ergo aut non determinant personas 
aut deten-ninant essentiam; quod si est. ergo essentia divina gignit aut gignitur'. 
132 Uent. 27, p. 216.29-32: 'Propterea dicendurn quod proprietates, curn sint in essentia, non earn determinant, 
sicut vinum est in dolio et in cellario, dolium quidem humectat, sed non cellarium. ' Cf. the general sense here with 
Prepositinus of Cremona. Suinina 10.6, pp. 263-4 who, like Peter. cites John of Damascus, Defide orthodoxia 50.1, 
p. 187. His solution is that the properties are in the essence. but are not therefore of the essence. 
133 ISent. 27. p. 216.32-3: 'Et propria qualitas est in prima substantia et secunda substantia, id est in significatis 
horum; et prirnam quidern. stibstantiam determinat, non tarnen sectundam. ' 
1340tto of Freising. Ge, -aa 1.58, pp. 83-4. See N. M. Hýring. 'The Porretans and the Greek Fathers'. MS 24 
(1962), pp. 189-191. 
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Gilbert argued that without this distinction we would be left in the absurd position of 
admitting that the same thing is begetting and begotten and that therefore tile same 
thing begot itself. 115 'Me necessity for this distinction also formed the subject of 
several treatises by Gilbert's supporters, the Porretani, throughout the second half of 
the twelfth century. 136 
Peter Lombard's position on the question is ambiguous despite tile assumption 
made by scholars that he opposed it unreservedly. He notes that the rationale of this 
proposed distinction between essence and Person is that otherwise there would be no 
way of distinguishing among the Persons. 137 And if there is no distinction of 
Persons, it follows that the same thing begot and is begotten. 138 Proponents of this 
position cite Hilary of Poitiers, who distinguishes between natura and res naturae. "9 
They take this to mean that nature (natura) and Person (res naturae) are not the 
same. 
140 
Peter clearly takes Gilbert's position as a denial of the essential identity of the 
three Persons. He cites a number of authorities to the effect that although distinctions 
between the common nature and the individual substance may apply to creatures, they 
do not apply to God. 14' But the Lombard actually seems to come some way towards 
Gilbert's position on the matter, when he says that 'there is some intellectual 
"-50tto of Freising, Gesta 1.58, p. 83: 'Ex qua absurditate facile sensus heretictis iuxta Sabellium emergeret, ut 
eadem res diceretur et generans et genita et eadem se ipsum genuisseý. 
136 N. M. H5ring ed., 'The Liber de Df'erentia naturae etpersonae by Hugh Etherian and the Letters Addressed 
to him by Peter of Vienna and Hugh of Honau', MS 24 (1962). 1-34. On Hugh's biography, see R. Lechat, 'La 
. 
ferts d Charles patristique grecque chez un th6ologien latin du XIIe si&cle: Hugues Eth6rien', Milanges dhistoire of 
Moeller 2 vols. (Louvain -Paris, 1914) 1,485-507; A. Dondaine, 'Hugues Eth&rien et Uon Toscan', AIIDLMA 19 
(1952), 67-134; Hdring, 'The Liber de Df`erentia', pp. 9-14. Hugh of Honau wrote a similar work, based on the 
Liber de Differentia, also ed. by Hdring, 'The Liber dc Diversitate naturae et personae by Hugh of Honau', 
AHDLMA 29 (1962), 103-216. For a recent bibliography of the Porretani, see J. Marenbon, 'A Note on the 
Porretani', in Dronke ed., A History of T)veýfth-Centurv Western Philosqj. 74v, 353-7. 
137 Uent. XXXIV. 1.1, p. 246.16-18: 'dicentes eandem essentiarn non posse esse Patrem et Filium sine personannn 
confusione. Si enim, inquiunt, ea essentia quae Pater est. Filius est. idern sibi pater est et filius'. 
13"ISent. XXXIV. 1.1. pp. 246-7: 'Si hanc rem dicis esse Patrem., et aliam quaere quam dicas Filitim. Si vero 
aliam non quaesieris. sed eandern dLxeris, idem genuit et genitus est. ' 
13 "1 9ISent. xxxrv. 1.2, p. 247. citing Hilary, De trin. VIII. 21,1. CCSL 62A, pp. 333-4, PL 10.252A-253A. 
14"ffent. XXXIV. 1.3. p. 247.26-8: 'intelligentes in his praemissis verbis Hilarii per "rem naturae" personarn, et 
nomine "naturae" divinam naturam. ' 
14'lSent. XXXIV. 1.6-8. pp. 249-50. 
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distinction in our mi , 142 ind when we say "hypostasis" and when we say "essence" . His final position, then, would seem to be that essence and Person are in every way 
the same thing, but that they signify differently, which does not really seem very far 
from Gilbert at all. 143 
4. The influence of the Sentences in the second ha4f of the tive4fth century 
Peter Lombard's Sentences had an enormous impact on teaching in the schools 
and were instrumental in paving the way for the doctrinal consensus of the later 
twelfth century. Although the Sentences were not fon-nally lectured upon until their 
introduction by Alexander of Hales in the 1220s, '44 it seems almost inconceivable 
that the volume of sources which bear their imprint is not an indication of their use 
as a teaching aid as well as a work of personal reference. They were used in this way 
almost as soon as they were written. 
Their influence was, on the one hand, mediated through a network of direct 
and indirect pupils, the famous 'school' of Peter Lombard. In the second half of the 
twelfth century virtually all the chancellors of the cathedral school of Notre-Dame 
were the Lombard's direct or indirect pupils: Odo of Soissons (c. 1153/60-c. 1167); 
Peter Comestor (1168-78); Hilduin (c. 1178-93); Peter of Poitiers (1193-1205); 
Prepositinus of Cremona (1206-9) . 
14' The presence of this pro-Lombardian group 
might imply the existence of an anti-Lombardian group. No such group existed, except 
perhaps the most fervent of the Porretani. Rather, virtually every work of scholastic 
142 [Sent. XXXIV. 1.9, p. 250.12-16: 'Quod aliqua est in ratione intelligentiae distinctio cum dicitur "hypostasis" 
et cum dicitur "essentia". Nec tamen diffiternur distinctionern habendurn fore secundurn intelligentiae rationern, 
cum dicitur "hy tasis", et cum dicitur "essentia": quia ibi significatur quod est commune tribus, hic vero non. I POS Est tamen hypostasis essentia, et e converso. ' 
143 For thinkers who follow the Lombard's conceptual distinction (Peter of Poitiers, Peter of Capua), see 
Schneider, Dic Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott, pp. 182-4. Cf. Hdring, 'Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik', pp. 121 - 
2. 
1441 
. 
Brady. The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', Franc&can Studies 
25 (1965). 90-116. 
145S 
. 
Femiolo, The Origins of the Universitv. The Schools of Paris and their Critics 1110-1215 (Stanford, 
1985), pp. 190-2. See also P. Glorieux, N1,7ertoire des maitres en th6ologie de Paris au XIIIe siecle 2 vols. (Paris, 
1933) 1. p. 13 for Bernard Chabert 0 205), Jean de la Chandeleur (1209-1213/15), Stephen of Reims (c. 1214-1218), 
whose educational backgrounds are not known. 
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theology written after 1160 reveals the influence of the Sentences. This includes the 
works of Alan of Lille and Simon of Toumai, thinkers usually assigned to the school 
of Gilbert of Poitiers. Their works clearly draw on the Sentences for patristic sources 
and for the framing of many questions. 146 In the second half of the twelfth century, 
the Sentences transcend any notional or actual division by school. They become part 
of the very edifice of theological study itself. 147 
A further, perhaps even more important ingredient in this process, was the 
literary genre or industry entirely devoted to summarizing, explaining and developing 
various aspects of the Sentences - the abbreviations, glosses and commentaries to 
which the work gave rise. 148 Let us for the moment examine this specifically 
oriented Sentence -literature before going on to consider scholastic theology in general. 
An abbreviation is, as its name implies, a condensed version of the Sentences 
which follows precisely the original organisation and preserves as far as possible the 
basic wording of its source. 149 Clearly such derivative works offer little for those 
interested in intellectual originality and independence of thought, but they are 
invaluable indicators of the rapid and widespread use of the Sentences as an 
authoritative reference work. The main aim of a gloss is to clarify the literal meaning 
146 A point recognised by Schneider in his survey, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott, pp. 3-4. 
14'Already under the year 1163 the Chronicon Universale Anonvini Laudunens&, ed. A. Cartellieri (Leipzig- 
Paris, 1909), p. 7 remarks upon the popularity of the work: 'In Francia claruit Petrus Lumbardus. Hic Novariensis 
in divinis et humanis scripturis nulli sui temporis sectindus ecclesiam Parisiensem. rexit et provexit. Hic compilavit 
psalterium continua glosacione, epistolas Pauli et sentencias, quas in 4 distinxit libris; que opuscula a cunctis in 
theologia studentibus habentur in gloria. ita tit, postpositis omnibus glosaturis, hec sola legatur. ' 
148F. Stegmiiller, Repertoriuin Coininentarioruin in Sententias Petri Loinbardi 2 vols. (Wiirzburg, 1947); V. 
Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Sulyplitnent au r6pertoire de M Frid6ric Steginueller (Florence, 1954); 
J. Van Dyk, 'Thirty Years since Stegmfiller. A Bibliographical Guide to the Study of Medieval Sentence 
Commentaries since the Publication of Stegmiiller's Rel. 7ertorium Cominentaribruin in Sententias Petri Loynbardi 
(1947)', Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), 255-315; Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 133-8. 
149Examples of abbreviations include Master Bandinus, Sententiaruin Libri Quatuor, PL 192.970-1112; Saint 
Martin of Leon (c. 1130-1203), Senno YYW in fiestAItate sanctae TrinitatLz, PL 208.1269-1350, on whom see, 
Dictionnaire de SI)iritualitj 10 (Paris, 1980). 685-6. See especially, Landgraf, 'Friischolastische Abkfirzungen der 
Sentenzen' for the same version of a Breiiarutn sententiaruin in BM Royal 7F XIII; Paris Maz. lat. 984 (1049) 
(fols. 1-132); Magdalen College O., dord, 40; Bodleian Laud. misc. 513, DUblin, Trinity College 275, fols. 1-118, 
attributed to Simon of Tournai; Lambeth Palace 116 (fols. 71-136), Luxemburg BN lat. 165 (fols. 1 -245); Landgraf, 
Introduction. pp. 114-15 leaves the question of Simon's authorship open. 
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of the original text. This is true both of inarginal glosses"O and those which are 
written as separate works. 15' Glosses which do survive in this separate form, of 
which the most important is the Glossa sul)er Sententias once attributed to Peter of 
Poitiers, resemble the stage of transition between gloss and commentary. 152 This 
Glossa is neither strictly speaking a literal gloss or paraphrase, nor a free-style 
commentary . 
153 It is true that in structure, the Glossa resembles a gloss more than 
a commentary, but the main difference is often in the length of the exposition rather 
than in the analysis offered. Its explication does not always adhere precisely to the 
order of the Lombard's text, and the language and method of argumentation differ 
significantly from the Lombard's. This is very clear, for example, from the gloss or 
commentary on Distinction IV of Book 1, which is merged almost indistinguishably 
with that on Distinction V. 154 This indicates that the Glossa belongs much more to 
the tradition which tries to see the unifying impulse behind the direction of the 
Lombard's thought, rather than simply being a literal gloss. For although the contents 
of Distinctions IV-V are very much interrelated, the nature of this connection is 
assumed rather than made explicit in the Sentences. In both the anonymous Glossa and 
in the Sentences of Peter of Poitiers, on the other hand, the same questions which are 
dealt with separately by the Lombard, are treated as a single unit by their authors. 
There were good reasons, in this sense, for thinking that the Glossa was the work of 
Peter of Poitiers. 
'50See J. de Ghellinck, 'Les notes marginales du Liber Sententiarum', Revue d'hL-aoire ecclisiatique 14.1 
(1913), 511-36,705-19, A. M. Landgraf, 'Drei Zweige der Pseudo- Poitiers- Glosse zu den Sentenzen des 
Lornbarden% RTAM 9 (1937), 167-204 adds to those manuscripts already indicated by de Ghellinck. 
'51A. M. Landgraf, 'ProWmes relatifs aux premieres Gloses des Sentences% RTAM 3 (1931). pp. 142-3. 
152 On the Glossa, see A. M. Landgraf, 'Notes de critiques textuelles stir les Sentences de Pierre Lombard', 
RTAM 2 (1930), pp. 80-2, following a personal communication from 0. Lottin, rejected the authorship of Peter of 
Poitiers. For the mss., see Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 137-8. The prologue to these glosses has been published by 
R. M. Martin, 'Notes stir Foeuvre litt6raire de Pierre le Mangeur', RTAM 3 (1931), pp. 63-4, after BM Royal 7F 
XIII, and 0. Lottin, 'Le prologue des Gloses stir les Sentences attribu6es A Pierre de Poitiers% RTAM 7 (1935), 70- 
3, after Paris BN lat. 14423. P. S. Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers. Master in Theology and Chancellor of 
Paris U 193-1205). (Notre Dame. Indiana, 1936), p. 148, writes that so far the gloss on Book I seems to be the same 
in every manuscript. My own examination of mss. at London, Oxford and Paris supports this conclusion. 
153 For these definitions, Stegmidler, Rq7crtoriuin, P. X; N. M. Hdring, 'Commentary and Hermeneutics', in 
Constable and Benson edd., Renaiýsance and Reneival. pp. 174-9. A similar distinction between a gloss and a 
commentary in law is made by G. Fransen, 'Les gloses des canonistes et des civilistes', in Les genres littiraires, 
p. 133. 
154 London BM Royal 7F XIII. fol. 7va. 
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In contrast to the extreme dependence of abbreviations and glosses on not just 
the structure, but also the views expressed in the Sentences, commentaries are 
distinguished by the author's independent stance on particular questions. `17he first 
commentary of this type, the Sentcntie Udonis, has been dated to c. 1160-65 and, like 
many other works of the second half of the twelfth century, draws on the Glossa on 
the Sentences. "' This author is writing very much in the spirit of Peter Lombard 
himself. Just as the Lombard had compiled the Sentences for the benefit of hard- 
pressed students, so our author has composed this Summa super sententias magistri 
petri as a kind of accessus to the entire work, thus rendering the subject matter, 
purpose and method of the Sentences themselves accessible to the lazy and sluggish 
reader. 156 Judging by the number of manuscripts, the work must have been fairly 
well known, and it was almost certainly used by Peter of Poitiers. 157 77he author's 
approach is to summarize the state of the question as presented by Peter Lombard, 
often using the same expressions and making selective use of patristic texts or 
referring to them in short hand rather than reproducing them in their entirety. He also 
proves the Lombard's position by adducing a number of patently absurd counter- 
arguments. For example, the Lombard had argued that 'God begot God' did not imply 
either that he begot himself or another God because there are neither several gods nor 
anything capable of begetting itself. One can show that neither of the inferences are 
necessary by examples: the Word became man, therefore himself as man or another 
man. 
158 
The other main commentary of this period was written by Stephen Langton (d. 
1550 
. Lottin, 'Le premier commentaire connu des Sentences de Pierre Lombard', RTAM 11 (1939), 64-71. For 
parallels between Udo and Master Martin, see A. M. Landgraf, Tdo und Magister Martinus', ibid., 62-4. Landgraf, 
Introduction, p. 136 classifies Udo's work as an abbreviation showing certain signs of independence, more or less 
the same conclusion as Schneider, Die Lehre voin drekinigen Gott, p. 2, who says the work gives the impression 
of being an abbreviation but departs from the Lombard on several occasions. For Udo's quaestiones, see Landgraf, 
Introduction, p. 136. 
156MUn ich CIm. 7622, fol. 1ra; Bamberg Patr. 126, fol. 3r: Sicut pigri et desidiosi nimium lectoris est obscura 
et magnis sentenciis, gravidam exponere ita quoque non studiosi sed supersticiosi est ea que plana sunt longis 
nimiurn. et peregginus e. xpositionibus onorare. Quapropter ad eum librum accedentibus qui ceterorum expositio est 
pauca prelibare stiff iciat. videlicet que sit materia, que intencio, et quis modus agendi. ' On the acce-vsus in classical 
literature. see E. A. Quain, 'The Medieval Acce. -z. -zuv Ad Auctores', Traditio 3 (1945), 215-64 and R. B. C. Huygens, 
Accessus ad Auctore,, z (Leiden, 1970); Hýring, 'Commentary and Hermeneutics', pp. 185-90. 
157 See Schneider, Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott, pp. 2-3 and Appendix B. 
158Scntentie Udonis. Munich Cb-n. 7622, fol. 4ra. See Appendix A. 1. 
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1228) in the early thirteenth century. '59 The theological agenda of Langton's Summa 
and Quaestiones (c. 1200-06) is also clearly defined in very fundamental ways by a 
reading of the Sentences . 
160 These works precede the Fourth Lateran Council by only 
a few years and are extremely important for our understanding of the nature of 
thought on the Trinity at that time, even though Langton does not seem to have played 
an important role at the Council itself. 161 But, as I shall argue, it is the years 
immediately preceding the Council, rather than the short time in which it sat, which 
count. Langton's views are particularly important in this respect since they influenced 
other thinkers. 162 
Besides works explicitly directed towards the Sentences there is a whole host 
of works, whether by Lornbardians or otherwise, which is informed by the Lombard's 
work in some fundamental way. The most oustanding illustration of this influence is 
the perpetuation of the Lombard's teachings through his own pupils. Perhaps the most 
important of these was Peter Comestor, chancellor of Notre-Dame (1168-78), who is 
thought to have been personally taught by the Lombard. His best known work is the 
Historia scholastica which, like the Sentences, became a scholastic textbook. 163 
However, several contemporary authors also cite Comestor's opinion on particular 
questions of doctrine. '64 His importance in the development of twelfth-century 
159Dated Landgraf, Der Sentenzenkommentar, pp. xviii-xLx from VIL Cl 4 of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples. 
"Tor the dating, L. Antl, 'An Introduction to the Quaestiones theologicae of Stephen Langton', Franciscan 
Studies 12 (1952), pp. 168-72 and S. Ebbesen and L. B. Mortensen, 'A Partial Edition of Stephen Langton's Summa 
and Quaestiones with Parallels from Andrew Sunesen's Hexatneron', CIMAGL 49 (1985), p. 25. These scholars all 
agree that Langton's theological works must predate his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal 
in 1206. Ebbesen and Mortensen also note that MS. Cambridge, St John's C7 (James 57) upon which their edition 
is based reflects editorial work, not by Langton himself, as late as the 1210s or 1220s. The Suinina is in fact a 
condensed version of disputed questions rather than a full theological suinma, (ibid., p. 26). 
16'See the late thirteenth -century chronicler, Walter of Coventry, Memoriale 2 vols., RS 58 (London, 1872-3) 
11, p. 228: 'Sed quoniam intellexit gratiam domini papae sibi subtracturn, pauca verba de caetero in concilio fecit'. 
16'For Langton's influence on Geoffrey of Poitiers, see G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, 'The Quaestiones of 
Cardinal Stephen Langton (111Y. New Scholasticiwn 4 (1930), 115-64. 
16'Smalley, The Stu4v of the Bible, p. 214. 
164 R. M. Martin. 'Notes stir l'oeuvre litt6raire de Pierre le Mangeur'. RTAM 3 (1931), 54-66-, A. M. Landgraf, 
'Recherches stir les 6crits de Pierre le Mangeur', RTAM 3 (1931), p. 294 prints Cornestor's opinion on [Sent. V. 1 
as reported by the Glossa on the Sentences (Bamberg Patr. 128, fol. 34rb; BM Royal 7F XIII. fol. 7vb has M. P. ). 
See also I. Brady, 'Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard'. Antoniý7nuin 41 (1966). pp. 489-90 
w-ho argues that reports of Cornestor's opinions are inchided among the Quaestiones of Odo of Soissons. Paris BN 
lat. 18108, fols. 83a-107b and Troyes lat. 964. fols. 89-159v. 
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theology is further attested to by the existence of a prologue to a full-length gloss on 
the Sentences which has been attributed to jjiM. 165 Comestor may even have lectured 
on the Sentences and secured their use as a scholastic textbook. 66 Either way., 
Comestor's writings and teachings on doctrinal theology, which are little more than 
hinted at in the extant sources, must have been crucial to the subsequent fate of the 
Lombard's Sentences. 
The Sentences of Peter of Poitiers (1130-1205), written c. 1170,167 are 
heavily indebted to the Lombard's Sentences and must have served to widen their 
influence. 168 Peter himself was probably taught by Peter Comestor, and like him he 
went on to hold the position of chancellor of Notre-Dame (1193-1205) . 
169 The wide 
use of Peter of Poitiers' Sentences is shown both by the impressive number of extant 
manuscripts and by their relationship to a number of collections of quaestiones. 170 
Partly because they share the same title, Peter's work is always remembered for its 
dependence on the Lombard's Sentences, even though it is divided into five rather 
than four books; more than half of the questions which he discusses and most of the 
patristic texts are found in the Lombard's work, and he never diverges from the 
165 Printed by Martin, 'Notes sur Foeuvre litt6raire de Pierre le Mangeur', pp. 61-2. It is on the basis of this 
prologue that Lottin, 'Le prologue des Glose', p. 71 notes the influence of Comestor on the author of the Glossa. 
166 D. E. Luscombe, 'Peter Comestor', in K. Walsh and D. Wood edd., The Bible in the Medieval World. Fssavs 
in Memorv qf Begl Smallg, Studies in Church Histog, subsidia. 4 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 110,116. 
167Moore, Ae Works of Peter of Poitiers, pp. 39-41 dates the work- to before May 1170, the date of Alexander 
III's letter to William, Archbishop of Sens, against the teaching of Peter Lombard's christological doctrine, arguing 
that it is highly improbable that Peter would dedicate a work- in which he proposed the prohibited doctrine, to this 
same William. 
168Esp. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholast&chen Methode II, pp. 406, though his assessment was partly 
determined by his belief that Peter was the author of the Glossa (pp. 504-8); Sententiae, edd. Moore and Dulong, 
p. vii. 
169The ingizister ineus to whom Peter refers on six occasions is Peter Comestor in at least two cases. See H. 
Weisweiler in a review of Moore and Dulong's edition of Peter's Sentences, Scholastik 27 (1952), p. 476, and 
Brady, Teter Manducator', p. 482. For Peter's biography, see Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers. pp. 1-24. 
170For the manuscripts, see ibid., pp. 27-36. The quaestiones, all associated with the teachings of Odo of 
Soissons (Paris Maz. lat. 1708; Paris BN lat. 18108, London BM Harley 3855), are discussed by A. M. Landgraf, 
'Petrusvon Poitiers und die Qu5stionenliteratur des 12. Jahrhiinderts', Philosol-)h&cheqJahrbuch 5/2 (1939), 202-22, 
348-58 who says they may be by him. Also Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 143,145-6 for abbreviations of Peter's 
Sentences and quaestiones associated with them. 
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Lombard positioli. '7' But with Peter of Poitiers. we are no longer purely in tile realm 
of the sic-et-non method of resolving apparently contradictory authorities. 172 Rather 
than giving an exhaustive list of authoritative texts which have a bearing on the 
interpretation of any given question, Peter selects a few for citation, almost always 
from the Lombard's Sentences, in order to locate the problem within the parameters 
of an on-going debate. In contrast to the Lombard's exhaustive approach, he refers to 
any other authorities in a few words. 173 Peter's language and use of argument also 
bear the imprint of contemporary teachings on logic and grammar. His more frequent 
use of dialectic and grammatical distinctions, therefore, reflects the changing 
intellectual context. 174 His knowledge of the latest techniques of argument is 
175 indicated by his employment of fallacies and instantiae . In this respect Peter's 
approach resembles very much that of Alan of Lille, upon whom he probably depends 
for his grammatical theory. 176 
Continuing this line of the Lombard's indirect pupillage is Peter of Capua (d. 
1214), thought to be a direct pupil of Peter of Poitiers when he studied at Paris in the 
1180s and early 1190S. 
177 Peter's Summa (written before 1190)178 belongs firmly 
ývithin the group of writings which adopts the Lombard's fourfold division of subject 
17'Moore and Dulong, Sententiae, pp. xxviii-xxx: Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers, pp. 48-9. For Peter's 
other principal sources (Hugh of Saint-Victor, the Summa sententiarum, the Sententiae divinitatis), see Moore and 
Dulong, p. xxii-xxvii; J. von Walter, Mag&tri GandullMi Bonoiensis, Sententiarum libri quattuor (Vienn a- Breslau, 
1924), pp. lix-lxviii for Gandulph of Bologna; J. N. Garvin, 'Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai on the Trinity', 
RTAM 16 (1949), 314-16. 
172 Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Meth(5ode 11, pp. 501-24; Moore and Dulong, Sententiae, pp-xv- 
xvi; Angelini, Lortodossia e la graininatica. p. 97: 'il modo di argomentare, di discutere le questioni di Pietro ý 
macroscopic amente diverso da quello del Lombardo, ed ý caratterizzato da tin ricorso costante e tecnicamente molto 
elaborato agli stntmenti della dialettica e della grammatica. ' 
173 ISent. 27, p. 216-42-3: 'Atictoritates autem que predicte surit ad hoc probandurn, et omnes consimiles, que 
induci solent. ' 
17'The view of Angelini, L'ortodossia e la graininatica, p. 100. 
175jbid.. pp. 98-9. 
176jbid., pp. 100_1. 
"'W. Maleczek, Petrus Capuanus. Kardinal, Legat am vienen Kreuz. -ug, Theologe (1214) (Wien, 1988), p. 74. 
Maleczek's exhaustive study finally establishes this Peter of Captia, Cardinal-Deacon of S. Maria in Vialata. not 
his younger namesake (126-1236), as the author of the Sumina (pp. 231-2). 
178Dated by Maleczek,. Petrus Capuanus. p. 233. 
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matter into God, creation and angelology, Cl-aistology, and the sacraments and shows 
strong relationships with several other works of the period. 179 Like the Lombard, 
Peter adopts a citation from Augustine's De doctrina christiana as the Summa's 
organizing principle. 180 
Peter of Poitiers' mixture of dependence and independence vis-A-vis the 
Lombard's Sentences shows that we should be wary of oversimplifying the eclectic 
range of methods and sources which theologians used and developed. This is true not 
only of Peter of Poitiers, but of virtually every major author of the later twelfth 
century. Prepositinus of Cremona (d. 1209/10) is another example of a theologian 
whose work only makes sense in the context of a knowledge of the Sentences, but 
whose techniques for solving problems are also indicative of post-Lombardian 
developments. Prepositinus"' first studied and taught at Paris, with a brief spell at 
Mainz, before becoming chancellor of Notre-Dame during the crucial years of 1206- 
1209/10.182 His most important work of doctrinal theology is the Summa 'Qui 
producit ventos' (c. 1188-94) . 
18' Throughout it he refers to the opinion of 'Master 
Peter Lombard', sometimes as only one opinion amongst several, without any special 
status of its own, '84 elsewhere as the authoritative position on a question, 185 or, on 
179jbid., p. 235. The Summa is influenced by the Glossa and shows parallels with quaestiones in BM Royal 9E 
X11 (fols. 2r-8v) and Paris Maz. lat. 1708. It in turn influences the Summa of Gerard of Sessio Vat. lat. 10754 and 
the anonymous Summa Bamberg Patr. 136. See A. Landgraf, 'A Study of the Academic Latitude of Peter of 
Capua', New Scholasticigm 14 (1940), 57-74 and Introduction, p. 147. 
'80Munich Clm. 14508, fol. lra: 'Augustinus in libro de doctrina talem ponit rerurn divisionem: rerurn alie sunt 
quibus fruendurn est, alie quibus utendurn est, alie que fniuntur et utuntur homines et angeli. ' Cf. Lombard, ffent. 1, 
pp. 55-61. 
"'An acquired name. See G. Lacombe, Prepositini Cancellarii Parisiensis (1206-1210). Opera Oinnia 1, La 
vie et les oeuvres de Privostin, BibliotNque Thomiste 11 (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1927), pp. 3-4. 
182ibid., 
pp. gff. 
'"Ibid., pp. 153-62 for the mss. and additionally Landgraf. Introduction, pp. 153-4. Lacombe also publishes the 
incipits; of Paris BN lat. 14526, pp. 168-78. Angelini has published an edition of Book I. For the tentative dating, 
see Landgraf, Introduction, p. 154. Lacombe (pp. 179-81) had prviously dated it to Prepositnus' chancellorship. 
184SUmma 1.8, p. 203.4. on the various opinions concerning the signification of equalis and shnilis; ibid. 12.2, 
p. 277.4, on the number of personal properties. 
185C,,, 
Amma 5.21, P. 220.61-2: 'Ad hoc bene respondetur in Sententiis, quod non ostenditur ibi quod filius potuit 
generare filium, sed removetur ad eo impotentia', on the question of whether or not the Son has the power to beget, 
Prepositinus cites the standard Augustinian authority on the subject found in the Sentences (it is not that the Son 
could not beget. but it is not appropriate for him to do so, Uent. VILI. 2, p. 92). 
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186 occasion, lie even rejects the Lombard's solution in favour of his own. Much 
more important for the overall content of the work than these occasional references 
to the Lombard's personal opinion, however, is the apparatus of questions provided 
by the Sentences. Sometimes this is made explicit, as when Prepositinus reproduces 
the arguments found in the Sentences about 'God begot God; therefore himself or 
another God' and 'God the Father begot God who is God the Father or God who is 
not the Father. ' 187 More often the origin of a question in the Sentences is clear from 
the way it is framed by Prepositinus and from the authorities he adduces for and 
against, as when he considers the question of whether the Father is wise by the 
wisdom which he begot. 188 
The Speculum Speculationem, written no earlier than 1201, is the only work 
of dialectical theology by Alexander Nequam (1157-1217). 189 The aim of the work 
has been defined as threefold: to refute Cathar doctrines; to use logic in the service 
of theology, especially the methods of terminist logic; and to bring the Lombard's 
Sentences, whose structure it generally follows, up to date in the light of the logica 
nova. '90 Alexander had studied and taught at Paris c. 1175-1182, so his approach is 
very much of a piece with other Paris theologians and reflects their concerns. He 
clearly takes many of his questions and authorities from the Sentences. '9' 
Particular opinions of the Lombard could also be disseminated in the fon-n of 
quaestiones. For example, several collections of quaestiones associated with the 
186C,,, 
Summa 10.6. p. 264.7-12, on whether the personal properties are in the essence: 'Magister tamen Petrus 
simpliciter concedit in sententfis, dicens eas esse ita in essentia quod eam non determinant sed in personis ita quod 
eas determinant. Convenientius tamen puto quod distinguatur illa propositio, scilicet: proprietates sunt in essentia; 
i. e sunt ipsa essentia, vera est; sunt proprietates essentie, falsa est. ' Prepositinus cites the Lombard's view that the 
properties are in the essence in such a way that they do not deter-mine it and in the Persons in such a way that they 
do determine them (Eent. XXXIII. 1.10, p. 243); he says a better explanation is that the properties are in the essence, 
but that they are not the properties of the essence. 
187SUmma 4.4, p. 217.1-3: 'Ex predictis potest haberi solutio argurnenti quod in sententiis invenitur, scilicet 
huius: pater genuit deurn, ergo deum qui est pater vel deum qui non est pater. ' 
18R^ '134-5. Summa 6.1, p. 230. Cf. Lombard, Uent. XXXII. 2.4, pp. - 
189SPeCUluln Speculationem, ed. R. M. Thomson. Atictores Britannici Medii Aevi 11 (Oxford, 1988). 
'90Ibid., pp. Lx-x. Of Alexander's ancient sources, Aristotle is the most frequently cited after Augustine (ibid., 
pp. xiii-xvii). 
"'For example. SI)eculuin II-xiii, p-132. on whether essence begets essence; also striking in this respect is 
Master Hubertus, Suinina, Munich Clm. 28799. fol. 2va-b. where the entire question is stnictured bv the format in 
the Sentences. 
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teaching of Odo of Soissons, chancellor of Notre-Dame (c. 1153/60-c. 1167) and 
thought to be a direct pupil of the Lombard contain the Lombard fon-nula, Dicit 
Augustinus: deus Pater genuit se alterum. 192 One author, perhaps Odo himself, even 
paraphrases entire sections from the Sentcnces. '9' As the quaestio informs the basic 
structure of the theological summae of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is 
extremely significant that individual quaestiones should be so heavily indebted to the 
Sentences. 'Fhe Compilatio quaestionum theologide of Master Martin, written in the 
1190s, borrows its subject matter from a wide range of sources, again with a 
significant contribution from Peter Lombard. 194 
But the orbit of influence of the Sentences was not restricted to the 'Lombard 
school'. The work penetrated the very process of study itself, so that no theologian 
remained untouched by it. This is true even of the so-called mild supporters of Gilbert, 
Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai. Alan, whose influence on theological 
methodology is difficult to exaggerate, taught at Paris and then Montpellier, before 
retiring to Citeaux, where he died in either 1202 or 1203. '9' He is best known for 
his methodological affinity to Gilbert of Poitiers, especially his use of negative 
196 theology and his predilection for Boethius and Pseudo- Dionysius. According to 
192paris MaZ. lat. 1708, fol. 249ra-b; London BM Harley 3855, fol. 12r. See A. M. Landgraf, 'Quelques 
collections de Quaestiones de la seconde moiti6 du XIIe si6cle. Premier classement', RTAM 6 (1934), pp. 379-81: 
idem, 'Quelques collections de Quaestiones de ]a seconde moiti6 du Xlle si&cle. Conclusions', RTAM 7 (1935), 
p. 113 detects a basic similarity among all the collections included in his survey. 
'9'See esp. Quaestiones Odonis 259, p. 87 for a whole series of authorities taken from Distinction IV-V of the 
Sentences. Cf. for example, 'Quod autem. Pater essentiarn suarn non genuerit, sic probatur indiscusse: Cum Pater 
sua sit essentia. si suarn generat essentiam, eo quod generat, est. Igitur quod generat est ... et quod est impossibile' 
with ISent. V. 1.4, p. 81. 
194 R. Heinzmann, Die 'Compilatio quaevtionum theologiae'secundum Magistrum Martinum. Mitteilungen des 
Grabmann-Instituts der Universitdt Mfinchen 9 (Mfinchen. 1964), p. 4 for dating. On Martin's eclectic range of 
sources, see Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott. pp. 4-5. 
'95For Alan's biography, see M. -T. d'Alverny, Alain de Lille. Textes inidits (Paris, 1965), pp. 12-29, - G. R. 
Evans, Alan of Lille. The Frontiers of Theologv in the Later Tweýfth Centurv (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 1-12. 
196, rhe Dionysian corpus, particularly the Celestial Ilierarchy, was enjoying a relatively wide readership for 
the first time in the Latin West in the twelfth centurv. The first accTible translation was by John Scottus Eriugena 
(862), superseding that by Hilduin of Saint Denis (i38). For the ms. tradition see J. Barbet, 'La traduction du texte 
latin de la Hiýarchie c6leste dans les manuscrits des Etpositiones in Hierarchiain caelestain', in JJ. O'Meara and 
L. Bieler edd.. 7he Mind of Eriugena (Dublin. 1973). 89-97. John SarTazine produced an improved translation c. 
1166. See G. Th&ry, 'Documents concemant Jean Sarrazin. reviseur de la traduction Erig6nienne du Corpus 
Dionvsicum'. AIIDLMA 18 (1950-51), 45-87. Dionysian ideas also gained additional currency indirectly through 
such works as Eritigena's Homily on the Prologue of Saint John (54 mss. ), ed. E. Jeauneau. Sources chritiennes 
151 (Paris. 1969) and Hugh of Saint-Victor's commentaries, PL 175.923-1154. 
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the latter, every created thing holds its place of importance relative to God in a 
descending hierarchy of likeness to hiln. 197 'Ilius the celestial hierarchy of angels is 
closer to God than the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church. 198 It is through this 
divine likeness that the hierarchies are able in varying degrees to serve as sources of 
knowledge of the divine nature. '99 But because any dissimilarity is always greater 
than any similarity, theological statements should always be negative rather than 
affin-native, i. e. should say what God is not rather than what he is . 
200 
Consistent with this preference for negative theology is Alan's attention to 
technical precision in theological language. He is perhaps the earliest theologian to 
make extensive use of the distinction between signification and supposition, and this 
in itself may partly account for the distinction's universal adoption by contemporary 
and subsequent scholastic theologians. It is somewhat ironic, given that Gilbert's 
argument for a distinction between 'essence' and 'Person' became something of a 
cause cilebre, that so much of supposition theory should depend precisely on such a 
semantic distinction between terms, including 'essence' and 'Person'. 
Alan may be a 'Gilbertine' by theoretical disposition, but this does not 
preclude him from using the Sentences. Many of the quaestiones found in the Summa 
'Quoniam Homines' (c. 1160) are drawn either directly or indirectly from the 
Sentences, sometimes with little modification . 
20' The question of whether essence 
begot essence is an excellent case in point. Alan cites a series of patristic authorities, 
all found in Distinction V of the Sentences, relevant to a determination of the 
202 
problem . 
He even refers the reader directly to that work for additional 
197 On the Dionysian hierarchy, see, R. Roques, Lunivers dionysien. Structure higarchique A monde selon le 
Pseudo-Denvs (Paris, 1954); A. Louth, Denvs the Areopagite (London, 1989); Pseudo -Dion vsius. The Complete 
Works, Classics of Western Spirituality, trans. C. Luibheid (London, 1987). 
'9'Louth, Demw the Areopagite, pp. 38-9. 
'99Ibid., p-39. 
200AIan cites Dionysius explicitly on this issue of negative theology, Regulae caelestis iuris XVIII. 3. ed. N. M. 
Hdring, AIIDLMA 48 (1981), p. 137. 
20'For the dating. see P. Glorieux, AHDLMA 20 (1953), p. 116. 
202- ide etswnholo IIIA, PL 40.183; De trin. V11.3. CCSL 50, p. 250, Sumina 65, p-215. Alan cites Augustine, Defi - PL 42.936, and Hilary. De trin. IV. 10, CCSL 62. p. 111, PL 10.104. See Lombard, Uent. V. 1.5. p. 821.5-7; V. 1-7, 
P. 82.25-7-, and V. 1.9. p. 83.26-7 respectively. 
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authorities . 
20' The standard arguments are also reproduced: if the divinity begot the 
divinity then the same thing begot itself, which is contrary to all reason; if the divinity 
begot the divinity there would be no distinctions in the Trinity; if the Father begot the 
divinity, he would have begotten his own cause; if the divinity begot the divinity, 
something would be its own cause; if the divinity begot the Son it would be distinct 
from the Son through generation and thus the divinity would no longer be the 
Son 
. 
204The influence of well-established scholastic formulations of certain questions 
is evident elsewhere in the Summa when Alan discusses in succession 'whether the 
Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit' and 'whether the Father is wise through 
the Son 9.205 
Simon of Toumai (d. 1201) also depends heavily on the Lombard's 
Sentences. 206 A comparison of the trinitarian sections from Simon's Summa or 
Institutiones in sacram paginam (1170-1175)207 with corresponding sections from 
the Lombard's Sentences reveals not only that Simon's source for the vast majority 
of his patristic citations is Peter Lombard, but also that the structure of Simon's work 
follows the Sentences to such an extent as to resemble in places a commentary. 208 
So it is not surprising to learn, therefore, that an abbreviation of the Sentences has 
2030,. 
Summa 65, p. 216: 'Sed quia. hec auctoritates et multe alie in sententfis diffuse exposite sunt, ad praesens hiis 
supersedemus. ' 
"'Summa 65, p. 216- Cf. Lombard, Uent. V. 1.4, p. 81. 
20'Summa 118-19, pp. 252-4. 
'For Simon's works, Les digputations, ed. Warichez; sections of the Institutiones are published by M. 
Schmaus, 'Die Texte der Trinitdtslehre in den Sententiae des Simon von Toumai, RTAM 4 (1932), 59-72,187-98, 
294-307 and R. Heinzmann, Die Institutiones in sacrain paginam des Simon von Tournai, Ver6ffentlichungen des 
Grabmann-Institutes. Neue Folge 1 (Mfinchen, 1967); N. M. Hdring, 'Simon of Toumai's Commentary on the so- 
called Athansian Creed', AHDLMA 43 (1976). 135-99; N. M. Hdring, 'Two Redactions of a Commentary on a 
Gallican Creed by Simon of Toumai', AHDLMA 41 (1974), 39-112. 
207 Dated by Heinzmann, Die Institutiones, p. 10. Heinzmann also argues, on the basis of Simon's own reference 
in the Disputationes, that the authentic title of the work- is Institutiones not Summa. 
20'30n Simon's sources in general, see Warichez, Les disputations, pp. xxiii-xxvii. For his use of Aristotle, see 
Heinzmann, Die I&vtitutiones. Twelfth-century sources include the canonist Rufinus for which see D. Van den 
Eynde, 'Deux sources de la Somme th&ologique de Simon de Tournai', Antonianuin 24 (1949), 19-42. For Alan 
of Lille, see 0. Lottin, 'Alain de Lille, une des sources des Disputationes de Simon de Tournai', RTAM 17 (1950), 
175-86 who publishes the incipits of the 19 anonymous quaestiones, which he attributes to Alan of Lille, from 
London BM Royal 9E XII, fols. 79rb-97va upon which the first 21 (except 7 and 17) of Simon's Disputationes 
depend. See HAring, 'Simon of Tournai's Commentary on the so-called Athanasian Creed', pp. 1434 for borrowings 
from the Suinina 'Quoniain Homines'. 
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been attributed to Simon ns tu . 
209 'Me trinitarian sections of the I ti tiones in fact read 
like a compilation from Gilbert's commentary on Boethius's De trinitate and Peter 
Lombard's Sentences. 210 Certain expressions which accompany Simon's scriptural 
citations are found in the Sentences, confirming beyond reasonable doubt that work 
to be Simon's source . 
21 1 The same can be said of the sections in which Simon sets 
out his position on divine generation. 212 On the question of whether the Father's 
power to beget means that he possesses a power which the Son lacks, Simon follows 
the Sentences by drawing particular attention to Augustine's response that it is not that 
the Son is not able to beget, but rather that it is not appropriate for him to do S0.213 
Simon's treatment is much longer than Peter Lombard's, which suggests that he is 
consciously expanding upon his source. Finally, a long section consisting of thirty 
questions relating to various points about the Holy Spirit follows in detail the order 
and content of the Lombard's treatment of the same questions. 214 
Concrete evidence of the penetration of the Sentences into southern Europe is 
215 provided by the Sentences of Gandulph of Bologna, written in the 1160s. Though 
216 by no means a commentary, Gandulph borrows heavily from the Lombard. De 
Ghellinck has stressed both authors' common use of dialectic in the han-nonisation of 
209ý 
troyes lat. 1371; London BM Royal 7F XHI; Dublin, Trinity College 275, fols. 1-118; Paris Maz. lat. 984; 
Oxford, Bodleian Laud. Misc. 513; Oxford, Magdalen College lat. 40. The work cannot be definitively attributed 
to Simon, according to Landgraf, Introduction, pp. 114-15. 
21"'The beginning of the work (4-10, pp. 63-8) is taken from Gilbert. See N. M. Hdring, 'Simon of Toumai and 
Gilbert of Poitiers', MS 27 (1965), 325-30 for Gilbert's influence. The remaining sections on the Trinity correspond 
to questions found in the Sentences: 13-14, pp. 69-71 literally reproduce the scriptural and patristic texts relating 
to the testimony on the Trinity in the Old and New Testaments in the original order in which they are found in 
Lombard, ffent. 11.4-5. pp. 63-8 
21 'For example Institutiones 13, p. 69: 'Ecce dicensfaciamus et nostram pluralitatem ostendit personarum'. Cf. 
Lombard, [Sent. 11.4.2, p. 64: 'Dicens enim. faciamus et nostram, pluralitatem personarum ostendit'. 
212Cf. InStitUtioneS 30-7, pp. 194-8 and ISent. IV-VII, LX, pp. 77-94,103-10; Institutiones 38-41, pp. 294-5 and 
Uent. XXXH. 2-3, pp. 234-7. 
21 'Institutiones 33-5, pp. 195-6 and Disputationes LXXXVII. 2, pp. 250-1. Cf. Lombard, ISent. V11.1.2, p. 92. For 
the same question see also Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 6, p. 40; Prepositinus. Sulnma 5.2, pp. 218-20. Schneider, Die 
Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott, pp. 67-75. 
214Institutiones 42-72, pp. 295-307. Cf. Lombard, Uent. X-X'VIH, pp. 110-59. 
215 Dated von Walter, Mag&tri Ganduphi Bononiensis. p. lxviii. 
21 6De Ghellinck, Le inouvement th6ologique, pp. 334-5. 
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patristic sources and the division into four books which follow much the same order 
of subject. 2 17 Of particular relevance for twelfth-century discussions of the Trinity 
is the fact that Gandulph follows virtually the same order of questions in his section 
on divine generation as the Lombard . 
218 There is also a strong literary tradition 
connecting the two works, for although it does not seem that Gandulph's work was 
widely disseminated, he is often cited in the marginal glosses of the Lombard's 
Sentences. 219 
Finally, the Sentences inform the structure of thirteenth-century summae, for 
example, the Fragmenta quaestionum theologicorum of Master Hubertus, written 
between 1194 and 1200. "0 Despite the title, the work is not a collection of 
questions, but a summa, of special interest from the point of view of the structure of 
the theological summae of the early thirteenth century. 22' The author's work of 
synthesis is truly remarkable. He cites an impressive range of contemporary 
theologians from Robert of Melun and Peter of Corbeil to Prepostinus of 
Cremona. 222 However, Peter Lombard is not only the most frequently cited twelfth- 
century theologian, but his Sentences provide the model for the division of the work 
into four books. 223 
217jbid., pp. 302-9. 
21"gent. 66-92, pp. 46-62, esp. pp-46-7, 'That God begot God, but not himself or another God', where 
Gandulph's approach is a condensed form of the corresponding section in Lombard, ISent. [V. 1 and V. 1-5. 
219J. de Ghellinck, 'La diffussion des oeuvres de Gandulphe de Bologne au Moyen Age', Revue bin6dictine 
27 (1910), 386-99 and 'Les notes marginales du Liber Sententiarum', pp. 521-3. For Gandulph's influence on Peter 
of Poitiers and others. see Landgraf, Introduction, p. 139. 
22ODated by R. Heinzmann, Die Summe 'Colligitefragmenta'des Magigter Hubertus (Clin 28 799). Ein Beitrag 
zur theologischen Sistembildung in der Scholastik (Mfinchen, 1974), pp. 20-4 on the evidence of a reference to the 
work in the Chronica of Otto of Saint Blaise under the year 1191. The work was first discovered by Martin 
Grabmann. 'Note sur la somme th&ologique de Magister Hubertus', RTAM 1 (1929), 229-39 and is now held by 
the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munich Clm 28799. M. -T. d'Alvemy, 'Humbertus de Balesma', AHDLMA 51 
(1984), 127-91 identifies the author of the summa with another Master Hubertus who delivered a sermon to 
students at Paris in 1192/3. 
22'Heinzmann, Die Summe 'Colligitefragmenta'des Magister Huberw, p. 8. 
222 Prepositinus is cited only 5 times (see Heinzmann, Die Sumine 'Colligitefragmenta'des Magister Hubertus, 
p. 14), but entire passages have been taken from his Sumina. See Appendix C. 
223Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 2ra: 'Primum enim genus quaestionum est de creatore; secundum de opere 
creationis, tertium de opere recreationis gesto in persona Christi, id est de incarnatione, baptismo, passione, 
resurrectione etc., quartum de opere recreationis quod Christus gerit in persona ecclesie; quinta de bonorum et 
malorum retributione. Et sectindurn hunc ordinam Liber Sententiarum dividitur in quattuor partes'. 
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All this testifies to the diversity of channels through which the Sentences were 
accessible to an ever-growing number of students of theology. But this dominance 
does not mean that there was no room for anyone else, as if twelfth-century scholars 
could only cope with the idea of one authority or point of view. Even theologians such 
as Odo of Soissons, who are, by general consent, assigned to the Lombard's 'school', 
could and did disagree with some of his views. 224 Another prime example of 
eclecticism and independence of thought is Peter the Chanter . 
225 The range of 
twelfth-century theologians drawn upon by the Chanter and the diverse nature of his 
own compositions further belies the sometimes rigid division of twelfth-century 
theology into 'schools'. 226 By the second half of the twelfth century theologians 
were no longer thinking in terms of personal allegiances and differences but rather in 
terms of the common interests and preoccupations, professional and intellectual, 
fostered by their common vocation. The adoption of the Sentences as a theological 
reference work meant that theologians were working to the same agenda, a 
circumstance which was bound to facilitate the emergence of a common tradition of 
thought on the Trinity. 
5. The 'triumph' of Peter Lombard 
In his monumental work on twelfth-century theology, de Ghellinck 
distinguished three phases in the definitive triumph of Peter Lombard: the 
christological disputes of the 1160s and 1170s; the near-condemnation issued by the 
Third Lateran Council of 1179; and the probably wiique formal approbation of the 
Lombard's personal doctrine at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.227 Despite his 
sometimes tendentious tone, de Ghellinck's account still holds good. Moreover, the 
very inclusion of a section on the Lombard's triumph ranks as an implicit recognition 
224 L. H6dl, 'Die theologische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Petrus Lombardus und Odo von Ourscamp nach 
dem Zeugnis der fr6hen Qudstionen- und Glossenliteratur', Scholastik 33 (1958). 62-80. 
22'J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants. The Social Vieus of Peter the Chanter and h& Circle 2 vols. 
(Princeton, 1970) 1, pp. 3-16. 
"Ibid., pp. 47-8. 
22 , 'Le inouvement th&logique, pp. 251-66. 
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that Peter Lombard's success was not a predeten-nined certainty, a mere fon-nality of 
the historical process, but was very much subject to the political and theological 
vicissitudes of the time. For the Lombard was as much the object of suspicion and 
hostility as Peter Abelard or Gilbert of Poitiers had been. 'Me attacks upon his 
teachings almost all came from outside the schools, from men whose conception of 
God was very much more rooted in personal experience. "8 A Gerhoch of 
Reichersperg, a Walter of Saint-Victor, even a Richard of Saint-Victor, took great 
exception to the confident tone characteristic of scholastic theology. Perhaps they 
regarded the standard evocations about the impossibility of knowing God and the 
poverty of human understanding as nothing more than hollow tokenism. Thus when 
Peter Lombard succeeded in resisting the accumulative weight of these fairly 
considerable onslaughts, a new moment in the history of Christian thought was 
inaugurated. Not just Peter Lombard the individual, but Peter Lombard, or rather the 
Sentences, as indicative of theology as a scientific discipline, triumphed. 
My survey of the theological literature of the second half of the twelfth century 
has stressed that no comer of scholastic theology remained untouched by the 
enormous impact of the Sentences on teaching and study. There is, of courseY only an 
indirect causal relationship between the Lombard's increasing dominance in the 
schools and his eventual triumph, inasmuch as the schools themselves assumed a 
greater social importance independent of the particular fortunes of the Sentences. As 
soon as men who had spent some years studying theology at Paris began to gain 
official positions in the Church, the likelihood of a successful condemnation of any 
of the Lombard's teachings receded rapidly, because these were now often the 
received wisdom. In effect this meant the further entrenchment of the Sentences as a 
given rather than a variable in theological study. 
The most protracted of these controversies, the attacks on the Lombard's 
Christology from the time of the Council of Tours in 1163 to the Third Lateran 
Council in 1179, best highlights the Lombard's changing fortunes and the change in 
'28J. Leclercq, 'The Renewal of Theology', in Constable and Benson edd., Renaissance and Reneual, p. 77 
regards this as one of the main differences between scholastic and monastic theology. 
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the papacy's attitude to the very principle of theological debate . 
229 During this 
period the Lombard was accused of expounding the view that 'Christ, insofar as he 
is man, is nothing' (Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid), the doctrine 
230 which earned the name of 'christological nihilism'. Pope Alexander III's efforts 
to prohibit the teaching of the Lombard's alleged error were reissued on several 
occasions but seem to have met with little success. 231 
The dispute continued unabated with the publication about 1179 of John of 
Cornwall's Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium, in which John urged Alexander 
III to condemn the disputed doctrine at the forthcoming council. 232 The only source 
which indicates that the matter was raised at the Third Lateran Council is the account 
of the vehemently anti-scholastic writer, Walter of Saint-Victor, who gives a brief but 
vivid account of the proceedings. 233 Scholars dispute whether Walter's account 
actually refers to the Third Lateran Council or to some other consiStory. 2 `4Walter 
claims that the Pope wished to condemn the Lombard's christological nihilism, and 
was only prevented from doing so by the opposition of several cardinals and the 
outspoken defence of Adam of Saint Asaph . 
23' The cardinals were of the view that 
the matter was not significant enough to warrant lengthy consideration, whilst Adam 
'29For the controversy, see de Ghellinck, Le mouvement thiologique, pp. 252-63; J. ChAtillon, 'Latran IfI et 
Fenseignement christologique de Pierre Lombard', in J. Long&re and E. Mollat edd., Le troisiidme concile de Latran 
(1179). Sa place dans Vh&toire (Paris, 1982), 75-90. 
"Tbe phrase was apparently coined by Walter of Saint-Victor. See Ch5tillon, 'Latran Ill', p. 80. 
23128 May 1170, PL 200.685B-C, Jaff6-Wattenbach 11, n. 11806; 2 June 1170, PL 200.684-5, Jaffi-Wattenbach 
11, n. 1 1809; 18 Febuary 1177, Affi-Waftenbach H, n. 12785. John of Cornwall, Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papant 
tertium, ed. N. M. Hdring, MS 13 (1951), p. 257 also reports that the issue was discussed at Tours; see R. 
Somerville, Pope Alexander and the Council of Tours (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 60-2. On the Lombard's doctrine, see 
P. Glorieux, 'L'orthodoxie de III Sentences (d. 6,7 et 10), Mikellanea Lombardiana, 137-47; Nielson, Theology 
and Philosopkv, pp. 243-79. 
232 Hiring, Me Eulogium ad Alexandrum', p. 254. n. 12 on the dating. E. Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall. A Brief 
Biography', RTAM 17 (1950), 46-60. 
"'Le Contra QuatuorLabyrinthosFranciae deGatithierdeSaint-Victor', ed. P. GlorieuxAHDLMA 19 (1952), 
p. 201. 
234 Glorieux, pp. 194-5 dates the work to 1178 and considers that the events described by Walter refer to a 
consistory not the Lateran Council. Chdtillon, 'Latran IIF, pp. 85-8 rejects both this and the doubts cast on the 
reliability of Walter's account. 
235This Adam is not to be confused with Adam of Balsham. See L. Minio-Paluello, 'The Ars Disserendi of 
Adam of Balsharn "Parvipontanus"', Mediaeval and Rena&sance Studies 3 (1954), pp. 165-6. 
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pledged to defend the Sentences, which he taught in the schools, on any count: 
Recently at the Roman Council, Pope Alexander resolved to condemn by name that man's teachings through which the diabolical error of Arius and Sabellius and modem day heretics has once again erupted, namely that Christ, in so far as he is man, is nothing. Some of the cardinals, however, wanted to delay the cause of God and the faith of the Christian religion, according to which we stand and live, to another discussion, and, failing to answer correctly, they said to the Lord Pope: 'Lord, we have undertaken to deal with other greater questions'. Then the Pope said: 'the first and greatest task concerns the faith and heretics'. At which some of those present left the consistory. Then a bishop, Adam of Wales, rose with them saying: 'Lord Pope, as both a cleric and formerly a director of his school, I would defend the teachings of the Master. 236 
If Walter's testimony does indeed refer to the Tliird Lateran Council, it seems that the 
Lombard was saved from condemnation not by general belief in his orthodoxy on this 
specific issue, but only because the Pope was over-whelmed either by the indifference 
of the cardinals and/or by support for the Sentences as a theological system at the very 
core of teaching at Paris. 237 The reluctance of the cardinals even to discuss the 
disputed question suggests that the steady growth of cardinals with a theological 
education had yet to have a significant impact on their intereStS. 238 
This suggests that one of the reasons debates about the Lombard's teachings 
came to a head in 1215 but not in 1179 may have been the changing nature of the 
cardinalate. In 1179 it was still just about conceivable for Rome to ignore 
developments in Paris; in 1215 it was impossible. On the other hand, it is perhaps not 
so remarkable that Peter Lombard escaped official condemnation at a time when such 
unequivocal judgement was extremely unusual. Even the judgements against Abelard, 
especially at Soissons, and against Gilbert at Reims, were by no means definitive. This 
represents not so much a reluctance to judge, though there may have been a feeling 
236 Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos, p. 201: 'Hoc etiam sciendurn quod Alexander papa nuper in concilio romano 
paraverat nominatim illius sententias damnare quarum argumentis etiam Arrii et Sabellii et novorum hereticorum, 
error diabolicus recrudescit, scilicet quod Christus nichil sit secundum quod homo. Quidam vero cardinalium 
causam Dei et fidei chrisfiane religionis qua stamus et vivimus, alienis negociis postponentes, non recte, 
respondentes dixerunt venerabili pape: Domine, alia maiora suscepimus tractanda. Tunc apostolicus: Immo primum 
et maximum de fide et hereticis agendum est. Quod illi audientes egressi sunt de consistorio. Quidam etiam 
episcopus, Adam walensis exiuit cum illis dicens: Domine papa, ego et clericus et prepositus olim. scolarum eius, 
defendarn sententias magistri. ' 
237 ChAtillon, Tatran IIF, p. 89. 
23"On this growth, see P. Glorieux, Tandidats ä la poupre en 1178', Milanges de science religieuse 11 (1954), 
5-30; P. Classen, 'Rom und Paris: Kurie und Universität im 12. und 13 Jahrhundert', in Studium und Gesellschaft 
im Mittelalter. Schriften der Monurnenta Germaniae Historica 29 (Stuttgart, 1983), 127-69. Also W. Maleczek, 
pst und Kardinalskolleg von 1191 biý 1216. Die Kärdinale unter Coelestin III. und Innocenz III, Publikation des Pa 
historischen Instituts beim Osterreichischen Kulturinstitut in Rom, 1 Band 6 (Wien. 1984). 
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that official condemnations created more problems than they solved, as a lack of a 
clear sense of how to make judgements about such complex issues. 'nere was no 
established procedure for arriving at decisions about doctrine. 'Ihe most obvious judge 
was of course the pope himself, but as the events of 1179 show, even the pope could 
not act without the support of his cardinals and other interested parties. A similar 
situation must have arisen during the preparation for the Fourth Lateran Council. As 
I shall show in chapter six, Innocent III's substantial borrowings from Joachim's 
trinitarian theology makes it almost inconceivable that he would have initiated the 
latter's condemnation. This means that some other, still unknown, group was 
responsible. 
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v THE EXTERGENCE OF A THEOLOGICAL CONSENSUS IN THE 
SECOND HALF OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY 
Before c. 1160 the instances of borrowing and influence in trinitarian theology 
cannot really be said to amount to a distinct tradition. The questions raised by 
Roscelin in his dispute with Anselm were addressed by Abelard in his Theologia. 
Peter Lombard in turn assimilated a significant proportion of tile arguments and 
solutions set down by Abelard, and also adopted his general interpretive framework 
for resolving seemingly contradictory questions. In addition, several other works of 
theology, such as the anonymous Summa Sententiarum and the De trinitate of Walter 
of Mortagne covered many of the same issues. But this scattering of theological 
writings on the Trinity does not amount to a common tradition. Collectively these 
works do not yet evince a clearly identifiable tone, method and preoccupation. 
Moreover, to earn the name 'tradition' a phenomenon must be well-establ i shed and 
transmitted from one generation to the next. Thus continuity and duration are 
essential. 
It is only from 1160 onwards, from the time, in other words, that the 
Lombard's Sentences began to be widely studied, that we can truly speak of an 
academic tradition of thought on the Trinity. In this period substantial agreement 
emerged on a number of issues and a distinct methodology was adopted. Indeed, by 
the late twelfth century, consensus rather than controversy was the dominant feature 
of debate in the schools. This consensus was in large part purely intellectual; it 
reflected agreement on a range of doctrinal problerns as well as tile best approach for 
resolving those problerns. But the social and institutional structures which generated 
these discussions and writings gave an added coherence to thought on the Trinity. 
Indeed, the institutional frarnework was the necessary precondition for the 
development of a distinct tradition of thought on the Trinity. Without tile kind of 
regularised teaching which the schools fostered, writings on the Trinity would have 
been isolated and discoi-mected. They would have constituted not so much a tradition 
as a polemic, such as we find in the nintli century, and again in the twelfth. in tile 
various confrontations between 'monastic' and 'scholastic' theologians. The 
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institutional foundations of this scholastic tradition, moreover, are clearly observable 
in tile theological texts themselves. For all works which may be characterised. as 
scholastic belong ultimately to the same genre whose defining feature v'7as the 
quaestio. These quaestiones lie at the root of the theological summae of the twelfth 
century and the systematic theology of the thirteenth. 
1. The structural unity of scholastic ulorks: the quaestio 
The quaestio technique may be regarded as one of the defining characteristics 
of scholasticism itself. Its presence transcends the division of knowledge into various 
disciplines, and its adoption as the organizing principle of a given written work 
immediately endows that work with a certain literary structure. Anyone writing such 
a work must arrange their material according to certain largely predeten-nined 
conventions. The posing of a question, the formulation of a problem, usually in the 
fon-n of a contradiction, took various forms, but in its essentials could be reduced to 
a variation on the sequence quaeritur utrum... an, so that even the language of quaestio 
literature is identifiable. All quaestiones and all works whose structure is informed by 
the quaestio technique belong, therefore, to a given genre. 
Thus the meaning and content of every work which we assign to the genre of 
scholastic theology are strongly predetermined by the simple fact of belonging to that 
genre. 'Me conspicuous repetition of entire structures of expressions and arguments 
from one theological work, or rather from a corpus of works, to another is as much 
a fwiction of writing and thinking within a particular genre, subscribing to an entire 
range of conventions about how knowledge can be most effectively attained and 
communicated, as it is of how far the author actually agrees with the standard 
argument, proposition or solution. The repetition of these structures may also have 
something to do with the use of easily remembered stock arguments as a teaching 
device. ' That is why theologians distinguish themselves when they express 
'A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, 'Nfedieval Philosophical Literature', in Kretzmann et al.. The Cambridov Hi-zton, 
qf Later Medieval Philosopýv. p-29- On the emergence of a literate society, B. Stock. The Implications of Litcracv. 
Written Lanýeuaqe and Modes ofInterpretation in the Elcvcnth and Tweýfth Ccnturies (Princeton. 1983). On the 
mnemonic characteristic of primary oral societies, see WT Ong, Oraliýv and Literaqv. Ae Technolo6zing Q the 
Word (London, 1982), pp. 33-6. 
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disagreement , vith the standard solution to a particular question or when they expand 
upon it significantly. But even in these cases the author still adopts or remains Nvithin 
the structure of the question as it is conventionally framed and developed. T'lius the 
most striking thing about the universal application of the quaestio technique is the 
large extent to which it determines the structure, content and approach of works of 
scholastic theology. 
Adoption of the activity of asking questions as a common practice could only 
take place in the context of the institutionalisation of study itself. T7he emergence of 
institutions whose sole function was to pose and resolve systematically problerns about 
meaning and interpretation was bound to affect both written and oral ways of 
structuring these problems. The practice of the quaestio, therefore, owes as much to 
teaching methods and classroom discussions as it does to problems arising from purely 
textual study. Many quaestiones, after all, take the fon-n of student notes of the 
master's framing of a question (reportationes)., 2 
In this respect, the use of authoritative texts as an integral part of the quaestio 
technique actually enabled the master to impose his own personal interpretation. For 
once detached from its original context, a passage assumed an independent status and 
was subject to the individual interpretation of the presiding master. As de Rijk has 
written, 'the authoritative text, despite its initial importance, increasingly took on the 
character of an instrument. ý3 'niere was a gradual shift in emphasis frorn the role of 
authoritative texts to the role of the master in interpreting those texts (determinatio), 
and the opinion of modem masters came to be cited alongside those of ancient 
authorities .4 
rnliS is not unlike Gadamerian hermeneutics, whereby to go behind what 
is said is to question beyond what is said; we may begin with someone else's question, 
but travel far beyond that by the very act of questioning? 
I Tor the practice of reportatio. see Weijers, Terininologie des universit&, pp. 361-5; J. Hamesse. 'Reponatio 
et transmission de textes'. in M. Asztalos ed.. The Editing o/* Theological and Philosoj)hical Textzftoiti the Middle 
Ages, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia Latina Stockholmiensia 30 (Stockholm, 1986). 11-46.. 
3 La philosophie. p. 102. 
2nd edition; Paris. 1966), pp. 358-60. For a contemporary 'M. -D. Chenu, La theologic au 
douzieine siecle Q 
description of a ddenninatio, see Matthe-%v Paris, Chronica inaibra 7 vols.. Rolls Series 57 (London, 1872-83). 
pp. 476-7 for his account of one of Simon of Tournai*s eventftil lectures. 
'Truth and Method, pp. 370-5. 
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An analysis of the quaestiones of this period will give some idea of just how 
the use of the quaestio is often more constitutive of the fundamental character of a 
work than its actual authorship. 'Ilie teaching of Odo of Soissons (d. 1171) is an 
excellent example of this. Odo was first (c. 1147) a master of theology at Notre-Dame 
and then its chancellor from 1160 to c. 1167 when he retired to the Cistercian 
monastery of Ourscamp. ' He was eventually persuaded by Pope Alexander III to 
accept the office of Cardinal-Bishop of Tusculum. in 1170. It is assumed from the fact 
that his name does not appear in curial documents after 1171, that Odo died that same 
year. 
A number of collections of quaestiones have been attributed to Odo or his 
school .7 n1iS is significant from the point of view of the unity of scholastic works in 
general because the question of Odo's authorship, or rather the precise relationship 
between these quaestiones and Odo's teaching, is virtually impossible to deten-nine. 
In other words, despite the wicertainty of a single authorship, these various collections 
evince a generic unity by virtue of their similar content and the presence of tile 
quaestio technique. 
The problem of authorship is further compounded by the fact that some 
manuscripts contain not only questions, but also reportationes, that is, reports by a 
student of classroom discussions. 8 The likelihood of establishing a single authorship 
is made even more remote in view of the contradiction between Odo's view, that of 
6 For the following biographical details, see F. Giusberti, Materials 
'for 
a Studv of Tuvýfth Centurv 
Scholasticism History of Logic 2 (Naples, 1982), pp. 113-14. Clarembald of Arras dedicated his commentarv on 
Boethius' De trinitate (1157-58) to Odo. See N. M. H5ring, Lýfe and Works of Clareinhald qf Arras. A Tit, eýfth 
Cenmy Master of the School of Chartres (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1965), pp. 63-5. 
7 The only printed edition of these is the Quaestione,, z Mag&tri Odon&, ed. J. B. Pitra, Analecta Novissima 
Spicilegii Solesmensis Altera Continuatio II (Rome. 1888). pp. 1-188 from Paris BN ]at. 3230. An evaluation of 
Pitra's edition can be found in Brady. 'Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings', pp. 461-5 who, on the basis of 
mss. not analysed by Pitra, argues that his text is not an exhaustive collection of all those quaestiones attributed 
to Odo and also contains some quaestiones, %NThich do not belong to Odo. For the list of mss. associated with Odo, 
see Landgraf's important pioneering studies in RTAM 6-7 (1934-35), 368-93 and 113-28. For the most recent list, 
including I those added by the research of Giusberti. see G. R. Evans, 'The Place of Odo of Soisson's Quaestiones. 
Problem-Solving in Mid-Twelfth Century Bible Study and Some Matters of Logic and Language', RT4M 49 
(1982), pp. 123-5. 
8In Pitra's edition of BN lat. 3230 the rej)ortationcs begin at no. 288. p. 98. Warichez. Les disl7utations, p. xiii 
thinks that this student reporter may be Simon of Toumai. 
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another master" and the opinion of a third, referred to as magister noster. 'o This 
range of opinion strongly suggests that these quaestiones emanate not just from Odo's 
school', but more generally from the schools of Paris during this period. " 
Despite the difficulty of idenitfying any single individual as the author or 
source of these questions, it is clear that these works are linked by a common method 
and approach and that in them we can see the emergence of a distinct tradition of 
thought on the Trinity. One common thread between these various questions is the 
reliance on the Lombard's Sentences both for the framing of a particular question and 
for the patristic authorities cited. The Sentences are a constant point of reference 
throughout; the course taken in some questions either does not make sense without a 
knowledge of the Lombard's work or is considerably enhanced by such knowledge. 
That the Lombard's Sentences are invariably the source for many of these 
questions is demonstrated by the treatment in these collections of the problem of 
whether or not the divine essence begets. Three quaestiones associated with Odo's 
school launch into this problem with a citation from Augustine, Deus pater genuit se 
alterum, which corresponds more closely to the Lombard's comments on the passage 
than to Augustine's actual words. 12 The approach to this question is formulaic, 
derivative and varies little from one quaestio to another. The most striking similarity 
is between London Harley 3855 and Paris Mazarine 1708, which are almost but not 
quite identical. 13 Both of these quaestiones proceed along semantic lines. Augustine's 
Tor example, Quaestiones Odonis332, pp. 180-2. H6d], 'Die theologischeAtiseinandenetzungZ'%vischenPetrLLS 
Lombardtts und Odo von Ourscamp', identifies this other master as Peter Lombard. 
'OQuaestiones Odonis 293.313,314,316,318,322,326,332 and 334. See Giusberti, Materia&, p. 118. Brady, 
'Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings', pp. 479-90 identifies this inagister noster with Peter Comestor; 
Giusberti, Materials, p. 118 finds Brady's argument convincing on the whole; Evans, 'The Place of Odo of 
Soissons's Quaestiones', pp. 129-30 is more sceptical about the possibility of identifying with any certainty this 
inagister no-vter. 
"Brady, 'Peter Nianducator and the Oral Teachings'. pp. 455-6. 
12 Quaeviones Odonis 259, p. 87; London BM Harley 3855, fol. 12ra, Paris Maz. 1708, fol. 249ra. Simon of 
Tournai cites the Augustinian passage in ftill, see In-vtitutiones 30. p. 194 and Di,, q)utatione. v LXXXVII. 1. p. 250. Cf. 
Lombard. Uent. [V. 21.4, p. 80. 
13 Lacombe, La i-ie et les oeui, res. pp. 49-66 identifies Paris NIaz. 1708 as the work of Prepositinus of Cremona. 
This attribution is rejected by Landgraf, 'Quelques collections', RT4M 7 (1935). pp. 117-21. Land_graf links both 
the London and Paris coilections with Peter of Poitiers. See Landgraf. 'Petrus von Poitiers und die 
Qudstionenliteratur des 12. Jahrhunderts'. Both collections also show parallels with Peter of Captia's Suinina. See 
Landgraf, 'A Study of the Academic Latitude of Peter of Captia'. 
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expression seerns to irnplNr that the Father begot himself, but if we pay close attention 
to the precise meaning of the crucial words, we must distinguish between 'se, and 
4 alterum'; the one denotes identity of essence and the other distinction of Persons. 14 
Moreover, the process of begetting does not produce another substance, just as when 
a craftsman makes an image, or a king makes a knight, it is not a question either of 
substance or non-substance. 15 
'Fliese authors agree, then, with the Lombard that the essence does not beget, 
but they also reject the statement, which lie accqpts, that 'God begot God'. For used 
in this way, that is, without any adjoining word, the word 'God' always designates 
divine essence, which does not beget. 16 All that can be said is that 'God the Father 
begot God the Son, since 'in this case, this noun "God", which signifies the divine 
essence, is joined to the personal names and is thus confined to the Persons. ' 17 '17his 
rejection of the expression 'God begot God' suggests that the problem of the 
signification of the word 'God' was far from resolved when these works were written 
in the 1160s. 'Fheologians had yet to articulate the general principle which was to 
dominate later discussions, that with notional verbs (verbs signifying begetting, etc. ) 
14 Lombard, Uent. [V. 2.4, p. 80.19-22: 'Quod ita intelligi potest: id est de se alterum genuit, non utique alterum 
Deum, sed alteram. personam.; vel genuit se alterum, id est genuit alterum qui est hoc quod ipse; narn etsi alius sit 
Pater quarn Filius. non est tamen aliud, sed unum. ' Harley 3855, fol. l2ra: *Augustinus dicit: deus pater genuit se 
alterum. Unde videtur quod filius _genitus sit 
ipse pater et alter ab ipso. Sed exponendum est. Nam per hoc quod 
dicit "se", iderntitatern essentie voluit notare; dicendo "alterum", alteritatem in persona tantum, ut sit sensus: "se 
alterum", id est, filium, qui idern est cum patre in essentia, et alter in persona et ita alteram genuit personam'. Maz. 
1708, fol. 249ra: * Dicit Augustinus: deus 1,7ater genuit se alteruin. Et hoc quibusdam inprobis possit videri quod 
filius genitus esset ipse pater et alter ab ipso. Dicit verbum Augustinus exponendum, per hcw quod dicit "se", 
iderntitatem. essentie genuisse voluit demonstrare; dicendo "alterum". alteritatern in persona tarnen significavit, ut 
sit sensus "genuit se alterum", id est, filius qui idern est in essentia cum deo patre et alter in persona et ita alterarn 
genuit personam'. 
15 Harley 3855, fol. 12ra: 'non tamen sequitur ipsum genuisse substantiam vel non substantiam. Sicut iste facit 
imaginern aut rex militem, non tamen substantiam vel non substantiam. ' Maz. 1708, fol. 249ra: 'non ideo sequitur 
ipsum genuisse substantiam vel non substantiam. In multis enim similibus fallit; cum enim artifex facit imaginem 
nec substantiam nec tit substantiam facit, vel rex faciendo militem. ' 
16 Harley 3855, fol. 12ra: 'Unde non est concedendurn quod pater genuit divinam substantiam, nec divina 
substantia filium, nec deus filitim. nec pater deum. nec detis deum, quia "dous" ita per se et simpliciter positum 
semper in designatione divine essentie ponitur, que nec genuit nec genita est, sed communis toti trinitati'. Maz. 
1708. fol. 249ra: 'Uncle non est concedenclum quod pater genuit divinam substantiam, nec divina substantia filium, 
nec detts filium. nec pater deum. nec deus detim, quia "cletis" ita per se et simpliciter positurn semper in 
clesignatione divine essentie ponitur que nec genuit nec genita est, sed conununis toti trinitati'. 
"Harley 3855, fol. 12ra: Totest autem dici: detis pater genuit detu-n filitim. Tunc enim hoc nomen "deus" 
I divinarn significans essentiam aditinctum nominibus personalibus restringitur circa personas. ' Nlaz. 1708, 
fol. 249rab: Totest autem dici quod detis pater genuit deurn filium. Tunc enim hoc nomen "dCLIS" divinam 
significans essentiam aditinctum norninibus personalibus restringitur circa personas. ' 
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'God' never signifies essence, only Person. 
More or less the same treatment is to be found in the quaestiones attributed to 
Odo of Soissons that have been published by Pitra, except that the question is dealt 
with under the larger heading of 'whether Person is identical with substance'. " The 
author's approach presupposes that the question. of whether or not the essence begets 
is just one of a series of questions which raise the paradox of identity of substance 
and distinction of Person in God. For example, how can. Augustine on the one hand 
say that the Father loves the Son by that love which is the Holy Spirit alone, and on 
the other deny that the Father is wise not by that wisdom which is the Son alone, but 
which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. '9 Clearly, the resolution of the difficulty is that 
in the first case the attribute of love is personal, whilst in the second it is essential. 
'Odo's' treatment of the statement 'God begot God', which reads like a 
commentary on Distinction IV of Book I of the Sentences, raises similar problems 
about the distinction between substance and Person. Without diverging from the 
Lombard's original explanation, 'Odo' nevertheless makes greater use of technical 
distinctions. In Augustine's statement, Pater genuit se alterum, 'se' is actually in the 
ablative, not the accusative. Read thus, Augustine's statement signifies not that God 
begot another self (se alterum), but another from himself (alterum de se) or another 
of the same essence. 20 This usage of extremely precise grammatical distinctions is 
an increasingly dominant feature of theological works informed by the quaestio 
method, probably because these kinds of distinctions are particularly suited to solving 
the apparent contradictions of meaning with which quaestiones tend to be concerned. 
Simon of Toumai's treatment of the sarne question amounts to an extensive 
commentary on the Sentences with the addition of these precise grammatical 
distinctions. Thus, in the same Augustinian phrase, 'se' signifies essence and for that 
reason is of neutral gender, whilst 'alteruni' signifies Person and is consequently of 
"Quaestiones Odonis 259, pp. 85-8. 
"Ibid., p. 86: 'Pater diligit Filitim, et Filius Patrem ea dilectione quae est solum Spiritus sanctus. Negat tamen 
esse sapientem ea sapientia, quae est solum Filius, sed ea quae est Pater et Filitis et Spiritus sanctus. ' These 
questions are also treated as a unit by Stephen Langton. Suinina. pp. 75-6. 
20 Quaestiones Odonis. p. 87. 
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21 masculine gender. 
Other quaestiones of this period show a similar tendency to those associated 
with Odo of Soissons, to concentrate on language itself as both the root cause of, and 
the solution to, theological problems. The so-called Quaestiones Varsai., ienses are an 
excellent example of what might be called the classic quaestio technique. 22 As with 
other collections of this period, there is no discernible order to the arrangement of 
subjects. There is, however, a clearly definable procedure: the problem is posed 
(quaeritur) 
, correctly resolved (Ad quod dicimus; sciendum est; solutio) and objections 
are reported and dealt with (Sed contra; Opponitur). 
The central role of the quaestio method in determining the formal structure of 
theological writings is strongly in evidence in other kinds of theological works besides 
actual collections of quaestiones themselves. The Summa of Peter of Capua is an 
excellent case in point, but the same could be said of virtually any author writing 
during the second half of the twelfth century: 
We shall show in advance, however, the way in , Nhich the questions are to be dealt with. Firstly, the 
authoritative grounds shall be established. Secondly, the walls of the arguments mid questions erected. 
'17hirdly, the roof of solutions and explanations shall be placed on top, so that the argument or question 
may be discussed, the solution or reasoning illuminated. 23 
In addition to being a way of structuring written works, the act of asking questions 
was also a method of reading and teaching. The practice of questioning, therefore, 
embraces the method of critical reading, the institutional framework and the formal 
written structure of scholastic theology. In any hierarchy of necessary conditions for 
the scholastic method as it has come down to us, the quacstio tecl-Lnique would be near 
11 ý Institutiones 30, p. 194: 'De se genuit allerum se, intelligit altenim esse masculini generis et personale, se vero 
neutri generis et essentia e contra proprietatem relationis. Est enim regula grammaticae relativum eittsdem generis 
esse cum eo, ad quod refertur. Sed tamen Pater est masculini generis et se neutri. Haec autem irnproprietas ibi 
invenitur: Seinini tuo, qui est Christus (Gal 3.16). Est ergo senstis: Pater de se genuit altertim in persona et se, 
id est sibi idem in essentia. ý 
"'Quaestiones Varsavienses Trinitariae et Christologi'Cae'. ed. F. Stegmidler, Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati 
11 (Vatican, 1946). 282-310 from Lat. 0. vell. 1.16, fols. 112r-142r held in the National Library at Warsaw. 
283) suggests that these quaestiones may be one of the sources for the disputabilia inordinata Stegmfiller (p. ý 
mentioned in the prologue of the Sentences of Peter of Poitiers. 
'Munich Clm. 14508, fol. lra: 'Modum autem tractandi questiones presignemus. Primo iacientur fundamenta 
atictoritatum, sectindo. erigent-ur parietes ar-g-timentortim et questiontim; tertio, superponetur tectum solutiontim et 
rationum, tit. quod in domo dei atictoritas qu&si cemim proponit, argumentatio sive questio discutiat, solutio sive 
ratio elticidet. ' 
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the top. 
2. Grammatical theology 
In the twelfth century, developments within grammar and theology occ rd 
more or less concurrently. 'I'lie beginnings of academic theology coincide closely with 
those of philosophical grammar and modem linguistic science. 24 Throughout the 
Middle Ages doctrinal controversies often revolved around questions of language, and 
there was always a close link between the study of God and the study of language. 
Unsurprisingly developments in the field of grammar invariably had their 
repercussions in theology, and vice versa. 
It was not until this period that grammarians, wider the influence of dialectic, 
embarked upon a new phase when they began to ask questions about the philosophical 
foundation of their discipline. 25 Of particular importance were the implications for 
Priscian's classic definition of the noun as signifying substance with quality. 26 Whilst 
grammarians did not distinguish between the proper and the improper signification of 
a noun, logicians, working from Boethius' translation of the Categories available from 
the early eleventh century, did. Whether a noun signified substance or accident 
24The most Lrnportant studies on the history of grammar are: C. Thurot, Notices et extrai6z de dii, ers inanuscrits 
latins pour seri-ir J Vh&toire des doctrines graininaticales au inoien dge, Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la 
Bibliothýque Impýriale et autres; bibliotMques 22.2 (Paris, 1868); R. W. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian in the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Centuries, 1. Peter Helias and his Predecessors', Mediaei, al and Renaissance Studies IQ 941-43), 194- 
231 and 'Studies on Priscian in the Twelfth Century, 11. The School of Ralph of Beauvais', ibid., 2 (1950), 1-56, 
both reprinted in Hunt, The Historv of Graininar in the Middle Ages. Collected Papers, ed. G. L. Bursill-Hall. 
Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series III, vol. 5 (Amsterdam, 1980), 1-38 and 
39-94; K. M. Fredborg, 'The Dependence of Peter Helias'Suinina SuperPriscianuin on William of Conches' Glose 
Super Pr&cianuin'. CLVAGL 11 (1973), 1-57. 
25 For this periodisation, see R. H. Robins, Ancient and Medieval Gra7ninatical Theorv (London, 1951) and his 
extremely readable, 4 Short Historv of Linguistics (London, 1967); J. Pinborg, Die Entivickling der Sprachtheorie 
hn Mittelalter, BGPTM, 42.2 (MCinster, 1967). pp. 19-59 and Lo, -ik und Seinantik iin Mittelalter. Ein Oberblick 
(Stuttgart, 1972). pp. 13-16; G. L. Bursill-Hall, 'Mediaeval Grammatical Theories', The Canadian Journal of 
Lingu&tics 9 (1963). 40-54; Speculative Graininars of the Middle Ages. The Doctrine of the partes orationis of the 
Modistae (The Ha-ue-Paris, 1971), pp. 15-36-, 'Towards a History of Linguistics in the Middle Ages, 1100-1450', 
in D. Hymes ed., Studies in the Historv qf Linquistics. Traditions and Paradipns (London, 1974), 77-92, J. F. 
Huntsman, 'Grammar*. in D. L. Wagnered., ne Seven LiberalArts in theMiddleAges (Indiana Univ. Press, 1983). 
58-95; M. A. Covington. 'Grammatical Theory in the Middle Ages'. in T. Bvnon and F. R. Palmer edd.. Studies in 
the H&torv qf Western Linguistics in Honour qfR. H. Robins (Cambridge, 1986), 23-42. 
I Zblnstitutiones grammaticae 2vols.. ed. M. Hertz, Graininatici Latini (Leipzig, 1855-9) 1. p. 55: Tropriurn est 
nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare. ' 
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properly would affect its i -neaning in a sentence. '- 
One of the earliest work associated with the pliilosophical grammar of tile 
twelfth century was by a theologian, Anselm of Canterburv. 2' This shows that 
although the influence of grammar upon theology was always bound to be more 
conspicuous, since all academic theologians had been trained in the arts, theologians 
were nevertheless often in a position to ask the most searching questions about 
language. Many scholars now recognise that eleventh- and twelfth-century 
developments in grammatical theory can only be understood as a response to 
discussions by theologians. 29 'Fhe need for a precise and technical language for 
talking about God acted as a stimulus to grammarians to sharpen their own conceptual 
tools. 
T'his brings us to the method of grammatical theology, in which 'The theme 
of reflection is language about God and not divine reality in itself %30 Although this 
assessment was made solely with reference to Prepositinus of Cremona, it accurately 
describes a major trend in theology from about 1160 onwards. T'heologians within this 
strand include some of the most eminent thinkers of the time: Alan of Lille, Peter of 
Poitiers, Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton, to name only a few. But what makes 
the significance of this approach quite outstanding is its presence in a number of lesser 
known and anonymous works. Even fairly limited research in the libraries of London, 
Paris and Munich bears out this claim. 'Grammatical theology' was a method practised 
at all levels of intellectual ability and achievement in the schools. It was not just the 
province of brilliant and original minds, but also, and just as importantly, of the less 
original. It is its widespread adoption that makes the method of grammatical theology 
the most important development in scholastic theology in the later twelfth century. 
27 On these points, see Colish, The Mirror of Languqge, pp. 69-70. 
'The De Graininatico of St 477sebn. The Theori, of Paronlww. ed. and trans. D. P. Henry (Notre Dame, Indiana, 
1964). 
29 ýz See G. L. Bursill-Hall's introduction to G. L. Bunsill-Hall et al., De Ortu Graininaticae. Studie. in Medieial 
Grammar and Lingu&tic Theori, in iWeinori, ql'Jan Pinhorg. Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of 
Linguistics, Series III. vol. 43 (Amsterdam. 1990), pp. 5-6: C. H. Kneepk-ens, 'On Mediaeval Syntactic Thought with 
Special Reference to the Notion of Construction', lkztoire Ej; hztoino1qoie Lanauage 12.2 (1990), p. 140, L. Valente. 
'Arts du discours et ýýacra I)agina dans le De troj7bý loquendi de Pierre le Chantre% ibid., p. 98. 
"Angelini, Vortodossia e la grainmatica, p. 29. 
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The approach has several distinguishing features which bind it to the discipline 
of grammar. Broadly speaking, the premise of grammatical theology was that It was 
possible. and indeed necessary, to identify a series of very specific and conceptually 
related rules governing theological discourse, just as in grammar there were such 
rules. " As theologians became more aware of the difficulties and dangers involved 
in using a humanly instituted language to describe divine reality - the problem of 
projecting the human onto the divine - the need for guidance in tile conditions 
governing the transference of words to theology became ever-more pressing. 32 Alan 
of Lille maintained that theology, like every other science, possessed its own rules and 
principles. " 'Fhe essential feature of such rules was the application of semantic and 
grammatical principles as a procedure for distinguishing between correct and incorrect 
statements., or rather for explaining why some statements were permissible and others 
not. For example, the gender of a pronoun in a given proposition will have a crucial 
bearing on the meaning of the whole and may provide the key to a correct 
interpretation. Masculine and feminine pronouns indicate Person, whilst neuter 
pronouns indicate essence. Hence the Father is not he who (ille qui) the Son is, but 
that which (illud quod) the Son is. -4 Any sloppiness here could leave us with a 
statement which effectively means that the Father is the same Person as the Son. 
The idea that theology was a separate discipline with its own methodology 
went back to Boethius' threefold division of speculative philosophy into naturalis, 
mathematica and theologia, and was further developed by Gilbert of Poitiers in his 
Commentaries on the opusculd sacra. " This new theology was something distinct 
from traditional biblical exegesis, though it never severed its links with the study of 
"Ibid., pp. 29.106, and esp. Lang, Die theologi-vchoi Prinzil3ienlehre, pp. 36-105. 
32See G. R. Evans, 'The Borro-v%7ed Meaning: Grammar. Logic and the Problem of Theological Language in 
Twelfth - Century Schools', Dou, mide Rei-ieu, 96 (1978). 165-75. 
33 Regulae, proloatis 1, pp. 121-2. 
'See Alan of Lille, Suinina 71., p. 219; Regulde XXVII, p. 143. Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 111, p. 18.179-80. 
Prepositinus of Cremona, Suinina 1.2, p-199. 
"G. R. Evans. Old Atvz and New Theolo, ai% The Beginnings q1'Theolqgv as an Academic Disciý)Iine (Oxford, 
1980). pp. 31 -2- 
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the Bible. 3" Gilbert, for his part, stressed that the valid application of rules to 
theological questions depended upon taking full account of theology's unique subject- 
matter, so that niles would always have to be transferred from the other sciences in 
a special way. " Master Hubertus put forward a similar position: 
Translation creates an impropriety, because, as it was said, all words are properly and principallý invented and introduced in order to signify the objects of the ten categories. When therefore some word is spoken of God, it is spoken in translation, because it is transferred, through some resemblance, to a divine signification, as though borrowed from its proper signification. " 
The emergence of theological rules reflects a move away from inductive methods 
towards deductive ones, at the same time as collections of individual 'sentences' 
became systematic textbooks of rules. '9 In his Summa 'Quoniam Homines', for 
example, Alan of Lille deals with a sequence of interrelated problems of interpretation, 
solving each one individually before eventually arriving at a general principle 
according to which each question could be systematically resolved. In the Regulde, 
however, Alan reverses this approach, by proceeding from methodically arranged rules 
to particular examples of their application . 
40 rflIUS in the Summa, during the course 
of his inquiry into whether essential now-is are common (appellativa) or proper 
(propria), Alan notes an argument for their being proper, since an essential term such 
as Weitas' does not accept partitive nouns such as 'quedam' and 'aliquis %4 ' By the 
36jbid., P. 9-) 
37 Lang, Die theologischen Prinzipienlehre. pp. 48-57, Evans, Old Arts, pp. 49-56. 
'8Summa, Munich Ch-n. 28799, fol. 7vb: Translatio parit improprietatem. quia sicut dicturn est oninia vocabula 
proprie et principaliter ad significandas res decern predicamentortim inventa et instituta stint. Cum ergo vocabulum 
aliquod de deo dicitur, translative dicitur, quia quasi a propria significatione mutuaturn per quamdam similitudinem 
ad divinam significationem transfertur. ' Cf. Alan of Lille. Summa 56, p. 200: 'Et hoc nomen "Detts" est quasi 
appellaturn; non enim proprie dicitur esse appellaturn. quia. tit dicit Boethitis. curn nomina transfferuntur ad 
theologica cuncta mutantur; non enim transferuntur sectindtu-n plenitudinem similitUdinis sed sectindum partem 
plenitudinis. ' 
"Lang, Dic theologischen Prinzipienlehre, pp. 58-74. 
'On Alan's methodology, see M. -D. Chenti, 'Un essai de rnýthode thMogique au XIIe siMe', Rei, ue des 
sciences philosophiques et th&logiques 24 (1935), 258-67 and 'Une th&olo_zie axiomatique au XIIe si&le. Alain 
de Lille (120Y, Citeaux 9 (1958), 137-42, J. ChAtillon. 'La m&thode th6ologique d'Alain de Lille'. in H. Roussel 
and F. Suard edd., Alain de Lille. Gauthier dc Chdtillon, Jak-emart Gij1je et leur temps, Actes du colloque de Lille 
octobre 1978 (Lille, 1980), 47-60, J. Jolivet, 'Remarques stir les Rcgulae Thcologicae d'Alain de Lille', in ibid.. 
83-99; Evans. Alan (? f Lille, pp. 65-80. 
"'Suinina 55. P. 199. 
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Regulae, however, this principle is formulated at the outset as a general rule. '-2 
This progression from the tedious and repetitive resolution of Individual 
quaestiones to the fon-nulation of general rules in theology was not peculiar to Alan, 
though he is perhaps the most outstanding exponent of the Regularmethode. 43 
Prepositinus of Cremona and Peter of Poitiers are other clear examples. 44 By the late 
twelfth century, another theologian, Master Martinus, expressed the doctrine that the 
essence does not beget in the forrn of a theological rule. 45 
TI-ie most important general principle was that all essential nouns used of God 
are always predicated in the singular, irrespective of whether they are being used of 
one Person only or the three together. 46 Related to this was the classification of 
words according to general type as either essential, personal or notional. This 
classification is one of the fundamental principles by which general rules could be 
formulated in the first place, and probably goes back to Anselm. of Laon via his two 
most famous and influential pupils, Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers. 47 In some 
cases, it is constitutive of the very structure of the work. For example, Peter of 
Capua's Summa: 
Of the nairnes which are spoken of God, some are essential, such as 'God', 'just' and similar words; 
some are personal, such as 'Father', 'Son' and such like; some are notional, such as 'paternity' and 
'sonship' and similar words. 48 
In other works, these distinctions are assumed rather than made explicit, as in the 
42 Regulae XXVIII. p. 144. 
43 Lang, Die theologischen Prinzipienlehre, pp. 75-93. 
'Angelini. L'ortodossia e la graininatica, pp. 105-70 has an extensive comparison of these three authors. 
45 Quaevione,, z, Paris BN lat. 14556, fol. 280ra: 'Regul a est theologica. quod natura divina non gignit nec gignitur, 
nec procedit nec spirat. ' 
46Augustine, De trin. V. 9, CCSL 50, p. 215. PL 42.917; Glossa wper Sententias, BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7vb; 
Gandulph of Bologna, ISent. 23-25, pp. 17-19; Robert of Molun. Uent. IIX p. 47; Sent divinitat&, pp. 166*-7*; Alan 
of Lille, Suinina 55, p. 199,56, p. 201; Rqwlae XXIII, p. 139, Simon of Tournai, Disputationes LXXXIIIA p. 
243; 
Prepositinus of Cremona, Suinina 1.4, p. 200. 
47 For example. Sent. divine paaine, pp. 6-8. Also from Anselm's *school', a quaevtio, printed by 
Lottin, 
Pi, schologie et inorale V, pp. 230-1, Sententie Atrebaten., ze-v. in ibid., p. 404. 
'Munich Clm. 14508, fol. lvb: 'Sciendtim igitur quod nomintim que de deo dictintur, quedam stint essentialia, 
tit "deus". "itistus" et huitismodi; quedam stint personalia. tit "pater", "filitis" et httiusmodi; quedam notionalia, tit 
ffpatemitas" et "filiatio" et htiitismodi. ' 
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anonymous Glossa on the Sentences4' or the Summa of Master Hubertus-50 `I`his 
classification of the diviiie names as essential, personal or notional was the highest 
category of technical generalisation about theological language and from it proceeded 
a number of subcategories. It has even been suggested that this categonsation is to 
theology what Aristotle's Categories is to the natural world: every theological word 
belongs to and exhibits the properties of at'least one category! 1 Peter of Poitiers 
begins his treatise with this ever decreasing hierarchy of application. Thus, of the 
words stated of God, some are temporal and some are etemal; of those which are 
eternal, sorne are used singly either according to essence (deus) or according to Person 
(pater); of those which are stated essentially, some are understood essentially 
(divin-itas; cssentia) and some personally (potentia; deus). 52Following this procedure, 
Peter arrives at a classification of nine types of word, including those which signify 
and always stand for essence and those which signify essence but sometimes stand for 
Person . 
51 It is this nine-fold classification which determines the structure of Peter's 
work. 54 
The typology of nouns predicated of God is even more intricately delineated 
in the Summa of Alan of Lille, whose first book is divided according to personal and 
essential words. Of theological nouns, some are essential in that they signify the 
55 
essence without having any other connotation (deus; essentia; deitas). Others are 
essential in that they signify relations which are added (addictas) to the divine nature 
(dominus; origo). " Still others are partly personal and partly essential in that they 
49BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7va: 'Deus genuit deum, id est pater filitim. tibi "deus" est nomen personale non 
essentiale. ' 
'OMunich Clm. 28799, fol. 2vb: 'hoc nomen "deus", licet essentiale sit, personaliter tamen ibi tenetur. I 
"S. Ebbesen, 'The Semantics of the Trinity According to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen', in Gilbert 
de Poitiers, p. 408. 
52 ISent. 11, p. 10.1 - 15. 
53jbid., p. 11.25-9. 
"See Angelini, Lortodos, ýzia e la grammatica, p. 99. 
"Summa 55. p-198: 'Nominum autern theologicortim alia stint essentialia que ita essentiam predicant quod 
ntillarn distinctionern conpredicant'. 
56Ibid: 'Alia cohessentialia, que significant relationes addictas divine usie'. 
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signify the divine essence principally or directly and co-signifY (signify secondarily 
or indirectly) the personal distinctions (I)ersona; trinitaS). 57 Others are purely 
personal, either signifying (vater; filius; s1firitus sanctus) or denoting ýP(iternitas; 
filiatio; processio) a personal property. " Finally, some are co-personal in that they 
signify relations added to the personal properties (distinctus; alius). 59 
Furthen-nore, some essential nouns signify and stand for the same thing, the 
divine essence (deitas; natura), whilst others signify essence and stand for Person 
(deus). Another way of defining this difference between totally and partially essential 
nouns is the distinction between mathematical or abstract, and concrete nouns. 60 
Essential nouns are mathematical when they signify and stand for the same thing, the 
divine essence Just as 'whiteness' (alb . 
61 'edo) signifies without calling to mind any 
particular white thing, so essential nouns which signify and stand for the divine 
essence do not convey the idea of any one of the divine Persons as part of their 
general meaning. Concrete nouns, on the other hand, signify Person as much as nature, 
just as in the natural world 'white' (a1bu, 0 signifies a thing which has the property of 
being white. 
The range of semantic categories elucidated by Alan of Lille gains systematic 
coherence in the Regulde: 
Every name which is spoken of God is either essential, co-essential, personal, co-personal, or partly 
57Ibid. 
' P. 199: Wia partim personalia, partim essentialia, que scilicet predicant principaliter usiam, 
compredicant autem personarum distinctiones'. Cf. Robert of Melun, Uent. 3. X, p. 49.24-5: 'Hoc vero nomen: 
"Trinitas", nec essentie esse videttir, nec persone. ' 
"'Summa 55, p. 199: 'Alia personalia, que vel personalem proprietatem predicant, tit hec nomina: Tater", 
"Filitis", "Spirittis Sanctus"; vel appeHant. tit hec nornina "paternitas", "filiatio". "processio". ' 
59 Ibid: 'Alia compersonalia, que significant relationes addictas personalibus proprietatibus'. 
'OAIan of Lille, Regulae XXX, p. 145. Peter of Poitiers. ISent. 18, p. 163, Stephen Langton, Quaestiones, p. 203 
distinguishes between substantive nouns which signify essence 'sine aliqua concretione' (e. g. essentia) and those 
which signify 'quasi in concretione' (e. g. deus); Master Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 8ra: 'Idem enim 
prorsus est deus et deitas et idem significantia. excepto quod alius est modus significandi in concretione et alius 
modus in mathematico. Similiter nec mathematicum deo convenit proprie, quia significat formam', Everard of 
Ypres, Dialogus, p. 2154. 
"Summa 55, p-199: 'Nomintim atitem essentialitim. alia idem significant et appellant, tit illa que stint quasi 
mathematica. verbi gratia tit hec deitas. natura. usia. essentia, idem enim significant et appellant scilicet essentiam 
divinam. * 
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personal and partly essential. '2 
A similar classification is provided by the anonymous author of a theological treatise, 
probably written in the late twelfth century, who argues that all nouns, whether 
essential, personal or notional, can each be further subdivided according to when they 
are used essentially, personally or notionally. " 
This overall tendency to sort and classify is one of the fundamentals of 
scholastic theology in the latter half of the twelfth century and developed concurrently 
with the equally important distinction between signification and supposition. Although 
this distinction is usually studied from the point of view of developments in language 
and logic, it was also at the heart of the semantic approach to the resolution of 
theological problems. h-i particular, the distinction between signification and 
supposition provided theologians with a more than adequate explanation of why 'God 
begot God' did not imply 'essence begot essence. Indeed, it seems more than likely 
that die concept of supposition was invented by theologians, since 'No one could have 
a stronger motivation than a teacher of theology for asking what terms stand for in 
given contexts. "' ne centrality of the distinction in the academic theology of the 
Trinity is further borne out by the fact that it provides thirteenth-century theologians 
with their conceptual framework for interpreting Joachim's condemnation at the Fourth 
Lateran Council. 
Medieval discussions of signification took place within two main traditions: the 
logical, which was predominantly Aristotelian; and the grammatical, which evolved 
in commentaries on Priscian's Institutiones grammaticae. 65 On balance the latter 
seems to have had the more lasting impact. According to grammarians writing in the 
second half of the twelfth-century, the signification of any word could ultimately be 
62Regulac XXXII, P. 146. 
63London BM Royal 9E XII (fols. 100-157). fol. 148vb: 'Que nomina, sive essentialia sive personalia sive 
notionalia. pontint essentialiter et personaliter et notionaliter. ' 
AA- 
'Ebbesen, 'The Semantics of the Trinity'. p. 40.1. 
65 See L. M. de Rijk. Logica Modernoruin. A Contribution to the EarIv Histor), of Tenninist Logic 2 vols. 
(Assen, 1962-67) 11.1. pp. 177-220 and 221-63 for logic and grammar respectively. 
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traced back to its first usage, its prima impoSitio. 66 Consequently, every word 
possessed a core, general meaning which derived from its first use, and which was 
prior to its meaning in any given context. This was a fairly vague concept, as the 
definition given by Peter of Spain in the 1230s, but common from c. 1030,67 shows: 
The signification of a ten-n, as it is understood here, is the representation of a thing by means of an 
appropriate word. " 
The doctrine of signification meant therefore that every word had a fixed, essential 
meaning which had to be squared with that word's usage in any given context. The 
concept of supposition provided precisely the means for determining a word's meaning 
as used in an actual sentence. 
Until the twelfth century, the terrn supposituni and associated terms referred 
to the grammatical subject of the sentence. 69 There is no metaphysical dimension, no 
sense in which the subject has reference to an actual substance. 70 It was during this 
period that suppositum acquired this second meaning - the property of the subject of 
a sentence to stand for some thing. 71 
In his De grainmatico, Saint Anselm distinguished between the signVicatio and 
the appellatio of a word. In effect, this anticipates the distinction between signification 
and supposition, even though Anselm does not use the technical language of the later 
66De Rijk. Logica Modernoruin IIA, pp. 496,525; Pinborg, Logik und Seinantik, p. 59; and the account of John 
of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.14, p. 33. The notion of hnj7ositio seems to be closely related to that of the causa 
inventionis of the parts of speech. See Hunt, *Studies 1'. esp. pp. 211-14, de Rijk, Logica Modernoruin IIA, pp. 110- 
11; K. M. Fredborg, 'Speculative Cyrammar', in Dronke ed., A Historv qf Tweýfth-Centug Western Philosqj-)kv, 
pp. 181-2. 
67 De Rijk. La philosophie, p. 184. 
68See the Suininule Logicales, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen. 1972), p. 79: 'Significatio termini, prout hic sumitur, 
est rei per vocern. secundum placiturn representatio. ' Partial and full translations are available by J. P. Mullally, The 
licale, 
f Peter of Spain (Univ of Notre Dame, Indiana. 1945) and F. P. Dinneen, Peter of Spain. Summulae Lo, rT ýo 
Language in Dispute. An English Translation of Peter of Spain's Tractatus called qfterwards Suminulae Logicales, 
Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111, vol. 39 (Amsterdam, 1990). 
'They are used in this sence by Boethius, Priscian and Peter Helias. See de Rijk, Logica Modernorum ILL 
p. 521,527. 
'Ibid., p. 5ý 21 - 
7 'Ith-Century Grammar', in Gilbert de Poitiers, 325-51 'But C. H. Kneepkens, 'Suppositio and Supponere in 1ý 
argues that it was not until Peter Helias in the mid-twelfth century that supposituin even meant the grammatical 
subject. 
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twelfth centIIrV. 72 Anselrn uses the example of arammaticus (literate, i. e. one wlio has 
the property of knowing grammar) to illustrate his point. 
73 He says fliatgrammaticus 
does not signify man and literacy together (substance and quality), but literacy directly 
or properly and man indirectly or improperly. 74 Grammaticus denotes man 
(appellatit, um hominis) in the sense of the one being literate, but does not convey or 
signify the proper meaning of man . 
75 Anselm's theory resembles supposition, then, 
insofar as a term (grammaticus) may signify one thing (literacy), but stand for or 
denote another (man). rMe concept of appellation did not itself become redundant once 
the distinction between signification and supposition became established. Instead it 
came to designate, according to the definitioii of Peter of Spain, 'the acceptance of a 
common term for an already existent thing. The example used by Peter is the term 
'Antichrist', which signifies and stands for the Antichrist, but which appellates nothing 
whatsoever since the Antichrist was still to come. 
A similar distinction between meaning and use, signification and supposition, 
is found in Abelard and William of Conclies, where it takes the form of a distinction 
between significatio and nominatio. 
77 But most important from the point of view of 
trinitarian theology is the presence of an embryonic concept of suppositio in the work 
78 
of Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers. The dominant usage is still 'function as the 
subject of a sentence' rather than 'the function of the subject as standing for 
2D. P. Henry, 'The Early History of Suj)j, 2ositio', 1-, ranciscan Studies 7 '13 (1963), 205-12; A. Maier-6, 
Tenninologia Logica della Tarda Scolastica, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 8 (Rome, 1972), p. 58. For de Rijk, 
Logica Modernoruin 11.1, pp. 16-18 the absence of the techn ical language in Anselm. renders Henry's argument void. 
7'For this account of Anselm, see D. P. Henry, The Logic qf Saint Ansebn (Oxford. 1967). pp. 19-24; Evans, 
Language and Logic, pp. 77-8; Pinborg, Logik und Semantik, pp. 43-7. 
74De grammatico 4.232, p. 37: 'G-rammatictis vero non significat hominem et grammaticum tit unum, sed 
grammaticurn per se et hominem per aliud significat. ' 
7511)id. 4.2133. p. 37: 'Et hoc nomen quarnvis sit appellativurn hominis. non tamen proprie dicitur eius 
significativurn'. 
76c,.. 
Summulac logicales, p. 197: 'Appellatio est acceptio ten-nini communis pro re existente. ' 
11 For Abelard, see MaierCi. Tcrininologia Logica, p. 70; for William of Conches see. de Rijk, Logica 
Modemoruin 11.1. pp. 227-8. 
78 Pinborg, Lo,.,,, ik und Semantik. pp. 47-50-, L. Nielson. 'On the Doctrine of Logic and Language of Gilbert 
Porreta and his Follovvers', CIMAGL 17 (1976). 40-69; Kneepkens, *Suppositio and Supponere', pp. 337-9 and 'The 
Iudicium Construction& (Summary)', in 0. Wei iers, ed.. Mjthodeýý et in-ýarument-ýý du travail intellectuel au moven - 
dge, Etudes stir le vocabulaire intellectuel du Moven Age 3 (Turnhout, 1990). pp. 14-15. 
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something'. 79 But it is through the works of Gilbert and the Porretani that this usage 
of supposition first made its entrv into grammar and logic. 80 Nielson has argued that 
Gilbert and his followers are interested in the concept of suppositio only in so far as 
it impinges on problems of theology and theological discourse. 81 Further on the 
origins of supposition in theology, Ebbesen suggests that the notion of suppositio 
personalis was invented by theologians to indicate when the word 'God' in a 
82 proposition stood for one of the Persons as distinct from the divine essence. 
By the late twelfth century the distinction between signification and supposition 
83 had come into its own, replacing that between signification and appellation. Peter 
of Spain, writing in the 1230s, defines the distinction thus: 
Signification and supposition differ, ho-, vever, because signification occurs through the imposition of 
a word for the thing to be signified, whereas supposition is the acceptance of an already significant term 
for something. " 
The importance of supposition theory at the level of practical application ties in with 
the division of all theological words into categories and sub-categories. For once a 
noun had been classified as either personal or essential according to the various 
stipulations about whether it signified essence properly or improperly, directly or 
indirectly, it was possible to explain precisely how and why that word functioned as 
it did in different contexts. 
As well as being used to solve individual theological problems, the 
signification-supposition distinction became an integral part of the theoretical 
framework adopted by theologians writing in the second half of the twelfth century. 
79 Pinborg. Lo, -ik und Seinantik, pp. 48-9-, Nielson, 'Ori the Doctrine of Logic and Language', p. 43. 
8"Pinborg, Logik- und Semantik, p. 49: 'Ein direkter Einflus Gilberts auf die logischen Handbücher des 12. 
Jahrhunderts läßt sich vielleicht nicht nachweisen. Seine Theorien spielen aber in den Forrnulierungen der 
Trinitätslehre und in der Grammatik eine große Rolle. Dadurch bekommen sie wieder indirekten Einfluß auf die 
Logik. '; Kneepkens. 'The Iudicium Con-vtructioni-ýz*, p. 15. 
"Nielson, 'On the Doctrine of Looric and Language'. p. 40- 
82 'The Semantics of the Trinity'. p. 402. 
83 See Nlaier6, Tenninologia Logica, pp. 85-6. 
"Suininule Logicales, p. 80.9-11: 'Diffenint atitem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per 
impositionem vocis ad rem significandum. suppositio vero est acceptio ipsitis termini lam significantis rem pro 
aliquo. * 
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Master Hubertus devotes a lengthy chapter to the concept of supposition as applied 
in a range of theological contexts. He considers first the supposition of essential 
names, such as 'God' and 'divine essence' and whether, when they are the subject of 
a sentence, they always stand for a Person, answering, as if there were any real doubt, 
in the negative (i. e. since one Person is not the Trinity). '5 'flien there is the problem 
that the supposition of 'God' in the sentence 'God begets and God is begotten' seems 
to be indefinite since tfie word 'God' does not stand for the Father any more than for 
the Son. 86 The distinction between signification and supposition was the most popular 
device for explaining away apparent absurdities, objections or contradictions, and its 
use was absolutely crucial to the emergence of a broad consensus in trinitarian 
theology. Alan of Lille may have been responsible for its widespread use by the late 
twelfth century: he certainly seems to have been the first theologian to use it 
extensively. 87 
At the very core of the development and refinement of this approach was the 
still thorny question of exactly why 'God begot God' did not imply 'essence begot 
essence'. The on-going vitality of this debate is quite remarkable, given the apparent 
absence of any dispute between genuine opponents. Apart from Alberic of Reims, and 
even his opposition must be considered questionable, there is no evidence that anyone 
seriously thought that the essence did beget. In other words, from the time that the 
question was first explicitly framed by Abelard, there was a unan-imous agreement 
among school-trained theologians that the essence did not beget. Why then was the 
question pursued so vigorously throughout the twelfth century and after? The answer 
is twofold. Firstly, tfie issue was central to the entire clarification of the opposition 
between unity of essence and distinction of Person; the problem of why, when the 
8'Summa. Munich CIm. 28799. fols. 5rb-6vb. Fol. 6va: 'Dicimus quod non semper hoc nomen "deus" in subiecto 
aliquam personartim designat, sed aliquando supponit essentiam, aliquando personam. Cum ergo dicitur "deus est 
pater", si hoc nomen "pater" substantive teneatur et quasi cum subintellectu articuli intelligatur, tune hoc nomine 
"deus" potest subponi essentia; si autern adiective et quasi relative teneatur, tune necessario supponitur persona et 
non essentia. ' 
16 Munich Clm. 218799, fol. 7rb. But against this is the fact that the signification of 'God' is singular since it 
signifies the divinity. Hubertus' solution is that the propositions in question are neither indefinite nor singular since 
'God' itself is neither a proper nor a common noun. but has elements of both. Cf. Alan of Lille's and Prepositinus 
of Cremona's definition of appellative and proper nouns below, p. 146, n. 100. 
8'Alan himself seems to have derived the distinction from Gilbert of Poitiers. See A. de Libera. 'Logique et 
th6ologie dans la Suinina "Quoniain Hoinines" d*Alain de Lille', in Gilbert de Poitiers. 437-69. 
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Father who is essence begot the Son wlio is essence, it did not follow that essence 
begot essence. I`his does not mean that theologians seriously considered the possibility 
that the essence did beget. They knew from early on in trinitarian discussions that this 
was impossible, on the grounds provided by Augustine that no thing begets itself. 
Rather, as de Rijk has written of the quaestio technique in general, their inquiry was 
6 88 purely theoretical, aimed at an exclusively intellectual clarification' . Such an 
inquiry would deepen and sharpen understanding. 
Secondly, the dilemma of why 'God begot God', but not 'essence begot 
essence' raised searching questions about language and signification which echoed a 
range of preoccupations common not just to theologians, but to other scholars as well. 
Language, how to widerstand and manipulate it, was the burning philosophical 
question of the age. Discussion of the question of whether essence begot essence 
provided a forum in which to thrash out and refine semantic concepts such as the 
distinction between signification and supposition and their applicability to empirical 
problems. The evidence that this was indeed the case is irrefutable; in their discussion 
of the signification of particular words theologians repeatedly used the example of 
God begot God/essence begot essence as a kind of test case for their argument. 
Again, this common methodology reinforces the case for consensus in 
trinitarian theology in the later twelfth century. 'Me similarities among academic 
theologians outweigh their differences, which is why the concept of 'schools of 
theology' can be somewhat misleading for this period. Both Alan of Lille and Simon 
of Tournai were undoubtedly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers, but it does not 
necessarily follow from this that they belonged to his 'school' (even with the 
qualification that they are not to be confused with the Porretani, Gilbert's self- 
proclaimed followers and defenders). 89 These same authors, as I have emphasised, 
also relied heavily on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in a way which makes it 
difficult to assign them to Gilbert's school without this being misleading. As Gillian 
Evans has written of Simon of Tournai: 
88 La philosophic, p. 97. 
89T'his distinction bemeen Gilbert's hard-core and less commited follo,, vers is a standard one. See ChAtillon, 
'La m6thode th&ologique', pp. 49-51. 
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Ile 
, 
community of interest here, the exchange of vievvs, is more important than the classification of a man s opinions as predommantly those of the Lombard or those of Gilbert of Poitiers. "' 
The overwlielming feature of academic theology during this period is consensus rather 
than divergence on a range of doctrinal issues. Of course, issues over which 
theologians disagreed should not be dismissed for the sake of uniformity. But these 
disagreements invariably centred on specific issues and should not detract from the 
significant agreement which had emerged both in ten-ns of methodology and of the 
cot-pus of problems under discussion. 9' I shall attempt to substantiate these claims by 
examining the interdependency of the problem of the signification of the ten-ns deus, 
essentia and persona with that of why 'God begot God' but not 'essence begot 
essence . 
3. deus/essentia: 'God begot God' but not 'essence begot essence' 
The signification of the terms 'God' and 'essence' was inextricably linked to 
the problem of why 'God begot God' did not imply 'essence begot essence'. 'I'lie 
solution adopted by theologians to this problem hinged on their distinction between 
the signification of these two ten-ns. In particular, they had to account for the fact that 
'God", unlike other essential ten-ns, did not always signify the divine essence. Rather, 
'God', because it was partly essential and partly personal, sometimes stood for essence 
and sometimes for Person. 92 The same point had already been made by Gilbert of 
9Wan ql'Lille, p. 8. Evans seems immediately to qualify this, however, by suggesting that this 'community of 
interest' may have broken down by the end of the twelfth century tinder the pressure resulting from the competition 
for students. Cf. Ch5tillon, 'La methode th6ologique' and Angelini, Lortodossia e la grainmatica, esp. p. 80, both 
of whom consider the differences between the 'schools' as much more prominent than their similarities. 
9'Tbis is essentially the thesis of L. H6dl, 'Die dialek-tische Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts'. in Arts libiraux 
et philo, -ýophie au inown dge (Montr6al-Paris. 1969), 137-47. H6dl distinguishes various strands in academic 
theology which nevertheless share many common assumptions. 
92 Alan of Lille, Suinina 56, p. 200: 'Unde hoc nomen quandoque ponitur personaliter, ut hic: Deus genuit Deum, 
et essentialiter tit ibi: Deus est trinitas. '; Simon of Tournai, Disl)utationes LXXLX, p. 229.24-26: 'Cum dicitur Deus 
gignit, Deus gignitur, nomen Dei personaliter surnitur. Sed cum dicitur unus solus Deus est, nomen Dei essentialiter 
dicitur. '; Prepositinus of Cremona. Suinina 3.3, p. 209.25-26: 'dicent qtiod hoc nomen "deus" aliquando pro essentia 
aliquando pro persona supponit.; BM Harley 3855, fol. 12ra-b and Paris Maz. 1708, fol. 249ra-b, Master Hubertus. 
Suinina, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 6va: 'Dicimus quod non semper hoc nomen "deus" in stibiecto aliquarn. 
personarurn. designat; sed aliquando supponit essentiam. aliquando personam. ', Stephen Langton. Suinina, p. 60: 
'quoddam nomen significat essentiam et supponit personam, et non semper, tit "deus"'; Peter of Poitiers. Uent. 27. 
p. 217.61-7: 'nomen "Deus" quandoque accipitur personaliter. et hoc dinoscitur ex aditicto. Nam curn nomine vel 
verbo significante notionem, vel prepositione, refertur ad personam, tit cum dicitur: Deus gentut Deum. Deus de 
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Poitiers. " However they explained this peculiarity of the word 'God', all acadernic 
theologians agreed on one point: the signification of the ten-n 'God' was equivocal and 
therefore its supposition (reference or meaning in context) in any given sentence was 
never a foregone conclusion but had to be determined in each individual case. 
For Alan of Lille, 'God' was a special case of an essential noun whose 
signification was the divine essence but whoseproper supposition was a Person, and 
94 only improper4, the divine essence. Only this kind of flexibility in the supposition 
and signification of 'God' would be able to account for its varied uses in different 
propositions. For if 'God' stood only for essence, we would not be able to say 'God 
begot' without concluding that 'essence begot essence'. "ý' On the other hand, even 
though the proper supposition of 'God' was a Person, it had at least improperly to 
stand for the essence if statements such as 'God is Trinity' were to be true, i. e since 
no one Person is the Trinity. 96 
Thus, according to Alan, 'God' is properly used as a personal, but improperly 
as an essential noun. 97 That is, it stands for Person directly, and for essence 
indirectly. Indeed, such is also the case, he explains, in the natural world. For 'man', 
since every man is an animal, is properly used to signify and stand for man, as in 
4 man is an animal', but improperly, since no man is a species, to signify and stand for 
Deo et huittsmodi, pro personis intelligitur. Curn vero dicitur per se. tit: Detis est, ad essentiam pertinct. ' 
9'Otto of Freising. Gesta 1.58, p. 83: 'Dicebat enim hoc nomen "deus" quandoque in designatione naturae, 
quandoque in designatione penonae unitis etiam poni. ' 
94Summa 56, p. 199: 'Stint alia nomina essentialia que nattiram predicant et personam appellant, tit hoc nomen 
"Deus"; et tale nomen dicitur essentiale ratione predicationis et significationis. Pro qualitate atitern significat 
naturam, pro substantia verc, significat personam-, supponit atitem pro persona. inproprie autem pro essentia. ' Also 
the view of Stephen Langton, Summa. p. 60: 'hoc atitem nomen "detis" suppositione est personale et significatione 
essentiale. ' 
95Summa 56, p. 200: 'Nec essentia est tanturn, quia non esset venim Detis genuit Deurn, quia essentia divina 
non genuit nec genita est. ' 
"6Ibid., pp. 199-200: Item si tanturn personale ponitur. er-o non vere dicitur Detts est trinitas, qttia pro ulla 
persona est ista vera. ' 
"'Ibid., p. 200: 'Ad hoc dicimus quod hoc nomen "Deus" proprie est personale sed inproprie ponitur 
essentialiter'. Alan's usage of 'proper' and 'improper' seems to contradict Evans' judgement that Alan does not 
employ these terms as a measure of technical exactitude. See Alan ql*Lille. pp. 33-4. 
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species, as in 'i-nan is a species'. " For both 'God' and 'man' are appellative 
(common) rather than proper nouns, insofar as they denote a plurality of individuals 
possessing the same nature. " 'flius 'God' appellates the plurality of Persons. '00 It 
is as if to get from the word 'man' to the species man we have to travel via the 
individual rnan. By analogy, in order to reach the idea of the divine essence from the 
word 'God' we have to go through one of the divine Persons. 
The explanation given by Prepositinus of Cremona to account for why two 
essential ten-ns, 'God' and 'essence', should differ in their signification and 
supposition, is effectively the same as Alan of Lille's, though he is less concerned 
about the propriety of 'God' standing for essence-10' He argues that 'God', unlike 
other essential nouns, notably essence, is used both essentially and personally. 102 Tlie 
general principle is: 
the noun 'God' whenever it is used to say soniething about God, signifies the divine nature. But 
sometimes 'God' both signifies and stands for nature, as when we say 'God is three Persons'; 
sometimes it signifies nature and does not stand for it, but for a Person, as when we say 'God 
begets. 103 
"e.. 
Summa 56. p. 200: 'sicut et in naturalibus contingit: nam hoc nomen "homo" proprie ponitur ad significandurn 
et supponendum hominern, ut cum dicitur horno est animal, inproprie tamen ponitur ad significandum et 
supponendum speciem, tit cum dicitur: horno est species. ' 
99Ibid., p. 200: 'Ad hoc enim ut aliquod nomen proprie sit appellativurn, oportet ut illud sit plurium 
suppositorum appellaturn in una communi natura, una dico non unitate sed unione et conformitate; unde hoc nomen 
"horno" plura appellat et una communi natura, id est in natura confon-ni et uniente; nam humanitas Socratis dicitur 
una, id est unifonnis et uniens humanitate Platonis'. On the distinction between nomen proprium and nomen 
appellatimn. see MaierfA, Terminologia Logica, pp. 47-52. 
100c", Summa 67, p. 217: 'Dicimus quod appellativurn, qtiia significat naturam communem plurium; et est plurium 
appellativurn, quia plurium personarum. 'Cf. Prepositintis; of Cremona, Suinina 4.2, p. 216.28-31: 'hoe nomen "deus" 
nec proprium est nec appellativurn, sed habet aliquid proprium et aliquid appellativurn. Habet enirn significationern 
proprii et suppositionem appellativi. ' This is the view reported by the anonymous BM Royal 9E XII (fols. 231- 
2460, fol. 239rb: 'Queritur an hoc nomen "detis" proprie an appellative accipiatur. Et dicunt quidarn quod nec 
proprie nec appellative tanturn, sed appellative ratione suppositionis, ut: pater est deus, filius est deus, spirittLs 
sanctus est deus-, proprie vero ratione significationis, tit cum dico divina essentia est detis. ' Angelini, Lortodossia 
e la graminatica, p. 110 notes that Prepositinus, like Alan, introduces the discussion on proper and appellative 
names during questions on divine generation. 
'114-18. 'O'Summa 4, pp. ý 
102Ibid. 4.1, p. 214.1-3: 'Stint etiam nomina que tantum essentialiter dictintur, tit "essentia", "nattira"; quedam 
que essentialiter et personaliter dictintur, tit "detts". ' 
215.29-32: 'hoc nomen "deus" tibique sign if icat divinarn naturam ctim de deo dicitur. Sed quandoque "'Ibid., p. ý 
significat earn et stipponit pro ea. tit detis est tres persone: quandoque significat eam et non supponit pro ea. sed 
pro persona una, tit detis generat'. 
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The word 'essence', on the other hand. never stood for Person, but only for tile divine 
essence. 104 
It is notable that the examples given by Prepositinus for the essential and 
personal supposition of 'God' are exactly the same as Alan of Lille'S. 105 For him, 
as for virtually all theologians, the main proof that 'God' does not always stand for 
the divine essence is the argument that., if it did, 'God begot God' would imply 
'essence begot essence', which they had already rejected as impossible. 
Peter of Capua uses many of the sarne examples, including the main one that 
even though the word 'God' is essential, it is sometimes used personally, as when we 
say 'God begot God'. '06A much more complex example reverses the order of the 
statement 'God begets and he is' to 'God is and he begets'. Now the supposition of 
'God' is no longer the Father but the divine essence, and from this it would follow 
that the essence begot. 107 
Peter's lengthiest discussion of the signification of the word 'God' occurs 
during his consideration of the proposition 'God begot God, therefore himself or 
another God . 
108 He reports a number of the alternative solutions put forward to 
explain why neither inference (himself or another God) is valid. The first is that 
although the proper supposition of 'God" is the divine essence, when 'God' is taken 
(transumitur) to stand for Person, its supposition is narrowed (contrahit) by the verb 
to which it is joined, so that it stands for one specific Person (ut supponat determinate 
104jbid 
. 3.8, p. 213.8-9: 'Si dicas essentiam esse vertim est de persona. probo quod non; quia 
hoc nomen 
tlessentia" non supponit pro persona. ' ibid. 9.1, p. 256.13-15: 'Nomen "essentia" non supponit nisi pro essentia; et 
hec dictio "trinus" non habet poni nisi gratia personartim; non ergo essentia est trina. ' 
'05Cf. Alan of Lille, Summa 56, pp. 199-200; 67-70, pp. 218-19; Regulae XXIX pp. 144-5. 
106SUmma, Munich Clm. 14508, fol. lvb: 'Quamvis autem hoc nomen "deus" essentiale sit, aliquando ponitur 
personaliter, tit detis genuit deum. ' 
107MUn ich Clm. 14508, fol. lvb: 'Deus generat ei ipse est; ergo verum est deurn generare ei ipsum esse; ergo 
vera sunt detun generare ei ipsos esse; ergo vera sunt detim esse ei ipsum generare; ergo deus est ei ipse generat. 
Sed hic non sit suppositio per hoc nomen "detis" nisi pro divina essentia; ergo divina essentia est ei ipsa generat. 
Respondernus: cum hoc nomen "deus" immediate adiungitur verbo stibstantivo, ita quod non sequitur aliquod 
adiectivum quod irnmitatur illi nomini, ut ctim dicitur deus est genitus, non potest supponere nisi pro essentia; cum 
vero iungitur verbo notionali tarnen stimitur ab essentia ad personarn; est ergo illatio falsa: vera sunt deurn generare 
ei ipstim esse, ergo vera stint deurn esse ei ipstim generare. ' 
'O"Munich Cim. 14508, fol. 2ra. 
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pro patre i, elfilio). Accordingly, the statements 'the Father begets' and 'God begets' 
are exactly equivalent (equipollent). Ali alternative solution is that with notional ý-erbs, 
'God' is indeed taken to stand for Person, but indeterminately so that no particular 
Person is singled out. '09 Die problem here is that because una et alia persona is 
begetting and begotten this would seem to open the way for unus et alius deus being 
both begetting and begotten. A third group argue that in such statements as 'God 
begot God' the word 'God' is taken to stand for Person, and never stands for essence. 
Its supposition is quasi mixtum; it stands for Person along with essence so that the 
sense is: God begot God, i. e. a Person participating in the divinity begot a Person 
participating in the divinity. "O But this raises other difficulties when it is not 
appropriate to replace the term 'God' with the term 'a Person participating in the 
divinity'. "' Finally, a fourth opinion holds that 'God' in its widest sense (ampliatus) 
always stands for essence, but that sometimes its supposition depends on the nature 
of the verb to which it is joined so that it may stand for Person! 12 
In all, Peter reports four different opinions. Explanations range from the proper 
supposition of 'God' being essence to the proper supposition being Person, and if 
Person, whether determinate or indeten-ninate. More impressive than these subtle 
variations, however, is the fact that all four of the proposed solutions presuppose an 
entire array of shared assumptions, including proper and improper supposition, 
determinate and indeterminate supposition and the restriction of ten-ns. Peter himself 
does not express a preference for one solution over another. He simply relays the state 
of the question among contemporaries. 
The same problem of why 'God begot God' does not imply 'essence begot 
'09Munich Clm. 14508, fol. 2ra: 'Alii dicunt quod hoc nomen "deus" cum verbo notionali transurnitur ad 
supponendum pro persona, sed non supponit determinate Propria triurn personarum, immo confuse et infinite, et 
est sensus: deus genuit deum, id est persona personam. ' 
'"Munich Clm. 14508, fol. 2ra: 'Tercii dicunt quod revera hoc nomen "deus" in huiusmodi locutionibus 
transurnitur utnim ad supponendum pro persona. sed nichilorninus supponit essentiam, et ita quasi mixtim supponit 
personarn curn essentia, tit sit sensus: deus genuit detim. persona divinitate participans genuit personam divinitate 
participantem. * 
... Munich Clm. 14508. fol. 2ra: 'Sed sectindurn hanc oppinionem. videtur hec esse falsa: deus genittis existat. 
quia hec est falsa: persona genita participans divinitate genita existat. ' 
112 Munich Clm. 14508. fol. 2ra-b: * Quarti dicunt quod hoc nomen "deus" ubicumque ponatur, supponit essentiam 
ampliatus, tamen quandoque eitis suppositio ex verbo cui adiungitur ad supponendum. determinate pro illa. persona 
cui convenit res verbi, ut dicitur "detis genuit". sensus est: essentialiter pater genuit'. 
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essence' provides the point of departure for Alexander Nequam's assertion t1lat 
although 'God' is properly essential, it is sornetirnes used personally. ' 13 'Fhe verb 'to 
beget' in the expression 'God begot God' restricts the supposition of 'God' to Person 
only. ' 14 'Fhe anonymous author of a summa uses the example of 'God begot God' 
as an illustration of the general principle that essential words can be used 
personally! 15 
Master Martinus also considers the problem of the signification of 'God' in this 
context: 
Some people ask, not in vain, whether the name 'God' signifies substance only or Person only or Person and nature. 'Mat it signifies nature only is an untenable position since the name 'God' can act for Person, as when it is said 'God begets God'. "' 
The first solution Martin reports is that 'God' signifies neither nature only nor Person 
only nor nature and Person, but signifies nature and Person differelitly. 117 'flie 
solution favoured by Martin himself is that of Alan of Lille, that 'God' signifies nature 
but stands for Person. ' 18 
Stephen Langton states that the word 'God' is restricted to standing for Person 
when it is joined to terms coupling or indicating notion as in the case of 'God begets' 
113S, 
pecululn ll.. wii, p. 136: 'Hoc nomen "Deus" proprie positum essentiale est, sed ex vi aditincti sepe ponitur 
personaliter. tit in his, "Deus generat", "Deus generattir". ' Also, ibid. II. xxx, p. 158. 
114jbid., 'In appellatione enim enuntiabilis observanda est lex constuctionis. Unde et hoc verbum "generare" 
cogit hoc nomen "Deo" facere personalern suppositionern. ' 
115 Fol. 148vb: 'Essentialia ponuntur personaliter, tit ibi detim de deo, et venit ad nos calciata divinitas, essentia 
genuit essentiam. ' 
116 BN lat. 14556, fol. 279vb: 'Querunt quidam non invacue, utrurn. hoc nomen "deus" significet substantiarn 
tantum vel tanturn personam. vel personarn. et naturam. Quod significat tanturn naturarn improbatur sic <> cum 
hoc nomen "deus" possit agi de persona, ut cum dicitur "deus gignit deum. "' 
117 BN lat. 14556, fol. 279vb: 'Quidam dicunt hoc nomen "deus" non significare tanturn naturam vel tanturn 
personam, nec concedunt significare naturam et personam, sed divisim recipiendum est, significare naturam, 
significare personam. ' Cf. the view of Gerardus Puella reporled by Prepositinus, Summa 3.3. p. 209.1-3. 
... BN W. 14556, fol. 279vb: 'Alii dicunt quod hoc nomen "deus" significat tanturn naturam, sicut hoc nomen 
"horno" significat tantum naturam, et appellat personam. sicut hoc nomen "horno" significat tantum horno et 
appellat Socrates, quod melitis est. ' 
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or 'God from God'. "9 By the same token, Langton explains, because 'God' in this 
context stands for Person, it does not follow from 'God begets' that 'the divinity 
begets '. 120 And similarly, 'God begot God' does not implY 'essence begot essence' 
because of the different significations of these two terms: 
I'lie noun 'essence' signifies God in existence (existentia). The noun 'God', in a manner of speaking, is shared by the three Persons. For this reason, the noun 'God' can be restricted to standing for Person, but the noun 'essence' cannot. And thus it is false: divine essence begot divine essence. '2' 
As he does for so many other questions, Master Hubertus provides a concise summary 
of the main points of the contemporary debate. He himself favours the same solution 
as that proposed by Stephen Langton: 
Many opinions present themselves concerning the supposition of the name 'God'. But this solution 
seems more useful and correct, namely that with notional verbs 'God' is reduced to personal supposition 
only, and in that instance can make a true supposition for Person and not for essence. 'Mus the sense 
is: God begot God, that is, the Father begot the S011.122 
Hubertus reproduces many of the arguments and authorities found in the Lombard's 
Sentences. 12' But where the Lombard's method of piling up authorities and 
arguments is sometimes at the expense of overall clarity, Hubertus' approach gains a 
theoretical depth and clarity from his appeal to the general laws of causation, relation 
and identity. For if the divine essence is begotten, it is either begotten from a Person 
or from the essence, and the former is impossible by reason of causation, relation and 
1'9Suinina, p. 57: 'Item haec dictio "deus" restringitur ad supponendurn pro persona per terminum copulantern 
notionern vel per terminum notantem notionem. Per ten-ninum copulantern ut detis generat, per terminum notantern 
tit deus de deo. ' See also anonymous BM Royal 9E XII (fols. 247r-250v), fol. 248va: 'Nota quod detis proprie 
supponit pro divina essencia, sed cum verbis nocionalibus nichil amittens extenditur ad personas. Qualia sunt 
fogenerat", "gignitur". "procedit", "spirat", "spiratur. "' 
120SUMma, p. 59: 'Item, cum utraque istarum dictionum sit essentialis, "deus", "deitas", quare non potest restringi 
hoc nomen "deitas" tit supponat pro persona, ut sic dicatur deitas generat sicut deus generat? Haec est ratio: hoc 
nomen "deitas" significat essentiam tit subsistentem, hoc nomen "deus" significat essentiam. ut inhaerentem. ' 
', 'Coinin. in Sent.. p. 7. Cf. with Peter the Chanter's article on restriction, cited by Valente, 'Arts du discours 
et sacra pagina dans le De tropis loquendi', p. 97 from Avranches. Bibliothýque Municipale 28, fol. 11 Ora. 
"Sumina, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 9rb: 'plurales occumtnt opiniones de suppositione huius nominis "deus". 
Expeditior tamen et verior videtur hec, scilicet quod ex notionali verbo contrahat personalem tanturn suppositionern, 
et quod meram ibi faciat suppositionem pro persona et non pro essentia. Est ergo sensus: detis genuit detim, id est 
pater filium. * 
123Mtinich Cirn. 28799, fol. 2va. For exarnple, Attgtistine. De trin. VII. 3, CCSL 50, p. -149, PL 4-1.936 
(Uent. V. 1.7, p. 82.215-7); Hilarvl. De triii. IV. 10, CCA 621. pAll. PL 10.103 ([Seiit. V. 1.9, p. 83.26). 
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identity. 124 Tile argument by causation is a paraphrase of the Lombard's argument 
that the Father cannot beget his own cause Oent. V. 1.4), the argument by relation 
repeats the principle also cited by the Lombard that the essence cannot be spoken of 
relatively with respect to the Father (Uent. V. 1.2), and the argument by identity takes 
up the point that since the Father and the divine essence are identical, if the Father 
begot the essence, then something begot itself, which is impossible Ment. V. 1.3). For 
the same reason the divine essence cannot be begotten from the essence. 
Hubertus proceeds to consider three opinions on the matter. Some hold the 
(rather peculiar) view that the essence does beget, since it is true that the divine nature 
which is in the Father is begotten in the Son. Diey allow that the essence begets itself, 
but not that it causes itself to exist. 12' The second opinion is that of Robert of Melun 
who takes the line that we may say 'God begot God' and 'essence begot essence' as 
long as the terms 'God' and 'essence., though essential, are understood personally. 126 
This would seem to be a very liberal interpretation of Robert's position, who was 
himself well aware of the dangers of the expression 'essence begot essence'. Die third 
opinion cited is that of Peter Lombard who rejects both the sense and the expression 
'essence begot essence'. If any such expression is found in authorities, the Lombard 
expounds its correct meaning. Again Hubertus essentially reproduces the Lombard's 
explanation of these passages, but within a theoretical framework which is absent from 
his source. In Augustine's statement 'essence from essence', for example, the word 
'essence' is assumed from the context to have a personal signification and is 
understood personally. 127 
Finally, Hubertus cites a series of instantiae against the arguments in favour 
124MUnich Clm. 28799, fol. 2vb. 
125Tbe only other author to report this view is Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich Clm- 14508, fol. 
2vb: 'Alii 
autern hoc concesserunt etiam essentialiter utentes hoc nornine, quod Augustinus dicit nulla res se 
ipsam gignit ut 
sit, dicunt non esse contra se. quia nec ipsi concedunt quod essentia divina gignat se ut sit, sed ut sit, scilicet nec 
ex generatione habet esse sed habet ex ea esse'. 
1-26Cf. Peter of Captia. Suinina, Munich Chn. 14508, fol. 2vb: 'Quidam tamen, utentes hoc nomine "essentia" 
personaliter. concesserunt essentiarn generare essentiam*. 
127MUnich Clm. 28799, fol. 2vb. Cf. UentY. 1.8. p. 83 where the Lombard explains that the Son. who is 
substance is from the Father, who is the same substance. 
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of the view that the essence begets. '2' Thus to the argument that the Son has the 
essence through generation from the Father and that therefore the essence is begotten 
corresponds the in. stantia: Peter possesses hair by virtue of generation from his 
mother; therefore his hair is begotten from his mother. In other words, the Son has the 
essence but this does not mean that the essence is begotten. Also, whatever is truly 
stated of the Father must beget since it is proper for the Father to beget; consequently 
the essence begets, since the Father is the essence. Hubertus counters: this statue is 
bronze and a property of bronze is that it is natural, therefore the statue is natural. 
These examples from a wide range of theologians show how progress towards 
a satisfactory clarification of the different significations of the words 'God' and 
4essence' was ultimately bound up with, perhaps even driven by, questions concerning 
the doctrine of divine generation. Every author who has something to say on the 
subject either raises the issue of the signification of these terms in the context of why 
'God begot God', but not 'essence begot essence', or, conversely, employs these 
propositions as the main instances of why their signification is problematic in the first 
place. 
4. persona 
In the later twelfth century, it becomes a commonplace of academic theology 
to take a conceptual distinction between essence and Person for granted. ' 29AIthough 
this distinction had been championed by flie Porretani, it was also accepted by Peter 
Lombard. The validity of an intellectual distinction between essence and Person, and 
its acceptance in non-Gilbertine circles is further testimony to the growing consensus 
in trinitarian theology. The esserice-Persori distinction became detached from the 
Porretani to become the general property of all school-trained theolgians. Once 
theologians had accepted this distinction there was no need to sacrifice divine 
simplicity for the sake of explaining why essence was acceptable in one statement but 
'2'Nlttnich Clm. 28799, fol. 3ra. 
'2'See Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieil7igen Gott, pp. ] 82-4. Prepositinus of Cremona, Suinina 3.8, p. 212.1-3: 
'Diximws quod distinguimus inter personam et essentiarn intellectu, quia aliquando loqtiimtlr de essentia quando 
non loquimur de persona. * 
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Person in another. 
Nevertheless, if it is possible to identify 'schools' of thought within academic 
theology on the Trinity in such a way that we can point to one group of individuals 
as likely to hold certain views distinct from another group, then it is probably 
discussion about the definition and signification of the word 'Person' which brings this 
division most sharply into focus. More than any other issue in trinitarian theology, the 
position adopted relative to the meaning of 'Person' was likely to mark an individual 
as either of the 'Lombardian' or 'Gilbertine' school. The first tended to take their 
point of departure from Augustine's statement that 'in God, it is not one thing to be, 
and another thing to be a Person'. "O This was cited as proof that 'Person' did indeed 
signify essence, but was a problematic term by virtue of its changing meaning in 
different contexts as well as over time. "' The characteristic doctrine of those more 
susceptible to Gilbert's position on the issue was the definition of persona as per se 
una, implying both distinction and unity. 132 
Acknowledging these differences, however, does not amount to saying that 
theologians were at loggerheads over the issue. Opinions differed but the essential 
approach was the same. It was a question of degree, rather than of absolute orientation 
how far an individual thinker was influenced by either Peter Lombard or Gilbert of 
Poitiers, as the examples of Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai show. If we look 
beyond the existence of a range of opinion on various issues, we find not only a 
basically similar approach, but a convergence on points of detail which often makes 
the concept of 'schools' redundant. 
The main issue was to establish whether and how 'Person' signified 
essence. "' Peter Lombard took the unqualified view that 'Person' did signify 
13oDe trin. VII. 11, CCSL 50, p. 261, PL 42.943: 'non enim alitid est deo esse, aliud personarn esse. ' 
13'Peter Lombard, ISent. XXV. 2, p. 192.18-19: 'hoc nomen "persona" multiplicern facit non unam tantum 
intelligentiam'. See Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott. pp. 118-21. 
132 Alan of Lille, Suinina 36d, p. 180; Simon of Totimai. Disputationes LXXIX. 4, p. 230.26-7. See Angelini, 
L'ortodossia e la graininatica, p. 122. 
133 Peter Lombard. Uent. XXV. 1-3, pp. 190-6; Gandulph of Bologna, ISent. 17, pp. 9-12; Alan of Lille, Summa 
36b-42, pp. 177-84; Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 3, pp. l. -23; Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 3.1-5. pp. 
207-11; 2 
248rb. See Angelini, L'ortodossia e la graininatica, pp. 120-30. Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E XII, fols. 237vb-238ra; . 
who contrasts the approach of Alan of Lille with that of Prepositinus of Cremona as 
Gilbertine versus Lombardian. 
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essence, and only cited Boethius' definition of Person as 'an individual substance of 
a rational nature' with respect to human not divine persons. ' 34 But this position was 
susceptible to a number of extremely powerful objections, the most common of which 
dated back to Roscelin and Abelard. "5 For if 'Person' did signify essence, it would 
seem to follow that since there is one essence, there is only one Person; or that since 
there are three Persons.. there are three essences. "' 
Although most authors agreed with Peter Lombard that 'Person' did signify 
essence, they were more circumspect in their solutions. It is only at this point that any 
difference according to 'school' becomes apparent. Contemporaries themselves 
expressed the range of opinion in such terms. Master Hubertus provides a convenient 
summary: 
For some, such as Master Peter Lombard and his followers, have said that the name 'Person' is 
essential. Others, such as Master Robert, that it is personal. Still others, however, namely the Porretani, 
that it is mixed - partly personal and partly essential. ' 37 
According to Prepositinus, some held the view that the signification of 'Person' was 
threefold. When it stands by itself without any word joined to it, 'Person' signifies 
essence, as in pater est persona. When, however, a word is joined to it, 'Person' 
signifies hypostasis, as in pater est aliqua persona. Finally, when the Father is 
134 [Sent. XXV. 2.1, p. 192.21-3: 'Discementes ergo dicendi causas huius nominis, scilicet "persona", 
significationern distinguimus. dicentes; quod. hoc nomen. scilicet "persona", proprie secundam substantiam dicitur 
et essentiarn significat'. See Schneider, Die Lehre voin dreieinigen Gott, p. 121. 
135Ab, elard, TSum 11.47, pp. 129-30; TChr 111.93, p. 231. 
136 Alan of Lille. Suinina 36c, p. 178: 'ista duo nomina: persona, usia eiusdem sunt prorsus significationis et 
consignificationis. Ergo vel non una sola est usia vel una sola est persona. '; Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 3, p. 12.18-20: 
'idem significatur hoc nomine "persona" et hoc nomine "essentia"; ergo Pater et Filius sunt una persona, vel non 
stint una essentia'; Prepositintis of Cremona, Suinma 3.1, p. 208.18-19: 'Idem est omnino patri esse essentiam et 
esse personam. Sed pater est essentia que est filius, ergo est persona que est filius'-, Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E 
XII, fol. 237vb: 'Hiis quia dicunt quod hoc nomen "persona" semper significat essentiam, ita obicitur: pater est 
persona; ergo filius est alia vel non est alia, si non est alia, ergo est eadem, ergo pater et filius sunt una persona; 
si est alia, ergo pater et filius sunt personae, ergo essentie, cum semper retineat hoc nomen "persona" suarn 
significationem': Hubertus, Suinina, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 5va: *quod hoc nomen "persona" sit personale, et non 
essentiale, multis rationibus posse probari videtur, et posito indirecte sic: idem est patri esse personam quod esse 
essentiam; pater est una essentia cum filio, ergo est tma persona cum filio; vel, pater est essentia que est filitis, ergo 
est persona que est filius. Item: patri est idem esse essentiam quod esse personam; pater est alia persona quarn 
filius, ergo est alia essentia quam filius'. 
137Summa, Munich Chn. 28799, fols. 5va-b: 'Quidam enim, tit magister Petnis Longobardus et sequaces eius, 
dLxerunt hoc nomen "personam" esse essentiale. Quidam, tit magister Robertus, personale. Quidam vero, ut 
porretani, mLxtum. <partirn> personale et parlim essentiale'. 
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distinguished from the Son in person, 'Person' signifies property. "" '17his is tile view 
of Peter of Poitiers. 139 However, a certain Master Gerardus Puella"O asserts that 
'Person' and 'essence' signify the divine nature in different ways. "' What Gerardus 
means is that 'essence' stands for the divine nature and not for any of the Persons, 
because it signifies the divine nature in itself ý-ratia sui). 'Person', oil the other hand, 
does not signify tile divine nature in itself but by virtue of its referents ýPater; filius; 
spiritus sanctuO. And 'Person' signifies the divine nature in such a way that it does 
not stand for it, but for one of the Persons, just as 'the species man' designates tile 
species man in itself and therefore stands for it, whilst 'man' only signifies the same 
species via individual men. 142 T'hus the signification of 'Person' restricts it from 
"%mma 3.2, p. 208.1-8: 'Ad predicta respondent quidam dicentes quod hoc nomen "persona" triplicent habet 
significationem. Quandoque significat essentiam. quando scilicet per se ponitur in predicato, sine aliquo adiecto: 
tit: pater est persona, filius est persona. Quandoque significat ypostasim, i. e. subsistentiam. tit quando ei aliquid 
additur, ut: pater est aliqua persona, filius est aliqua persona, et alia est persona patris et alia filii. Quandoque 
proprietatem, tit: pater in persona distinguitur a filio i. e. in personali proprietate. ' The same opinions are reported 
by the author of some Quaestiones, BM Royal 9E XII. fol. 237vb: 'Nota quod hoc nomen "persona", Lit M[agister] 
dicit in sententiis. tres acceptiones habet: aliquando significat essentiam, unde idern esse deo esse deurn et esse L- 
personam, aliquando ypostasim sive subsistentiam, unde pater proprietate est pater vel persona; aliquando 
personalem proprietatem, unde pater in persona id est in personali proprietate. differt a filio. ' Also Peter of Capua, 
Munich Clm. 14508, fol. Ilva-b; also Alan of Lille, Suinina 36d, p. 179: 'Has obiectiones quidarn vitare conantes, 
attributint huic nomini "persona" diversa significationes. tit nuric usia, tit cum dicitur Pater est persona; nunc 
ypostasim, tit cum dicitur Pater est alia. persona quarn Filitis: nunc personalern proprietatam, ut cum dicitur Pater 
differt a Filio in persona, significet. Dicunt ergo quod hoc nomen "persona" significat usiam quoties per se ponitur, 
ut cum dicitur Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus stint persone, vel Pater est persona. Ex adiunctio veto mutat 
significationem, tit cum dicitur Pater est una persona, vel Pater est alia persona quarn Filius. ' 
"91Sent. 3, pp. 13-14: Tredictorum non est facile stimere solutionem nisi determinata equivocatione huius 
nominis "persona"; nam. hoc nomen "persona" interdum sipificat essentiam, tit cum dicitur: Pater est persona, 
Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona; interdurn significat yPOstasis apud grecos, ut: alia persona est Pater. 
alia. persona est Filius; interdurn in designatione personalis proprietatis ponitur, tit cum dicitur: alius est Filius in 
persona, alius Pater I ... 
I Cum vero iot habeat significationes hoc nomen, ex diversis aditinctis detenninatur in qua 
illartim significationum ponatur. ' Angelini, L"rtodossi(i e la graininatica. pp. ] 25-6 maintains that Peter*s view is 
compatable with Peter Lombard's despite the superficial sitniliarity to that of the Porretani. 
14()Died 1184. Studied with John of Salisbury and from before 1165 he was teaching at Paris where he gained 
a considerable reputation. None of his written works survive. Bishop of Coventry in 1183. See DIIGE 20.787-8. 
"'Prepositintis of Cremona. Suinina 3.3. p. 209.1-3: Tropter has obiectiones dLxit magister G. Puella quod hoc 
nomen "persona" aliter significat divinam naturam quarn hoc nornen "essentia". ' The second of the four opinions 
reported by Stephen Langton, Suinina, p. 130: 'Ita sectindurn istam opinionern tam iste terminus "deus" quarn iste 
terminus "persiona" significat divinarn essentiam. sed aliter et aliter'. Also the view of Alan of Lille. according to I 
Angelini, L'ortodossia e la graininatica, p. 127. 
"2Summa 3.3. p. 209.3-8: 'Quia hoc nomen "essentia" significat divinam naturam gratia sui, i. e. ita quod 
supponit pro ea. et non pro aliqua personartim. Et hoc nomen "persona" econverso si-mificat divinam naturam non 
gratia sui, sed gratia contentortim. i. e. patris et filii et spirittis sancti. Et ita significat earn quod non supponit pro 
ea. sed pro aliqua personarum. Ut in hoc simili videri potest; hoc oratio: hec species homo, designat hanc speciern 
homo gratia sui et supponit pro ea. Sod hoc nomen "horno" significat eandem speciem non gratia sui, sed gratia 
contentortim. ' Cf. Langton, Summa, p. 130: *iste terminus "persona" significat divinwn essentiam tit inhaerentem 
et non supponit ewn, inirno tanium personam; iste tenninus "essentia" significat divinam essentiam tit subsistentent 
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standing for the divine nature. 
An alternative solution is that 'Person' signifies essence principally and co- 
signifies distinction. 14' This is the solution of Alan of Lille and Simon of 
Toumai. 144 Arguing against the proposition that 'one Person alone begets' implies 
that 'one God alone begets', Simon of Tournai takes the view that even though 'God' 
and 'Person' signify the same thing, the divine essence, 'Person' also co-signifies 
distinction. '45We can say 'one Person alone begets' because there are a plurality of 
Persons only one of whom begets; 'one God alone begets' is inadmissable, however, 
since there are not a plurality of gods of whom only one begets. In. his commentary 
on the Athanasian Creed, however, Simon takes a slightly different stand when he says 
that 'Person' signifies substance in the sense of hypostasis not essence. 146 rn-lis 
solves the problem of why three Persons does not mean three gods or three 
essences. 147 Simon actually seems to be trying to steer a middle path between 
'Person' signifying and not signifying essence. In both the singular and the plural 
'Person' signifies essence, but exclusively so in the singular, whilst in the plural 
distinction is co-signified. It is by virtue of this co-signification of 'Person', rather 
than its primary signification, that we say there are three Persons. 148 
et eam supponit. ' 
143 Prepositinus, Summa 3.4, p. 210.1-2: 'SUnt a1ii dicunt quod. hoc nomen "persona" principaliter significat 
essentiam, et consignificat distinctionem'; identical with the third opinion reported by Stephen Langton, Summa, 
p-130. Also BM Royal 9E XII (231-246), fol. 237. v-b: 'Alii dicunt quod hoc nomen "persona" aliud significat et 
aliud consignificat. Unde pater dicitur persona quasi per se una, id est pater est unum et per se, id est est unum 
et est distinctus. ' 
144 Also, the Porretan Sententie Magistri Gisleberti, ed. N. M. Hdring, AHDLMA 45 (1978) 9, p. 112. 
145 Disputationes LXXIX. 4, p. 230.23-6: 'Tamen licet nomen Dei et nomen persone idem significent, congrue 
dicitur, una sola persona gignit: nomen enim persone non solum significat essentiam, sed etiam personalem 
discretionem. ', ibid., p. 230.34-5: 'Licet ergo nomen Persone significet essentiam, quia tamen plures consignificat 
distinctiones'. 
146 Ed. N. M. H5iing, AHDLMA 43 (1976) 14, p. 162: 'Nomen igittirpersonesignificatstibstantiam. non usyiam 
sed ypostasim. ' Cf. Peter of Capua, Sumina, Munich Clm. 14508, fols. 11 vb-I 2ra: 'Dicimus ergo quod hoc nomen 
"persona" non pariter transsumptione equivocum erat ad essentiam et ad ypostasim, sed iam modo decidit ad 
significationern essentie secundurn theologurn et significat tanttu-n ypostasirn. ' I 
147COmm. on the Athanasian Creed 15, p. 162: 'Dicitur ergo: pater et filius et spiritus sanctus stint tres persone 
, postases. non 
tres dii quia non tres usye'. quia tres hy 
"Wid. 17, p. 163: 'nomen persone in utroque numero singulariter designat unitatern sive essentiam sed in 
singulari, singularitertinitis. In plurali vero pl Lira] iterplurium personartim consignificat, distinctiones. Qu are ratione 
consign if icat ion is, non principalis significationis, pluraliter dicitur de tribus personis. Z71 
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Similarly, Alan of Lille argues that because 'Person', in addition to signifying 
essence, co-signifies distinction, the recurrent objection that if 'Person' signifies 
essence it follows either that there is more than one essence or that there is only one 
Person, can be finally met. 149 Both Alan and Simon also attempt an etymological 
definition of 'Person' as per se una. 150 This was a way of conveying the word's 
twofold semantic function as signifying unity (of essence) and distinction (of Person). 
Prepositinus' own solution is that at one time 'Person* did signify essence but 
that it no longer does SO. 15 1 This was Augustine's solution to the problem: the early 
defenders of the faith needed a word to answer the question 'three whatT regarding 
their confession of a trinity in God; Person was adapted for this purpose. 
The debate about the term 'Person' is further evidence of scholars' need for 
flexibility in usage: actual usage is the deten-nining factor in the term's definition. 
5. The use of technical arguments by theologians 
An integral part of the entire edifice of grammatical theology was the 
increasing use of specific types of argument. TI-le art of discovering valid arguments 
was a growing concern for scholars in all fields in the twelfth century, and was given 
an additional stimulus by the Latin translation of Aristotle's De sophisticis elenchis 
"Summa 36d. p. 180: 'Huic opinioni sic quidam obvitint: ista duo nomina. "usia", "persona", idem significant. 
Ergo vel non una sola est usia, vel una sola est persona. Non sequitur. Quarnvis enim idem significant. non tarnen 
idem consignificant; hinc enim consignifcat distinctionern, illud vero non. ' 
"OSimon of Toumai, Di-, qmtationes LXXIX. 4, p. 230.26-34; Comm. on the Athanasian Creed 16. p. 163. Alan 
of Lille, Summa 36d, p. 180. See Master Hubertus. Summa, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 5vb: 'Tercii dicunt hoc nomen 
If a persona" significare essentiam et nihiinintis significare personalern distinctionern et hoc sectindurn nominis 
ethimologiam. ' 
"'Suinina 3.5, P. 211.1-9: 'Magister vero Prepositinus dicit quod hoc nomen "persona" hodie non significat 
essentiam, sed quondam significabat. Sed necessitate faciente, tit dicit Augustinus. translatum. est a significatione 
essentie ad significationern distinctionis. Cum enim scriptura dicat: Pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres, 
querebatur quid tres. Et forte poterat dici tres res. Sed quia hoc vocabulum "res" nimis est commune, oportuit 
inveniri aliquod vocabulum minus commune. quod possit conitingi huic vocabulo "tres". Et translaturn est hoc 
nomen "persona" a prima significatione ad distinctionern significandum. ' Also Peter of Captia, Suinina Munich Clm. 
14508, fol. 1 lv-b: 'Nos vero dicimus quod hoc nomen "persona" primo prorsus idem. significabat quod hoc nomen 
"essentia" vel hoc nomen "deus". Sed catholici qtii dicebant in trinitate esse tres nec adhuc aponebant aliquod 
nomen ad hoc nomen tres coatici ab ereticis ad respondendUm huic questioni "quid tres" transumpserunt'. The 
fourth opinion reported by Stephen Langton. Suinina, p. 130. Also reported by Alan of Lille. Suinina 36c, p. 178 and 
Alexander Nequam. Speculuin 11. v, p. 121. Cf. Peter Lombard, ffent. XXV. 1.4, p. 191. Hubenus, Sumina, Munich 
Clm. 27899. fol. 5vb identifies this as the view of Robert of Melun. 
1,56 
1-: 32 by James of Venice c. 1125-50. According to Aristotle, sophistical refutations are 
really fallacies. and thus only have the appearance of truth. It is precisely by knowing 
all of the tlilrteen fallacies which Aristotle discusses that the honest seeker after truth 
is able to identify and expose the fallacious reasoning of his sophistical opponents. 
Even though the study of the rules of valid argument was primarily the task of 
logicians, the subject naturally had implications for methods of resolving theological 
problems. That this was in fact the case is demonstrated by the existence of works on 
logic written specifically for the practical use of theologians. "' At the level of 
practical application, de Rijk has established that specific types of argument, such as 
fallacies and counter- arguments, were used by Peter of Poitiers in his Sentences (c. 
1170). 154 
Peter of Poitiers, however, was by no means the only practitioner. Such 
methods of argumentation were not merely commonplace in the second half of the 
twelfth century; they were absolutely integral to the kind of theology being taught and 
written at that time. 'Me Sentences Q 155/6-1163/4) of Robert of Melun provide some 
indication of the future role of technical types of argument. "' Robert's debt to Peter 
Abelard is considerable. In the Sentences, he defended Abelard's view of power, 
wisdom and goodness as the special properties of the three divine Persons and 
similarly followed Abelard in his predilection for long and complex analogies. 156 But 
at the same time, Robert was far from being a slavish imitator. 157 Indeed, Robert is 
152 De sophisticLv elenchis, Aristoteles Latinus VI 1-3, ed. B. G. Dod (BrtLxelles -Leiden. 1975). 
153 See especially Peter the Chanter's De trop& loquendi, on which see Giusberti, Materials, pp. 92-7, G. R. 
Evans, 'A Work of I. Terminist Theology"? Peter the Chanter's De Troj)is Loquendi and Some Fallacie', Vivariuin 
20 (1982), 40-58, 'Ponendo theologica exeinpla: Peter the Chanter's De trop& loquendi', Histog of Universities 
2 (1982), 1-14, Valente, 'Arts du discours et sacra 1.7auina dans le De troj, 7is loquendi'. See also the Fallacie 
inagtýtri Willehni. in de Rijk, Logica Modernoruin 11.2.683-702. 
154 Logica Modernoruin 1, pp. 163-78. 
155 Dated by Horst, Die Trinitdts- und Gotteslehre de, ýý Robert von Melun. p. 23. For Robert's biography, see 
R. M. Martin, 'ý-oeuvre th6ologique de Robert de Melun% Reme dhi-, 4oire ecclj-, ziastique 15.1 (1914). 456-89 and 
Oeuvre, v 1, pp. vi-xii. For Robert's teaching career at Paris. see John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, pp. 78-9. 
116 R. M. Mail in, 'Pro Petro Abaelardo, Un plaidoyer de Roberi de Melun contre S. Bernard', Revue des sciences 
philosol. 7hiques et thiologiques 12 (1923), 308-23; Luscombe, The School QI'Peter Abelard. pp. 281-98. 
157 On Robert's independence. see Marlin, 'Pro Petro Abaelardo'. p. 309-, Luscombe, The School QI'Peter 
Abelard, pp. 297-8. On Robert's wide use of sources, see Marlin. 0euvres 1. pp. xlvi-1; Horst. Die Trihitdts- und 
Gotteslehre des Rohcrt von Melun, pp-185-91. 
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cited in his own right by other authors, most notably by Jol-ui of Comwall in the 
context of christological debates, 'ý' and by Master Hubertus for his views on the 
Trinity. 159 
But I am concerned less with Robert's direct influence than with the 
compatibility of his approach, namely his use of argument. with that of subsequent 
authors. This may well constitute a direct influence. However, we cannot be sure 
whether the arguments used by Robert, and then in later writers, were his own or 
whether they were in general circulation at the time, and merely appropriated by him 
and his contemporaries. Knowing the original source would be a bonus, though it is 
probably wrong even to think in ten-ns of original sources. What is important for my 
purposes is the fact that certain arguments are used by a number of authors, pointing 
to a common approach to theological problems. 
A contemporary of Peter Lombard, Robert adopts the quaestio technique in his 
approach to theological problems. And like the Lombard, he is also preoccupied by 
a number of questions relating to the doctrine of divine generation, firstly, 'whether 
it is true that God begot himself or another God, since it is true that God begot 
God. '160 Robert briefly recapitulates Abelard's original argument. 16 ' Firstly, the 
proposition 'God begot another God', is totally inadmissable, since there is no doubt 
that there is only one God. The remaining proposition, that 'God begot himself', is 
equally absurd, since as Augustine states, no thing begets itself. Robert states the 
solution to the problem clearly and succinctly: in the orthodox statement, 'God begot 
God', the word 'God' indicates Person, not essence. 162 flIiS is because 'God' is a 
158 Eulogium Alexandruin Papain, p. 268. Also R. W. Hunt, 'English Learning in the Late Twelfth Century', 
Transactions of the Roval Historical Societi, 19 (1936), pp. 32-3.37-8 for Robert of Crik-lade who cites Robert's 
teaching approvingly. 
'"References (9 in total) are indicated by Heinzrnann. Die Summe "Colligitefragmenta " des Magbzter Hubertus, 
p. 14. On Robert's influence, Horst, Die Trinitdts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun. pp. 318-27; A. M. 
Landgraf, Tamilienbildung bei Paulinenkommentaren des 12. Jabrhunderts. 2. Robert von Melun tind seine Schule', 
Biblica 13 (1932), 169-93. 
160 ISent. 4. XXI. p. 141.6-8: 'Queritur enim an verurn sit. Deurn se vel alium Deurn generasse: quia verurn est 
Deurn genuisse Deum. * It is notable that Robert should elsewhere ([Sent. 31 pp. 3-5) identify errors concerning the 
Father's generation of the Son with Arianism. 
161 TChr Iff. 110-11. pp. 235-6; TSch 11.64, p-440, Hist calain., pp. 84-5. 
162 Uent. 4. XXI, p. 141.17-19: 'Detis nec se genuit, nec alitim Detim. facile resisti potest hoc cognito quia hoc 
nomen "Detis" in predicta loctitione personas distinguit et non essentiam. ' 
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type of common name which can often refer to Person. 163 Thus the difficulty in 
interpretation lies in the fact that the word 'God' is equivocal in meaning; it can 
signify essence or Person, common or proper names. Its exact meaning in this case 
can only be deten-nined from the context, which here excludes 'God' from signifying 
as a common noun. 164 
Robert does not use the language of supposition as such, but his point about 
diverse signification comes very close to supposition theory without actually 
employing the technical terminology. Robert reinforces his position in a non-technical 
way with a number of analogies whose fon-n corresponds to the instantiae used by 
other authors. These are used to show just how absurd it would be to attribute exactly 
the same meaning to the same ten-n used in different contexts: 
When I say, 'the Apostle wrote to the Romans', meaning Paul, a relation cannot be made of this so that 
it is either the one who wrote to the Corinthians or another Apostle. For this name 'Apostle' does not 
retain the same signification in the second iiistance as it had when it was used in the first. Whence the 
165 
entire sentence is inappropriate on account of its [Apostie's] diverse signification. 
Robert also has to deal with the Porretan view that if the Persons are predicated of the 
divine essence or even the properties of the Persons, it follows that the divine essence 
is begetting, begotten and proceeding. 166 I'he logical sequence which they reject 
would be: 'the Father is begetting' (nater est generans), 'the essence is the Father' 
(essentia est pater), 'the essence is begetting' (essentia est generans), therefore 'the 
essence begets' (essentia generat). In other words, since the Father and tile essence 
are identical, any property of the Father must also be attributed to the essence. And 
163 Uent. 3. XXIII, p. 77; UentAXXXI. pp. 2221-3. 
'64ISent. 4. XXI, p. 141.19-22: 'Unde cum queritur. an Detts se ipsurn genuerit vel. alium, questioni loctim tollit 
nomen Trinitati commune personaliter accepturn. Nam non convenienter ad nomen commune in loco proprii 
positurn relatio fieri potest. ' 
'65Ibid., p. 142.4-10: 'Item curn dico: Apostolus scribit Romanis, Paulum proprie designans, non recte ad hoc 
talis fit relatio: ergo vel ille qui scripsit Corinthis vel alius apostolus. Hoc nomen enim "apostolus" secundc, positurn 
non eandem retinet significationern quam habuit curn primo poneretur. Unde locutio tota inconveniens est propter 
eius diversarn sign if icationem. ' 
166 ISent. 4. XXII. p. 144.6-13: 'Qtiod Ecclesia catholica recipit, id est, divinam essentiain singularum personarum 
stiscipere predicationem ei omniurn sirntil. Venirn enim est: divina essentia Pater est, 
divina essentia Filius est, 
divina essentia Spiritus Sanctus est. Vera est ei ista: divina essentia est Pater ei Filius ei 
Spiritus Sanctus. At hic 
infenint quidarn: divina ergo essentia generans est ei genita atque procedens. ' 
See Horst, Die Trinitäts- und 
Gotteslehre des Robert voll Mcluný PP-1-40-44. 
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yet this is only true in a very restricted sense, which only becomes clear 'when the 
distinction between substantival and adjectival predication is introduced by other 
authors. 167 Essentia est generans is perfectly valid so long as generans is predicated 
substantivally Ofessentia, i. e. indirectly through the essence, and not adjectivally. '6' 
Accordingly, the only statement which can be inferred from essentia estgenerans is 
pater est gcnerans, not essentia generat. According to Robert, it is not because the 
personal properties are neither predicated of the Persons nor of the essence that we say 
that the divine essence does not beget, but because these properties take on an entirely 
different signification when they are predicated of the essence from when they are 
predicated of the Persons. 169 It is a feature of adjectival words, such as 'begetting', 
that they are hardly ever used without indicating some sort of relation. 17' To 
illustrate, Robert cites the following argument which commits the same error as those 
who try to prevent the essence from begetting by denying it is the subject of the 
personal properties: 
This man and this body are indeed the same thing. Yet not just any word can be correctly joined, %vith 
the expression 'this man' and with the expression 'this body'. It is correct to say this man is rational', 
but it is not correct to say 'this body is rational . 
171 
In the technical language of the fallacies, this would be the fallacy according to 
accident, whereby a property which is attributed to the subject is then falsely attributed 
to all other predicates of that same subject. 172 The reason for expressing Robert's 
167 See Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 27, p. 219 and Appendix A. 3. 
'6'3See A. Maier6, 'Logic and Trinitarian Theology. De inodo predicandi ac svlogizandi', in N. Kretzmann ed., 
Meaning and I17ference in Medieval Philosoj)kv. Studies in Metnorv of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 251-3. 
169ISent. 4. XXIII. p. 147.21-9: 'Nam proprietates stint ipse persone. Ideo sicut persone a divina non removentur 
essentia, ita nec proprietates, et sicut persone de ea entintiantur, ita et proprietates. Sed non quibuscumque vocibus 
de ipsis personis entintiantur, eisdern possunt de divina essentia entintiari. Hic enim vocibus; "generans", "genitus". 
it procedens", de ipsis personis dicuntur, quibus de ipsa essentia divina nequaquam. enuntiari possunt, co quod hec 
voces cum hac voce "divina essentia" copulate ad aliam transirent significationern'. 
'-'olSent. 4. XXIII, p. 148.9-1 1: 'Quod unde contingat, ei dubitim esse non estimo qui non ignorat virn dictionum 
adiectivartim, que raro sine vi relationis pontintur. ' 
'-"Ibid.. p. 148.13-17: 'Idern quippe est hic homo et hoc corpus; non tamen quecumque dictio cum 
hac voce 
"hic homo" vere copulatur; et ctu-n hac voce "hoc corpus" vere copulari potest. Vere dicitur hic homo est rationalis, 
non tamen vere dicitur hoc corpus est rationale. ' Merely the first of an entire sequence of examples which expose 
the same error. 
'-"-De sophisticis elenchis, p. 1 1 166b29-166b37. 
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method in these terms is to show that there is already an in-built tendency in academic 
theology towards this kind of argumentation even before the explicit use of technical 
types of argument such as fallacies. 
Such extensive use of logical examples is also found in the Glossa on the 
Lombard's Sentences, which dates to the 1160s. In his gloss on Distinction IV of the 
Sentences, the author highlights the problem of the diverse signification of the word 
'God' . 
17' Taking as his starting point the proposition found in the Lombard's 
Sentences that 'If God the Father begot God, either he begot God who is God the 
Father, or God who is not God the Father', our author, following the Lombard, rejects 
the first inference, i. e. 'God who is God the Father', because in the sentence 'God 
begot God', the word 'God' is being used personally and refers to Father and Son 
respectively. 174 Alongside this argument the author cites an analogous problem based 
on Psalm 109,1, which is also used by Robert of Melun, 'The Lord spoke to my Lord, 
therefore, either to himself or to another Lord. 9175 In other words, it is as ridiculous 
to say 'God begot God', therefore himself, as it would be to say someone called Lord 
spoke to someone called Lord, therefore to himself. 
A more technical kind of argument occurs during the author's refutation of the 
view that the essence begets. The difficulty which the opposing argument aims to 
expose is that identity of substance between the Father and the divine essence is 
incompatible with the Father begetting and the essence not begetting. 176 The 
argument runs as follows: the signification of the term 'pater, because it has only one 
signification, must have the same sense for 'pater' as for 'divina essentia'; the 
consequence of predicating 'pater' of 'pater' is that the Father begets; similarly, 
173 BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7va. 
174 BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7va: 'deum qui est deus pater, hie dicimus esse filittrn, quia. "qtti" refertur ad deum, 
personaliter ponitur'. 
175 Robert of Melun, [Sca. 4AXI, p. 143.1-4: 'Dixit Doininus Doinino ineo; nec: ex hoc sequitur quod alii vel 
sibi. Nam neque sibi dixit quia. se ipsurn non genuit nec alii Domino, eo quod non est alius Dominus ille qui 
genitus est et alius ille qui genuit, sed genitor et genitus tinus et Diminus [sic]'. See Appendix A. 1 for other authors 
use of this argument. 
17"rhe same problern is in effect addressed by Robert of Meltin, Uent. 4. XXII, p. 144.19-27: 'At qua ratione 
Patris suseipit predicationem si generans non est? Non enim alitmde est quod Pater Pater est et quod divina essentia 
Pater est. Nam unde aliunde hoc esse possit ratione nulla assignari potest. Si ergo Pater inde Pater est. quia 
generans est. et divinam essentiarn ex eodem Patrem esse necesse est aut Patrem non esse, cum non sit unde 
alitmde Pater esse possit. Divina ergo essentia generans esse videtur, aut Pater non esse. ' 
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therefore, the same should follow when 'pciter' is predicated of 'divina essentia', i. e. 
the divine essence should beget. 177 'It does not follow,, retorts our author, because 
even though 'pater' signifies the same thing when it is predicated of both the Father 
and the divine essence, it is stated of the Father respective, but not of the divine 
essence. 178 In other words, the essence is identical with the one who begets (the 
Father) but it does not follow from that that he has the property of begetting. To prove 
his point, the author gives an instantia, a type of argument which has the same line 
of reasoning as the argument to be refuted, but whose logic is found seriously 
wanting: 
The term 'having a son' applies with the same signification to this man and this woman, but when it 
is predicated of the woman, it follows that she has conceived. 179 
If we were to pursue the same line of reasoning as adopted in the first case we would, 
of course, run into the blatantly absurd conclusion that the man has also conceived. 
Instantiae, or counter- arguments, are an integral part of the refutation of arguments 
in the Glossa, and other works such as the Sententie Udonis and the Summa of Peter 
of Capua. Recent research has shown that the use of instantide was a standard feature 
of the study of logic, and to a lesser extent., grammar and theology, in the second half 
of the twelfth century. "O For every question that was addressed, several objections 
were reported. 'nie defective logic of these objections was then revealed by producing 
arguments which proceeded along the same formal lines but whose conclusions were 
indisputably false. Ilie Glossa on the Sentences seems to have been particularly 
important in this respect since a number of its arguments recur in subsequent 
177 BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7va: 'Quod tamen essentia generet et generetur, sic videtur posse probari: iste 
t tum terminus "pater" in nulla significatione convenit patri in quantum non conveniat divine essentie, quia unam an 
habet significationem in quantum personam patris significat. Sed ad predicationem illius termini de patre, sequitur 
quod pater generet: ergo ad predicationem huius de divina essentia. sequitur quod divina essentia gigneret. 
' For 
this argument. see Appendix A. 2. 
'-"BM Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7va-b: 'Non sequitur. Et est ratio, quia licet utrobique idem significat hoc nomen 
ff pater", tamen cum respective dicatur de patre, et de divina essentia. non dicitur respective. 
' 
179Royal 7F XIII, fol. 7vb: 'Instantia. Iste terminus "habens filium" in eadem significatione convenit virc, huic 
et mulieri huic. sed ad predicationern de muliere, sequitur quod concepisse. 
Ergo etc. ' 
"Y. Iwak-uma, Instantiae. A Study of TNvelfth-Century Technique of Argumentation with an Edition of Ms. 
Paris BN lat. 6674 f. 1-5, CIMAGL 38 (1981), p. 2 and 'Instantiae Revisited', ibid. 44 (1983). pp. 61-2. 
For some 
useful comments on bnztantiae, K. 
Jacobi, 'Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth Century'. in Dronke ed.. A Hi. 'Ztoýi, of 
Tjt, 1qfth-Centui: i, IVestcrn Philosop4i% pp-242-5. 
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theological works. "' The author of the Glossa also seems to have been the first 
theologian to argue a simplici coniersa. This argument exposed as false the premise 
that the position of the subject and the predicate in a sentence can be simply reversed 
without effecting any change in meaning. For example, 'the Father of the Son of God 
is God' changes to 'God is the Father of the Son of God'. And because 'God' and 
'divine essence' are the same, we would then be able to say 'the divine essence is the 
182 Father of the Son of God' and thus 'the divine essence begot the Son' . 
The use of fallacies seems to be a slightly later development. It was based on 
a number of Aristotelian works: the Categories, the De interpretatione and especially 
the De solMisticis elenchis. 183 The most common were the fallacies of univocation. 
and equivocation which theologians seem generally to have used interchangeably, 
without regard to the technical distinction drawn between the two by commentators 
on the De sophisticis elenchis, where univocation. was classified as a type of 
equivocation. 184 Theologians used equivocation and univocation in their most general 
sense, to indicate that the same word does not always retain a single unchanging 
meaning, either because its varied impositions result in diverse significations, or, 
because the same word, though having a single imposition and thus signification, 
could have different significations according to its use in a particular context. 185 It 
is this innate link between fallacies and signification which explains the close 
development between the theory of supposition and the use of fallacies. 186 Wherever 
the signification of a word is not stable (i. e. most cases), its supposition (meaning-in- 
context), will vary from one sentence to another. If anyone should fail to take notice 
of this variation, they will be in danger of committing the fallacy of equivocation by 
misconstruing that term's signification and consequently its supposition. 
"'See AppendLx A. 
182 See AppendLx A. 3. 
1831 
. Rosier. 'tvolution 
des notion d'equivocatio et univocatio att XIIe siMe', in I. Rosier ed., LAmbiguftg- 
Cinq 9tudes historiques (Lille, 1988), 103-66. 
184jbid., pp. 131-57. 
115 For this definition of equivocation, ibid., pp. 132-3. Also the definition of the Fallacie Parvipontane from 
the second half of the twelfth century. See de Rijk, Logica Modernoruin II. I. pp. 494-7. 
1861bid., p. 491. 
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One of the most common causes of the fallacy of equivocation was the 
signification of the word 'res'. In his Sumina. Alan of Lille rejects the proposition that 
the divine essence begets by demonstrating that one of the arguments proposed in 
support of it is based on the fallacy of univocation: only one thing (res) is tile divinity 
and that is the Father, therefore that thing (res) which is the divinity begot, therefore 
the divinity begot. Ilie argument is false because the meaning of thing (res) has been 
confused by its use both essentially, 'only one thing is the divinity', and personally, 
187 'the thing which is the divinity' (the Father who is divinity) . 
Commenting on the 
same danger of misconstruing the meaning of 'res', Peter of Capua observes how its 
use in the singular to signify essence and in the plural to signify Person, could lead 
not to the fallacy of univocation, but of equivocation! 88 According to Master 
Hubertus, the fallacy of univocation. occurred whenever the normal supposition of a 
word was either restricted or relaxed. Hence, to proceed from 'God begets and he is' 
to 'God is and he begets' is a clear example of the fallacy of Univocation: the word 
'God' signifies essence first and foremost, but signifies Person when placed with the 
verb 'to beget; but this signification, and thus supposition, of 'God' for Person is 
relaxed when the two parts of the first sentence are reversed; now 'God' (God is) 
stands for essence and consequently 'God is and he begets' would mean that the 
divine essence begets. 189 
In addition to the use of fallacies by theologians for the purpose of solving 
individual problems, we find several treatises expressly concerned with providing 
guidance to theologians on the correct employment of fallacies. The most famous of 
`Summa 65, pp. 216-17: 'Item una sola res est deitas. et illa est Pater. Ea res que est deitas gignit. Ergo una 
sola res est deitas et illa gignit [ ... 
1 fallacia tinivocationis inpedit. Primo enim res surnittir essentialiter. secundo 
personaliter. Unde sectinde instandtim ita: sola res est deitas, et illa fuit quandocumque Pater fuit; ea res que est 
deitas est Patri coetema-, ergo tina sola res est deitas et illa est Patri coetema. ' 
188Munich Clm. 14508, foI. 1vb: 'Hoc autern nomen "res" in singulari est essentiale; in plurali, personale. Unde 
Augustintis dicit: una res est est tres res. Patet ergo hic incidere fallatiam equivocationis: pater et filitis et spiritus 
sanctus sunt tanturn una. res; ergo non stint tres res. ' Also Master Hubertus, Suinina, Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 43vb: 
'tit predicatur in his tarnquam. in equivocis. scilicet ut hoc nomen "res" tam in plurali quam. in singulari sit tam 
personale quarn essentiale, et sectindurn hoc possunt dari omnia supradicta; vel. melitts, tit dicatur hoc nomen 
"res" 
in singulari esse naturaliter essentiale sed ex usu esse contracturn, tit in plurali sit personale'. 
'"Munich Clm. 28799, fol. 9rb: Tnivocationem intelligo cum ex restrictione vel relaxatione suppositionis 
vocabuli, vel est quandoque significationis incidere fallatia in argumentatione et sectindum, 
hoc sic negotiamur: deus 
generat et ipse est, ergo deus est et ipse generat. Hic manifeste apparet univocationis 
fallatia. Nam hoc nomen 
"deus", cum nattira sit essentiale, ex aditinctione huius verbi generat, trahitur ad personalem significationem. 
In 
conclusione vero relaxatur eitis suppositio et supponit pro essentia. 
' 
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these is Peter the Chanter's De tropis loquendi. Less well-known is the late twelfth- 
century textbook on fallacies, the Fallacie niagistri Willelmi-'90 The author divides 
the work according to the thirteen fallacies, giving a number of examples of each. 
Particularly interesting from the point of view of trinitarian theology is the fallacy 
according to accident. William defines this fallacy in several ways, but in general the 
error arises when an accident or property attributed to the subject of a proposition is 
also assigned to the predicate of the same proposition or vice versa. '9' The classic 
example, cited by William, in trinitarian theology was 'God is the Father', 'God is the 
Son', therefore, 'the Father is the Son'. 192 Master Hubertus makes effective use of 
the fallacy according to accident in his refutation of the Porretan argument that the 
Persons cannot be predicated of the divine essence since it would follow from this that 
the essence begot, i. e. if the Persons are predicated of the essence, so must the 
properties of the Persons, and with the same result, that the essence begets. 193 By 
the same token, counters Hubertus, it could be said that since a property of bronze is 
that it is natural, and a statue is bronze, it follows that the statue is natural. 
We can see then that theologians made extensive use of a common store of 
stock arguments which were generally recognised to have a valid place in theological 
discussions. These arguments worked on the principle that parallel lines of reasoning 
ran through arguments which treated of different subject matter, but that this 
difference in content was of no consequence as long as the formal structure of the 
arguments was the same. It is also possible to detect a growing preference for these 
kinds of arguments in favour of the citation of authoritative authors. Authorities were 
immobile; they could only be pushed so far convincingly to say what a twelfth-century 
writer thought that they should say. Argurnent, conversely, was alive and adaptable. 
'90Ed. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum 11.2, pp. 683-702. De Rijk (ibid. 11.1, pp. 34-5) suggests that William de 
Montibus (d. 1213) may be the author. J. Goering, William de Montibus (c. 1140-1213). The Schools and the 
Literature of Pastoral Care (Pontifical Institute of Medi 
0% val Studies Toronto, 1992) does not mention the tract in 
his discussion. 
"'Fallacie inag&tri Willehni, p. 692.11-15: 'Incidit autern hec f allatia in argumentatione quandocumque aliquid 
assignatur stibiecto quod non potest assignari predicato, vel econverso, atit quando subiecturn assignatur alicui ctli 
non potest assi gn ari predicaturn, vel econverso; aut quando aliquid ponitur curn subiecto quod non potest poni cum 
predicato, vel econverso. ' 
"Ibid., p. 693.14-16. 
"'Suinina. Munich Cifn. 28799, fol. 8va. 
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In addition, the methods for reconciling written authorities, once established, were 
fairly straightforward, but also limited to a certain extent in their application to those 
problems discussed by patristic theologians. For many of the issues discussed in the 
twelfth century there were no directly relevant authorities. Or rather, citing Augustine 
or Pseudo-Jerome, for example, to the effect that the personal properties are identical 
with the Persons themselves, may have sufficed to establish the official position on 
the matter, but did not advance understanding of why this was the case. In many 
instances, an awareness of the process of argumentation itself was the most effective 
means of responding to awkward questions and objections. By far the most convincing 
and fool-proof explanations of difficult questions took place within this framework of 
technical argument. 'Me central authorities on any given issue were always hovering 
in the background as a constant reference point, but they are no longer the momentum 
of a debate. Effective use of argument and the conceptual categories drawn upon in 
the process come to take pride of place. 
It should be apparent from the sheer volume of material included in this examination 
of twelfth-century trinitarian theology that a wide range Of academic theologians 
shared a significant body of common methods, assumptions and preoccupations. This 
common ground constitutes nothing less than a distinct and coherent tradition of 
thought in trinitarian theology. Repeated encounters with the same arguments and 
objections, distinctions and solutions in the works of different theologians show that 
these thinkers were engaged in a genuine dialogue. They made considerable progress 
in answering many of the questions raised about the doctrine of the Trinity since 
Roscelin of Compi6gne had in the late eleventh century first highlighted the problem 
of how to reconcile identity of substance and distinction of Person from a logical point 
of view. They achieved some measure of coherence by approaching the problem from 
within a logico-semantic framework which allowed them to iron out many of the 
logical inconsistencies which plagued the doctrine without having to sacrifice divine 
simplicity and unity. It is this academic tradition of thought on the Trinity which will 
provide the basis for thirteenth-century interpretations of the Fourth Lateran 
Council's 
decree on the doctrine. This tradition accounts for their misunderstanding of the 
decree. 
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, LI-7-'Y, cursus on Freoe 
194 
'Me distinction between signification and supposition may in some cases be compared 
to that between sense and reference. 195 In particular, it bears some resemblance to 
the philosopher Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which is current in 
contemporary logic and philosophy of language. '9' Frege argued that every word or 
sign expresses its sense, but designates its reference. 71is distinction between sense 
and reference creates a certain flexibility in use so that two different ten-ns may have 
the same reference, but different senses, that is, each convey a different aspect of the 
nature of the thing in question. In this way, 'we connect the name with a particular 
way of identifying an object as the referent of the name. 197 The relevance of this 
for medieval supposition theory is that even if two ten-ns have the same reference, if 
they also have different senses, which according to Frege they will, the substitution 
of one term for another in a given context will be invalid. TI-lat is why the statements 
a=a and a=b are not tautologies, but have genuinely different cognitive values as long 
as 'the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of 
presentation of the thing designated. "" A good example of what Frege was driving 
at is that of two different expressions used to describe the same person. "I'lie author 
of the Poetics' and 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' both refer to Aristotle but are 
far from being identical in meaning. 
'94My interest in Frege is much less technical than P. Geach, Reference and GeneralitV. An Etainination of 
Some Medieval and Modern Theories Ord edition; Cornell Univ., 1980) which is mainly concerned with questions 
of distribution, particularly the problem of indefinite pronouns. 
'"Mullally. 7he Summulde Logicales, pp. xli-ii; P. Boehner, Medieval Logic. An Outline of its Development 
from 1250 to c. 1400 (Manchester, 1952), pp. 27-8; J. Pinborg, 'Some Problems of Semantic Representations in 
Medieval Logic', in J. Pinborg, Medieval Semantics. Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grainmar, ed. S. 
Ebbesen (London, 1984), p. 255; F. P. Dinneen 'Suppositio in Petrus Hispanus. Linguistic Theories and Models', 
in Bursill-Hall et al., De Ortu Grammaticae, pp. 70-1 and Peter of Spain. Language in Dispute, p. xviii; A. de 
Libera. Penser au moven dge (Paris, 1991), p. 69. 
"'See Frege's essay 'On Sense and Meaning', translated in P. Geach and M. Black edd., Translations from 
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege Ord edition; Oxford, 1980), 56-78. On Frege's concept of sense and 
reference, see G. Currie, Frege. An Introduction to his Philosol)kv (Brighton. 1982), pp. 84-112-, M. Durnmet, Frege. 
Philosop4v of Language (London. 1973). 
197 Ibid., p. 95. In an earlier essay, Frege speaks of t-%N? o different modes of determination. See Currie, Frege. An 
Introduction. p. 100. 
J, pý Frege, 'On Sense and Meaning'. p. 5-71. 
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Frege's main interest was in explaining how two different terms could 
faithfully represent the same thing. Medieval theologians shared this preoccupation. 
In trinitarian theology, their interest focused on the problem of how the terms 'God' 
and 'essence' could refer to the same thing and yet not be exactly equivalent and thus 
interchangeable. But they were also interested in the additional problem of the varied 
signification and supposition of the same term in different contexts. The central 
problem of this type in trinitarian theology was the diverse signification of the word 
'God' which meant that sometimes 'God' stood for essence and sometimes for Person. 
It is at this point that the comparison with Frege proves less helpful and convincing. 
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vi THE LATERAN DECREE ON THE TRINITY IN ITS SOCIAL AND 
INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
The doctrinal statement on the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council 
was the first general statement and clarification of the doctrine for centuries, and the 
first issued by an ecumenical council' since the Second Council of Constantinople in 
553. Indeed, apart from the decrees on the Trinity issued by the councils held at 
Toledo in the early Middle Ages, the Lateran decree on the Trinity constitutes both 
the most detailed and the most authoritative statement on the doctrine of the entire 
Middle Ages, and since its first formulation at Nicea and Constantinople in the fourth 
century. 2 In ten-ns of its size and scope the Council was, moreover, the first truly 
general council of the Middle Ages. There is clearly a sense in which Pope Innocent 
111, and no doubt others, felt it was appropriate that the first of the decrees issued by 
such a large and prestigious assembly should concern itself with a definition of the 
faith in tile tradition of the early conciliar creeds; it was the least the occasion 
demanded. Nor is it perhaps surprising, given the prominence of the doctrine in the 
councils of the early Church, most notably Nicea and Constantinople, that at the head 
of this credal-type statement should stand a definition of trinitarian orthodoxy in its 
absolute essentials. It is the second decree, however, in which Joachim's doctrine is 
condemned, which provides the most detailed treatment of the doctrine. 
It would seem, ti-ierefore, that Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard was not 
merely the result of a misunderstanding on his part, but went so far as to pose, or to 
be seen to pose, a serious threat to the very foundation of trinitarian orthodoxy as it 
had been thrashed out during the course of the twelfth century: his critique threatened 
the fine balance which had been struck between a satisfactory position on divine 
generation on the one hand, and a watertight conception of divine unity on the other. 
'R. Foreville, Latran I, II, III et Latran IV. Histoire des conciles oectimeniques 6 (Paris, 1965), p. 9: 'Le concile 
dit "oectim6nique" devient le lien privil&gi6 o6 petit et doit se rýaliser cette unanimit& dans tine ecclýsiologie de 
conununion n'exclttant aucune des grandes ýglises locales dont Fensemble organique fon-ne I*tglise universelle. 
Son autorit6 est reiýue par toutes les ýglises et la tradition commune dont il týmoigne Femporte sur les traditions 
locales pour respectables qti'elles soient. ' 
2Foreville, ibid.. pp. 280-1 suggests that the doctrinal decrees may have been modelled on previous conciliar 
definitions, especiallv Toledo XI. 
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Joachim's 'error' was no more serious than those attributed to Peter Abelard and 
Gilbert of Poitiers. It came at a time, however, when the intellectual and institutional 
conditions were more favourable to a definitive condemnation. For one thing, the 
emerging doctrinal consensus among increasingly professional theologians at Paris 
meant that they were of a frame of mind to press for a detailed clarification of the 
doctrine. In addition, the continued expansion of papal jurisdiction and the greater 
awareness of the scope of a general council as touching upon not just issues of reform 
and ecclesiastical discipline, but matters of faith as well, meant that the relevant 
institutions were equipped and prepared to take the matter all the way to conciliar 
proclamation. 
71-fis chapter is concerned with the meaning of the decree in its widest possible 
sense. For this reason much of the discussion anticipates issues which really belong 
to the next chapter, namely how far and in what sense are thirteenth -century 
interpretations of the decree a case of misunderstanding. I take the view here and 
throughout the thesis that they are a misunderstanding shaped by the strength of the 
academic tradition from which they emerged, but at the same time, there are reasons 
for thinking that the decree itself pointed these theologians in precisely this direction. 
1. The decision making process and the role of Pope Innocent 111 U] 98-1216) 
None of the sources for the Fourth Lateran Council tell us precisely how the 
canons were prepared and approved before their official presentation to the assembly. 
But it is almost inconceivable that the final list was arrived at during the Council 
itself. `17he sheer scale of the gathering severely limited the opportunity for serious 
discussion. It was simply not feasible for an assembly consisting of 412 bishops 
(including 71 primates) and over 800 other dignitaries, ecclesiastical and lay, from all 
over Latin Christendom to consider in detail each of the 71 canons in the Council's 
three sessions (11,20 and 30 November). ' But logistics aside, the two evewitness 
3 For the list of paricipants, see Hefele-Leclercq, V. 2,1722-33. According to F. -J. 
Schmale, 'SvStematisches 
zu den Konzilien des Reformspapsttums im 12. Jahrhundert', 
Annuariuin Historide Concilibruin 6 
674), 
p. 27 the 
length of councils varied from 1 day to more than 2 weeks. 
On the religious significance of holding the Council 
in November. a month notable for the number of feast days in Rome. see B. M. Bolton, 'A 
Show with a Meaning. 
Innocent III's Approach to the Fourth Lateran Council. 1215', Mediei, al Histog 1 (1990). p. 
61. On the steady 
increase in the number of participants in twelfth-century councils. see R. Foreville, 
Troc6dure et d6bats dans les 
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accounts suggest that any time for discussion was in any case given over to 
ecclesiastical and political disputes. 4 Both Richard of San Germano and the 
anonymous, probably Gen-nan, eyewitness state that the canons themselves were only 
read out on the last day for 'ratification' by the assembly, which seems to have been 
a mere fon-nality. 5 Ratification of Joachim's condemnation was no exception. Richard 
of San Germano relates that the session in which Joachim's doctrine was condemned 
began with a sermon by Innocent III in which the Pope spoke first of the case of 
Raymond of Toulouse, pronounced the sentence concerning his lands and then 
condemned the book of Joachim of Fiore. ' According to the recently rediscovered 
anonymous eyewitness account, at the third and final session of the Council the Pope 
ordered the articles of faith relating to the Trinity to be read out to the assembly, 
which accepted them unanimously. After this all heretics were condemned. The 
doctrines of Joachim and Amalric of Paris were singled out for particular rebuke, the 
accusations against them read out and the assembly asked if they reproved these 
7 opinions. They shouted 'even more fiercely' that they did . 
This view of the Council's role as one of formal endorsement of a 
predetermined programme of legislation is entirely consistent with twelfth-century 
developments in conciliar procedure, most notably the progressively central role of the 
pope. Increasingly, particularly as the scope of papal conciliar legislation ranged ever 
conciles mWi&aux du Latran (1123-1215)', Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia 19 (1965). pp. 23-5. On the 
number of canons, see A. Garcia y Garcia. Constitutiones Concild quarti Lateranensis una cuin Coininentari& 
glossatoruin. Montimenta luris Canonici, Series A: Corpus Glossatorum 2 (Vatican City, 1981), pp. 15-16. 
4 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. C. A. Garufi, Rerurn Italicarurn Scriptores VII, pt. 11 (Bologna, 1936), 
pp. 61-73 left columns. S. Kuttner and A. Garcia y Garcia, 'A New Eyewitness Account of the Fourth Lateran 
Council', Traditio 20 (1960), 115-78. This evidence is in line with twelfth-century developments. See Schmale, 
'Systematisches züi den Konzilien', p. 30. 
5 Richard of San Germano, Chronica, p. 73.15-16: 'Et sancta synodus LXX capitula promulgavit. '; Kuttner and 
Garcia y Garcia, 'A New Eyewitness Account', p. 128.184: 'Deinde leguntur constitutiones domini pape. ' The 
editors interpret this to mean that the canons 'were read and adopted, not debated in the council. ' (p. 164). The 
reading out of the decrees on the last day was established practice in the twelfth century. 
6 Chronica. p. 73.2-12. Innocent's sermon is not the spurious one published by. Man--zi 22,973-8, but a sermon 
once extant in the lost register of his 18th Year as Pope. See the reconstruction of the lost register from the index 
of Reg. Vat. 8A in A. Theiner, Vctera Monulnenta Slavoruin Meridonalium ffi-ýztoriain illustrantia 2 vols. (Rome, 
1863-75: reprinted Osnabrilck, 1968) 1, p. 63: 'Sermo de Trinitate in concilio sett sancta universali synodo Rome 
in ecclesia sancti Salvatoris celebrato: in quo sermone fuit reprobatus libellus sive tractatus Abbatis loachim contra 
Magistnim P. Lumbardurn. ' 
Kuttner and Garcia y Garcia. 'A New Eyewitness Account. pp. 127-8. 
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wider, councils functioned as forurns for ratification rather than debate. There was no 
voting or discussion; instead, the assembled participants would express their consent 
by exclaiming Placet. ' At best the assembly might be able to make some 
recommendations as to the particular fon-n of individual canons. ' This process is 
already detectable by the pontificate of Urban 11 (1088-99), and by the time of 
Calixtus 11 (1119-24) the role of the council had been reduced to the ceremonial 
acclamation of the pope's decision. 'o 
Although the council's function was largely formal thereafter, it was not 
entirely superfluous. " According to twelfth-century canonists, the authority of a 
general council, especially of the first four (Nicea, Constantinople, Ephesius and 
Chalcedon), was based on Scripture itself. '2 This was true, above all, of doctrinal 
decrees which, unlike disciplinary measures, were eternally binding. " Moreover, 
according to the early commentators on Gratian's Decretum, no single individual, 
including the pope, had the sarne authority on questions of faith as the early councils. 
On doctrinal issues, the authority of a general council of the Church was thought by 
some to be superior to that of the pope alone. 14 By the early thirteenth century, 
moreover, the idea was gaining rapid acceptance among canonists that the authority 
of a council derived not only from its being part of tradition, a fact which was always 
bound to work against the more recent councils, but in its being truly representative, 
29. 'Schmale. 'Systematisches zu den Konzilien', p2 
Wid., p. 35. 
"I. S. Robinson, The Papaqv 1073-1198. Continuin, and Innovation (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 125-33. 
"Foreville, 'Proc6dure et d6bats', p. 29: 'La simple ýnum6ration des questions de foi d6battues dans les grands 
conciles We 1119 A 1215) montre que, si le pape a tin r6le ýminent (Innocent III fut thýologien i Paris et canoniste 
d Bologne, disciple de Pierre le Chantre et d'Huguccio); que si la Curie a souvent prýpar6 les thýmes et ordonn6 
certains d6bats, I'assembl6e episcopale conservait son autonomie: des mouvements s'y manifestaient, 
des 
oppositions y prenaient corps, parfois victorieusement, elle pouvait, dans certains conditions, 
imposer son point 
de vue. ' 
12 B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibiliti, 1150-13,50. A Studv on the Concept of Infallibilim Sovereigntv and 
Tradition in the Middle Ages (Leiden, 19721). pp. 46-7. 
13jbid.. p. 46-, Win, 'Pope and Council: Some New Decretist Texts'. MS 19 (1957), p. 
201. 
"Tierney. 01-4, in, -z of Paj)al Infallibilitv. p. 46, Win. 'Pope and Council'. p. 208; idein, Foundations Qf the 
Conciliar Thcoriý Ae Contribution of the Medieval Canon istsfiroin Gratian to the Great Schisin (Cambridge, 
1955), pp. 49-50. 
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especially if any statement of doctrine was to be issued. ': ý In this respect, Innocent 
III chose an extremely propitious moment at which to convoke such a vast assembly. 
The role of the pope as supreme legislator and of the council as giving formal 
consent does not mean, however, that the pope alone was the sole source of all 
conciliar legislation. Many of the measures instituted by the Fourth Lateran Council 
were not merely developments of Innocent's previous pronouncements and of the 
legislation of the Third Lateran Council, but were also responses to a wide range of 
opinion within the Church. 16 Moreover, Innocent was clearly not able to impose his 
will in every instance: Canon 13 broke with Innocent's policy till then of encouraging 
a wide range of religious movements by prohibiting the fon-nation of new religious 
orders. 17 This might seem an obvious point, but it is worth stressing for the Fourth 
Lateran Council. For it is usually taken for granted that the Lateran decrees of 1215 
constitute in every respect the fon-nal expression of Pope Innocent III's personal 
position. 18 Particularly compelling is Maccarrone's observation that the formulation 
of the decrees in the first person reveals 'the authoritative and personal tone of 
Innocent III and shows how the conciliar legislation was the fruit of his work and of 
the Curia. "9 But again, aside from the improbability that one individual could single- 
handedly generate such a wide-ranging programme of legislation, twelfth-century 
developments in the conciliar decision-making process suggest that the crucial stage 
was often one in which specially commissioned groups of experts were entrusted with 
"Tiemey, Oriýins of Papal infallibilitv, pp. 48-9; Foreville, 'Proc6dtire et d6bats', p. 37. 
16jbid., pp. 32-4. See Garcia y Garcia. Constitutiones Conciiii quani, pp. 12-14 for explicit and ýmplicit 
references to the Third Lateran Council and Gratian's Decretum in the canons. 
17 See Conciliorum. p. 242. On Innocent's policy see A. Fliche, *Innocent III et la r6forme de F6 lise', Reme 9 
d'histoire eccidsiastique 44 (1949), 87-152; M. Maccarrone, StudiSu Innocenzo III, Italia Sacra 17 (Padova, 1972), 
pp. 223-327; B. M. Bolton, The Mediewl Rqfonnation (London, 1983); 'Via Ascetica: A Papal Quandary', in W. J. 
Shiels ed., Monks, Hennits and the Ascetic Tradition, Studies in Church Histori, 22 (Oxford, 1985), 161-91. 
18 See especially, H. Tillmann, Polm Innocent X (1954, trans. Amsterdam, 1980) who throughout her study 
identifies Innocent .s personal will as the force behind the decrees in almost every case with the repeated use of 
expressions such as 'he pronounced' and 'he decreed'. G. R. Evans, 'The Attack on the Fourth Lateran Council'. 
Annuarium Historiae Concilioruin 21 (1989), p. 243 notes that subsequent critics in the Middle Ages assumed that 
the legislation was Innocent's personal contribution. 
`M. Maccarrone, 'Il IV Concilio Lateranense', Dii, initas 5 (1961), p. 284-, suppported by Garcia y Garcia, 
Constitutiones Concild quarti, p. 6 whose position is that the canons were drawn tip by Innocent before the Council. 
Garcia y Garcia mentions the further point that all of the manuscripts which carry a title attribute the canons to 
the Pope. Also Evans, 'The Attack on the Fourth Lateran Council', p. 243. 
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20 the task of preparing a report on a given issue. Certainly there was ample time for 
such a commission, whether fon-nallv or informally constituted, to do its work in time I 
for the Council in November 1215. '17he Pope had announced his intention to hold a 
21 council on 19 April 1213, two-and-half years in advance of the actual event. 
Moreover, in the same circular letter he explicitly referred to the fon-nation of such 
investigatory groups: 
Because, however, a universal council cannot practically be assembled for another two years, we have 
meanwhile arranged for men of sound judgement in every province to examine fully any questions 
which urgently require the attention of apostolic caie. " 
The need for preparation was particularly true of doctrinal questions which would, by 
their very nature, demand detailed investigation. Such a procedure certainly seems to 
have been set in place at the consistory of Paris in 1147 when Godescalc of Saint- 
Martin was asked to prepare the case against Gilbert of Poitiers in time for the 
Council at Reims the following year. John of Cornwall's Eulogium ad Alexandram, 
which recommended that Peter Lombard's teaching on Christology be condemned, 
23 may fall into the same category of specially commissioned report. It is almost 
unthinkable that such preparation did not play an important part in the formulation of 
the doctrinal decrees. 
In addition, an important role was almost certainly also played by the cardinals. 
The college of cardinals had been established as the highest governing body of the 
Church since the papal schism of the 1130S. 24 'nie scope of its jurisdiction had 
increased throughout the twelfth century, as Robinson indicates: 
20 Schmale. 'Systematisches zu den Konzilien', pp. 28-9. 
21 Schmale, 'Systematisches zu den Konzilien', p. 25 notes that councils were usually announced no more than 
one year in advance. On Innocent's determination that the Council should be well-prepared, see Maccarrone, 
'11 
IV Concilio Lateranense', pp. 276-8 and Bolton. 'A Show with a Meaning', pp. 55,58. 
22 PL 216.824C: 'Quia vero ante biennium universale non posset concilium commode congregari, disposuimus 
interim per viros pnidentes in singulis provinciis plenius explorare quae apostolicae provisionis limam exposcunt'. 
23 Foreville. Latran. pp. 151-2 and 'Procýdureet&bats% p. 31; Schmale, *Systematischeszu den Konzilien', p. 29. 
Also Walter Map. De nuuis curialiuin, ed. M. R. James. Anecdota Oxoniensia 14 (Oxford, 1914). pp. 60-1 for Walter 
Map's investigation into the life of Peter Waldes for the Third Lateran Council. 
24Maleczek-, Papst und Kardinalskolleg. p. 207; also S. Kuttner, 'Cardinal&: the History of a Canonical 
Concept', Traditio 3 (1945), pp. 172-7. The term collcgiuin first appeared in 1150; see Robinson. Paj)aqv, p. 41. 
174 
The intensif i cation of the judicial functions of the curia increased the pope's dependence on the 
collaboration of the cardinals and gave particular prominence to the nu-igistri III the college. Simultaneously the cardinals became involved in the resolution of questions concerning the catholic f aith. 'ý 
This is not to say that the authority of the pope, especially one as conscious of his 
inheritance as Innocent 111, was limited by the college of cardinals, but that they had 
26 certain rights of consultation as participators in papal plenitudo potestatis. Indeed, 
the significance of the cardinals' resistance to the accusations brought against Gilbert 
of Poitiers at Reims lies not so much in their support for Gilbert, as in their sense of 
outrage at Bernard of Clairvaux's attempt to control the proceedings in flagrant 
contravention of their own rights . 
27 That the views of the cardinals could not be 
ignored for the purposes of formal pronouncements upon the faith is also suggested 
by Walter of Saint-Victor's account of the failure of Pope Alexander III's attempt to 
condemn Peter Lombard's christological teachings. If Walter is to be believed, it was 
the cardinals' opposition to the condemnation which eventually led Alexander III to 
abandon the proceedings. Conciliar decisions were not always a foregone conclusion. 
Pope Innocent III would almost certainly need, in that case, the full support of his 
cardinals for any doctrinal statement issued by a general council. It must surely be of 
particular significance in this connection that the formula which indicates papal 
consultation with the cardinals, de fratrorum nostrorum consilio, is used by Innocent 
III in several of his letters announcing the forthcoming COU11Cil. 
28 The canonist 
Huguccio stated that the decision of the pope in conjunction with his cardinals was 
more authoritative in such cases than the decision of the pope alone. 
29 
Securing the support of the cardinals was unlikely to prove problematic in 
Innocent's case. He and several prominent members of the cardinalate had studied 
25 Ibid., p. 107. 
16 Maleczek. Papst und Kardinalskolleg, pp. 284-5 rejects any suggestion that Innocent considered the power 
of the cardinals as anything other than dependent on his own. 
27jbid.. pp. 225-6; Robinson, Pal)aqv, pp. 108-9. 
28M '197.318. aleczek, Pal7st und Kardinahzkolleg. pp.. 
19 ý Tierney, houndations, p. 71. 
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theology at Paris and could therefore be thought likely to hold similar vIews. 30 
According to his biographer, Innocent 'pursued academic studies first at Rome. then 
at Paris and finally at Bologna, and lie surpassed his contemporaries in both 
philosophy and theology. "' Innocent's studies at Paris probably extended from c. 
1180 to July 1187 when he became a subdeacon under Gregory VIII . 
32As Pope, he 
referred on several occasions to his student days in Paris in affectionate terms . 
3' He 
showed his gratitude to his fon-ner teacher, Peter of Corbeil, by promoting him three 
times within the space of three years. 34 His unwavering support for the corporation 
of masters at Paris during the crucial years from 1207 to 1216, is further cause for 
thinking that as a faithful product of Paris theology, he would be more likely than not 
to share the same assumptions as Paris masters and their unofficial representatives on 
the college of cardinals, Robert de Courson and Stephen Langton. 35 
An integral part of Paris theology was support for Peter Lombard. Hence the 
cause-effect argument adduced by scholars: Innocent studied at Paris, therefore he was 
responsible for condemning Joachim's attack on that institution's most illustrious 
representative, Peter Lombard. Even accepting that Innocent himself was not 
3OSee Maleczek, Papst und Kardinalskolleg for cardinals educated at Paris: Hugolino, Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia 
(pp. 126-33)-, Robert de Courson, Cardinal-Priest of S. Stefano in Celiomonte (pp. 175-9); Stephen Langton, 
Cardinal-Priest of S. Crisogono (pp. 164-6). Maleczek also stresses the importance given by Innocent to education: 
14 of the 30 cardinals promoted by him were noted for their education (p. 294). 
3'Gesta Innocentiipapae III c. II, PL 214. xvii. On Bologna, see K. Pennington, 'The Legal Education of Pope 
Innocent HF, Bulletin of Medieval Canon Lait, N. S. 4 (1974), 70-7 who argues that Innocent's studies at Bologna 
were of insufficient duration for him to have gained any significant expertise in canon law. Pennington's position 
has been rejected by W. Imkarnp, Das Kirchenbild Innocenz'HI (1198-1216), P5pste und Papsttum 22 (Stuttgart 
1983), pp. 39-46 and Maleczek, Papst und Kardinalskollea, p. 103. 
32Tillmann. Pope Innocent, p. 13 n. 51; Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild, p. 24. 
33 PL 214.148D to Philip of France and Register 1 171, p. 243, PL 214.746A, Register 11 188, p. 360; PL 
215.637-8. 
'41n 1198 the Pope intervened in favour of Peter of Corbeil in his application for a prebend at York-, WL 
214.442-4 and Regester 1478-80, pp. 700-2). Peter was soon promoted to Bishop of Cambrai in 1199 (Gesta c. LVL 
PL 214. ciii) and finally Archbishop of Sens c. 1200 (Potthwa 1,1196). None of Peter's writings survive, but for 
contemporary references, see Imkamp, Das Kirchenbild. pp. 28-30 and E. Rathbone, 'Peter of Corbeil in an English 
Setting', in JJ. G. Alexander and M. T. Gibson edd., Mediei, al Learning and Literature. Essav, ýý Prevented to Richard 
Williain Hunt (Oxford, 1976), 287-306. 
35 The Pope supported the masters in a number of test cases, for which see CUP 1. pp. 67-8.73-4,82-3. See also 
G. Post, Tarisian Masters as a Corporation, 1 -200- 1246', Speculuin 9 (1934), -421-45; H. Rashdall, The Unil'ersitics 
of Europe in the Middle Ages 3 vols., rev. ed. F. M. PoNvicke and A. B. Emden (Oxford, 1936) 1. pp. 300-9: Ferruolo, 
The Origins of the Uniiersiti% pp. 294-5. 
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individually responsible for all of the I Lateran canons, his personal attachment to Paris 
theology would seem to provide an extra strong motivation for his protection of Peter 
Lombard. The words of the great scholar Maýorie Reeves eloquently present this 
general view: 
Innocent 111, himself a product of the Paris theological school, was determined to establish the Master of the Sentences as the authority. 'I'lie strong opposition of the great Calabrian must have been well known and thus his work against Peter Lombard was selected for formal condemnation at the Fourth Lateran CoUnCil. 36 
This argument functions on two distinct but interrelated levels. It attributes Joachim's 
condemnation to Innocent's accession as Pope and, in so doing, it trivialises the 
substantive theological issues addressed in the decree. Thus the idea that the 
intellectual and logical problem posed by the Trinity, which had been the subject of 
vigorous discussion since the late eleventh century, in any sense stimulated such an 
official statement of doctrine is simply not taken into consideration. Instead we are 
offered a scenario in which only the preferences, loyalties and reputations of a few 
individuals count. 
But simply showing that the traditional argument depends on a series of 
questionable assumptions rather than on conclusive evidence still does not prove that 
Innocent was not predisposed towards supporting Peter Lombard as scholars have 
assumed. It only suggests that his probable support for the Lombard does not explain 
the decreee on the Trinity in its entirety, or even for that matter, Joachim's 
condemnation. But what does raise serious questions about the nature of Innocent's 
involvement in Joachim's condemnation are his extensive borrowings from Joachim's 
writings on the Trinity. This influence is apparent in at least two of the Pope's letters 
and sermon S. 37 The occasional nature of these writings on the Trinity makes it 
36 77ze Influence of Prol? hecv in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1969). p. 32. See also Bertola, 'La dottrina 
trinitaria in Pietro Lombardo', in Miscellanea Loinbardiana, p-129; M. Maccarrone, 'Innocenzo Ill. Prima del 
Pontificato', Archii-io della Societi Roinana di Storia Patria. Nuova serie 9, vol. 66 (1943), p. 73 and idein, '11 IV 
Concilio Lateranense', p. 288; Tillmann, Pol)e Innocent, p. 4; M. Reeves and B. Hirsch-Reich, The Figurae of 
Joachim qf Fiore (Oxford, 1972), p. 219; A. Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore e il Gioachhniýmo (2nd edition; Naples. 
1976), p. 66; H. Monti, La inanýfestation de VEsl7rit selon Joachiin de Fiore (Paris. 1977; Italian trans. 1983), p-25*, 
H. Lee, 'The Anti-Lombard Figures of Joachim of Fiore: A Reinterpretation'. in A. Williams ed.. Prophecv and 
MillenarianisIn. Essais in Honour of Marjorie Reei, es (Oxford, 1980), p. 134; B. McGinn, Ae Calabrian Abbot 
Joachim qf Fiore in the Historv qf Western Thoiqht (New York-, 1985), p. 167. 
37 PL 215.213-20; 217.465-70. 
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particularly difficult to define li-inocent's approach to the subject. Their most 
characteristic feature is the citation of scriptural authorities which are then subjected 
to a comprehensive symbolic reading consistent with the more personal theology of 
the religious orders. Indeed, judging from Innocent's entire theological output one 
would be hard-pressed to find anything resembling the scholastic method in theology: 
Maccarrone defines Innocent's approach as 'timiditd teologica'; " lmkamp not only 
identifies Innocent's greatest affinity with symbolic theology, but detects a positively 
anti-scholastic tone in his writings. '9 
How can we be sure that Innocent is the author of these writings? The sermons 
at least are almost certainly of Innocent's own creation and were even put together by 
him as a collection between 1202 and 1204 . 
40 The letters, which are arranged in 
Registers according to pontifical year do, however, pose a problem . 
4' As records of 
the daily business of the curia, as well as of the Pope's personal correspondence.. by 
no means all of the letters contained in the Registers will be of papal authorship. 
42 
But letters concerned with doctrinal questions by their very definition do not fall 
within the brief of daily administration or formulaic response. 
43 It seems reasonable 
to assume, therefore, that these letters and sen-nons on the Trinity were written 
by 
Innocent himself. 
The most striking instance of borrowing is Innocent's reply of December 
1203 
to a letter from the former Archbishop of Lyons, Jean des Bellesmains 
(d. 1204), who 
had retired to the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in 1195. 
' The former 
Archbishop, whose original letter does not survive, had earlier written to the 
Pope 
"Studi, p. 370- 
39Das Kirchenbild, p. 92. 
40jbid., p. 64. 
"The Registers are incomplete. See MO.. pp. 72-3. 
42 Both C. R. Cheney, 'The Letters of Pope Innocent 111', Bulletin of the 
John Rvland. v Librarv 35 (1952-53), 
pp. 33-9 and fmkarnp, Das Kirchenbild, pp. 
83-90 distinguish between Innocent's personal style and standard curial 
practice. 
43 This is one of the criteria listed by Imkamp, 
Das Kirchenbild. pp. 87-8 for establishing Innocent's personal 
authorship. 
"PL 215.213-20. lmkamp, Das Kirchenbild, p-87 n. 623 cites this letter as an example of 
Innocent's personal 
response on a theological 
issue. 
178 
with two queries, one concerning the Psalms, the other a liturgical question relating 
to the Holy Spirit. 45 It is Innocent's response to his first question %vhich directly 
concerns us here. The former Archbishop had asked the Pope why the Book of Psalms 
prescribed no Psalm for the third day of the week . 
46 The question provides Irinocent 
with the occasion for a lengthy exposition on the Trinity. For according to him, this 
omission is due to the holy mystery of the Trinity, which even the Psalmist was not 
able to express adequately, chosing instead to say nothing rather than do it an 
injustice. 47 
Innocent presents his conception of the progressive revelation of the Trinity 
throughout history. To this end, the sacred name of Adonai has been designated: And 
the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: I am the Lord, that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, 
and to Jacob; and my name Adonai I did not shoiv them. (Ex 6,2-3). It is at this point 
that Innocent's use of Joachim becomes explicit. He immediately identifies the name 
Adonai with the Greek Tetragrammaton which he gives as IEUE . 
48 This transcription 
of one of the Hebrew names of God as IEUE is one of the most characteristic features 
of Joachim's trinitarian thought . 
49 But even more compelling is how closely 
50 Innocent's analysis here resembles Joachim's in the Expositio in Apocaýypsim. 
Irmocent mirrors Joachim when he says that although the sacred name is spoken as 
Adonai, it is written down with only four letters as IEUE . 
5' But what is most striking 
about Innocent's usage is his literal borrowing from the Expositio, which is worth 
45 On Jean des Bellesmains, see P. Potizet, Langlahz Jcan dit Bellesmains (1122-1204? ) (Lyon, 1927). 
46 According to Jewish devotional practice, continued in the Christian Church, each day of the week had its own 
special psalm. See J. A. Lamb, The Psahns in Chr&tian Worship (London, 1962), pp. 12-13. 
47 PL 215.214B. 
480n the Tetragrammaton, see A. A. Maurer, 'The Sacred Tetragrammaton in Medieval Thought', in Actas del 
V Congresso Inteniacional de Filosofia Medieml 2 vols. (Madrid, 1979) 11,975-83. 
49Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, pp. 39-43. On later omissions of this name from some manuscripts of the 
Liberfi-guraruin on the grounds of its association with Joachim's opposition to Peter Lombard, see ibid., pp. 200-1. 
50 Venice. 1527. 
"PL 215.216D: 'quatuor litteris figuratur I. E. U. E pro quo Judei proferunt Adonay. Cum enim dicant ineffabile 
nomen illud, ipsurn proferre non audent, sed aliud proferunt loco eius. Nam hoc nomen Adonay sex litteris 
scribitur, illud autern quatuor solummodo figuratur I. E. U. E. ' Cf. Joachim. Expositio, fol. 35va: 'prontintiatur 
Adonay, et tamen in hebreo non eisdem caracteribus quibws scripturn est, pronuntiatur, sed aliis. Scribit enim 
quatuor literis propter quod et apud grecos thetragrammaton nominatur cuius inscriptio ista est. IEUE. ' 
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quoting fuliv in the original Latin: 
Est enim hoc nomen IEUE tante virtutis, sicut petitissimi asserunt Hebreorum quod si distinguatur in tres dictiones, ut singillatini quelibet proferatur, inlepitatern sui nominis representet. 52 
And Joachim: 
Est autem nomen istud ut tradunt peritissimi hebreorum tante virtutis, ut si distinguatur in tribus dictionibus ad hoc ut singillatim proferatur IE, sýigillatim EU, singillatim UE, singula distinctio integritatem sui nominis habeat. 53 
The above two passages are irrefutable evidence of textual borrowing. A further 
possible example of Innocent's concrete debt to Joachim is his figural representation 
of the Trinity in the form of a triangle, with the letters IE, EU and UE each positioned 
at one of the comers, and the full IEUE symbol placed in the centre . 
54 Innocent's use 
of the Expositio makes it likely that Joachim is also his source for the triangle-IEUE 
figure. It is not, however, a foregone conclusion since Innocent, as we shall see, may 
himself be drawing from Joachim's own source for the diagram. 
The trinitarian interpretation of the equilateral triangle is not absolute proof of 
Joachite influence, since it was an increasingly common tool in trinitarian theology 
55 
around the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But this particular version 
of the triangle as an image for the Trinity may be derived from Joachim's trinitarian 
interpretation of the Alpha and Omega figures in the Expositio, and of the psaltery in 
the Psalterium decem chordarum . 
56 The parallels with the Expositio, as we might 
expect, are much stronger than with the Psalterium. hi the Psalterium, the discussion 
of the triangular representation of the Trinity is somewhat divorced from the IEUE 
52 PL 215.216D-217A. The same passgae is also found in Innocent's sermon on the circumcision of the Lord, 
PL 217.467C. See below, pp. 
"Erpositio, fol. 35va. 
"In the Migne edition the figure appears in the main text at PL 215.216A, but in the MS. of the 
Register it 
is found in the margin. Microfilms of the Papal Registers are held by the Seeley Historical Library 
in Cambridge. 
For the triangle, see Box 1502, Reg. Vat. lat. 6, fol. 118va. 
"See B. Obrist, ' La f igure g6omýtrique dans Foeuvre de Joachim de Flore', Cahiers de cii, disation midiji, ale 
31 (1988), 297-321. William of Auvergne, De trinitate, ed. B. Switalski (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 
Toronto, 1976). pp. 141-4,204-5. 
16EXpo. vitio, fols. 33vb-37vb; Psalterium decein chordarum (Venice, 1527), 
fols. 230vb-231ra, 232vb-233ra. See 
Reeves and Hirsch-Reich. Figurae, pp. 46-51.56-9. 
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symbol. IEUE is discussed only once in the work and is represented once with the 
Alpha and Omega figures. 57 It does not appear in conjunction with the triangle. In 
the Expositio on the other hand, Joachim spells out the triangle-IEUE conjunction. He 
says that IEUE can be written in triangular form, two letters (IE, EU, UE) at each 
comer, and the entire name in a circle. 58 The other possible Joachite source is the 
psaltery figure in the Liber Figurarum. 59 
That Joachim should be Innocent's source for the triangle-IEUE figure is an 
extremely attractive proposition since it fits in well with his textual borrowing from 
the Expositio, but it is one not altogether without its difficulties. For one thing, 
although Joachim describes at length this triangular representation of the Trinity and 
the trinitarian import of the IEUE symbol, this specific triangle-IEUE combination in 
the figural form as used by Innocent is not found in any of Joachim's works. The 
problem is not of course insurmountable since the Alpha and Omega figures and the 
psaltery figure constitute fairly close approximations and it is not difficult to see how 
the triangle-IEUE figure might be a development of them. But an almost exact 
prototype, rather than a mere approximation, of Innocent's drawing is to be found in 
Joachim's own source for the IEUE transcription, Petrus Alfonsi (c. 1040-c. 1140), a 
Spanish Jewish convert to Christianity. 60 Beatrice Hirsch-Reich correctly identified 
Alfonsi's Dialogus (written in 1110) as the source for Joachim's own version of the 
IEUE transcription . 
6' Relying on Migne's imperfect edition, however, Hirsch-Reich 
took Alfonsi's diagrammatic representation of the Trinity to be a series of interlaced 
circles placed within a larger circle. 62 But according to the editor of a modem edition 
of the Dialogus based on a twelfth-century manuscript, the figure printed 
by Migne 
nd used by Hirsch-Reich is not found in either this or any of the other manuscripts 
"Fols. 277rb and 257r respectively. 
5'Erpositio. fol. 36rb. 
"See Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae. pp. 199-201. 
601 would like to thank Dr Michael Evans for having 
drawn my attention to the Alfonsi figure. 
61 2 (1954), p. 172. For the 
dating, 
'Die Quelle der Trinitdtskreise von Joachim von Fiore und Dante'. Sophia 
22 
see K. -P. Mieth, 
Der Dialog des Petrus Aýfonsi. Seine Uberliqferung im Druck und in den Handschrýften 
Texteditionen (Berlin, 1982), p. vii. 
62 'Die Quelle der Trinit5tskreise'. p. 172. The figure is at PL 157.611C. 
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which he examined. " In its place is a ttiangular-IEUE figure which is almost an 
exact copy of that used by Pope Innocent in his letter to Jean des Bellesmains. 64 
It is certainly quite conceivable that Petrus Alfonsi is Innocent's source for his 
triangular representation of the Trinity. Besides the striking similarity between their 
drawings, there is additional evidence that the Dialogus was drawn upon elsewhere 
in precisely this trinitarian context. In a sermon on the Trinity written c. 1208-10, 
Gamier of Rochefort (c. 1140-1225/6), the former Bishop of Langres who had retired 
to the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in 1199, is almost certainly drawing upon the 
Dialogus for his trinitarian exposition of the IEUE symbol . 
65 Reeves and Hirsch- 
Reich assumed that Gamier*s source was Joachim, but extensive textual 
correspondences with Alfonsi's Dialogus suggest that Gamier is borrowing directly 
from Alfonsi himself. 66 Moreover, one of the thirteenth-century manuscripts of the 
Dialogus originated from Clairvaux, Gamier's own monastery, and two others, dating 
from the twelfth or thirteenth century came from Citeaux . 
6' A further direct link 
between Alfonsi and Gamier is provided by Gamier's own adoption of the same 
triangle-IEUE figure used by Alfonsi in a work generally attributed to Gamier, the 
Contra Amaurianos. 68 
There are no textual parallels, however, between hinocent's letter and the 
Dialogus. Even if, therefore, Alfonsi, rather than Joachim, is Innocent's source for the 
triangle-IEUE figure this detracts neither from Innocent's direct borrowings from 
Joachim's Expositio nor from his general affinity with Joachim's commentary on the 
63Mieth, Der Dialog, pp. xlviii-il. 
6'See Mieth's edition, Der Dialog, p-78. Another twelfth-century rns. of the Dialogus, London BM Harley 
3861, fol. 53va, has exactly the same illustration. The thirteenth-century London BM Royal 15 C If. fol. 151ra 
contains a very basic sketch. 
65PL 205.710-25. On Gamier, see N. M. Hdring, 'The Liberal Arts in the Sermons of Gamier of Rochefort', 
MS 30 (1968), 47-77 and Dictionnaire de,, ý Auteurs Chzterciens, edd. E. Bronette et al.. La Documentation 
Cistercienne 16.1, fasc. 1 (Rochefort, 1975), 272-3. Gamier himself cannot be Innocent's source for the triangle- 
IEUE figure since he is writing c. 1208-10. that is. after Innocent. Even if borrowing could 
be proved, however, 
we still have Innocent's clear use of the passage from the Exj, 7ositio. 
66Figurae, p. 297. See AppendLx D. 
67 Troyes, Biblioth6que Municipale 509. fols. Ir-57v; Dijon. Biblioth6que Publique 228, fols. 2r-92r; 230, fols. 
2r-101v. See Mieth, Der Dialog, pp. mxix-. xxxv. 
'Ed. C. Baeumk-er, BGPM 24.5/6 Minster, 1926). p. 35. 
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figure, assurning that there is no common textual source for which there is as yet no 
evidence. Innocent's interpretation of the triangle-IEUE figure is, moreover, in exact 
conformity with Joachim's exposition as found in the Expositio. He writes that each 
distinction YE, EU, UE) possesses something in common with the other two and is 
in no way separate from them. Each divine Person is shown to be consubstantial to 
the other two. Moreover, the fact that the second distinction receives its first letter 
from the first distinction and the third distinction receives its first letter from the 
second is a parallel to the Father's begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy 
Spirit from both. This accurately conveys Joachim's thought on the matter. 69 Innocent 
has grasped Joachim's essential point, that each of the three distinctions, because of 
its indivisibility from the other two, recalls IEUE in its entirety and that this is an 
analogy for the consubstantiality of the three divine Persons. The Pope also follows 
Joachim when he says that IEUE truly indicates that there are three Persons, since its 
four letters are really only three due to the repetition of the letter E. " One final point 
of similarity is Innocent's conviction that the mystery of the Trinity can be best 
conveyed through the means of figures as opposed to words . 
7' This preference for 
figures is one of the fundamentals of Joachim's approach and a point to which he also 
X P explicitly refers in this section in the E, OSitio. 
72 
Innocent's sermon on the circumcision of the Lord (Luke 2,21) is another 
instance of probable borrowing from Joachim. 73 The passage from Luke is Innocent's 
point of departure for a meditation on the symbolic power of the name Iesus. 
Foremost among these mystical properties is a series of numerical symbolisms 
69EXPOSitio, fol. 35vb: 'Et ita secundurn nomen propagatur a primo, tertium a secundo, ut aliud sine alio 
pronuntian nequeat, tanquarn si E litera que scribitur post I communis sit primo nomini. et secundo V litera 
communis sit sectindo et tertio quatenus et per hoc quod secundurn nomen pendet ex primo, unigenitus dei filius 
consubstantialis ostendatur illi a quo genitus est, et per hoc quod tertium nomen pendet ex secundo, ostendatur 
spiritus sanctus consubstantial is esse filio qui consubstantialis est patri. ' 
70PL 215.217C: 'Rursus, in hoc nomine sunt tres littere. sed media geminatur, quia in Deo sunt tres personae'. 
Cf. Joachim. Expositio, fol. 36rb: 'Licet ergo litere ipse quatuor sint numero et non sex, immo tres tantum, sed una 
gemina*. 
71 PL 215.217A: 'Quod ad exprimendurn trinitatis et unitatis misterium, in subiecta figura potest plenius 
denotari. ' 
72 Fol. 35vb: ýquod quidern melius figuris ipsis ostendere quam verbis congruentibus reserare valemus. ' On this 
preference. see Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Fýgurae. p. 20; Obrist. 'La figure gýorn&trique'. pp. 
310-12. 
7'PL 217.465-70. 
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generated by the name itself: it has two syllables, five letters, three vowels, two 
consonants and three inflections Wsus, ksu, JeSUM). 7' The two s'yllables represent 
Christ's two natures, divine and human ; 75 three vowels in one name evoke the idea 
of three Persons in one divinity; two consonants signify the union of God and man in 
Christ, the assumption of human nature by a divine Person. But tile most important 
signifying property of the name ksus from the point of view of Joachite influence is 
that this name has exactly the same vowels (I, E, U) as the sacred name of the Lord, 
the Tetragrammaton. These same letters were embossed in gold plate on the forehead 
of the High Priest of the Temple because no one dared to speak that sacred name. 76 
Instead the name Adonai was spoken in its place. 77 IEUE conveys the mystery of 
trinity and unity, three Persons in one substance, just as Abraham saw three angels, 
but worshipped only one (Gen. 18). 
The guiding principle of Innocent's thought here is exactly the same as that in 
his letter to Jean des Bellesmains, down to the actual wording in some sections. He 
repeats the passage from Joachim's Expositio that the name IEUE is of such 
excellence that, as the most learned of the Jews realised, if it is distinguished in three 
symbols VE, EU, UE), each one recalls the full name IEUE. 78 
Innocent himself wrote in friendly ten-ns to Joachim and followed his 
predecessors in supporting the Abbot's Order of Fiore. 79 Several prominent members 
74PL 217.466B. 
7'PL 217,466C: 'Hoc igitur nomen lestis duas habet syllabas, qttia lesus duas habet naturas, scilicet divinam 
et humanam'. 
76Exodus 28,36-8. For this detail, see Augustine. Quaestionuin in Heptateuchuin, PL 34.638; Bede, De 
tabemaculo et vas& eius. PL 91,478C, who mentions that the Hebre-%N, divine name is writ6ten with 
four letters 
VHVH); Gerhoch of Reichersberg, Letter to Pope Hadrian about the Noielties oj'the Dav, ed. 
N. M. Hdring 
(Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto. 1974) X. l. p. 53; Gamier of Rochefort, PL 
205.716D who 
transcribes the name as Ieue; Alexander Nequam, Speculuin Speculationein I. xxxii, p. 105. 
'7PL 217.467AB: 'Habet autern hoc nomen lesus illas easdern vocales, quas habet illud nornen Domini 
Tetragrammaton, et erat scriptum lamina aurea super frontem pontificali cidari pendente, videlicet I. E, U, sive 
loth, 
Eth, Vau. quod nomen Dei dicunt ineffabile. unde non audent illud proferre. sed pro eo scribunt et profenint 
hoc 
nomen Adonay'. 
-'*8PL 217.467C: 'Hoc autem nomen tante virlutis existit. tit peritissimi assenint Hebreorum, quod si distinguatur 
in tres dictiones, quelibet illanim significat illud quod tottim, tit si dicatur, le. Eu. Ue. quelibet nomen est 
Dei. sicut 
videlicet et tottim, 1, E, Ue: quia mirum, quelibet trium personartim, sictit et 
ipsa natura. est unus Deus. ' 
79Register 1 524, p. 757; PL 214.480. For Innocent's confirmation of the Florensian Order's privileges, see 
Potthxt 1,2092. On papal support in general, see McGinn. Calabrian Abbot. pp. 22-5. 
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of the curia during b-inocent's pontificate, %vere among the first patrons of the Order. 80 
Innocent may have gained access to Joachim's works after 1200, the date of Joachim's 
testamentary letter, iii which Joachim mentions, as proof of his submission to papal 
authority, his intention to send his major works to Rome for approval . 
8' But perhaps 
the most direct way of explaining Innocent's acquaintance with Joachim's ideas and 
writings is the presence of Rainier of Ponza (d. 1207/9), a fon-ner companion and 
disciple of Joachim, at the papal curia during the first half of the pontificate. 
Rainier had accompanied Joachim during his retreat to the Sila mountains in 
1188 and is mentioned along with him as a fugitivus by the Cistercian General 
Chapter in September 1192.82 By 1198 Rainier was papal legate in Spain and 
83 
1 Languedoc. Several contemporary sources testify to his close links with t] e Pope 
Caesarius of Heisterbach refers to him as the Pope's confessor, a testimony which is 
confin-ned by the grief-stricken letter written by Cardinal Hugolino, the future Gregory 
IX, upon Rainier's death c. 1207-9 . 
84 Innocent himself speaks of Rainier in ten-ns of 
the highest esteem . 
85 Given his close links with both Joachim and Innocent, it is 
quite possible that Rainier acted as a kind of mediator between the two men. 
Joachim's continuing influence on Rainier at this time is visibly demonstrated 
8OSee F. Russo, Gibacchino da Fiore e le Fondazioni Florensi in Calabria (Naples, 1958), esp. for Cardinals 
Cencio Savelli (Honorius III) and Hugolino (Gregory IX), pp. 226-32. Also F. Russo, Regesto Vaticano per la 
Calabria I (Rome, 1974) for Honorius III's letters of 1216 (588) and 1220 (665) in support of the Florensian Order. 
"Only the Liber de Concordia had been submitted by this date. As part of this possible acquaintance, see R. E. 
Lerner, 'Joachim of Fiore as a Link between St. Bernard and Innocent III on the Figural Significance of 
Melchisedich', MS 42 (1980), 471-6. 
82 For Joachim's withdrawal, see the anonymous ý! ita, ed. H. Grundmann, 'Zur Biographie Joachim von Fiore 
und Rainers von Ponza', Deutsches Archiv, fiir Eýfbrschung des Mittelalters 16 (1960), pp. 533-4; J. M. Canivez, 
Statuta Capitulbruin Generalium Ordin& Cbaerciensbz ab anno 1116 ad annuin 1786 8 vols. (Louvain, 1933-41) 
1, p. 154. 
"For the relevant correspondence, see Register 192-4. pp. 132-8,99, pp-145-7; 165, pp. 234-5; 239, pp. 338-9, - 
249, p. 352; 395, p. 594-, 449, pp. 672-3; 494, pp. 722-3. 
"Dialogus iniraculorum, ed. J. Strange 2 vols. (Cologne, 1851) 11, dist. VII, cap. VI, p. 8: 'Renerio iam. dicti 
Innocentii confessori'. For Hugolino's letter, see E. Winkelman ed., *Analecta Heidelbergensia', Archivio della 
Sociad Romana di Storia Patria 2 (1879), p. 366: 'Novit hec plenius summus pontifex papa Innocentius, cuius 
innocentiam domino orationibus et lacrimis conmendabat. ' See also ne Book of St Gilhert, edd. R. Foreville and 
G. Keir (Oxford. 1987), pp. 174-7 for Rainier's role as interpreter of Innocent's dream in the canonization process 
of Gilbert of Sempringharn. Also, G. Tiraboschi, Vetera Humiliatoruin Monumenta 3 vols. 
(Milan, 1766-78) 11, 
p. 140 for Rainier's involvement in the examination of the Humiliati. 
"For example, Register 1 395, p. 594, PL 214.373: 'Grattis tui nominis odor. et suavis tue fame duleedo, per 
quarn tue refigionis honestas dignis undique laudum preconis exaltatur'. 
185 
in the form of a letter, written by Rainier on the Pope's behalf, to the head of the 
Cistercian Order, Amald-Amaury (1202-12). " Significantly perhaps, this letter was 
written in 1.203, the sarne year that Innocent wrote to Jean des Bellesmains. In it 
Rainier admonished the daughter houses of Citeaux for their quarrel with the mother 
house, firmly reinforcing the Pope's own hard line of the previous year. 87 Rainier's 
tone, at once both reproachful and laudatory, reflects Joachim's own ambivalent 
attitude towards the Order. Rainier, like Joachim, attributes a crucial role to the 
Cistercian Order as the mediator between the second and third status. Both men 
identify the first five monasteries of the Cistercian Order with the first five 
monasteries of the ordo mon-achorum, but seem to exclude them from the final and 
perfect seven. " Other borrowings could be enumerated such as his typology of 
Bernard of Clairvaux as 'another Moses'. '9 At the same time, however, Rainier's 
criticism is unsparing. He predicts in apocalyptic terms typical of Joachim the Order's 
decline unless internal reforms are instituted. 90 The comprehensiveness of Rainier's 
borrowing is quite remarkable and must be one of the earliest written examples of 
Joachim's growing influence. 
Having established that Innocent made forays into Joachim's trinitarian 
theology and that this borrowing invalidates the argument that the Pope was bound to 
support Peter Lombard, it remains to determine more precisely the extent of Innocent's 
involvement in Joachim's condemnation. As a starting point, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Innocent himself did not actively seek out Joachim's condemnation. He 
must have been responding to someone else's initiative. 'nie Pope himself had made 
provision for precisely such initiatives when he first announced the holding of a 
'6B. Griesser, *Rainer von Fossanova und sein Brief an Abt Arnald von Citeatix (1203)', Ci, ýztercieitýzer Chronik 
60 (1953), 151-67. 
87 PL 214.1107-8. For growing criticism of the Order's avariciousness, see J. B. Mahn, L'ordre cistercien et son 
gouvernement (Paris. 1951), pp. 110-12, J. Leclercq, 'Les Epitres d'Alexandre III sur les Cistercians', Revue 
bin6dictine 64 (1954), 68-82; G. Constable, Monastic Tithes. /roln their Origins to the Tiveýfth Centurv (Cambridge, 
1964), pp. 188,194-5.280-1,292-4. 
88Griesser, 'Rainer von Fossanova', pp. 163-4. Cf. Joachim, Liber de C071cordia, ed. E. R. Daniel, in 
Transactions (? f the Ainerican PhilosolyhicalSocien, 73, part 8 (1983), pp-411-15. See Reeves, Iqfluence. pp. 135-44. 
On Joachim's five/seven number symbolism. see Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, pp. 14-19. 
"Griesser. 'Rainer von Fossanova'. p. 164. Cf. Joachim, Liber de Concordia, p. 417. 
9OGriesser. 'Rainer von Fossanova'. pp. 165-6. 
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general council in April 1213. Despite the absence of documentation to the effect, we 
know from certain discrepancies between papal policy before 1215 and the conciliar 
decrees thernselves that at least some of these initiatives were positively received and 
acted upon. Canon 13 prohibiting the formation of new religious orders is the most 
impressive instance of this. 
A further point is that a reluctance on Innocent's part to condemn Joachim 
would account for the extremely measured tone of the condemnation. There is a 
genuine concern to ensure that Joachim and his followers do not suffer unfairly as a 
result of the judgement. Joachim's orthodoxy is treated at considerable length. His 
willingness to accept papal authority by ordering the submission of all his works is 
referred to, as is his testamentary letter of 1200 in which he professed his unreserved 
obedience to Rome. Further mention is made of Joachim's achievement as a monastic 
founder and the discipline observed at the monasteries founded by him. 
Joachim, moreover, is not named as a heretic; only someone perpetrating his 
error now that it has been condemned will be treated as such. " The same point was 
one of the those singled out consistently in the commentaries of canonists on the 
decree. 92 
If, as now seems certain, the Pope was not responsible for Joachim's 
condemnation, two serious possibilities remain, neither of which can be proven. The 
first, that the condemnation was the result of Cistercian hostility to Joachim's Order 
of Fiore, has been proposed by several Joachite scholars. 9' There is really no 
evidence to support this view except what we know of Cistercian disquiet at 
Florensian success in southern Italy. 
The other possibility is that Innocent, in condemning Joachim, was acting upon 
the expert advice of Paris-trained theologians, particularly their influential colleagues 
in the cardinalate, Stephen Langton and Robert de Courson. Again, there is no 
documentary proof to substantiate this. But the language of the decree itself and the 
9'Russo, Gibacchino da Fiore e le Fondazioni Florcnsi, p. 31; Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, p. 70 and G. di 
Napoli, 'Giacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', Rivista di Filosqfia neo-scolastica 71 (1979), pp. 647-8,681-2 
draw attention to this distinction between those who err in good faith and those who err persistently. 
92 Garcia y Garcia, Constitutiones Conciiii quani, pp. 188,289,466,483. 
93 See below, pp. 194-5. 
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conditions at the emerging university of Paris both point to the involvement of Paris 
theologians in the drafting of the decree. 'flie problem with this hypothesis is the 
glaring discrepancy between the Lateran decree and thirteenth-century interpretations 
of it. If the decree was drafted by theologians at Paris, it would be difficult to explain 
how their successors managed to be so wide of the mark in their assessment of it. One 
possible explanation may lie in the Council's apparent concern, having once 
condemned Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection, to eliminate tile other obvious 
alternative position to the Lombard's quaedam summa res, that the divine essence 
begets. The rejection of this doctrine in addition to Joachim's unity of collection 
facilitated the confusion in subsequent commentators. Add to this the strong likelihood 
that the prime movers were busy cardianls rather than full-time academics constantly 
immersed in theological debates, and a way round the problem begins to take shape. 
2. The Lateran decree 
Before proceeding to discuss in detail the substantive theological issues raised 
in the second decree, a brief summary of its main points may prove useful here. 
The decree begins with the condemnation of 'the libellus or tractatus which 
Joachim of Fiore published against Master Peter Lombard'. The Council singles out 
Joachim's objection to the Lombard's concept of the divine essence as a quaedam 
summa res which is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. By this Joachim 
understood the Lombard to have separated the divine essence from the three Persons, 
thereby introducing a fourth thing into God. Hence Joachim's accusation of 
Quaternity. 
TI-ie Council draws a crucial link between Joachim's accusation of Quatemity 
and his erroneous conception of divine unity. The one, opposition to Peter Lombard, 
is merely the symptom of the other, unity of collection. Joachim has reduced divine 
unity from a unity of essence to a mere unity of will. The case against Joachim is 
anchored not only in his attack on Peter Lombard, but also in his use of biblical 
analogies to demonstrate that the unity of the three Persons is a spiritual unity, similar 
to the unity of the faithful in one Church. 
Having exposed Joachim's error, the Council proceeds to approve fon-nally 
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Peter Lombard's doctrine. It affirms the Lombard's concept of the essence as a 
quaedam summa res and his assertion that the essence does not beget. There follows 
a detailed clarification of the ortliodox doctrine oil divine generation, i. e. tile divine 
essence does not beget, rather it is the Father who begets the Son. 
The Council issues a statement to reinforce the point that Joachim's analogies 
go beyond the permissible degree of similarity between God and creation. When 
Christ prays to his Father 'that they might be one as we also are one' (In 17,22; 
already cited as an example of Joachim's misuse of analogy), the first 'one' refers to 
the spiritual unity of the faithful; the second 'one', on the other hand, refers to the 
identity of nature which unites the divine Persons. The point is that however perfect 
the unity of the faithful may be, it is nevertheless of a completely different and 
inferior order from the unity of essence among the three Persons. 
Despite the detail of its criticism, tile Council clearly does not regard Joachim 
as a heretic. Finally, the Council condemns the doctrine of Almaric of Bke. This 
consists of one sentence tagged onto the end of the decree and no explicit link is made 
with Joachim's doctrine. 
3. The authenticity of the lost libellus 
The sheer complexity of the Lateran decree on the Trinity is evoked in the very 
first sentence which alone has generated an enormous amount of research and debate: 
We condemn, therefore, the book or tract on the unity or essence of the Trinity which Abbot Joachim 
published (edidit) against Master Peter Lombard. 
Excluding chronicle and other accounts which are themselves based on the decree, 
94 
this is the only contemporary reference to a libellus or tractatus, called De unitate seu 
essentia Trinitatis, issued by Joachim exclusively as a polemic against Peter Lombard. 
Joachim himself never refers to such a work. Even more remarkable is the absence of 
any reference to this work in the report on Joachim's many alleged errors compiled 
by the Commission at Anagni in 1255 in the aften-nath of the condemnation of the 
114 Two letters of Horious III which refer to the lost work- are clearly also based on the decree. 
See Russo, 
Regesto Valicano 1.588,665. 
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Joachite Gerard of Borgo San Donnino's Introductorius in Evangelium Acternum. " 
Scholars have responded to the elusiveness of the libellus in the historical 
record in several ways. By far the majority accept that it is both an authentic and a 
separate work by Joachim, which is now lost. Accordingly, there have been numerous 
attempts to identify the libellus with a variety of anonymous works from the period. 96 
The first to do so was Paul Fournier, whose identification of the Porretan Liber de 
vera philosophia (c. 1179) as Joachim's lost work had an enon-nous impact upon 
97 subsequent research . Fournier later retracted this claim, but maintained that Joachim 
was indirectly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers via the author of the Liber. 98 Apart 
from the anonymous author's alleged tritheism, Fournier found an impressive 
resemblance between the Liber's and Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard-99 The 
attractiveness of Fournier's thesis lay, therefore, not only ill the Liber's resemblance 
to the Lateran decree's account of Joachim's lost work, but in its placing of Joachim's 
attack on the Lombard in a plausible historical and intellectual context, that of the 
controversy between the Lombard's and Gilbert's respective followers. Fournier's line 
of inquiry, including his assignation of Joachim to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers, 
was adopted by a number of subsequent scholars who regarded Joachim's 
condemnation as the final episode in the rivalry between the supporters of Peter 
Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers. '00 Antoine Dondaine in particular drew Joachim 
into the circle of Gilbert's followers active in the 1170s and 1180s. He suggested that 
an anonymous Brevis controversia modernorum Latinorum de unitate sancte Trinitatis, 
95 The Protocol is edited by H. Denifle, 'Das Evangelium aeternuin und die Commission zu Anagni', ALKM 
1 (1885), 49-142. It mentions and cites from all of Joachim's major works. For Gerard's condemnation by 
Alexander rV, see CUP I, p. 297. 
96The misleadingly entitled Liber Contra Loinharduin. (Scuola di Gioacchino da Fiore), ed. C. Ottaviano, Reale 
Accademia d'Italia Studi e Documenti 3 (Roma, 1934) is not one of them. The ms. dates from the early fourteenth 
century. Ottaviano dubiously assigned the work- to the 'school of Joachim', the very notion of which has been 
criticised by subsequent scholars. See for example, di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo% pp. 636-7. 
But no scholar has so far suggested an alternative explanation for the Liber. 
97 'Joachim de Flore et le Liber de vera philosophia', Revue d'histoire et de littirature religieuses 4 (1899), 
37-66. 
"Etudes sur Joachim de Flore et ses doctrines (Paris. 1909), pp. 99-100. 
'Ibid., pp. 93-4. 
"'Particularly influential in this respect is M. -H. Vicaire. *Les Porr&tains et FAvicennisme avant 12115', Reme 
des sciences 17hilosol)hiques et thiologiques 26 (1937), pp. 449-50. 
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which breaks off abruptly after a few lines, might be a fragment from tile lost 
work. 'O' In his recent exhaustive research on the subject of the lost work, Axel 
Mehlmann rejected Dondaine's suggestion and concluded that the Brevis controi, ersia 
was not a passage from the lost libellus, there being little resemblance with Joachim's 
opposition to Peter Lombard. 102 Further, Mehlmann has shown that another proposed 
candidate for the lost work is in fact an excerpt from Gandulph of Bologna's 
Sentences. 103 In two catalogues from the papal library at Avignon under the years 
1375 and 1407 this text is referred to as Ioachim Florensis de unitate Trinitatis, quae 
sit dýfferentia inter nomina essentialia et nomina relatiVa. 104 
Those who accept the authenticity of the lost work think it must have been an 
early work. 10' Two very different types of evidence would seem to point towards 
this conclusion. In the Dresden manuscript of the Liberfigurarum there is a group of 
figures entitled perfidia Petri, known as the anti-Lombard figures. The roughness of 
their conception suggests that these figures may represent an early stage in Joachim's 
articulation of his opposition to Peter Lombard and that they originally belonged to 
the lost De unitate. 106 
Secondly, historians refer to the lengthy account of the events leading up to 
Joachim's condemnation given by Matthew Paris (d. 1259) in his Historia 
107 
anglorum. Here Matthew dates Joachim's attack on the Lombard to the pontificate 
'O'MS. BN lat. 2802, fol. 109rv. See Dondaine. Ecrits de la ýPetite ecole'porr&aine, pp-56-9. 
102 De Unitate Trinitatis. Forschungen und Dokumente zur Trinitätstheologie Joachims von Fiore im 
Zusammenhang mit seinem verschollenen Traktat gegen Petrus Lombardus. Inatiguraldisserlation zur Erlangung 
der Dokturwürde der Theologischen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg i. Br. (1991), pp. 353-4. 
'03Ibid., pp. 369 ff. on Biblioteca. Allesandrina, MS. 81, fols. 94ra-98vb. Di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro 
Lombardo'. p. 636 had also denied the authenticity of this fragment. 
104 A. Maier, *Zu einigen Handschriften der Biblioteca Alessandrina in Rom und ihrer Geschichte', Rii, ista di 
Storia della Chies-za in Italia 18 (1964), p. 7. Maier argued that the passage was from the lost work (pp. 8-9). 
'O'Lee, 'The Anti-Lombard Figures', p. 137; McGinn, Calabrian Abbot. p. 166 follows Lee. K. -V. Selge, 
Uorigine delle opere di Gioacchino da Fiore', in 0. Capitani and J. Miethke, Lattesa delle line dci teinpi nel 
Medioevo. Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-gen-nanico 28 (Bologna, 1990), p. 91 argues that Joachim's extraordinary 
literary output of the 1180s must have been preceeded by lengthy study and probably also the drafting of now 
lost 
opuscula. The libellus against Peter Lombard , vould have been one of these (p. 115 n. 62). 
"'L. Tondelli, Il Libro dellefigure dell'abbate Gioachino da Fiore 2 vols. (2nd edition; Turin. 1953) 1, pp. 171 - 
80; Lee, 'The Anti-Lombard Figures. 
"'Hi, vtoria angtorum 3 vols., Rolls Series 44 (London, 1866-9) 1, pp. 411-17; Chronica maiora 
11, pp. 310-13. 
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of Alexander 111, a dating which has been generally accepted. "' Antonio Crocco, for 
instance, accepts Matthew's dating of Joachim's attack to 1179, the year of the Third 
Lateran Council, citing in support the notes of the early seventeenth -century scholar, 
Severinus Binus, contained in Mansi's conciliar collection. '09 According to Binus' 
interpretation of Matthew's account, Alexander III, who had already accepted the 
accusations against Peter Lombard's Christology, encouraged Joachim (directly or 
indirectly) to take issue with the Lombard. "O Crocco takes this to mean that 
Joachim's attack was written at the instigation of the Pope. "' This is an extremely 
attractive hypothesis since the lost work would consequently belong in the context of 
the wider opposition to Peter Lombard's teachings, which is well-documented. 112 
There are several problems with using Matthew Paris 9 account, however, which 
have not previously been noticed. Matthew simply reproduces the account of Roger 
of Wendover (d. 1236), his predecessor at St Albans. "' But no one has attempted 
to identify Wendover's own sources. Wendover's account of Joachim's condemnation 
does not in tum depend on any other chronicler, including his own usual sources, 
Ralph of Diceto or Roger of Howden. ' 14 Close examination reveals that he has 
reconstructed, from his own vantage position, a coherent narrative which confon-ns to 
a plausible sequence of events. Under the same year, 1179, he records the following 
events: the Third Lateran Council; a letter of Alexander 1111 to William, Archbishop 
'"Mansi 22.1081 contains the relevant section from Matthew Paris and is the source for most modem 
accounts. F. Foberti, Gioacchino da Fiore. Nuovi studi critici sulla inistica e la religiosita in Calabria (Florence, 
1934), pp. 85-8 is virtually alone in his sceptical attitude to Matthew Paris' account and its use by historians; he 
rejects outright suggestions that Joachim presented his work- to the Third Lateran Council. 
'09Gioacchino da Fiore, p. 65. On Severinus Binus, especially contemporary criticism of his interpretation of 
sources, see H. Quentin, dean-Doininique Mansi et les grandes collections conciliares (Paris, 1900), pp. 21-4. 
"0 Mansi 22,1081: 'Causam. scribendi contra Petrum Lombardum ei dedisse videtur Alexander papa'. 
"'Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, p. 65. 
"2The position of M. W. Bloomfield, 'Joachim of Flora: A critical survey of his canon, teachings, sources, 
biography, and influence', Traditio 13 (1957), p. 263. 
"'Roger of Wendover, Flores historiaruin 3 vols.. Rolls Series 84 (London. 1886-9) 1, pp. 1 
18-23. See V. H. 
Galbraith, Roger Wendoi, er and Matthew Paris (Glasgow University Publications 61,1944), pp. 23-4; R. Vaughan, 
Matthew Paris (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 21-34. 
'"On Wendover*s sources, see T. Duffus Hardy, Dcscriptive Catalogue of Materials Relating to the 
Historl, 
of Great Britain and Ireland to the End of the Reign offIenri, 
VII 3 vols., Rolls Series 26 (London, 1862-71) 111, 
pp. 80-1; Galbraith, Roger Wendover. p-15. 
But see Vaughan, Matthew Paris, p. 23. 
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of Sens, against the christological doctrine of Peter Lombard; Joachim's attack on 
Peter Lombard, which in fact paraphrases the first part of the text of the Fourth 
Lateran Council decree; "' and finally the Fourth Lateran condemnation itself, which 
begins at the point where the previous paraphrase left off, and the order of which does 
not correspond to that of the original decree. 
It is extremely significant that, apart from the Third Lateran Council itself, 
none of these events occurred in 1179. Pope Alexander's letter to William of Sens was 
actually written on 28 May 1170 and belongs to a series of letters against the 
Lombard's christological. doctrine issued by the Pope to northern French prelates from 
the time of the Council of Tours in 1163. "6 This letter does not appear in any of 
Wendover's usual sources. This same letter of May 1170, however, was reproduced 
by John of Cornwall in the second edition of his Eulogium ad Alexandrum papam, 
written around the time of the Third Lateran Council. ' 17 Of the five surviving 
manuscripts of the Eulogium, moreover, four are English. ' 18 Roger of Wendover's 
inclusion of the letter of 1170 rather than the most recent one of Febuary 1177 
together with the strong manuscript tradition of the Eulogium, in which the letter of 
1170 is published, in England, suggests that the Eulogium is his immediate source. If 
this is the case, it perhaps shows a special interest on the part of Wendover in 
changing attitudes to Peter Lombard. '19 The sources cited by Wendover therefore 
reveal absolutely nothing about the existence, date or composition of the lost libellus. 
Alexander HI's letter together with the two separate accounts of the Fourth 
Lateran Council decree, one under the year 1179 and the other under 1215, form a 
115 See M. Gibbs and J. Lang, Bishops and Rýforin 1215-1272 ivith special reference to the Lateran Council 
of 1215 (Oxford, 1934), p. 105 for the dissemination of the Lateran decrees in England. A copy may have been 
brought back to St. Albans by Abbot William 0 214-123 5) who attended the Council. See Gesta abbatum monasteri 
Sancti Albani 3 vols., Rolls Series 28.4 (London, 1867-9) 1, p. 261. M. W. Bloomfield and M. Reeves, 'The 
Penetration of Joachimism into Northern Europe', Speculuin 29 (1954), p. 785 assume that Wendover is citing from 
Joachim's lost work on the grounds that his citations are the same as those found in the Lateran decree. It would 
seem more likely, however, that Wendover's source is the decree itself. 
116PL 200.685. See Hefele-Leclercq V. 2,1110-11 for the previous confusion of this letter of 1177 with the acts 
of the Third Lateran Council. 
117L-,, 
Eulogium ad Alexandruin Papain, p. 257. 
118 Hdring, 'The Eulogium', p. 253. 
"9Reeves. lnfluence, p. 45 says Wendover's account 'shows more than a formal interest. ' 
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coherent narrative from beginning to end: the first signs of opposition to Peter 
Lombard, as revealed by the letter of Alexander 111; Joachim's attack, associated both 
thematically and chronologically with that of Alexander Ill; 120 finally, the passing 
of time along with a change in papal attitude from the days of Pope Alexander to 
those of Innocent III which accounts for the reversal of papal policy and Joachim's 
eventual condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council. 121 Wendover's main sources, 
therefore, are Alexander's letter to Archbishop William and the Lateran decree itself. 
There is no citation from the lost work which is not mediated through the text of the 
conciliar condemnation. It is in his rationalisation. of events that the significance of 
Wendover's account lies; as evidence for the authenticity of the lost libellus it is not 
only irrelevant, but misleading. 
Other chroniclers mention in passing Joachim's lost work, but are nowhere 
near as detailed as Wendover's account. Again all the signs point towards a 
dependence on the Lateran decree rather than independent access to the libellus. 122 
A second approach to the problem of the libellus mentioned in the Lateran 
decree is to deny its authenticity altogether. 12' The starting premise here is that the 
Lateran Council's representation of Joachim's doctrine is totally incompatible with the 
doctrine found in his extant works, particularly the Psalterium decem chordarum. The 
most important exponent of this view is Francesco Foberti who argued that the lost 
work was a Cistercian forgery, fabricated with the aim of discrediting Joachim's name 
and thwarting the success of his rival Order of Fiore. 124 He went so far as to deny 
that Joachim had ever attacked Peter Lombard. 125 Foberti's thesis highlighted the 
120Flores historiaruin 1, p. 12 1: 'Scripsit etiam eisdem diebus contra eundem Petnim Lumbardum abbas Joachim 
Florensis coenobii libellum'. 
121jbid., p. 122: 'Stetit autern haec indeterminata altercatio a diebus Alexandri papae usque in tempora Innocentii 
papae per annos multos'. 
122 For other accounts, see E. Pispisa. Gioacchino da Fiore ei Cronisti Mediemli (Messina, 
1988), pp. 41-71; 
Reeves, Influmce, pp-65-6. 
12'See especially, F. Foberti, Nuoý, i studi and Gioacchino da Fiore e il GioachinLwno antico e moderno 
(Padua, 
1942); also, J. I. Saranyana, Joaquin de Flore _i, 
Toinds de Aquino. Historia Doctrinal de una Polemica (Pamplona, 
1979). 
124NUOVi studi, pp. 106-131. For Cistercian hostility to the Florensians in Calabria, see 
Russo, Gioacchino da 
Fiore e le Fondazioni Florensi, pp. 217-23. 
125NUOI, i studi. pp. 81-105. 
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crucial opposition of the Cistercians to Joachim's monastic reform. It failed, however. 
to explain Joachim's own references to his opposition to Peter Lombard. ' 26 The 
Lombard is explicitly named in an early work-, the De vita sancti Benedicti,, ' 27 and 
there are various textual references to his Sentences in other works. 128 But now that 
Innocent III has been eliminated as the chief instigator of the condemnation, the role 
of Cistercian opposition must be reassessed. 
A variation on this hypothesis is the argument that the lost work is indeed 
authentic but that it, and by extension Joachim's doctrine, is misrepresented by the 
Lateran Coul , lCil. 129 This hypothesis has the advantage of preserving Joachim's 
orthodoxy without resorting to an outlandish conspiracy theory. One final alternative 
is that the work mentioned in the Lateran decree is none other than the Psalterium 
decem chordarum, Joachim's main extant work on the Trinity. Whether, as Giovanni 
di Napoli tentatively suggests, selections from the Psalterium were made and 
submitted by the Cistercian Order, is another matter. 130 The important point is that 
the similarities between the libellus and the Psalterium are numerous and striking 
enough to make this a serious possibility. It also forces us to reassess one massive 
assumption of the entire debate, that by the phrase, 'the book or tract on the unity or 
essence of the Trinity which Abbot Joachim published against Master Peter Lombard', 
the Lateran Council is referring to a work against Peter Lombard under this specific 
title. Since the decree is the only source for the existence of such a work, there is no 
way of knowing whether the title De unitate seu essentia Trinitatis is authentic or one 
126See L. Tondelli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e il Concilio Laterano 11', La Scuola Cattolica 71 (1943), 126-31. 
127 Edited by C. Baraut, 'Un tratado inýdito de Joacquin de Fiore: De vita sancti Benedicti et de officio divino 
secundum eius 
ýoctrinam', Analecta sacra tarraconensia 24 (195 1), pp. 76-7: 'abolita primo impietate Sabellii, qui 
personas negavit, secundo pravitate Arrii, qui unitatem scidit. tertio blasphernia Petri, qui unitatem a Trinitate 
dividens, quaternitatem inducit. ' Foberti, Nuovi Studi, pp. 98-105 argued that this passage was not authentic. 
128psalt., fol. 277rb; Tondelli, Il libro dellefigure 1, p. 61. 
129Reeves, bifluence, p. 128; Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, p. 137 distinguishes between the orthodoxy of 
Joachim's confession of faith and the ambivalence which sometimes characterizes his theological speculation; di 
Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. 
"O'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. pp. 679-85. A suggestion treated with scepticism by Selge, 
'Uorigine delle opere 1, p. 115 n. 61, Nx-ho is otherwise receptive to the idea that the first book of the Psalteriuln 
is 
the lost work (pp. 113-15). 
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adopted by the drafters of the decree for purely descriptive purposes. "' rnie extent 
to which the Psalterium is concerned with refuting the error of Quatemity and the 
number of literal correspondences between it and the work referred to in the Lateran 
decree really does throw doubt on the existence of a work directed specifically against 
Peter Lombard and distinct from the Psalterium. 
'Fhe strongest argument against the identification of the lost libellus with the 
Psalterium is that the obvious similarities could very well be explained by Joachim's 
tendency to re-use the same images and analogies throughout his works. The 
resemblance between the decree and the Fsalterium, therefore, is by no means absolute 
proof that the work referred to is in fact the Psalterium rather than another work. 
Thus, for example, scholars agree that all the figures found in the Liberfigurarum are 
based on textual or drawn figures taken from earlier works but since no figures in 
Joachim's extant works correspond to the anti-Lombard figure found in one 
manuscript of the Liberfigurarum it is reasonable to assume that these figures must 
132 have belonged to the lost work. Moreover, the text which accompanies the figure 
includes the phrase 'the essence is a certain supreme reality which is common to the 
133 
three Persons, and which is neither unbegotten, nor begotten, nor proceeding'. 
Both drawing and text together, therefore, constitute another reference to the 
Lombard's doctrine. If this figure was indeed part of the lost work it would explain 
its survival in only one manuscript of the Liberfigurarum and what seems to be its 
deliberate omission from the other surviving manuscripts-' 34 
Similarly, Joachim's reference towards the end of the Fsalterium to the passage 
from the Sentences also cited in the decree may just be the repetition of a previous 
"'See di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da. Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', p. 636 n. 57; Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatiý, p. 247 
n. 44; Selge, 'L'origine delle opere', p. 113 n. 58. 
132 Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, p. 73. For the figure, see Dresden, Landesbiblioteck 
A. 121, fol. 89r; 
Tondelli, Il libro dellefigure 1, p. 61 and II, XXVIa, Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, pp. 212-23. 
133 Tondelli. Il libro dellefigure 1, p. 61: 6essentia est quaedarn. surnma res communis tribus personis, nec 
ingenita, nec genita. nec procedens. ' 
114 Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae. pp. 100,103-4,21-1. 
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attack. "' Not only does Joachim attack the view that 'the one divine substance is 
a certain supreme reality (quacdam summa res) which is common to the three Persons, 
and that each individual Person is that same substance', he calls this doctrine insane 
(vesaniam. ). This passage finds an almost literal echo in the Fourth Lateran Council's 
account of Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard's doctrine of a quaedam summa res as 
insania. 
The evidence, then, either for the existence of an independent work, now lost, 
attacking Peter Lombard or for the lost work being none other than the Psalterium is 
inconclusive. The only contemporary reference to the lost work is in the decree itself. 
As to the theory that the Psalterium is the lost work, again this is undermined by 
Joachim's recycling habits. Either way, it is fair to say that the description of the lost 
work in the decree is at least consistent with Joachim's extant works on the Trinity. 
4. Joachim's accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard 
The subject of Joachim's attack, according to the Council was Peter Lombard's 
statement in the Sentences that 'a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) is 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that reality is neither begetting nor begotten nor 
proceeding'. This is not in fact a literal citation from the Sentences but a paraphrase 
based on several of the main arguments from the section in which the Lombard 
discusses the question of whether the divine essence begets. 136 Now whether the lost 
libellus or the decree itself is the source of this paraphrase is impossible to say 
without access to the libellus for comparison. 137 Certainly, the text which 
accompanies the anti-Lombard figures in the Liberfigurarum closely resembles the 
135p. 
salt., fol. 277ra-b: '0 quarn perverse modis omnibus emendavit titninque qui dixit unam substantiam esse 
quamdam stu-nmam rem communem. tribus personis, et singulam personam esse illam stibstantiam. ' See below, 
pp. 201-2. 
136ComparelSent. V. 1.6, p. 82.19-21: 'cum enim una et summa quaedarn res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia 
essentiam genuit, eadern. res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest'; with canon 2, Concilibruin, p. 
231.10- 
12: 'Quoniam quaedam summa res est Pater et Filitts, et Spiritus sanctus, et illa non est generans neque genita nec 
procedens'. Mehlmann. De Unitate Trinitad, ýz, p. 253 says that the omission of the word una 
in the Council's version 
suggests that the reference is to Joachim's attack in the libellus in which Joachim himself refers to this section 
from 
the Sentence, -z, rather than to the Sentences themselves. 
137 Mehlmann. De Unitate TrinitatLv, p. 247 n. 45 takes the view that this account of Joachim's opposition is most 
probably a reference to the lost work rather than a literal citation from 
it. 
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passage cited in the Lateran decree. "8 Whatever the source of this conflation, 
however, there is a clearly stated progression from the concept of a quaedam summa 
res to that res as neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. In other words, one 
of the presuppositions of the view that the essence does not beget is that it is a 
quaedam summa res. 'Mis connection between the quaedam summa res and the 
generation of the essence is implicit in the Lombard's entire approach and reflects the 
interdependency between the doctrines of divine unity and divine generation. Precisely 
the same link between these two doctrines is made in the decree, either because this 
passage is a genuine citation from Joachim's libellus or because the framers of the 
decree have so understood Joachim's opposition. At the same time, the Council 
addresses only the first aspect of Joachim's opposition, the Lombard's concept of a 
quaedam summa res, and neglects to comment on the second, the essence as non- 
begetting etc. In this respect, at least, the decree f aithfully reflects Joachim's position 
since to judge from his extant works it is true to say that Joachim's wholehearted 
opposition was explicitly directed only against the Lombard's concept of a quaedam 
summa res and never against his position that the divine essence does not beget. In 
the mind of the framers of the decree, however, not begetting or being begotten 
belongs to the concept of the quaedam summa res. But this implicit link in the decree 
is still far removed from the interpretation of thirteenth-century theologians and does 
not alone account for the discrepancy between the explicit concerns of the decree and 
their exclusive focus on the question of the essence as begetting. Thirteenth-century 
readings still constitute a significant misunderstanding. 
Joachim understood the Lombard's statement to demonstrate not so much a 
Trinity as a Quaternity in God, as though the common essence were a fourth thing 
separate from the three Persons. This is Joachim's famous accusation of Quaternity 
against Peter Lombard which is well-documented in his surviving works. The first 
book of the Psalterium is dominated by Joachim's preoccupation with the error of 
Quaternity and the spiritual blindness which he regards as its root cause. Joachim's 
opposition to the Lombard on the issue of Quaternity thus provides a focal point 
both 
138 Tondelli. II libro delle figure 1, p. 61: 'essentia est quaedarn surnma res communis tribus personis, nee 
ingenita, nee genita, nee procedens'. See Mehimann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 543 for a detailed analysis of this text 
and how closely the understanding Quaternity here corresponds to that 
found in the Lateran decree. 
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for his particular opposition to the Lombard and for his hostilitv to the kind of 
theological approach which his opponent represents. "9 He nevertheless accepts the 
validity of certain of the techniques characteristic of scholastic theology. For example, 
when making the point that God is one but not singular, he cites with approval an 
example used by grammarians which illustrates a similar point about how a singular 
subject may signify a unified plurality, e. g. 'the people run' ýnopulus currunt) . 
140 At 
the same time he makes clear that such rules are subordinate to the intelleaus 
141 spiritualis . Indeed the title and structure of his main work on the Trinity, the 
Psalterium decem chordarum, derive from a vision experienced by Joachim at 
Pentecost during his stay at the Cistercian monastery of Casamari in 1183/4.142 
Joachim stresses that the necessary precondition for his insight into the trinitarian 
mystery was his renunciation of the attempt to know God through academic study. 143 
In his view, doctrinal heresy is the inevitable outcome of contempt for the 
contemplative route to God. 144 It is born of the carnal intellect which harbours the 
misconception that God must be made to confon-n to the same conditions which 
1390n Joachim's anti-scholasticism, see Bloomfield, 'Joachim of Flora', pp. 272-4; Reeves, Influence, p. 31; 
Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, pp. 219-20; di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', pp. 631-2; 
McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, pp. 166-7. Di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', p. 651 says that this anti- 
scholasticism rather than any real difference in doctrine explains Joachim's attack. 
140See Scritti Minori di Gibacchino da Fiore. De Articulis Fidei, ed. E. Btionaititi, Fonti per ]a Storia d'Italia 
78 (Rome, 1936), p. 5.6-8. 
14'See G. di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore: Teologia e Cristologia', Aquinas 23 (1980), p. 16. 
142- salt., fol. 227va: 'Igitur donante ipso mox subscripti operis librum primum in ipso monasterio positus I 
inchoavi et ex parte perfici; secundum vero et tertium, non ibi tunc, nec eodern tempore. sed quasi post annos 
duos. ' See also the anonymous Vita ed. by Grundmann, p. 532: 'Tunc cum esset in dicto monasterio Casamarie, 
revelaturn est ei misterium Trinitatis, et scripsit ibi primum librum Psalterii decem cordarum. ' According to Luke 
of Cosenza (Vita, pp. 53940), it was at Casamari that Joachim also began work on the Expositio in Apocatypsim 
and the Liber de Concordia. Reeves, Influence, p. 23 n. 1 says the D(positio and Concordia were begun before the 
Psalterium. Recently on the chronology of Joachim's works, see Selge, *L'origine delle opere', pp. 112-13. 
143p 1 
.. -ol. 227ra: Tram aliquando ego ipse anxitL sa tfs ad verba, dei, et querebarn per exercitium lectionis ad 
veritatis notitiam pervenire; cumque ad eum per legendi studium properare flagrarem, assumens sibi pennas velut 
aquile, longius quarn erat recedebat a me. Cum atitem positus in ferore novissimo [noviciol, cepi Dei causa diligere 
psalmodiam multa. michi in scriptura, divina. psallenti sub silentio reseran ceperunt, que antea legendo vestigare 
nequiveram'. 
144 Psalt.. fols. 229vb-230rb. Cf. Richard of Saint-Victor, De trin. VI. 22, p. 260.53-9: 'Sed quod per intelligentiarn 
capere non potes, per fidei devotionem credere potes [... ] Sed forte non vultis hoc credere, eo quod non potestis 
exemplo probare vel per intelligentiam capere. ' 
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pertain to the created world. 
145 
Joachim's ob session with the error of Quatemity derives from the interaction 
of his trinitarian theology with his theology of history. 146 His understanding of 
history as the realisation of the immanence of the three divine Persons in the historical 
process rendered any hint of something fourth particularly intolerable. The genius of 
Joachim's use of the ps altery-tri angle figure lies precisely in its demonstration that 
unity and trinity are compatible ideas, rather than mutually exclusive ones leading to 
Quaternity. 147 The indivisibility of the psaltery's triangular form means that 
undivided unity runs seamlessly into trinity in such a way that three seem to be one 
and one to be three. 148 Each comer, because it consists of two lines converging in 
one distinct angle, conveys simultaneously the idea of threeness and unity. 14' The 
entire figure satisfies the requirements of trinity and unity, since the three comers are 
nothing if not the entire figure and vice versa. "' In this way, unity is not divorced 
from trinity, but they are one and the same thing. 
Joachim's most important attack on Quaternity has not received the attention 
it deserves given its close resemblance to the account of his doctrine found in the 
145p 1 
., sa t fol. 229ra: 'Nee negamus trinitatem in unius confessione substantie, sed partium scissiones, quas 
cam" sibi fingit intellectus horremus'. 
146 On Joachim's theology of history see Reeves, Influence, 16-27 and 'T'he Originality and Influence of Joachim 
of Fiore, Traditio 36 (1980), 269-316; G. Wendelborn, Gott und Geschichte. Joachim von Fiore und die Hoffinung 
der Christenheit (Wien, 1974); E. R. Daniel, Me Double Procession of the Holy Spirit in Joachim of Fiore's 
Understanding of History', SI-7eculum 55 (1980), 469-83, Mottu. La Manifestation; various relevant articles in Storia 
e messagio in Gioacchino da Fiore, Atti del I Congresso internazionale di studi gioachimiti 19-23 Settembre 1979 
(S. Giovanni in Fiore, 1980) and LEta dello Spirito e la Fine dei Tempi in Gioacchino da Fiore e nel 
GibachiMi-vino Medievale, Atti del 11 Congresso internazionale di studi gioachimiti 6-9 Settembre 1984 (S. Giovanni 
in Fiore, 1986). 
147 On the originality of Joachim's use of the psaltery figure, see B. Hirsch-Reich, 'The Symbolism of Musical 
Instruments in the Psalterium decein chordarum Of Joachim of Fiore and its Patristic Sources', Studia Patr&tica 
9 (Berlin, 1966), 540-51; Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Figurae, pp. 51-61. 
148Psalt., fol. 230vb: 'Igittw vas ipswn tinum est. sed tamen triangulatum-, sed tamen in tribus comibus miro 
modo consistens. Adeo enim tria comua ipsa unitas possidet indivisa, ut et tria videantur esse untim et unum tria'. 
149p I ., -231ra: 
'Non enim aliquod triurn si totaliter horum quod libet contemplari volueris hoc est sa t fols. 230vb 
pro quantitate duarurn linearum que conveniunt in angulo tino distincte ibi occupat partern suarn et aliquid seorsurn 
a duabus attingit, sed ipsa indivisa similtudo substantie mirabiliter sufficit ad ipsa tria, ita ut 
in uno quolibet duo 
necessarie accipiantur. ' 
15OPsalt.. fol. 234ra: 'Non autern ita sunt tria cornua inserta sive sculpta in ipso, tit aliud sit Psalterium et aliud 
tria cornua eiws, sed illud idem. Quomodo illud idem'? Quia tottim 
Psalterium, tota tria cornua; et tota tria corntia 
toturn psalteriurn *. 
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Lateran decree. '5' Having railed against the monarchianism of Sabellius and the 
subordinationism of Arius, Joachim lashes out once again against the error of 
Quaternity: 
But how perversely in every way did lie correct both these errors, who said that one divine substance is a certain supreme reality (quaedam summa res) common to the three Persons, and that each individual Person is that same substance. For by that it is as if the number one hundred was understood for the substance, but three tens (denarii) for the Persons. Or, if he did not mean to say that the 
substance is greater than each of the Persons, it is as if the three denarii were understood for the 
Persons, and a fourth denarius for the substance, just as if God were not Trinity but Quaternity. Yet 
they endeavour to conceal this insane doctrine (vesania) in this way, and thus they say that each one 
of the Persons is the substance, as if they said that three clenarii are one denarius, and one denarius is 
three. But in both of these positions there is an inequality. For one denatius pertains to the Father, one 
to the Son, and one to the Holy Spirit. Thus all three (trinatius) together pertain to the Trinity [... ] the 
value of the denarius is meant to designate the perfection of the Person, and not to signify quantity. 
Similarly, three denarii (ternarius) are used to designate trinity, not to signify quantity. For where there 
is no limit [in terms of quantity], no such signification can be given [... ] T'herefore, three denarii 
designate the three Persons, of whom each one is perfect God. Thirty (unus tricenarius), which is the 
collection of the denarii, designates the Trinity of one substance, because perfect God is the Trinity and 
perfect God is each individual Person. Consider the end of the matter iri that sacred name of God which 
is IEUE: IE is one name and is referred to the Father; EU is one name and is referred to the Son; UE 
is one name and is referred to the Holy Spirit; IEUE is one name, but not because it can simply be 
referred to the Father alone, or to the Son alone, or to the Holy Spirit alone, but to all three together. 
This passage is an extremely rich source both for the nature of Joachim's opposition 
to Peter Lombard and its possible relationship with his alleged doctrine of unity of 
collection as understood in the Lateran decree. Clearly Joachim thinks that by calling 
the essence a res, Peter Lombard has established it as a distinct thing with a numerical 
value. This number does not equal the Persons either together or separately. For the 
number 100 (essence) is not equal to 3x 10 (Persons), nor does 3x 10 (Persons) 
equal 10 (essence). But 3x 10 (Persons) does equal 30 (collection of Persons/unity 
of essence), the collection of the denard. Whether or not Joachim's numerical 
comparisons are heterodox is something which can and has been endlessly debated. 
The important point is that they are certainly ambiguous. There is no doubt that this 
passage could be construed as putting forward a doctrine of unity of collection. 
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What is particularly significant in this connection is the way in which Joachim's 
"'Fol. 277rb. See Mehimann, De Unitate Trinitat&, pp. 548-57. 
152Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatig, p. 555 defends Joachim: 'Weil Joachim kein quantitativ-numerisches 
Verstdndnis der g6ttlichen Einheit hat. liegt ihm ein kollek-tiver Begriff der Einheit der Trinit5t von vomeherein 
fern! ' Joachim's own orthodoxy is not the issue here; my argument is that this passage is susceptible to a tritheistic 
reading. 
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polemic here is echoed, sometimes literally, in the Lateran decree. Firstly, there is the 
reference to the offending passage from the Lombard's Sentences, which approximates 
fairly closely to the citation in the decree. In addition Joachim describes the 
Lombard's position as utterly insane 0., esania), an accusation which is also reported 
by the Council (insania). '5' Moreover, it is quite possible from this passage to see 
how Joachim's accusation of Quaternity against Peter Lombard might both alert 
someone to a tendency towards unity of collection and also be interpreted as the 
tangible result of an unconscious and not always articulate tritheism. Joachim's 
objection to the Lombard's concept of the essence as a res may seem to proceed from 
his own concept of the essence as the collection of the three Persons, which is 
encapsulated in his use of arithmetic to bring out the difference between his own and 
the Lombard's position. In other words, Joachim's own inadequate concept of unity 
of essence could conceivably account for his reaction to the Lombard's quaedam 
summa res as a fourth thing. 
This constant polemic against the error of Quaternity begins to look less like 
a conceptual difficulty with the Lombard's ten-ninology, as di Napoli maintains, than 
a real difference in doctrine. Joachim's doctrine is rooted much more in the 
circurnincession and interpenetration of the three Persons than in the Lombard's 
solitary res of unity. 154 In this context, his ob sessive preoccupation with Quaternity 
might appear to those who agreed with the Lombard as nothing other than the 
expression of a much more fundamental error of unity of collection. This, at least, is 
the reading found in the Lateran decree. 
Joachim 9s accusation of Quatemity, far from being a 'confused protest' against 
the triumph of scholasticism"-' expresses a real concern in trinitarian theology. It 
153 The term in-vania was a common one in accusations of heresy. For example, Abelard, TChr IV. 77, p. 301 and 
Dialectica, pp. 554-5; Robert of Melun, Uent. 3. I, p. 2.7-9; Walter of Saint-Victor, Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos, 
p. 319.6,319.10. 
"'See esp. F--, cpositio, fol. 34rb: 'Si enim non prius intelligimus esse tres, quomodo tres ipsos simul possumus 
intelligere unurn? Alioquin qui sic accipiunt unurn. quod trium essentiam personarum ut aliquod unum 
distinctum 
et proprium esse dicant, sic, inquarn, aliquod unurn singulare. quomodo cum credimus, 
deus pater untis est, deus 
filius unus est. deus spiritus sanctus untis est. quasi quartum aliquod sit divina substantia. 
' Mehlmann. De Unitate 
Trinitati: g, p. 567 comments: 'Die Einheit Gottes üt für Joachim diese Perichorese der 
drei Personen, daher verurieilt 
er in aller Schärfe den Versuch, das Eins Cunum") des göttlichen Wesens in einem 
den drei Personen gemeinsam 
unpersönlichen Gottwesen zu sehen'. 
155B. McGinn. 'Apocalypticism in the Middle Ages: An Historiographical Sketch'. MS 37 (1975), p. 280. 
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belongs to a series of similar accusations dating back to the charge levelled by 
Bernard of Clairvaux against Gilbert of Poitiers, that he had made God a Quaternity 
by separating God from his divinity. 156 'I"he accusations of Bernard and other 
'traditionalists' arose from an uneasiness about the new way in which some of their 
contemporaries were talking about the divine essence or nature. It seemed to them that 
to acknowledge the common divinity shared by the three Persons, some people had 
inflated it to something greater than the Persons and consequently God himself. The 
Porretani countered that Gilbert's distinction between essence and Person was a 
conceptual one and did not therefore imply Quaternity. 157 Far from being a disciple 
of Gilbert, Joachim actually takes his inspiration from Gilbert's accusers. 
One strand in twelfth-century preoccupations with the error of Quaternity 
centred, therefore, on the sensitive issue of a distinction between essence and Person 
or the essence and the personal properties - either way making the essence a separate 
thing. Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard certainly belongs in this category and is 
particularly closely connected to Bernard's critique, of which Joachim almost certainly 
would have known. 158 But the other, closely interrelated theme in accusations of 
Quaternity may also have a significant bearing on how contemporaries understood 
Joachim's attack. Several authors, both scholastic and anti-scholastic, anchor their 
understanding of Quaternity in one aspect or another of the doctrine of divine 
generation. "9 This suggests that it was not always possible or even useful to 
separate the question of the unity of the essence from the generation of the essence 
when identifying the error of Quaternity. 
Most intriguing of all is the vitriolic attack of Walter of Saint-Victor on Peter 
Lombard, among others., in his Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae, written around 
156 De consideratione V. 15, Opera 111, p. 479. Also Gerhoch of Reichersberg, Letter to 
Pope Hadrian. XLHI. 2, 
p. 107.82-4. Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, Libellus rV. 1, p. 55. 
157Sententie Magi, -ztri Gisleberti, ed. Hdring, 7, p. 111: 'Queritur, cum una sit et eadem communis trium essentia 
personarum. si sit diversa a personis ut sit quaternitas. non trinitas, ut quidarn 
dicunt heretici. Nos autem dicimus 
non esse diversam. Sed, ut ait Augustinus, ratio dividit. ' 
"'Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 349 describes the De con-, dderatione as Joachim's 'trinit5tstheologisches 
Lehrbuch'. 
159Sirnon of Totimai, Disputationes LXXXVII. 2, p. 251: 'Si ergo potest generare alium a se et 
Patre et Filio, 
ergo quaternitas potest esse in trinitate. 
'; Quaestiones Varsaviensis. p. 297. 
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the time of the Third Lateran Council. 160 If the lost libellus is indeed an authentic. 
early work, it probably postdates Walter's tract by a few years. 161 Walter takes 
extreme exception to the Lombard's view, which he attributes to the influence of 
Abelard, that the divine essence does not beget because since it is una et summa 
quaedam res, if essence begot essence, the same thing would have begotten itself. 162 
The Lombard thereby commits both the errors of Sabellius, by saying that the same 
thing (res) is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the error of Arius, by denying that the 
Son is begotten from the Father's substance. 161 Walter then cites some long passages 
from Augustine and Bernard which reject any assimilation of the common essence or 
divinity to a fourth Person. 64 A series of citations from the 'errors' of Gilbert of 
Poitiers (actually the Sententie divinitatis), Peter of Poitiers, Jol-in Damascene and 
Peter Lombard follow in which these authors firstly discuss the relation of essence to 
Person and, secondly, put forward, in one form or another, the view that the essence 
does not beget. 165 From this it would seem that Walter's opposition is 
simultaneously targeted at the idea of a quaedam summa res non-begetting and a 
quaedam summa res as a fourth thing. 
In several passages Walter identifies the error of Quaternity as one of the 
consequences of Peter Lombard's assertion that the essence does not beget. '66He 
objects that there is no fourth divinity or essence common to the three Persons, but 
"'Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos, pp. 310-26. 
16'Mehlmann. De Unitatis Trinitat&, pp. 273-8 compares Walter and Joachim. 
"'Contra Quatuor Labvrinthos., p. 310.14-19, citing from the Lombard's Sentences. 
16'Ibid., pp. 310-11. 
'64Ibid., pp. 311-14. 
165jbid, pp. 315-17. 
166jbid., p. 317.16-24: 'Quod vero sequitur: an essentia genuit essentiam, quid ad Spiriturn 
Sanctum pertineat 
omnino nescitur curn non sit genitus, nisi sicut Abeilardus et iste sentit: si 
Spiritus Sanctus de substantia Patris est 
duos filios habet; si inquarn, ita proposuisset non fecisset fucurn ut dicit Ambrosius, timens; proferre quod sentit 
nec consequentia sua diabolica illarn quartarn divinitatem quarn 
Augustinus et veritas damnant, et ipse sub nomine 
divine essentie denuo ressuscitatam introducere auderet personis tribus communern nulli autern propriarn, quasi 
aliud sit persona. aliud essentialis natura. 
' 
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proper to none of them, which is neither begetting nor begotten. 
167 r Mis point is 
made explicitly a number of times; the link is also implicit in this whole section and 
is one of the salient points in Walter's summary of these and various other errors. 
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It is as though Walter's hostility to the concept of a quaedam summa res is further 
exacerbated by the Lombard's denial that the essence begets (and vice versa). 
Walter's attack on the Lombard's trinitarian theology demonstrates that the 
accusation of Quaternity could conceivably be linked both to the concept of a 
quaedam summa res and the essence as non-begetting, and legitimately so given that 
these two doctrines are so closely linked by the Lombard himself. It reveals the strong 
association of ideas between the quaedam summa res, the generation of the essence 
and the accusation of Quaternity in such a way that any one of these three would 
naturally bring to mind the other two. Although, therefore, Joachim never discusses 
the question of whether essence begot essence, his accusations of Quaternity against 
Peter Lombard could be interpreted as another traditionalist attack on the view that the 
essence does not beget. From this it could be inferred that Joachim thought that the 
essence did beget. 
Joachim's perspective on the generation of the essence is not in fact dissimilar 
to that of Walter's predecessor as prior at Saint Victor, Richard of Saint-Victor. 169 
In his De trinitate, written some time after 1162, Richard, like Walter, also attacked 
the Lombard for denying that essence begot essence, though he did not accuse him of 
Quaternity. 170 There is general agreement that Richard's concept of persona is the 
167 Ibid., p. 322.5-9: 'Que cum ita sint, manifestissimis rationibus et auctoritatibus conuincunctur isti falsum 
introducere trinitatem per nescio quam. divinitatem sitie essentiam quartam, tribus quidem communem, nulli autem 
propriam, que nec gignit nec gignitur. ' Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitat&, p. 276 draws particular attention 
here to 
the resemblance with Joachim's attack. 
"'Contra Quatuor Labvrinthos, p. 333.13-17: 'Quod Pater et persona Patris gignit, sed non de natura. Quod 
Filius et persona Filii gignitur, sed non de natura. Quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit de utroque, sed non 
de natura. 
Quod persona et gignit et gignitur et procedit; natura nec crenuit nec genita est nec procedit. 
Quod una est trium 
personarurn quarta divinitas tribus communis, nulli propria'. 
169Richard was appointed prior in 1162. For his biography, see C. Ottaviano, 
Riccardo di S. Vittore. La vita, 
le opere, ill-? ensiero (Rome, 1933), pp. 411-22. 
170Dated by I Ribailler in his edition. Richard de Saint- Victor. De Trinitate, texte critique (Paris, 1958), p. 12. 
For Richard's attack. see De trin-VI. 22, pp. 259-60 and De sul)erexcellenti bal, 7tisino 
Christi, PL 196.1015A. 
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anchor of his entire trinitarian theology. 171 This may account for his attack on the 
Lombard, since underlying his revision of Boethius' classic definition of Person is a 
conception of substance as something concrete unlike the Lombard's rather abstract 
view of the divine essence as a quaedam summa res. 172 Richard does not think, 
therefore, that the essence as quaedam summa res begot, but that the essence as 
Person or hypostasis begot. Accordingly, it could be argued that Richard and Peter 
Lombard really agree, since neither thinks that the essence as quaedam summa res 
begets, and that Richard's attack is the result of a terminological misunderstanding. 
Consequently, Richard would not be implicated in the Lateran condemnation of 
Joachim's attack. 173 
For Joachim the fact that the Father begets the Son also presupposes that there 
174 is a substantia genita . His clearest statement on the question occurs in his 
Professio fidei, which the Protocol of Anagni wrongly referred to as the last chapter 
of the De articulis fidei. 175 Like Richard of Saint Victor, Joachim refers to patristic 
usage: 'God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom and essence from 
essence. ' 
176 The Son is from the unbegotten substance of the Father, i. e. from the 
Person of the Father, not from the common substance of the whole Trinity. '-'7 
171 Ottaviano, Riccardo di S. Vittore, p. 517; A. M. Ethier, Le De Trinitate de Richard de Saint-Victoir, 
Publications de l'Institut d'6tudes m&di6vales d'Ottawa (Paris-Ottawa, 1939), pp. 21-3; J. Bligh, 'Richard of St 
Victor's De Trinitate: Augustinian or AbelardianT, Heithrop Joumal 1 (1960), 118-39; P. Hofmann. 'Analogie 
und Person. Zur Trinitdtsspekulation Richards von St. -Victor', Theologie und Philosophie 59 (1984), 191-234; U. 
Kiihneweg, 'Der Trinitdtsaufweis Richards von St. Vik-tor', Theologie und Philosophie 62 (1987). 401-22. 
`See esp. L. Ott, Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briqfliteratur der FrÜhscholastik, BGPTM 34 (Münster, 
1937), pp. 647-51 and H. Wipfler, Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers und die Trinitätsspekulation 
des Richard von St. Viktor. Ein Vergleich, BGPTM 41.1 (Münster. 1965), pp. 206-10. 
173 See DTC 15.2,1719; Ott, Untersuchungen. pp. 650-1; G. Salet trans., Richard de Saint Victor. La Triniti, 
Sources chritiennes 63 (Paris, 1959), p. 506, Hofinann, *Analogie und Person', p. 194 n. 17. 
174p -234ra: 'Est enim substantia genita in ingenita et econverso, et nihilominus procedens salt fols. 233vb 
substantia in genita et in ingenita et econverso; ita tamen tit propter surnmam unitatern, sic alia persona dicatur et 
sit substantia ingenita, alia sub genita, alia procedens, tit tarnen simul tres persone non sint tres substantie, sed una 
substantia. ' 
175protoCol, p. 139. The Protocol does not comment on the question of the essence as begetting. 
An edition of 
the Profes,, zio and a discussion of its authenticity is provided by P. de Leo, Gibacchino da 
Fiore. A-vl)etti inediti 
della i, ita e ddle opere (Soveria Mannelli, 1988), pp. 165-75. 
176pr(? feS. Vio, p. 173.12-13. Richard of Saint-Victor. De trin. VI. 22, p. 259. 
17'prqfe., ZZio. p. 173.15-17: 'confiteor Filitim esse de stibstantia Patris, id est. de stibstantia 
ingenita, quarn Greci 
dicunt ypostasis, Latini vero personarn Patris, non. quod absit, de substantia totius 
Trinitatis. quasi de cornmuni'. 
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Elsewhere he finds it useful to spell out this distinction between the essence of each 
Person and the common essence of all three Persons. 178 T'hus both Richard and 
Joachim use substantia in the sense of persona -hypostasi: y, not in the sense of 
quaedam summa reS. 179 Joachim even anticipates the objection that his position 
implies that there are two separate substances, the substance of the Father and the 
substance of the Son. "O His language is entirely consistent with the view that Person 
not essence or substance begets and is thus not in friction with the Lombard's position 
or that of the Council. 181 
It is possible to see in the light of both Richard's and Walter's attacks how 
Joachim's uneasiness at the Lombard's concept of a quaedam summa res might have 
been still further aggravated by his opponent's assertion that the essence is neither 
begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, especially since Joachim, like Richard held the 
view that the essence as Person or hypostasis did beget. 182 The addition of the 
essence as non-begetting to the already objectionable quaedam summa res was bound 
to sharpen Joachim's sense of the Lombard's res as a fourth thing. But for Joachim 
the Lombard's denial that the essence begets is not the main issue, but only the 
necessary consequence of his more basic error: his concept of the essence as a 
quaedam summa res and its resultant separation from the three Persons. In this sense, 
it could be argued that one's position on the generation of the essence is merely 
symptomatic of a much more fundamental position on the question of divine unity. 
178Psalt., fol. 234ra: 'sed ad differentiarn unitatis. hoc est. unius substantie trium personarum. ne quis, quod 
absit, sic accipiat unam trium personarum essentiam. quomodo essentiam cuiuscumque persone. cum ibi nomine 
essentie inelligamus simul ingenitum et genittim et procedentem; hic aut solum Patrem. aut solum Filium, aut solum 
Spiritum Sanctum. ' 
179See Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis. p. 263 for Joachim. 
"Professio, p. 173.18-20: 'Nec quia dico Filium esse de solius Patris substantia, iccirico separo substantiam 
Filii a substantia Patris, ut cogar propter hoc duas substantias confiteri', ibid., p. 174.6-9: 'Inde est ut substantiam 
vel sapientiam genitam dicam esse inseparabilem et inseccessibilem ab ingenita, ac per hoc, sicut 
ingenitam nego 
esse genitarn et e converso, ut tamen simul genitam et ingenitarn non dicam duas substantias esse, sed simplicem 
unam. ' Cf. RicharcL De trin. VI. 22, p. 260: 'Absque dubio substantia Filii est genita. substantia 
Patris ingenita, nec: 
ingenita substantia est genita, nec genita est ingenita. Nec tamen sequitur tit ibi sit alia et alia substantia. sed alia 
et alia persona. ' 
181 Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, pp. 244-5.257,264-7. 
182 MehImann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 253 n. 109 considers that Joachim's opposition was not to the concept 
of a quaedain sumina res as such but to a quacdain suinina res as non-begettintg etc.; only this could account 
for 
the acctLsation of Quaternity. 
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Joachim objected to the Lombard's quaedam summa res and elsewhere used the 
language of substantia genita. The Lombard and the Council affirmed the quaedam 
summa res and rejected the begetting essence. 'Mus to attack the quaedam Summa res, 
as Walter's example shows, was to attack the entire quaedam summa res1non- begetting 
essence axis. 
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5. UnitY qfcollection and use of analogy 
A causal link is drawn in the Lateran decree between Joachim's accusation of 
Quatemity against Peter Lombard and the allegation in turn levelled against him, that 
his concept of divine unity amounted to nothing more than a unity of collection: 
namely three Persons and the common essence as though a fourth [Person], manifestly protesting that 
there is no thing (res) which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, nor essence, substance or nature, although he concedes that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence, substance and nature; and yet in this way he does not confess a true and proper unity, but one of collectivity and resemblance. 
Thus, to follow the progression of thought laid out in the decree, Joachim takes 
exception to the Lombard's concept of a quaedam summa res (which is neither 
begetting etc. ) because he himself has no place for a res as the subject of the three 
Persons., only as their predicate. ' And this distinction between the res as subject and 
the res as predicate is tantamount to unity of collection. rflie distinction being made 
here is in fact a technical one which would have been immediately recognised by 
contemporary scholars; to an untutored eye it might seem as though the propositions 
'there is a res which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit' (which Joachim allegedly denies) 
and 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence' (which Joachim allegedly concedes) 
amounted to the same thing. 2 But clearly the framers of the decree discerned a real 
difference between the two statements, otherwise not only would there have been no 
reason for them to mention it, but to do so would have weakened their case against 
the Abbot. Instead, the fact that Joachim denies that there is any res which is the three 
Persons is indicative of unity of collection. ' 
More or less the same interpretation of Joachim's and Peter Lombard's 
'Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Erpositio supersecunduin decretalein, Opuscula Theologica I (Rome, 1954) 1189, p. 428: 
'concedat quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus stint una essentia, una substantia, una natura, quasi tina essentia 
possit praedicari de trinus personis, ut dicamus: Tres personae sunt una essentia, non autem e converso, ut dicatur: 
Una essentia est tres personae'. Di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', p. 666 rejects the logic of 
Aquinas' distinction. 
'This is di Napoli's argument, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. pp. 651-2,681-2. Accordingly Joachim 
and the Lombard differ merely in their point of departure, from Persons and essence respectively, and not 
in their 
actual concept of unity. 
3 Di Napoli. 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. pp. 652-3 disputes both this and the logic of the decree 
here. The position attributed to Joachim is not indicative of unity of collection since he still professes an 
identity 
between the three Persons and the essence predicated of them. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 544 agrees, 
citing di Napoli. 
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divergent understandings of the unity of essence has been provided by Winifred 
Schachten. 4 Joachim's concept of divine unity as the circumincession or 
interpenetration of the Persons allows no room for the divine essence as an entity 
(really or conceptually) except through the identity of the Persons, a position which 
is far removed from the Lombard's concept of the essence as a quaedam summa res. ' 
'nie divinity is not referred to as the subject but can only be spoken of in the form of 
one of the Persons: the Persons owe their divinity only to their relationship with one 
another and unity is established through this relationship. 6 
Ilie reason why this distinction attributed to Joachim is significant to the 
framers of the decree and reveals so much about their understanding of his concept 
of divine unity is because it presupposes adherence to a theory of predication and of 
universals in which such distinctions would make a real difference. The point is that 
the accusation levelled here against Joachim is essentially the same as that levelled 
against Gilbert of Poitiers at the Council of Reirns. One of the charges brought against 
Gilbert was denying that 'God' or 'substance', i. e. any term denoting unity, could be 
7 the subject-term of a proposition. Words which fall into this category, i. e. words 
being used in an abstract rather than concrete sense, could never be the subject 
according to Gilbert, since by its very definition a subject was a concrete individual, 
it was 'subject' to other conditions. Gilbert, like Joachim in his comparison of the 
Lombard's teaching to someone trying to make the number 10 (essence) equal to 3 
x 10 (Persons), denies that there is one thing which is the three Persons since this 
would be like saying one thing is three things. It seems that the authors of the decree 
have inferred this from Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard, not so much because it 
is really an issue for Joachim himself, but more because such a position would be 
entirely consistent both with Joachim's opposition to the Lombard's quaedam summa 
-'4Die Trinitätslehre Joachirns von Fiore im Lichte der Frage nach der Subjektivität Gottes in 
der neueren 
Theologie*, I-, raiizi-ýzkani., zche Studien 62 (1980), 39-61. 
511)id., 
p. 4 3. 
Ibid.. pp. 53-5. 
7 See chapter 4. pp. 97-8. 
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res and his doctrine of unity of collection as understood by the Council. ' And the 
reason that they are able to make this assumption is surely because for them all these 
ideas are part of the same logico-semantic position. 
The task then is not so much to establish Joachim's orthodoxy or heterodoxy 
in absolute terms, but to establish how his doctrine may have been construed (or 
misconstrued) as heterodox by the authors of the decree, and whether they even 
understood his basic question. In particular, it is to ascertain how far twelfth-century 
discussions of the Trinity may be informing the Council's reading of Joachim's 
position. Of course to do so is to make certain assumptions about the authors of the 
decree based not on concrete evidence, but on a 'most likely scenario' approach. 
Firstly, the doctrine of unity of collection, both in its logical and theological 
forms, would be familiar to most school-trained theologians. It may be anachronistic 
of us to associate it so closely with tritheism, but it is legitimate to do so insofar as 
both unity of collection and tritheism denote not only a loose concept of unity but also 
the absence of true oneness-9 The 'arch-tritheist' of this period, Roscelin of 
Compiýgne, is really closer to the position of unity of collection than to out and out 
tritheism. Part of the difficulty posed by the notion of collection was that it was often 
genuinely helpful, if not indispensable, in clarifying certain aspects of the doctrine. In 
his De trinitate, Walter of Mortagne argued that the term 'trinitas' could not be 
predicated of any one Person alone, but of all three together, by virtue of which it 
ranked as a collective name. 'o Again Thomas Aquinas, writing after the Lateran 
condemnation, defended the use of 'trinitas' as a collective term, even though this 
would seem to undermine divine unity. He argued that although the idea of collectivity 
usually excluded any possibility of there being a true unity of essence, the term 
ctrinitas I differed in precisely this respect of designating a unity of essence: 
81t is true that in his extant works Joachim hardly ever predicates the three Persons of God, essence or 
substance. But see, for example, De articulisfidei, P-4.3: 'Ante omnia intellige 
Deurn tuum esse tres Personas 
plenas'. 
9De R6gnon, Etudes de thiologie positive IL pp. 255-7 and Fourriier. Etudes, pp. 15-16 consider Joachim a 
tritheist. Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, pp. 339-40 says the allegation has been uncritically accepted 
by 
generations of scholars and takes the view that Joachim is not a tritheist. 
"PL 209.584: Totest atitem hoc homen "Trinitas" collecthn appellari, curn de nulla personarum per se dicatur, 
sed simul de omnibus'. Also Robert of Melun, 
Uent. 3. X. p. 50; BM Royal 9E XII, fol. 148va: 'Alia quedam 
numeralia stint vel collectiva 
[ 
... 
I tit "unus", "duo". "tres". "trinus". "trinitas ... . 
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A collective term has two implications, namely plurality of subjects and some sort of unity, namely some kind of co-ordination; a 'people', for instance, is a multitude of men somehow ranked together. In the first respect 'trinity' is like other collective terms; but in the second respect it differs since in the divine Trinity there is not only unity of order, but with this also, unity of nature. " 
There has been much debate about the justness of the charge of unity of collection 
levelled against Joachim. Part of the problem in assessing his orthodoxy lies in various 
attempts to identify the source of his alleged tritheism with that of other 'heretics', 
especially those under the influence of Greek theology with its emphasis on the trinity 
of Persons over and above the unity of essence. 12 The most important of these was 
Fournier's thesis that Joachim was indirectly influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers via the 
Porretan Liber de vera philosolMia (c. 1179), and perhaps even met its author. " The 
first point of similarlity to be noted between Joachim and the Liber is the latter's 
opposition to the recent resurgence of Sabellianism, i. e. his abhorrence of the super 
unity proposed by contemporaries which threatened to engulf any real trinity. 14 These 
criticisms resemble Joachim's dislike of the Lombard's quaedam summa res, though 
they are made from a distinctly Gilbertine perspective. The modem Sabellians not only 
confuse the Persons with one another by saying that one res is Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, they also confuse the Persons with their properties. " In this way, they confuse 
everything together (Persons, properties, nature) in one fictitious, non-existent unity. 16 
"Summa theologica 6 vols. (Rome, 1894) la. 31.1, p. 263, trans. Black-friars (London, 1965). p. 85- 
12 Fournier, Etudes, p. 15; E. Anitchkof, Joachim de Flore et les milieux courtoig (Rome. 1931), pp. 146-52, 
Ottaviano, Liber contra Lombardum, p. 61; Chenu, La thiologie, pp. 300-1. Against this, see Crocco, Gibacchino 
da Fiore, pp. 118-19-, Reeves, 'Originality and Influence'. p. 270; P. Alexander, 'The Diffusion of Byzantine 
Apocaly d the Beginnings of Joachimism', in Williams ed., Prophecv and 
, pses 
in the Medieval West an 
Millenarianism, 55-106 argues that, despite his knowledge of Greek language and culture, Joachim is not influenced 
by Byzantine apocalyptic literature. On Joachim's often ambivalent attitude to the Greek Church, see Bloomfield, 
'Joachim of Flora', pp. 285-6. 
"Fournier, Etudes, pp. 80,99-100. Fournier's thesis has dominated subsequent scholarship. See Anitchkof, 
Joachiin deFlore, p. 144; deGhellinck, Le mouvetnentth6ologique, pp. 262-3-, Dondaine, Ecritsde la 'petite jcole', 
p. 9. Most recently, Saranyana, Joaquin de Fiore, pp. 34-40 rather curiously argues that the De unitate mentioned 
in the Lateran decree, but not Joachim himself, is influenced by Gilbert. 
14 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fols. 62ra-78vb. 
15Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 63vb: 'Moderni vero non so ' 
lum. confundant personas in se invicem, dicendo rem 
unam esse patrern et illam. eandem. numero esse filiurn et ipsarn eandern numero esse spiriturn sanctum, sicut 
Sabellius, sed etiam confundunt personas ipsas in ipsis proprietatibus personarum. dicentes personas 
ipsas esse ipsas 
proprietates personarum. 
"Liber. Grenoble 1085, fol. 63vb: 'Sic ergo confundunt hec omnia simul in his simul omnibus, scilicet personas. 
proprietates, naturam. deurn ipsum, et unitatern 
in hanc unitatern ficticiam'. 
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And the cause of this extreme form of Sabellianism is a failure to distinguish the 
manifold signification of the words unus, una and unum . 
17 
The author of the Liber thus rejects any view of divine unity as una res. 
Instead, divine unity is the collection of the three Persons and is nothing other than 
divine trinity. 18 The tfiree Persons are one according to the communion of majesty. '9 
Unity is not trinity nor trinity unity since only the unity of nature, not the trinity of 
Persons, is numerically one . 
20 And since a trinity is of three Persons, a duality of two 
and a unity of one, if trinity is unity, it must follow that three Persons are one 
Person 
.2' This comes very close to Joachim's argument that a quaedam summa res 
cannot be the three Persons because that is like saying 1=3. 
In this Porretan work, one of the errors imputed specifically to Peter Lombard 
is his denial that the divine essence begets. 22 In terms of the Liber's possible affinity 
with Joachim, however, this is a red herring. Joachim does not attack Peter Lombard 
because he denies the generation of the essence but because of his quaedam summa 
res. Another similarity made much of by Fournier is the author's use of biblical 
analogies which he cites against the modem Sabellians as evidence that divine unity 
is not una res, but a collection of several things . 
2' By this the author reveals the kind 
of unity which he has in mind: it is not an individual unity such as the unity of one 
man, but, using a comparison cited by the Council against Joachim, the unity of the 
17 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 64rb: 'Causa vero huius erroris eorum, quo scilicet incidunt in heresim Sabellianam, 
hec est, quia, scilicet videntur ignorare multimodarn significationern huitis nominis "unus", "una", fvttnum". ' Cf. 
Joachim Psaft., fol. 231rb. 
'8Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 68ra: 'unitas est collectio tritim personarum que nichil aliud est quarn trinitas'. 
'9Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 68ra: 'untim propter maiestatis conununionem'. 
20 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 68rb: 'nec trinitas est unitas. nec unitas est trinitas. Trinitas enim est proprietas 
simul trium personarum non nature. Unitas quoque proprietas est nature, non personarum. Persone enim tres sunt 
numero non una. Natura quoque una est numero, non tres. * 
"Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 68rb: 'sicut trinitas est tres persone, ita clualitas due persone. et unitas tma persona. 
quare curn trinitas, sit unitas, et econverso, et dualitas sit unitas et econverso, tres persone sunt una persona et 
econverso 
22 Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 89rb. See Fournier, E-tudes, pp-88-91. 
23FOtlrnier, Etudes. pp. 82-3 for references. 
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faithful in one Church. 
24 It is the unity of I Cor 3,8 (He that planteth and he that 
ivatereth arc, one ). 
25 
There are certain points of contact between the Liber's and Joachim's criticism 
of the una res doctrines of their contemporaries, particularly Peter Lombard. But there 
are no compelling textual similarities or significant usages of the same texts. Both 
object to any hint of super unity, but only Joachim accuses Peter Lombard of 
Quaternity. `17he Liber's criticism is definitely from a Gilbertine perspective, whilst 
Joachim's is much more traditionalist. It is nevertheless important for our overall 
understanding of the Lateran decree that many of the issues raised by the Council, 
particularly the denial that una res can be the subject of the three Persons, are 
discussed in the Liber. In this way, Joachim's worry about Peter Lombard's quaedam 
summa res takes on even greater significance despite and, indeed, because of the 
extreme unlikelihood of any Gilbertine influence. Joachim's attack can no longer be 
merely attributed to the influence of a doomed theological school, but is an 
independently worked out assessment. 
Rejection of this Gilbertine influence has been absolutely central to Joachim's 
'rehabilitation' and the assertion that his position is essentially Augustinian. 
26 
Particularly compelling is the argument that Joachim's anti-scholasticism and 
veneration for Bernard of Clairvaux, whom Joachim casts as the harbinger of the new 
27 28 
age, is irreconciliable with any borrowing from Gilbert of Poitiers. But proving 
that Joachim is not consciously influenced by Gilbert's doctrine does not exclude the 
possibility that contemporaries may have discerned some general link between them. 
Several scholars have recently argued that Joachim conceives of divine unity 
'Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 68rb. 
"Liber, Grenoble 1085, fol. 64va. 
26 See the studies of A. Crocco, 'La formazione dottrinale di Gioacchino da Fiore e le fonti della sua teologia 
trinitaria'. Sophia 23 (1955), 192-6; 'La teologia trinitaria di Gioacchino da Fiore', Sophia 25 
(1957), 218-32; 
Gioacchino da Fiore, pp. 119-20; Mottu, La Manýfestation, pp. 236-7; di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da 
Fiore e Pietro 
Lombardo'; 'La teologia. trinitaria di Gioacchino da Fiore'. Dii-initas 23 (1979), 281-312; 'Gioacchino da Fiore: 
teologia. e cristologia', 1-51; D. C. West and S. Zimdars-Swartz, Joachbn of Fiore. 
A Studv in Spiritual Perception 
and Histori, (Indiana University Press, 1983). pp. 32-3. 
17 Liber de Concordia, pp. 416-17. 
2'Crocco. Gioacchino da Fiore, pp. 121-4. His ar iments are taken tip by Bloomfield. 'Joachim of Flora'. 9t 
pp. 272-3. 
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in terms of tile circurnincession or interpenetration of the three divine Persons. - " But 
whether this view of divine unity constitutes adequate grounds for tile Council's 
accusation of unity of collection or even for a real difference with Peter Lombard's 
concept is another matter. 
But whilst most scholars argue that Joachim merely misunderstood the 
Lombard, Schachten detects a real difference between them. 'O At one point, 
Schachten seems to turn Joachim's doctrine of circurnincession into one whose logical 
conclusion, via the fourteenth-century Liber contra Lombardum, is tritheism. " 
According to Schachten, Joachim assumes that every property attributed to a Person 
must be attributed to the divine essence. 32 And so, if Joachim wants to avoid the 
Sabellianism to which this doctrine, whereby no one Person has any stronger claim 
than the other two to a particular property, will inevitably lead him, lie is driven to a 
form of tritheism in which three identical essences are joined in kind of communion 
but not in a numerically single unity. " At least, Schachten tells us, this is the 
interpretation offered by the Council and Aquinas. 'Mis is a rather dubious assertion 
given that no textual references are provided in suppport. Even worse, is that 
Schachten should use the Liber contra Lombardum, which scholars now agree has 
nothing to do with Joachim, as confin-nation of Joachim's tendency towards tritheism. 
This hardly amounts to an argument at all: a fourteenth-century text with trithesitic 
tendencies and no proven link with Joachim is used to substantiate thirteenth-century 
assessments of Joachim's orthodoxy, as though the fact that the Liber's alleged 
tritheism would in any case be proof of Joachim's. 
The charge of unity of collection depends in large part upon the Council's 
representation of Joachim's use of biblical texts as analogies for divine unity, and it 
, 
Tes, p. 295; Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatig, pp. 557,566-7 and esp. '<'Otto, Die Funktion des Bildbegrif 
Schachten, 'Die Trinitätslehre Joachims von Fiore'. p. 43 and Ordo Salutis. Das Gesetz als Weise der 
Heilsvennittlung. Zur Kritik des Hl. Thomas wn Aquin an Joachim ion Fiore, BGPTM, Neue Folge 20 (Münster, 
1980), p. 22. 
ý) 
sp 295 'O'Die Trinititslehre Joachims; von Fiore'. pp. 42,53. Also Otto, Die Funktion des Bildbegrýf 
"Ordo Saluds. p. 56. 
321bid., p. 55. 
33jbid.. p. 56. 
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is upon the accuracy of this judgement that scholars have focused their attentions. 
The Council summarises Joachim's position: 
But he does not confess in this way a true and proper unity, but one of collectivity and resemblance, in the way that many men are called one people, and many believers one Church, according to: The 
multitude of beliei, ers had but one heart and one soid (Acts 4,32), and: He who isjoined to the Lord is one spirit with him (I Cor 6,17); also He that planteth and he that watereth are one (I Cor 3,8), 
and all of us are one body in Christ (Roin 12,5); again in the Book of Kings: Aty people and your 
people are one (I Kings 22,4). But above all to prove'5 this opinion, he refers to what Christ says in 
the Gospel concerning the faithful: I wish, Father, that theY may be one in us, as we also are one Vn 
17,22), that they may be made perfect in one Vn 17,13). For, as he says, the Christian faithful are not 
one, that is a single reality which is common to all of them, but they are one in this way, that is one 
Church on account of the unity of the catholic faith and finally one kingdom on account of the 
indissoluble union of charity. 
It would seem that the Council is merely summarising Joachim's own use of these 
scriptural texts, i. e. Joachim himself says that Father and Son are one in the same way 
that many believers are one Church - this is not the Council's gloss. Virtually all these 
passages are indeed used by Joachim as analogies for divine unity. In particular, the 
following section from the Psalterium corresponds in considerable detail to the 
passage from the decree: 36 
Because God is triune in unity, he has always desired that many men and different peoples should be 
joined together as one, because he knows that there can be no joy wherever there is separation and 
diversity. 37 
This forms the preamble to Joachim's exegesis of A 17,11 and 20-22, cited against 
him in the decree: 
The Son prays for his elect that they might be one according to the resemblance of his unity with the 
Father, speaking thus: Hol)) Father keep them in thy naine ivhich thou hast given ine that they may be 
34 See S. Otto, >Die Denkform des Joachim von Floris und das Caput "Dainnamus" des 4. Laterankonzils', 
Materialen zur Theorie der Geistesgeschichte, Die Geistesgeschichte und ihre Methoden 
2 (München, 1979), 106- 
15, idem, Die Funktion des Bildbegrüfes, pp. 297-9; di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', pp. 654-7; 
Mehlmann. De Unitate Trinitatis, pp. 577-84. 
"The Commission of Anagni criticises Joachim's use of analogy as a proof for the Trinity. See Protocol, p-136- 
Di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. pp. 634-5,645-6 argues, however, that Joachim's analogies 
have a didactic rather than a demonstrative function. 
360tto, Tic Denkform des Joachim'. p. 107 says that this section was either copied from the lost work- or 
represents the first draft. 
37pSalt., fol. 233va: 'Quocirca quia, ipse in unitate trinus est, quesivit semper et queret, quornodo plures homines 
et diversi populi convenirent 
in unum, sciens quod nulla possit esse felicitas tibi scissio et diversitas est'. 
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one, even as we are one Vn 17,11). 
38 
He continues: 
Certainly we have heard from the Word of truth how the Son wishes us to be one after the image and resemblance of that unity by which he and the Father are one. 717hat unity, however, is in the spirit, according to what is written in the Acts of the Apostles: the inultitude of believers ivere of one heart 
and one soid (Acts 4,32). According to this mode of unity, we should understand what the Apostle 
said: He that is joined to the Lord becoines one spirit ivith him (I Cor 6,17). 39 
When Joachim says 'that unity is in the spirit', he is probably referring, as his 
scriptural citations suggest, to the unity of the faithful in one Church as the fulfilment 
40 of the human potential for unity and the human equivalent of divine unity. This 
would make divine unity, not Christian unity, the model; in this case the Council has 
misunderstood him. But he could instead be referring to the unity between Father and 
Son because lie seems to equate 'that unity by which lie and the Father are one', with 
'that unity is in the spirit'; in that case he would indeed be saying that divine unity 
is like the unity of the faithful, as the Council alleges. 
According to the first reading, the analogy would take full account of the fact 
that there are different types or degrees of unity and oneneSS. 41 Joachim himself 
shows that lie understands this when he cites Augustine's comments on different types 
of unity which vary according to their strength of cohesion from division, through the 
joining of separate things (one body to another), to the natural unity of things of the 
same nature . 
42 rMUS 'separation causes division, conjunction a certain unity %43 But 
38 Psalt., fol. 233va: 'Inde est quod filius orat pro electis suis, ut sint unurn ad sue et patris sui similitudinem 
unitatis, dicens sic: Pater sancte senw eos in nomine tuo quos dedisti inihi, ut sint unum sicut nos'. 
"Psalt., fol. 233va: 'Certe audivirnus ex verbo veritatis; quornodo nos velit filius esse unum ad imaginem et 
similitudinem illitis tinitatis; qua ipse et pater unum stint. Est atitem unitas ista in spiritu, secundum illud quod 
scriptum est in actibus Apostolorum: Muftitudbibz autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una. Secundum hunc 
modum tinitatis, accipiendum est illud quod Apostola ait: Qui adheret domino unus spiritus est'. 
4Schachten, Ordo Salutiz. p. 25: 'Wienun Joachim die "unitas in spiritu" verstanden wissen will, ist schwer zu 
deuten. ' 
"For a systematic exposition of this idea, see Dominicus Gundissalinus, De unitate, ed. 
P. Correns. BGPM I. 1 
Nfinster. 1ý91), who describes a descending scale of unity from unity of essence through to unity of will 
(pp. 9- 
10). On Gundissalinus. see J. Jolivet, 'The Arabic Inheritance'. in Dronke ed., Historv of Tiveýfth-Centun, Western 
Philosophv, pp. 134-45. Compare also Bernard of Clairvaux's delineation of different degrees of oneness, 
De 
consideratione V. 18-19, Opera 111, pp. 482-3. 
42psalt. fol. 233vb. The reference to Augustine does not seem to be a literal citation, but gives the sense of De 
trin. VI. 4-8. CCSL 50, pp. 231-7, PL 42.926-9. 
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the most ineffable unity is that in which three Persons are one spirit and one 
substance. -44 
The purpose of the biblical analogy seems to be didactic, as though the 
consubstantial unity of Father and Son is the ideal to which Christians should 
aspire. 
45 Such a reading would also be supported by the patristic tradition of using 
these passages as exhortations to the faithful to overcome their internal divisions and 
46 attain unity insofar as it is possible for them. Hilary of Poitiers denied that Acts 4, 
32,1 Cor 3,8 and Jn 17,20-1 were evidence of a mere unity of will between Father 
and Son as his Arian opponents alleged. 47 He even countered that the unity of will 
described in Acts 4,32 could indeed be thought of as a unity of nature, since where 
a multitude of believers share the one true faith, a natural unity is achieved through 
48 the nature of the unity of the one faith . 
Augustine also used Jn 17,20-22 to assert the consubstantiality of Father and 
Son . 
49He interprets the passage as signifying God's will that humanity should be one 
in their belief in him, since it is only through Christ that they can overcome their own 
conflicting desires, and thus achieve a unity in God. 'rhis tradition seems to have been 
very much alive in the twelfth century when the unity of the three divine Persons was 
still considered a model for Christian unity-'O 
But if Joachim, on the other hand., really does say that the unity of Father and 
43psalt 
.. fol. 233vb: liquet quod scissio divisionem facit, coniunctio unitatem quidem 
[sic]'. 
44Psalt., fol. 233vb: 'Quanto ineffabilitis una substantia stint et units spiritus, siquidern Deus spirittis est. tres 
persone Deitatis'. 
45 Crocco, Gioacchino da Fiore, pp. 136-7; di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo'. pp. 655-6; 
MehImann. De Unitate Trinitatis. p. 580. 
4"Probably based on Greek exegetical practice. See C. Kannengieser, Athanase d' Alexandrie. Eieque et 
Ecrvain. Une lecture des traitis Contre les Arians, Theologie Historique 70 (Paris, 1983), pp. 326-38 for 
Athanasius' interpretation of Jn 17,11; 20-23 as analogies for the unity of the faithful in one Church after the 
model of divine unity. Also DTC 15.2,1601; de Margerie. La Trinitj chritienne, p. 308 for the Second Vatican 
Council. 
-47 De triii. VIII. 5-17, CCSL 62A, pp. 317-29, PL 10.240-9. 
'8De trin. VIII. 7, CCSL 62A, p. 319.7-9, PL 10.241B: *Si ergo per fidem, id est per unius fidei naturam. unwn 
omnes crant. quomodo non nattiralem in his intelli:, --is tinitatem, qui per naturam unius fidei unum suntT 
49De 
trin. IV. 12; CCSL 50, pp. 176-8, PL 42.896. 
50javelet, linage et Ressemblance 1. pp. 447-50. 
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Son is a spiritual unity like that of the faithful then he does, as the Council says. 
exceed the bounds of propriety in his use of analogy. 'fliat is why the Council reminds 
us that the difference between God and creation is so great that the principle of 
51 analogy must be one of dissimilarity rather than similarity. 
Just as Joachim's application of analogy is ambiguous, so his theory of analogy 
is susceptible to a number of readings and may not, therefore, have served as a strong 
counterbalance. His position seems to be in perfect harmony with the Council's own 
52 emphasis on dissimilarity. He also speaks of using concrete things in order to 
penetrate the meaning of a word, not in order to show the truth of resemblance. " His 
doctrine of dissimiles similitudines suggests a level of sophistication in the use of 
analogy entirely compatible with the Council's position. 54 
Stephan Otto has suggested that the discrepancy between Joachim's method of 
analogy and the Council's interpretation of it may lie precisely in Joachim's failure 
to put his own rigorous theories into practice. 55 The failure is thus one of application 
56 in the particular case of divine unity rather than of general method. 
It may be the case, as some scholars suggest, that the images and analogies in 
the lost libellus to which the decree refers were much less clearly expressed and 
57 formulated than those which we find in the Psalterium . Even in the Psalterium 
"Conciliorum, p. 232.34-5: 'inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior 
sit dissimilitudo notanda. ' 
12 See Otto, 'Die Denkform des Joachim', p. 109; MehImann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p-582. The passages in the 
Psalterium are too numerous to cite, but for example Psalt., fol. 234rb: 'Quamvis autem Deus omnipotens sine 
quantitate magnus sit, res; tamen quibus eum assimilando intelligere querimus quantitate necesse est terminentur'; 
also, fol. 230va: 'necesse est ut cedat quantitas illi magnitudini que quantitatem non habet, et visibilis forma 
invisibili nature, et comprehensibile corpus incomprehensibili deitati'. 
53 Expositio, fol. 36va: 'At quia res palpabiles et grossiores infirmis intellectibus capaciores sunt, loquimur de 
eis ad insinuandam virititern vocis, non ad ostendendarn veritatern sirnilitudinis. ' 
'4Esp. Rzalt- fols. 233rb-va. In general. see Javelet, IinaQe et Resseinblance, p. 136: T'expression qui traduit 
le mieux le rapport entre, le Cr6atur et les crýatures, est celle de Dis, -ýeinblance revseinblante ou celle 
de 
Ressemblance dissemblante. Uaffinit6 peut donc exister. mais il convient sans cesse de rappeler que le ciel est 
"incomparable" A la terre. ' 
"Die Funktion dev Bildbegr&s, pp. 297-9; 'Die Denk-fon-n des Joachirn, pp. 109-11. Many of Otto's 
conclusions are supported by Schachten. Ordo Salutis, esp. pp. 23-5,98-102,131-8. 
`Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes, p. 299. 
57 See Mehlmann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 585. 
219 
though, Joachim's use of certain analogies is susceptible to the kind of reading found 
in the decree. 58 His recurrent use of the term collectio and his predilection for 
collective analogies to which the Council itself refers would intensify rather than allay 
any doubts about his orthodoxy. 59 One analogy bordering closely on unity of 
collection is the image of the three golden statues which are made from one lump of 
gold . 
60 Joachim's coin/number analogy in which 3x 10 (Persons) equals 30 (essence) 
is also susceptible to a reading in terms of unity of collection and it is also possible, 
moreover, that this passage was part of the lost libellus, since it refers to the offending 
passage from the Lombard's Sentences. 61 
6. General statement on the doctrine: the Father's generation of the Son 
Having explained Joachim's opposition to Peter Lombard and summarised his 
errors on divine unity, the Council proceeds to issue a clarification of the doctrine 
giving special attention to the question of divine generation. The reason for this may 
be that, having rejected Joachim's unity of collection, the Council wished to eliminate 
a further possible contender to the Lombard's quaedam summa res, the position that 
essence begets essence. Also underlying this section is an awareness of the 
interdependence between divine unity and divine generation. The affirmation of the 
58 Mehlrnann. De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 582: 'Mann kann nicht ausschliessen. dass manche Begriffe, Bilder und 
Vergleiche. die Joachim in seinern Libellus contra Petrum Loinbarduin benUt7t hat, Anlass zu Missverstdndnissen 
gegeben haben k6nnten. Schachten, 'Die TrinitAtslehre Joachims von Fiore', p. 57 points out that Joachim's images 
of three trees. three tribes of David and the psaltery do not convey the idea of personal circurnincession and that 
this accounts for the charge of unity of collection. It would be unwise, however, to push this too far given that the 
Council uses not these but Joachim's biblical analogies as evidence of unity of collection. 
59For example, Psalt., fol. 231rb: 'potest untis accipi de collectione multorum, ut unus populus, una plebs'; ibid., 
fol. 232va: 'Iribus Juda, et tribus Beniarnin, et tribus Levi que rernanserunt filiis David et templo domini unus simul 
populus dicte sunt. ' (MehImann, De Unitate Trinitatis, p. 561 defends this image), De articul&fidei, p. 5.3-6: 'unurn 
tamen dicimus non singularern, non utique, sicut dicimus unurn sydus, unum. iaspidem, unurn smaragdum-, set unum. 
ab unitate utpote cum dicimus unurn gregem, unurn populum, unam. turbam. ' 
6ODe articul&fidei, p. 7.4-8: 'si una massa auri distingueretur in tres statuas, maxime si ut solent fieri in arte 
fusoria, tote tres essent coniuncte, si diceretur singula statua esse unum aurtim ut tamen simul tres non dicerentur 
nisi unum aurum? et miratur homo si singula divinitatis Persona dicitur verus Deus, et simul tres unus Deus? '; 
Professio fidei, p. 173.22-6: 'unum stint unitate non singularitate, ac si tria vasa ex tina fomace procedentia 
dicerentur unum attrum. Ac per hoc. etsi singulum dicatur et sit atirum et unum aunim. differt tarnen hoc unum 
ab illo uno. quia illud untim non dicitur collective, set singulariter de singulo, istud dicitur collective de tribus'. 
Cf. Augustine. De trin. VII. 11, CCSL 50, p. 264, PL 42.944. 
61 Psalt., fol. 277rb. See below. pp. 201-2. 
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quaedam mlnma res excludes any possible generation of essence. 
T'he Council confesses 'with Peter' that there is a quaedam summa res which 
is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, three Persons together and each individually. For this 
reason there is only a Trinity in God, not a Quaternity, since each of tile Persons is 
that res, namely substance, essence or nature: 
That thing is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, because there are distinctions in the Persons and unity in the nature. 62 
The decree then proceeds to elucidate in considerable detail how it is that the Father's 
generation of the Son, the very principle of distinction in the Trinity, does not affect 
the absolute unity and simplicity of essence which has just been so unequivocally 
underlined. In begetting the Son, the Father neither divided his substance with the Son 
nor gave it to him wholly, but begot the Son without any reduction to his own 
substance. This focus on the Father's generation of the Son assumes that the problem 
of divine generation lies at the very heart of trinitarian orthodoxy, and also that it is 
indispensable to a true and proper concept of divine unity. 
There is little indication from his extant works that Joachim would have 
differed from this statement on the doctrine issued by the Council. 63 His own 
position on the Father's generation of the Son is characteristically delivered through 
the means of analogies. His preferred analogy is the fire image, one which has a 
natural affinity with the absolutely uncontroversial image of light proceeding eternally 
from light. 64 The flame which proceeds from the burning bush in Exodus 3,2 
corresponds to the Son, and the heat which proceeds equally from both corresponds 
65 to the Holy Spirit, and yet the three are one fire. Like the image of light from light, 
the function of this image is to show that one thing can proceed forth from another 
'Concilioruin, p. 232.16-19. Cf. canon 1, ibid., p. 230.11-14: 'Haec sancta Trinitas sectmdurn conu-nunern 
essentiam individua et sectindurn personales proprietates discreta'. 
63 See esp. Mehlmann, De Unitate Ti-initatbz, pp. 571-3 who stresses the agreeement between 
Joachim and the 
Council on the question of consubstantiality. 
64Joachirn is aware of use of the light image by the Chtirch Fathers. Psalt.. fol. 231vb: 'Antiqui tamen patres 
disputantes adverso Arium. qui filii negabat etemitatem flammarn sive ignern similitudini pateme 
dederunt lucern 
filio qui coeternus patri. ' 
65 Mzalt.. fols. 231vb-232ra; also De arliculi, ýz, fidci, pp. 7-8- 
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without there being a consequent loss of nature in the source. In this respect. it has 
no implications for Joachim's position on the generation of the divine essence. but was 
simply a traditional means of expressing the consubstantiality of the Father and the 
Son. 
It could, however, be inferred from the decree that part of the Council's 
criticism of Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection was motivated by a sense that 
his doctrine jeopardised not only divine unity, but the Father's generation of the 
Son. 66 Or it may be that, to avoid confusion, the Council wished to reject 
unequivocally the view that essence begets essence, since it also threatened both 
divine unity and divine generation. Three issues mentioned in the decree point towards 
this conclusion. The first is the early reference to the Lombard's Sentences. The 
Council cites the Lombard's doctrine of the quaedam summa res and the non-begetting 
essence as though these two issues were inseparable. 'flie Council then goes on to 
affirm the orthodoxy of the quaedam summa res, and that it is neither begetting, 
begotten or proceeding. Finally, there is the significant clarification of divine 
generation which suggests that this issue, as well as the issue of divine unity, is one 
being dealt with in the decree. It is this clarification which may have misled later 
commentators into thinking that this was Joachim's error. 
7. The invoNement of Paris theologians in. the framing of the decree? 
Theologians at Paris are by far the most likely candidates for the framers of 
the Lateran decree on the Trinity. This would be true even without Pope Innocent HI's 
startling debt to Joachim's trinitarian theology and the consequent abandonment of the 
traditional thesis that Innocent was the main force behind Joachim's condemnation. 
For it is most unlikely that the Pope would have personally drafted and approved all 
of the canons without some degree of consultation with the appropriate experts. 
Added 
to which is the visible evidence of Innocent's borrowing from Joachim, which makes 
it difficult to imagine the circumstances in which the Pope would have actively sought 
'Mehlrnann, De Unitate Trinitatis, pp. 244-5 argues that Joachim's position on the generation of the essence 
was totally uncontroversial and not one taken 
into consideration by the Council. 
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out Joachim's condemnation. The hypothesis that the Cistercians were somehow 
involved seems far-fetched. This leaves Paris theologians as the group most qualified 
and with the greatest interest in drawing up a statement on the doctrine. 
A brief consideration of current and fortner Parisian masters of theology alive 
in the period from April 1213, when Innocent requested submissions, to November 
1215, when the Council was held, reveals particularly close links between Paris and 
Rome which must strengthen the case for the participation of Paris theologians at 
some stage. At least three masters of considerable distinction in the field of doctrinal 
theology were cardinals during this period: Peter of Capua, Cardinal-Priest of San 
Marcello (1200-14); Robert de Courson, Cardinal-Priest of San Stefano in Celiomonte 
(1212-19), and papal legate in France; and Stephen Langton, Cardinal-Priest of San 
Crisogono (1206-28). They were ideally placed to petition the Pope about any 
concerns of Parisian masters. Innocent's cardinalate was still dominated by individuals 
67 of Roman origin and remained oriented towards Italy. But individuals with some 
form of higher education were beginning to be appointed in greater numbers and to 
have a greater impact. Of the 30 cardinals either created or promoted by Innocent, 14 
either used the title magister or were known to have followed some course of learning 
at one of the emerging universties. 68 
In addition, Innocent's former teacher of theology at Paris, Peter of Corbeil (d. 
1222) was Archbishop of Sens throughout this period. He had, moreover, already 
presided over the investigation and condemnation in 1210 of the Parisian-based sect, 
the Amalricians. 69 Unfortunately, we have no information as to his approach or 
attitude to trinitarian theology, a situation which also applies to many of the other 
theologians active at this time. 70 
Developments at Paris itself provide further grounds for seriously considering 
the role of its theologians in the drawing up of the Lateran decree. The emergence of 
a doctrinal consensus on the Trinity in the second half of the twelfth century opened 
"Maleezek. Papst und Kardinalskolleg, pp. 292-3. 
68II)jd., p. 294. 
69G. Dickson, 'The Buming of the Amatricians', Joumal qf Eccclesiastical Historv 40 (1989), pp. 351-2. 
70 See the list of masters at Paris provided by Glori&ix, Rjl)ertoire 1, p. 228. 
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the way for the public expression of a common body of opinion on the doctrine. Add 
to this the formation of a corporation of masters and we have the social and 
intellectual conditions necessary for the participation of Paris theologians in the 
process of formulating official Church doctrine. As the distinguished canonical 
historian Raymonde Foreville writes of the Lateran decree on the Trinity: 
Cette profession de foi trinitaire est compl6t&e par une eccl6siologie. Expression coll6giale de la foi 
71 catholique elle est conque par des th6ologiens de I'Ecole parisienne. 
The social context in which debates on the Trinity at Paris in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries took place is essential both to understanding the nature and course 
of these debates and to a fuller contextualisation of the Lateran decree on the Trinity. 
Like any other phenomenon, theology is in part 'a socially constructed reality' and as 
such there is reason to think that factors which may be broadly described as 
sociological may impinge on the actual content of doctrine as it eventually comes to 
be formulated 
. 
72 This is certainly true of the quaestio technique which grew out of 
both intellectual and institutional practices. 
The task here is to determine as specifically as possible how social relations 
within the schools and, more importantly, between the schools and the outside world, 
impinged upon the formulation of trinitarian doctrine. In my view, the most important 
element is not the one which is usually discussed - professional and intellectual rivalry 
within the schools themselves - but the masters' desire for professional recognition as 
a distinct body within the Church. The on-going rivalry between the schools of Peter 
Lombard and Gilbert of Poitiers has been used to account both for Joachim's attack, 
as an intellectual disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers, on Peter Lombard, and for his 
condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council at a time when the Lombard's supporters 
were at last strong enough to overwhelm their rivals. But if anything, it is the triumph 
of professional unity over disunity which brought about the possibility of exercising 
authority outside the narrow confines of the schools. 
At the heart of this process is the emergence from about 1170 of what is 
71 'Pro&dure et d6bats', p. 28. 
72 R. Gill, Theologi, and Social Structure (London, 1977). pp. Lx-x. 
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generally described as the corporation of masters. 
73 The formation of a group of 
masters conscious of their professional vocation and rights is in turn closely associated 
with the licentia docendi, the right to teach . 
74 'Me right to grant the licentia docendi 
became a contentious issue between the chancellor and the masters who were 
75 increasingly aware of their professional status. The changing status of the magister 
seems to have engendered a self-conscious pride which precipitated a desire for 
professional recognition . 
7' Fired by the conviction that the right to teach should 
therefore be dependent on their professional suitability and not left to the discretion 
of the chancellor, the masters contested the chancellor's exclusive right to confer the 
licentia docendi. The dispute had probably been continuing for some time when Pope 
Alexander III intervened in 1170-72. His decree forbade officials in all cathedral 
schools either to demand a fee for conferring the licentia docendi or to refuse it to any 
qualified person . 
77 In this way the 'masters achieved the earliest formal recognition 
of their distinct status in the ecclesiastical system. ý7' The issue of the licentia 
docendi, the outcome of which would really decide the question of the masters 9 
professional status, was resolved in their favour and was officially confin-ned in the 
statutes of the rniird Lateran CounCil. 79 rnie regulation evidently, though, was not 
enforced, to judge by a dispute in 1212-13 over the continued charging of fees by the 
73 On this see, Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation', 421-45; Rashdall, 71e Universities of Europe 1, pp. 292- 
309; J. Verger, Les Universit& au Moven Age (Presses Universitaires de France, 1973); M. M. McLaughlin, 
Intellectual Freedom and Its Limitations in the Universiýv of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries 
(New York, 1977), pp. 12-17; A. E. Bernstein, 'Magisteriurn and License: Corporate Autonomy Against Papal 
Authority in the Medieval University of Paris'. Viator 9 (1978), 291-307. 
74 A good summary of the question of the licentia docendi can be found in E. Lesne, Histoire de la proprO6 
eccl&iastique en France V, Les 6coles de la fin du VIIIe siecle d la flin du X71e, Memoires et Travaux publi6s par 
des professeurs des facult&s catholiques de Lille (Lille, 1940), pp. 425-30,489-92-, also Weijers, Tenninologie 
des 
univerist6s, pp. 46-51. 
"Chenu, La thgologie, pp. 324-6, R. W. Southern, 'The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres', 
in 
Constable and Benson edd., Renaiýsance and Renewal, pp. 134-5. 
76 J. Le Goff, 'Quelle conscience I'Universit6 m6di&ale a-t-elle eue d'elle-mýme? ', in Pour un autre Mo-ven 
Age. Temps, travail et culture en Occident: 18 essais (Editions Gallimard, 1977), 181-97. 
'Tor the text, CUP 1. pp. 4-5. 
78McLaughlin. Intellectual Freedom. p. 12. 
, 9CUP 1, p. 10. Translated in L. Thorndike, Universiti, Records and LVe in the Middle Ages 
(New York, 1944), 
p. 21. 
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chancellor in return for the licentia docendi. 'O But by this time, it seems that the final 
recognition of the right to teach was dependent in reality not on receiving the licentia 
docendi, but on the practice of inception which lay with the masters not the 
chancellor. " 
To claim the licentia docendi, therefore, because teaching lay at the very heart 
of the master's distinctive function, was to claim entry into a distinct professional 
group. 82 Though having attained this first recognition of their distinctiveness as a 
group, the masters collectively were still far from the kind of internal organisation and 
self-regulation which, according to Weber, is essential before corporate action or 
rather the enforcement of corporate action is conceivable. 83 Much of this effort at 
self-regulation converged on the procedure for admission to the masters' guild, which 
also dates from the 1170s. Although, because of sheer numbers, it seems most 
plausible that the masters of the arts were the principal force behind the quest for 
corporate recognition, this does not mean that theologians did not play a part or have 
their own reasons for wishing to form a more cohesive professional group. In their 
case, the attempt to restrict entry to their numbers and to allay fears within the Church 
at large of the preponderance of doctrinal heresy at Paris are the most tangible 
manifestations of their desire for a more responsible public role and profile. The 
accusations throughout the twelfth century against various masters connected with the 
schools at Paris, most notably against Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and Peter 
Lombard, left many ecclesiastical authorities suspicious and critical of the activities 
of theologians. In fact, despite the standardisation of teaching practice and the growing 
consensus over many issues, the general perception of the masters of theology at Paris 
was still a negative one. Superfluous disputations in the schools were the subject of 
'OCUP I, p. 73. 
"J. Verger, 'Des 6coles A l'universit6: La mutation institutionelle', in R. -H. Bautier ed., La France de Philippe 
Auguste. Le temps des mutations (Paris, 1982), p. 827 n. 43 thinks that the practice of inception at this time is 
implied in the statutes of 1215. 
82 See Verger, 'Des 6coles A FuniversiW, pp. 820-1 on the identification by contemporary chroniclers of scolares 
as group distinct from both clerics and lay citizens of Paris. 
13M. Weber. The Theorv of Social and Economic Oiýqanisation (New York. 1947), pp. 146-7. 
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forceful attack in a letter from Stephen of Tournai to the pope c. 1192-1203! W 
McLaughlin writes, 'Not until the early thirteenth century, when an outburst of 
speculation bold to the point of heresy coincided with the emergence of the university 
as a recognized corporation of masters, did the problems raised by their freedom 
become acute. "' The investigation into the doctrines of Amalric of Býne as 
propounded by his followers was an example on a impressive scale of corporate self- 
regulation. 86 Among the adherents of Amalric who were condemned in 1210 were 
several former students and masters of theology at Paris . 
87 The association of Paris- 
trained theologians with this public scandal might have proved fatal to the institution's 
future had not the authorities acted so swiftly and decisively. 88Not only were these 
men expelled from the masters' corporation, but, in an attempt to block off future 
breeding ground for heresies, Aristotle's works on natural philosophy and 
commentaries on them, which were strongly associated with the Amalrician sect, were 
forbidden under pain of excommunication. `17he condemnation reveals the deep anxiety 
of Paris theologians that intellectual heresy was penetrating their ranks. 'Meir 
collective action was an attempt to prevent further heresy and shows a determination 
to purge their members of any element which might damage their reputation or 
jeopardise their potentially wide influence in the Church. The confirmation of 
Amalric's condemnation at the very end of the Lateran decree seems to point towards 
a further link between the drafting of the decree and events at PariS. 89 
The condemnation of the Amalricians, moreover, coincides with the period, 
roughly 1207-10, when the masters at Paris received official papal recognition of their, 
'4CUP I. pp. 47-8. Trans. in Thomdike, Universitv Records, pp. 22-4. 
"Intellectual Freedoin, p. 19. 
86 For the text, see CUP I. p. 70; trans. in Thomdike. Universitv Records, pp. 26-7. 
87 G. Dickson, 'The Burning of the Amalricians', Journal of Ecclesiastical History 40 (1989), p. 355. On the 
Almaricians in general, see M. -T. d'Alvemy, 'Un fragment du procýs des Amauriciens', 
AHDLMA 18 (1950-51), 
325-36; G. C. Capelle, Autour du dicret de 1210: 111 - Ainawy de Bene. Etude de son panthiisine 
fonnal, 
Bibliothýque Thorniste 16 (Paris, 1932). 
18 Dickson, 'The Burning of the Amalricians', p. 348. 
89Dickson, 'The Burning of the Amalricians', p. 363 comments that the addition of Amalric's condemnation 
is indicative of the intellectual nature of Joachim and Almaric's respective heresies rather than of 
Joachim's alleged 
influence on Almaric. 
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in practice, already established corporate status. 'O Ilie role of Pope Innocent III, 
himself a former student of Paris and one who kept a close eye upon events there, was 
crucial in this process. A series of decrees issued over the years 1207-16 marks the 
confirmation of important legal rights. 'Ilie Pope took the side of the masters in their 
case against a certain Master G. who had refused to take an oath of obedience which 
committed him to abiding by the statutes of the society of masters. 9' This points to 
papal recognition of the legitimacy of the masters acting collectively to enforce their 
corporate rules. Innocent's decree also uses several expressions which signify implicit 
papal acceptance of this legal status: universitas was used for the first time in the 
sense of university; consortium and societas reinforce the sense that a discrete social 
organisation is being referred to. 92 
Further confirmation of rights and public powers was to follow. 9' All these 
rights were collected and confin-ned in Robert of Courson's statutes of 1215, addressed 
to the universitas magistrorum et scolarium, and themselves an example of internal 
self-regulation and of co-operation between the masters and papal representatives. 94 
Despite the widespread view that the organisation of teaching at the cathedral 
schools, and by extension at the emerging university, reflects a more general twelfth- 
century movement towards communal organisation, it has been argued that this 
corporate instinct cannot alone account for the formation of a corporation of masters 
at Paris. 9-r' Instead, Ferruolo argues: 
the formation of the first 'university of masters and scholars' in Paris resulted not so much from the 
pragmatic need of scholars to band together to secure their interests against an external adversary as 
9ORashdall, The Universities of Europe 1, pp. 300-9, Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation'; Ferruolo, The 
Origins of the Universitv, pp. 294-5. 
9'CUP 1, pp. 67-8. 
92 On these and other terms which express the idea of community amongst the masters, see Weijers, 
Terminologie des universit6s, pp. 15-45. See also P. Michaud-Quantin, Universitas. Expression A inouvement 
coinmunautaire dans le inoyen-dge latin (Paris, 1970). 
93CUp 1. pp. 73-4,82-3. 
94CUp 1, pp. 78-80; trans. in Thorndike, Universiti, Records, pp. 27-30. S. C. Ferruolo, 'The Paris Statutes of 
1215 Reconsidered'. History of Universities 5 (1985), 1-14. 
9'Femiolo. The OrýQins of the Universitv. p. 310. 
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from the prevailing influence within the schools of cenain exalted educational principles and values. 9' 
It was the masters' common recognition of their professional vocation as teachers, that 
is, purveyors of knowledge and truth, which propelled their pursuit of regulations 
ensuring and protecting their common interests. 
The emergence, from the last quarter of the twelfth century, of some kind of 
associative society of masters had its repercussions for the study of theology. 
Increasingly, masters of theology began to regard themselves as a group with common 
aims, interests and doctrinal views. Instead of the kind of confrontational approach 
characteristic of the early and even of the middle of the twelfth century, there is a 
growing sense that theologians share a basically similar approach to theological 
language and doctrine. '17his similarity of approach cleared the way for substantial 
agreement on a range of theological issues, what Chenu has called 'the formation of 
- 97 a common opinion of masters . In his Summa, Prepositinus indicates his awareness 
of the general consensus on a given issue by means of the expression magistri nostri, 
the received opinion of the masters as a body. 9' It is even possible to detect a 
compunction to confon-n with the view of the magistri nostri. At the least, 
Prepositinus goes to considerable lengths to gloss over any apparent divergence 
between his and their respective views on specific issues. rMis comes through 
particularly well in his treatment of the question of how divine will seems, 
contradictorily, both to prohibit and to pen-nit fornication: 'But lest we seem not to 
follow the view of our masters, we grant that it is the case', i. e. that permissio is a 
sign of the divine will. 99 In a similar vein, Alan of Lille conceives of theology as a 
professional discipline requiring a highly trained mind and a considerable degree of 
96jb id., p-5- 
97La 
thj010,., ýie, p. 
328. 
"7.1, p. 240-18,7.2, p. 241.9; 10.21, p. 259.1; 10.4, p. 260-1; 12.1. p. 
175.1. Angelini, L'ortodossia e la 
grammatica, pp. 103-4 argues that the expression mag&tri nostri 
does not include Porretani such as Alan of Lille 
and Simon of Tournai. On this consensus and its corresponding expressions. see 
Chenu, La th&logie, p. 359. 
'%tnma 7.2. p. 241.9-10. I 
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technical knowledge. '00 Theology is not a suitable subject for the uneducated and 
uninitiated, but is only fit for those who, in the possession of a higher intellect, may 
ascend to the ineffable mysteries and perceive with a pure eye the secrets of 
philosophy. 10' 
As a university education increasingly meant a career in either civil or 
ecclesiastical administration and similarly as the proportion of public office-holders 
with a scholastic education increased, 102 there seems to have been a growing desire 
on the part of the Paris theologians for some measure of respectabi4y. As Baldwin 
says, they sought 'to legitimate their contributions to society. 9103 Before academic 
theology could have any influence outside the confines of the classroom, its 
practitioners would have to be perceived as serious and responsible individuals, 
capable of arriving at agreement in a mature way. An unruly group of ambitious and 
argumentative theologians, interminably debating without ever reaching any kind of 
consensus, would be unlikely to secure the kind of authority which they sought. 
Agreement on doctrinal issues, regulation of teaching practice and a sense of common 
mission among theologians were the essential preconditions for the exercise of power. 
There are, therefore, good reasons for thinking that theologians at Paris were both 
willing and able to become involved in the process of drawing up a major and official 
definition of trinitarian orthodoxy along the lines of the Lateran decree. 
'OoRegulae, prolOgUs n. 7, p. 123: 'Unde Boethius librum inscripsit De ebdomadibus quasi de subtilissimis 
theologorum propositionibus. Iste propositiones quanto intelligentiam habent altiorem tanto magis peritum exigunt 
auditorem. ' 
'O'Regulae, prologus n-8, p-123: 'Unde non sunt rudibus proponende et introducendis qui solis sensuum 
dediti 
sunt speculis sed illis, qui ductu purioris mentis ad ineffabilia conscendunt et puriori oculo philosophie secreta 
perspiciunt. Hee enim propositiones in peritiori sinu theologie absconduntur et solis sapientibus collocuntur. 
' 
102 For an analysis see J. W. Baldwin, 'Masters at Paris from 1179 to 1215. A Social Perspective', 
in Constable 
and Benson edd., Rena&sance and Reneival, pp. 151-8; R. Avi-Yonak, 
'Career Trends of Parisian Masters of 
Theology, 1200-1320', History of Universities 6 (1986-7), 47-64 identifies the most dramatic increase in the 1220s. 
'O'Baldwin, 'Masters at Paris', p. 158. 
230 
VII THI RTEENTH- CENTURY RECONSTRUCTIONS OF THE LATERAN 
DECREE 
Virtually all academic interpretations of the Fourth Lateran Council's decree 
on the Trinity took place in the context of the debate on 'essence begot essence'! 
This concentration is quite extraordinary given that the question of whether the divine 
essence begets is at most secondary in the decree itself. The fact that the decree cites 
from that section in the Lombard's Sentences in which this question is discussed was, 
of course, a deten-nining factor in subsequent treatments. A large proportion of the 
thirteenth -century discussion takes place, after all, in Sentence commentaries. Even if 
the issue is implicit in Joachim's condemnation for unity of collection insofar as some 
view of the essence begetting is not incompatible with Joachim's position, the fact 
remains that Joachim was not condemned for his position on the generation of the 
essence but for his concept of divine unity. One cannot avoid the conclusion that a 
significant misunderstanding has occurred. 
Apart from the conceptual link between the main issue of unity of collection 
and the tangential one of whether or not the essence begets, there is also the question 
of the begetting essence as another rival to the Lombard's quaedam summa res. Like 
Joachim's unity of collection, this position was also rejected by the Council. It is not 
so strange, therefore, that thirteenth-century commentators, taking their lead from the 
decree itself, as well as their own long standing preoccupation with the essence begot 
essence debate, should reconstruct the decree in these terms. rMus they take the view 
that Joachim attacked Peter Lombard because he objected to the latter's argument that 
the essence does not beget. 
The question of whether the essence begets was at the heart of twelfth-century 
scholastic solutions to the problem of unity and trinity in God, but also functioned as 
an effective vehicle for discussion of the central preoccupation of scholastic 
theologians, the problem of theological Ian uage itself, and it is this which accounts 4_ý 9 
'There is an excellent survey of this discussion, including extensive excerpts from mantiscripts, in M. Schmaus, 
Der Liber Projnýqnatorius des Thoinas Anglicus und die Lchrunterschiede zu, ischel? Thoinas i, on Aquin und Duns 
Scotus, BGP711 29 Minster. 1930), pp. 48-65. It is highly significant that Schmatis himself takes it for granted 
that these authors are dealing with the inain subject of the decree. 
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for the durability of the discussion. The apparently unsustainable position that 'God 
begot God' was orthodox, but that 'essence begot essence I was not, focused attention 
on the problem of how linguistic usage could be made to accommodate diviiie reality. 
A semantic approach to the problem demanded a semantic solution. Hence, twelfth- 
century theologians developed the distinction between the signification and the 
supposition of a word, differentiating in this way between what a word means and 
what it stands for. Even though, therefore, the terms 'God' and 'essence' reftr to the 
same thing, they signýo it in different ways. Further, the word 'God' was found to 
have a variety of significations which explained its different uses in particular 
contexts. 
This approach was the dominant one by the late twelfth century and was 
adopted by scholastic theologians writing before and after the Fourth Lateran Council. 
The problem of why 'God. begot God', but not 'essence begot essence' was the 
exemplary case of its application. The solution developed by scholastic theologians 
highlighted all the advantages of the semantic approach without exposing its flaws. In 
this sense, the issue provided an effective form of polemic; it was relatively easy to 
win an argument by showing that the premises of an opponent led unavoidably to the 
conclusion that the essence begot. 
This distinct academic tradition of thought on the Trinity was not disrupted by 
the Lateran decision. Instead, an essential continuity links twelfth- and thirteenth- 
century approaches. By the time theologians come to give their views on the Lateran 
decree, they are in fact drawing on an extremely wel I- established tradition of 
trinitarian theology which was bound to infon-n significantly their understanding of the 
decree. Unless we realise this, we cannot understand their reading of the decree. We 
are, moreover, likely to mistake Peter Olivi's controversial views on tile question as 
something peculiar to him alone, rather than as part of a much wider debate in 
trinitarian theology. When placed in this context, thirteenth- century commentaries on 
the Lateran decree become infinitely more comprehensible: we can understand how 
and why it was that these theologians took a seemingly minor issue and placed it at 
the centre of their explanation of Joachim's error, even if they thought that this issue 
was in any case related to the charge of unity of collection. Although they are, in a 
manner of speaking, imposing meaning oil the decree, rather than merely activating 
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already dormant meaning, their motives for doing so, and the particular fon-n the 
construction takes, are understandable when placed in this -,, vider context of their 
underlying assumptions and intentions. Thirteenth-century interpretations are, to 
borrow an expression from reception theory, determined by the 'horizon of 
2 expectations' of their authors. The fact that the question of whether the essence 
begets is mentioned in a prominent place at the beginning of the decree along with the 
implicit link with the question of divine unity seems to have triggered a whole chain 
of expectations on the part of thirteenth-century readers. As Hirsch, one of the most 
influential thinkers in the field of genre theory, writes: 
an interpreter's preliminary generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything that he 
subsequently understands, and that this remains the case unless and until that generic conception is 
altered. 3 
It is only because scholastic theologians attached so much importance to the debate 
about the generation of the essence that they could give it such a prominent place in 
their discussions, regardless of its place in the decree itself. 
1. The appropriation of Joachim's condemnation in Sentence commentaries and 
summae 
The first theologian to comment on Joachim's condemnation was William of 
Auxerre (d. 1231). William taught at Paris and his major work, the Summa Aurea, 
written between 1215 and 1229, reproduces his teaching there. 
4 'Me Summa was 
widely read; more than 120 manuscripts have been located to date. 
5 William was 
clearly, therefore, an extremely valued writer. His influence is apparent in subsequent 
discussions of the Lateran decree, for it is his interpretation of the questions at 
issue 
2 H. R. Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic ofReception (Univ. of Minnesota, 1982), esp. pp. 
22-3. R. C. Holub, Reception 
7heory. A Critical Introduction (London. 1984), esp. pp. 57-8. 
3 E. D. Hirsch, Validitv in Interpretation (Yale Univ.. 1967), p-74. 
4Sumina Aurea, Introduction Ginirale, ed. J. Ribaillier, Spicilegittm Bonaventurianurn 20 
(Paris-Rome, 1987), 
p. 16. 
5Suinina Aurea 4 vols., ed. J. Ribaillier. Spicilegium Bon aventuri anti m 16-19 (Paris-Rome. 
1980-86) 1. p. 7. 
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there which is echoed in later thirteenth-century commentaries, evidence surely of his 
b pivotal position between the earlier scholastic theology of the 12th century and the 
full flowering of scholastic genius in the thirteenth'. ' 
William's discussion occurs during the course of his treatment of a question 
which probably belongs to a debate on proper and appellative nouns, 'Whether the 
noun "God" in its primary signification can have a plural'. 7A modem scholar looking 
for William's reaction to the Lateran decree could be forgiven for overlooking this 
section of the work. There is no immediately obvious connection between Joachim's 
concept of divine unity, which was the principal object of reproof in the decree, and 
the signification of the word 'God'. But, as we have seen, the signification of 'God' 
was the subject of lengthy and complicated discussions bi the twelfth century and 
after. Towards the end of the twelfth century it was standard practice to draw a 
distinction between the signification and the supposition of terms such as 'God' and 
6 essence' in order to show why these terms could refer to the same divine reality and 
yet describe it in different ways. This is the main theme of William's chapter and one 
which he links explicitly to the issue of contention between Peter Lombard and 
Joachim. 
William wants, of course, to show that the term 'God' does not have a plural. 
However, both reason and authority would suggest the contrary. The opposing 
arguments work on the premise that since 'God' has the same signification as 
something else (essence or Person), and this something has a plural, it follows that 
'God' has a plural. Hence, because God is identical with the divine essence and the 
divine Persons, it must have a plural. The scriptural authority for the view that 'God' 
has a plural comes from passages where the word is used metaphorically, as in Gal 
4,8, You served these ivho ii)ere not gods. 
Against all this, however, is the argument that 'God' is a proper name 
(proprium nomen) and as such cannot be plural. William's explanation hinges on the 
distinction between the signification and supposition of a noun. Although 'God' and 
gauthor of creation' are equivalent in terms of supposition G. e. they denote the same 
61A. St. Pierre, 'The Theological Thought of William of Auxerre. An Introductory Bibliography', RTAM 33 
(1966). P-147. 
'Suinina LIVA pp. 53-7. 
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thing), they are not equivalent in ten-ns of signification (i. e. they signify tile same 
thing, but in different ways). ' Although in actuality neither the term 'God' nor 'author 
of creation' is predicated of more than one thing, in the case of 'God' it is not even 
conceivable that it could be plural. It is precisely in this respect that it differs from 
6 author of creation'. The analogy William uses is between Socrates and the sun, i. e. 
Socrates could under no circumstances even be thought to be more than one thing, 
whereas it is possible to imagine more than one sun. 
'Mis is a curious argument, but one which nevertheless makes the point that 
a term's supposition and signification imply different things respectively. William uses 
this principle to reject the other objections regarding 'essence' and 'Person': 
sometimes two terms are equivalent and yet one of them [i. e. God] can be used to stand for the other 
[i. e. essence and Person] whilst the other cannot in turn stand for it. ' 
After having explained the true import of the scriptural and patristic texts, William 
cites a further objection, which he notes is a standard one, to the singularity of God: 
Since the noun 'God' is purely essential and is nevertheless used to stand for Person, why, since 
similarly the noun 'essence' is purely essential, can it not be used to stand for Person? 'O 
The explanation offered by William was by the early thirteenth century a familiar and 
well-rehearsed argument but his is the clearest so far: 
It is now clear from what has been said that the noun 'essence' is only assigned to essence or nature. 
The noun 'God', however, is assigned to something possessing the divinity and for that reason it accepts 
supposition for each Person which possesses the divinity. But since the noun 'essence' is assigned to 
nature or essence, under no circumstances can it stand for anything except the essence. 
" 
'Ibid., P. 54.35-7: 'Nec est verum quod hoc nomen "Deus" et iste terminus "principium primurn creaturarum" 
equipollent quanturn ad significationern, licet equipolleant quanturn ad suppositionem. ' 
Wid- p. 54.47-9: 'Ad secundo obiecturn potest patere solutio ex predictis, quia quandoque 
duo termini 
equipollent et tamen tinus potest trahi ad supponendurn pro aliquo, alius autern non pro illo'. 
'oIbid., p. 56.81-3: Turn hoc nomen "Deus" sit pure essentiale et tamen potest trahi ad supponendurn pro 
persona, quare similiter hoc nomen "essentia". curn sit pure essentiale. non potest trahi ad supponendurn pro 
personaT 
"Ibid.. P. 56.86-90: Tatet ex iarn dictis quia hoc nomen "essentia" impositurn est soli essentie sive nature, 
hoc 
autern nomen "Deus" imposittuTi est habenti deitatern et ideo habet supponere pro qualibet persona que 
habet 
deitatem. Sed curn hoc nomen "essentia" imposit-um sit nature sive essentie, nullornodo habet supponere nisi pro 
essentia. ' 
1'213 5 
This is absolutely axiomatic for William: the impositio of 'God' allows it to stand for 
Person, but the impositio of 'essence' does not. Despite this, Joachim had argued, 
according to William, that 'essence' does indeed stand for Person. '2William goes 
so far as to identify what he believes to be Joachim's view that essence begets essence 
as the cause of his attack on Peter Lombard. Consequently, it is this question of the 
generation of the essence which is the real point of contention between them, and not, 
as we might expect from Joachim's works and from the decree, the Lombard's 
quaedam summa res. For nowhere, either in his own works or even according to the 
Lateran Council's account of his position, does Joachim ever discuss this question, 
never mind explicitly put forward the argument William attributes to him. It seems 
safe to assume, moreover, that William is not in any case basing his judgement on 
Joachim's actual works but rather on the Lateran decree which would have been easily 
available to him, and so it must be from this document that William has inferred his 
understanding of Joachim's position. In other words, the views which William 
attributes to Joachim are for him implicit in the decree. Certainly, the specific 
argument which William attributes to Joachim could not be inferred from the decree: 
this is something which William imports from his own immersion in that particular 
debate. What is not so clear is whether William's reading of Joachim's position could 
be reasonably inferred from the decree alone given that, although the Council affirms 
that the essence does not beget, it does not expressly attribute the opposite view to 
Joachim. It seems that William has misread the Council's rejection of the begetting 
essence towards the end of the decree as yet another of Joachim's errors. 
William cites the statement in the Lombard's Sentences to which Joachim 
allegedly objected, that 'since the essence is unique, if essence begot essence, then the 
essence begot itself, which is impossible. "' According to William, Joachim's 
argument against the Lombard's assertion proceeds as follows: 
But Joachim objects to this proof, since in the same way you could have said Peter: God is unique, 
therefore if God begot God, God begot himself; but this is impossible, therefore God did not beget God. 
Ilierefore, just as, though God is unique, God nevertheless begot God, and it does not follow from this 
`Ibid., p. 56.91-2: Joachim tamen dicit quod hoc nomen "essentia" bene potest supponere pro persona. I 
13jbid.. p. 56.96-7. William is certainly referring to the Sentences rather than the decree's paraphrase of them. 
Cf. Lombard, Ucnt. V. 1.6. p. 82.19-21. 
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that God begot himself, [so too] in the same way, although the essence is unique, nothing prevents the 
essence from lia,,,, in begotten essence, since it does not follow from this that the essence begot itself. " 9 
Again, not only is this not a direct citation from any part of Joachim's writings, it is 
not a question which Joachim discusses, even incidentally. Neither is the issue explicit 
in the Lateran decree. Clearly, then, William has somehow inferred from the text of 
the decree that Joachim's real objection to Peter Lombard's view was not the 
Lombard's concept of a quaedam summa res, but his opposition to the Lombard on 
the issue of the essence as begetting. William correctly reports that the Lombard 
denied this, but thinks Joachim affirmed it. 
It seems that William's immersion in the scholastic discussion on why 'God 
begot God' but not 'essence begot essence', and the distinction between signification 
and supposition which grew out of that, predetermined his reading of the dispute 
between Joachim and Peter Lombard as represented in the Lateran decree. Regardless 
of any implicit link there might be between Joachim's unity of collection and the 
generation of the essence, or of the Council's own rejection of the begetting essence 
as an alternative to the Lombard's view, nowhere in the decree is the view that the 
essence begets attributed to Joachim. By concentrating on the question of whether or 
not the essence begets, William not only adopts a more effective framework for 
refuting Joachim's opposition than the more problematic question of the quaedam 
summa res, he also choses an issue which is consistent with his own interests and with 
the demands of the immediate question under consideration. 
William gives full credit to Joachim's argument. hi his solutio, he comments 
that Joachim had good reason to oppose the form of the Lombard's argument and the 
logical premises which underlay it, i. e. something is unique, something begot 
something, therefore something begot itself, which is impossible. But, says William, 
Joachim did not pay sufficient attention to the nature of the terms with which he was 
dealing: 
Because indeed the noun ýessence', since it is assigned to essence only, is of such a nature that it cannot 
"Suinina LIVA p. 56.98-104: 'Sed obicit loachim contra haric probationern. quia eodern modo pottlisti, 
Petre, 
dicere: unicus est Deus, ergo si Deus genuit Deurn, Deus genuit se ipsurn; sed 
hoc est impossible, ergo non Deus 
genuit Deurn. Sicut ergo licet unicus sit Deus, tamen Deus genuit 
Deum, nec inde sequitur quod Deus genuit se-, 
eodem modo. licet unica sit essentia, nichil impedit quin essentia genuerit essentiam, nec 
inde sequitur quod 
essentia genuit se. ' 
stand for anything except the essence. 'ý 
Thus. William implies, even though the Lornbard's argument is basically flawed, it 
nevertheless holds good because of the property of the term 'essence' to stand for 
essence only. And it is precisely in this respect that the term 'essence' differs from 
the term 'God'. That is why there is no necessary equivalence in the arguments which 
Joachim allegedly parallels, i. e. God begot God, but not therefore himself; essence 
begot essence, but not therefore itself. For the term 'God' stands for both essence and 
Person. 16 And even though we might think that essence should stand for anything 
which possesses divinity (meaning the Persons),, this is prevented by the signification 
of essence as that which infon-ns existence, and this signification. excludes essence 
from standing for Person, since Person does not convey this sense. 17 In a previous 
section William had defined 'persona' as signifying both essence and relation, and it 
is presumably this two-fold signification which disqualifies 'persona ' from having 
essence as its supposition in certain contexts. 18 Joachim was wrong to argue as he 
had and was therefore, William concludes, rightly condemned by the Council. '9 But 
this was certainly not the main reason for Joachim's condemnation as William claims. 
The Council at no point explicitly accused Joachim of maintaining the view that the 
essence begot, even though this charge might be thought to be implicit in their 
affirmation of the Lombard's doctrine of the non-generation of the essence. 
The first Franciscan scholar to write about Joachim's condemnation was 
15jbid., p. 56.105-8: 'Dicimus quod loachim bene oponit quantum ad formarn argumentation is, sed non bene 
opponit quantum ad naturam. terminorum. Quoniarn enim hoc nomen "essentia" talis nature est quod non potest 
supponere nisi pro essentia cum soli essentie impositum sit*. 
1611) id., p. 57.112-14: 'Sed non tenet hec fonna argumentandi in hoc nomine "Detis", quod habet supponere tam 
pro essentia quarn pro persona. ' 
'Wid., p. 57.125-31: 'Quamvis forma huius nominis "essentia" insit personis, tamen non eis convenit secundum 
quod significatur per hoc nomen "essentia". Idem est enim. essentia quod natura faciens esse sive 
informans ens 
secundurn quod significatur per hoc nomen "essentia". Idem enim est essentia quod natura 
faciens ens vel 
informans ad esse, infon-nare autem vel facere esse non convenit personis, licet illa factio vel 
informatio nichil 
aliud sit quarn ipsa essentia. ' See W. H. Principe's comments on this passage and on 
William's concept of esse. 
V'the Hq7ostatic Union (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1963). in William q Auxerre's Theologv q 
pp. 22-3. 
"Summa LVI. 3, p. 85.24-5: 'dicmus quod hoc nomen "persona" partim dicittir secundurn essentiam. partim 
secundurn relationem'. 
19jbid. 1. [V. 6, p. 57.117-18: 'merito dampnatus ftiit propter hoc dicturn loachim in concilio sub Innocentio 
tertio. ' 
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Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), who began his lectures on the Lombard's Sentences 
sometime in the 1220s, and probably after William of Auxerre had completed his 
Summa Aurea. 20 These lectures have been preserved in what have been identified as 
student rej)ortationes .2' Alexander's fullest discussion of the Fourth Lateran 
Council's doctrinal statement on the Trinity is to be found in Distinction V of this 
commentary. 22 He pays much closer attention than William of Auxerre to the explicit 
point of contention between Joachim and Peter Lombard: 
But if the divine essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding (non gignens nec genita nec 
procedens), there is therefore something (aliquu res) which is neither begetting nor begotten nor 
proceeding. Also the begetting thing is not the same as the thing which is not begetting, that is the Son; 
neither is the proceeding thing simply the begotten thing and so forth. Therefore, the thing which is 
neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding is not something which belongs to the three Persons; 
therefore, there will be four things in the Trinity. This is the view which Joachim attributed to Peter Lombard. 2' 
At the same time, Alexander, no less than William, is drawing out what he sees as the 
assumptions underlying Joachim's attack oii Peter Lombard, the ideas without which 
it would be inexplicable. He does not mention the Lombard's concept of a quaedam 
summa res, only his view that the essence is not begetting etc. It is only by drawing 
out on Joachim's behalf the potentially undesirable implications of Peter Lombard's 
view that the essence does not beget that Alexander can make sense of Joachim's 
opposition. He can reconstruct the impulse behind Joachim's accusation of Quaternity 
only with reference to the idea of the essence as neither begetting nor begotten nor 
proceeding, rather than to the essence as quaedam summa res, the real cause of 
offence. But, says Alexander, although it is true that, because the divine essence is not 
begetting it follows there is a 'thing' which is not begetting, it does not also follow 
"'00n Franciscan scholars in general, see A. M. Hamelin, L'icolefiranciscaine de ses dibutsjusqu'd Voccain&me, 
Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia 12 (Louvain. 1961); Glorieux, Ripertoire 11. 
2'W. H. Principe, Alexander qf Hales' Theologv of the llq)ostatic Union (Pontifical Institute of Medý4v*al Studies 
Toronto, 1967). p. 14. 
2'Magistri Alexandri de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiaruin Pctri Lombardi 1. Collegitim S. 
Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1951), pp. 79-91. 
23jbid. INA. p. 79.11-18: 'Sed si divina essentia non est gignens nec genita nec procedens, ergo aliqua res est 
quae nec est gignens nec genita nec procedens. Item. res gignens non est res quae est non-gignens. tit Filius. nec 
res procedens simpliciter est res genita, et ita de aliis. Ergo res nec gignens nec genita nec procedens non est aliqua 
tritim personanim: ergo erit quatemariws in Trinitate: quod loachim. imposuit Lombardo. ' 
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that this is a something, an aliqua res. For 'ciliqua res' properly refers to Person, i. e. 
21 something distinct. Moreover, we can say 'the divine essence is a res gignens', 
where 'res' is taken to mean hypostasis (i. e. the Person of the Father) without this 
forcing us to conclude that the divine essence itself begets . 
2' And this does not mean 
that there are four res because the res which is not begetting is identical with the 
Person wliich is begetting. 26 There is absolute identity between essence and Person. 
therefore, such that the non-begetting essence is the same as the begetting Person, the 
Father. Thus a central factor in Joachim's misunderstanding, according to Alexander's 
account, would be the ambiguity of the term 'res'. As a res in itself, the essence does 
not beget. Nevertheless the essence is a res gl*gnens where 'res' here means the Father 
who begets. This conception of the divine essence as a res which does not beget, but 
which is not therefore an aliqua res (a distinct thing), may link in with Joachim's 
accusation of Quatemity and his condemned doctrine of divine unity. The drafters of 
the Lateran decree could only explain Joachim's accusation of Quaternity as a 
consequence of his doctrine of unity of collection. For, it could be argued, Joachim 
could not have mistaken the Lombard's quaedam summa res for a fourth thing unless 
he had no proper concept of divine unity but only a unity of collection. They might 
also have thought that a counterpart to unity of collection, as well as another 
alternative to the Lombard, would be the view that the divine essence begets. That is, 
there is nothing to prevent someone who has no concept of the divine essence as a 
quaedam summa res from thinking that the essence begets. 
A further problem is that since the divine essence is neither begetting nor 
begotten nor proceeding it is in a position of opposition with respect to the three 
Persons and as a result identity between essence and Person through predication is not 
possible: 
'Ibid., pp. 79-80: 'Respondeo: haec est concedenda "divina essentia est neque gignens etc.: ergo res est neque 
gignens" etc. Sed non sequitur: ergo "aliqua res", nam "aliqua res" proprie trahit ad personarn. ' 
25jbid.. p. 80.3-7: 'Concedenda tamen haec est "divina essentia est res gignens", nam "res" surnitur pro 
hypostasi; haec autem est vera "divina essentia est hypostasis gignens". Nec sequitur: est res gignens, ergo est 
gignens vel gignit. ' 
26 Ibid.. p. 80.7-9: 'Ad aliud dicendurn quod non est quaternarius rerum, nam res quae non est gignens etc. est 
persona gignens etc., et ita non facit numenim in eo quod est "res"'. 
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'to beget' and 'to be begotten' are relatively opposite, similarly 'not to beget' and 'to beget' are 
relatively opposite. Therefore, those things to , vhich [these propertiesi are attributed are also opposite. But a begetting thing is not the same as one which is begotten etc. Therefore, since the non-begetting 
and the begetting are more opposite than the begotten and the begetting (and similarly with regard to 
the other hypostases), it follows that the divine essence, which is neither begetting nor begotten nor 
proceeding, will be opposite to the individual hypostases. Therefore, the divine essence is not 
appropriately predicated of a hypostasis. Therefore, this is false: the Father is the divine essence. 
We answer that just as in man there is an essence, namely by which he is (quo est), there is 
also a quod est. And this is the cause of the quo est being the predicate, and the quod est the subject. 
But in no creature are these identical. In God, however, they are the same, and yet each has its own 
mode. Therefore, this argument does not follow: in man the quod est and the quo est are not identical, 
but man is the subject by virtue of his quod est, and the predicate by virtue of his quo est, and, 
therefore, man is not a man. Rather what ought to be inferred from this is that the mode of the subject 
is not the same as the mode of the predicate. This confused the abbot Joachim. For when I say that 
4man is an animal', not animal but man establishes man as rational or irrational. Therefore, this is false: 
'animal is man'. Similarly, going back to the first argument, it does not follow: the divine essence is 
neither begetting etc., because essence neither determines this or that thing, nor is it this or that thing, 
since the act of begetting is not attributed to the essence. 27 
Alexander's point is that although we distinguish in created things between the quod 
est and the quo est so that they are different., this does not mean that we should be led 
into absurdities such as 'man is not a man'. It is not that man as quod est or subject 
is different in essence from man as quo est or predicate, but that their modes of 
signifying are different. When we say that in man the quod est and the quo est are 
different, we are not talking about two discrete and separate things but two different 
modes. Having established this semantic principle, Alexander proceeds to use it to 
explain why Joachim's objection is invalid, although it is not clear precisely what 
connection he is making. His point would seem to be that the simple fact that the 
divine essence is neither begetting etc. does not establish the essence as a separate 
entity from the begetting, the begotten and the proceeding for the very reason that this 
is just a mode of signifying, not a means of actually separating essence from Person. 
Thus, just as man is rational by virtue of being man rather than by virtue of being 
animal, so the Father is begetting by virtue of being the Father, not by virtue of being 
the divine essence. Therefore, it is neither here nor there in terms of the number of 
personal distinctions within the divinity that the divine essence does not beget, 
just as 
saying that animal is not rational would not affect the issue of man's rationality. 
The 
definition of essence as something common to the three Persons, just as the definition 
of animal as something common to all men, means that the essence 
has no 
'Glossa pp. 80-1. 
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determining effect on the distinguishing properties of the Persons, just as animal 
cannot determine the distinguishing characteristic of man, his rationality. The fact that 
the essence does not beget, therefore, makes no difference to the number of Persons 
in God. 
Alexander's discussion of 'essence begot essence' in his Summa picks up some 
of the same points found in the Glossa, but has much stronger parallels with William 
28 of Auxerre's treatment. Anticipating the arguments of Bonaventure and Aquinas, 
Alexander makes the point that the property of begetting is only attributed to a ten-n 
whose mode of signifying is concrete rather than abstract. 29 
The first objection considered by Alexander against the view that the essence 
does not beget is attributed to Joachim. 'Me argument reported, down to the actual 
wording, is a version of the one also given by William of Auxerre: 
If, therefore, God begets God, it follows that essence begets essence. Moreover, it does not follow from 
this that the essence begets itself, just as it does not follow that God begot himself. Now Joachim, who 
was of this opinion, argued in this way against the Master of the Sentences: 'Peter, you say that if 
essence begets essence, since the essence is undoubtedly one, it follows the same thing begets itself. ' 
Therefore, in the same way, since there is only one God, it follows: 'God begets God, therefore the 
same thing begets itself'. But this is false because it does not follow; therefore, nor does the other. 30 
Alexander formulates Joachim's argument in precisely the same terms as William of 
Auxerre. It is impossible to say whether he is borrowing directly from William himself 
or indirectly through the academic grapevine of stock arguments. Of course, the 
argument itself is not William's creation, but dates back to the later twelfth century. 
But its attribution to Joachim and the form of personal address allegedly used by him 
is introduced by William and becomes one of the characteristic features of the 
discussion in the thirteenth century. 
28SUMina Theologica 4 vols., Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi. 1924-48) 1. liber 1, pars 1. inq. 11, q. 
1, c. 3, 
pp. 421-9. 
'Wid.. p. 4.11: 'In eis quae dicuntur de formis, ita tit quid si volumus eis attribuere acturn, 
hoc non est n's' in 
quantum dicuntur concretive, sicut caliditas non cale facit. sed calidum; ergo similiter 
"generare. generari" non 
dicuntur de essentia prout significatur ita abstractive, scilicet per hoc nomen "essentia". 
' 
30jbid.. p. 422: 'si ergo Deus generat Deum, ergo essentia generat essentiarn. - Nec ex 
hoc sequitur quod essentia 
generet se, sicut nec sequitur quod Deus generet se. Nam loachim. cuius 
fuit haec opinio, ita argumentatur contra 
Magistrurn Sententiarum: "Petre, t-Li dicis; quod si essentia generat essentiam. cum non sit nisi una essentia. ergo 
idem generat se. " Ergo a simili. curn non sit nisi unus Deus, sequitur: 
"Deus generat Deum. ergo idem generat se"; 
sed hoc est falsum, quia non sequitur*, ergo nec 
illud. ' 
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Alexander's response is to fon-nulate a general rule about theological language 
which disqualifies Joachim's argument and which is a good example of grammatical 
theology coming to the rescue. He says that notional verbs ho beget' etc. ) are only 
predicated of those nouns which signify the divine essence as a quod est, for example, 
'God' in 'God begets God'. 31 Words such as Veitas' and 'essentia', however, do not 
signify the essence in this way, but absolutely. The general rule is that notional or 
personal verbs cannot be predicated of words which signify the divine essence 
absolutely because such absolute words designate an order of nature which is the 
opposite state from the notional. 32 Joachim's mistake was failing to recognise this 
distinction between words such as 'God' and 'essence' when it came to the question 
of the divine generation. 33 For a verb signifying notio is never predicated of the 
essence, because the essence defies all manner of existence characteristic of individual 
things. Hence, even though in God, essence and Person are the same thing, their 
modes of signifying differ markedly. 34 
Alexander's approach, therefore, is to define the divergence between the correct 
view of Peter Lombard and the Lateran Council on the one hand, and the mistaken 
view of Joachim on the other, in terms of language and modes of signifying. His 
criticism, also found in William of Auxerre's Summa Aurea, that Joachim's error was 
the result of a lack of technical understanding, is extremely significant. rhis motif is 
also present in subsequent commentaries. It is significant for what it reveals of the 
attitude of these authors that only men trained in the schools will have the intellectual 
"Ibid., p. 425: 'Et ideo generalis regula est quod de nomirnibus divinis significantibus divinam essentiam ut 
it quod est" possunt dici verba notionalia, sicut generare, generari et huiusmodi, quae dicunt habitudines notionales 
personae ad personam; ideo potest dici: "Deus generat Deum. Deus spirat Deum. '" 
32jbid., p. 425: 'Absolute significatur divina essentia per hoc nomen "deitas", per hoc nomen "essentia". 
Generalis ergo regula est, quod de illis nominibus divinis. quae significant divinam essentiam absolute, non possunt 
dici verba notionalia sive personalia, quae dicunt habitudines personales. quia essentia sic designata absolute 
significatur absque designatione ordinis naturae; et ideo nunquarn convenit ei modus comparatus, qui est modus 
ordinis, quia modo opposito significatur, scilicet absolute; ideo nullo modo dicitur essentia generare nec generari, 
nec deitas, quia verba ista dicunt habitudines ordinis naturae in personis-, et ideo, non sunt haec vocabula extendenda 
nisi ubi significatur essentia curn ordine naturae, qui est ordo personalis. ' 
33jbid., p. 425: Tuit autern deceptus loachim credens omnia vocabula circa istarn materiam esse eiusdem 
ponderis, sed quia verburn notionale semper est alicuius ordinis, ideo nunquarn dicitur de essentia, quae significat 
quid absoluturn ab omni ordine in ratione dicendi, sed de aliis. ' 
'4jbid., p. 425: licet sit idem in Deo essentia et persona. tamen alitis modus significandi est in essentia et 
persona 
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equipment necessary for a correct understanding of the Sentences. In this sense, 
Joachim is portrayed very much as an misguided outsider, someone totally unqualified 
to make an accurate assessment of a work such. as the Sentences. 
I'here is a greater sense of exasperation in the commentary of another 
influential Franciscan theologian, Bonaventure (d. 1274). His discussion is again found 
35 in his commentary on Distinction V of the Sentences. At the beginning of his 
discussion Bonaventure highlights the familiar but important distinction between 
concrete and abstract essential terms which corresponds to Distinctions IV and V of 
the Sentences. Thus 'deus' is a concrete essential term and 'essentia' an abstract 
essential term. 36 
When he comes to consider Joachim 's objection Bonaventure, like William of 
Auxerre, notes that Joachim attacked both the opinion and the argument of the 
Lombard . 
37 Joachim first attacks the Lombard's opinion that the divine essence is 
neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding because this is tantamount to saying that 
38 the essence is a fourth thing in addition to the three Persons. Bonaventure's 
analysis here is consistent with the judgement delivered by the Fourth Lateran 
Council, which he mentions by name, insofar as he recounts Joachim's accusation of 
Quaternity. But, following his predecessors, he neglects to mention Joachim's hostility 
to the idea of a quaedam summa res, the issue which was most fully developed by the 
Council. 
Bonaventure's version of Joachim's objection to the Lombard's reasoning 
belongs without question to the tradition of commentaries on the dispute inaugurated 
by William of Auxerre. Tlius Joachim is made to argue, addressing the Lombard by 
name, that if the consequence of 'essence begot essence', where the essence is one 
35 Commentarius in I Librum Sententiarum, Opera Oinnia 10 vols. (Quaracchi, 1882-1902) 1. d. V, pp. 1 10-23. 
16COmin. in Sent., p. 110: 'In praecedenti distinctione movit Magister questionern de comparatione generationis 
ad terminum essentialern concreturn, qualis est hoc nornen "Deus". In presenti movet questionern de comparatione 
generationis ad terminum essentialern abstracturn, qui est "essentia. - 
37jbid., dUl). fV, p. 121: 'Contra hoc obiicit loachim. tam contra positionern quarn contra rationem. ' 
38jbid.. p. l')J: 'Contra positionern, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit: ergo in divinis est 
res generans et genita et procedens. et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est ibi quatemitas. si stint 
quatuor res. 
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thing, is that something begot itself, the sarne should follow for 'God begot God'. 39 
For the same conditions apply in each case, i. e. something begot something, and 
therefore the same consequences should also follow on, i. e. that the same thing begot 
itself. As much as 'essence begot essence' impies 'essence begot itself ', so 'God begot 
God' should imply 'God begot hirnself'. 
According to Bonaventure, therefore, the principal target of Joachim's objection 
is the Lombard's doctrine of Quaternity, but this accusation in turn is really due to 
Joachim's opposition to the Lombard's view that the essence does not beget, not his 
concept of a quaedam summa res. If the essence does not beget it is something in 
addition to the three Persons, i. e. a fourth thing. rMis is the accusation of Quatemity 
found in the Lateran decree. But Joachim also supposedly challenges the Lombard's 
reasoning on the crucial argument 'God begot God' but not 'essence begot essence', 
the subject of lengthy discussions in the schools throughout the twelfth century, but 
not of the Lateran decree as such. Again, therefore, Joachim's opposition to the 
Lombard is being assimilated into the language and concerns of this academic debate, 
his argument being adapted accordingly. At the same time, Bonaventure also implies 
that Joachim thought the Lombard's opinion's led to Quaternity precisely because he 
(Joachim) is of the view that the essence does indeed beget. 
Bonaventure attempts to make sense of Joachim Is attack. On one level, he 
attributes it to Joachim's deficient reasoning which led him to misunderstand Peter 
Lombard's use of the term 'res', an implicit reference to the controversial quaedam 
summa res. For 'res' is not univocal; it can mean both hypostasis (Person) and the 
divine nature. 40 In other words, there is a rey generans (tile Father), a res genita (the 
Son) and a res procedens (the Holy Spirit), but the res which neither begets nor is 
begotten nor proceeds (the divine nature) is not therefore a thing distinct from the 
three Persons and to be added to them since it is the common nature held by all three 
and not something separate from them. What is ironic about this is that this is also 
"Ibid., p. 121: 'irridet rationem Magistri: si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res: ergo una res 
generat se ipsarn. Similiter, inquit Ioachim, potttisti dicere, Petre: Deus generat Deum. et unus est Deus: ergo 
eadern res generat se ipsam. ' 
40jbid., p. 121: 'Dicendum, quod loachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia "res" non accipitur 
uniformiter, quia curn dicitur "res" pruno modo, ibi accipitur "res" pro re naturae, sed curn dicitur secundo modo. 
accipitur pro ipsa natura divina. ' 
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Joachim's view: the divine nature is not distinct from the three Persons, it is not a 
fourth thing. 17his raises the question of whether indeed, as has been suggested, the 
real difference of opinion between Joachim and Peter Lombard came down to nothing 
more than different understandings of the the term res. 41 
But Bonaventure accuses Joachim not only of misunderstanding the Lombard's 
use of the ten-n 'res', but also of generally lacking sufficient reasoning powers. The 
fact that 'begetting' is predicated of one thing (tl-ie Father) but not of another (the 
divine essence) does not mean to say that consequently there must be a numerical 
distinction between the Father and the divine essence. 'n-Iis is a point about predication 
which goes back to Abelard but which really takes root in the Glossa on the 
Sentences. 42 Bonaventure exposes the absurdities of this position through the same 
technique as the author of the Glossa, by showing how if the same reasoning were 
applied elsewhere, unacceptable conclusions would ensue: Peter is an individual thing, 
man is not an individual thing; therefore Peter and man are two things. Possessing or 
not possessing a property, therefore, does not amount to a distinction of number (i. e. 
of substance) between two such things. 43 
As for Joachim's counter- argument Unstantia), again it is not correctly thought 
out. ýMe word 'essence' differs from the word 'God' precisely in standing for and 
signifying the same thing; it never stands for Person, but only for the divine nature, 
whilst 'God' can stand for many things. 44 
For this reason Joachim ignorantly censured the Master and because, being simple, he did not revere 
the Master, therefore by the just judgement of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council and 
the position of the Master approved. 45 
4'Di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', pp. 670-1. 
42 2-3. Appendix A. ý 
43 Coinm. in Sent., p. 121: Traeterea, deficit ab insufficienti, quia non valet: si aliquid dicitur de aliquo, et non 
dicitur de alio, quod propter hoc illa faciant numerum. Unde non valet: Petrus est individuum: homo non est 
individuum: ergo Petrus et homo stint duo. Habere enim. proprietatem et non habere non sufficit ad distinguendum. ' 
This recalls the argument of Alexander of Hales in his Glos--za LV. 2, p. 80.29-31. 
-"Coinm. in Sent.. p. 12 1: 'Ad instantiam, eitis dicendurn, quod non recte instat; quia essentia est res una quantum 
ad suppositurn et sig"nificattim; non enim supponit personas; sed Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed 
plures quantum ad suppositum. ' 
45 Ibid., p. 121: 'Et ideo ignoranter loachim reprehendit Magistnim. et quia. curn esset simplex. non est reveritus 
Magistrum. ideo itisto Dei itidicio damnattis ftiit libellus eitts in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magstn approbata. ' 
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Bonaventure is still following the actual text of the decree to some extent. In some 
Franciscan authors, however, Joachim's original accusation of Quatemity has become 
entirely divorced from the conciliar condemnation. In Odo Rigaldi's (d. 1275) 
commentary on the Sentences one of the unattributed arguments against the Lombard 
is in fact none other than Joachim's accusation of Quaternity. 46 Joachim himself is 
mentioned as the perpetrator of the objection that essence begot essence does not 
mean something begot itself since the same does not apply to God begot God. 47 But 
it is almost as if Joachim's personal reputation and orthodoxy is no longer of any 
interest. Odo does not mention the Council; his main interest is in grappling with 
issues which still had the capacity to raise a number of extremely complex questions. 
The first Dominican master of theology at Paris, Roland of Cremona (d. 1259), 
also commented upon the dispute between Joachim and Peter Lombard during the 
48 
course of his Summa (written before 1234) . Roland's source for Joachim's 
opposition to the Lombard seems to be William of Auxerre, and the scholastic 
tradition to which both belonged, rather than the decree itself. This usage is consistent 
with Roland's extensive dependence on William's Summa Aurea . 
49Roland himself 
never refers to the Lateran decree and it is not inconceivable that the conciliar text 
was not among the sources of his exposition. 
Roland begins his discussion of the question with the argument attributed to 
46 BN lat. 14910. fol. 16vb (cited in Schmaus, Der LiberPrqj, 7qgnatorius, p. 50 note 13): 'Essentiaestres, constat 
non generat. Ergo est res non generans eadern ratione nee genita nee procedens. Ergo aliqua ibi sive in Trinitate, 
quae nee est generans nee genita nee procedens. Ergo aliqua res est ibi, quae nee est Pater nee Filius nee Spiritus 
Sanctus. Ergo ibi est quaternitas'. On Odo, see Hamelin. L'icolefranciscaine, pp. 18-22; Glorieux, Ripertoire II, 
pp. 31-3. 
47Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, p. 52 n. 13: 'Item Magister opponit sic: si divina essentia essentiam. 
genuit, cum non sit nisi una essentia, idem genuit se. Sed contra eurn arguit Iochim sic: si deus genuit deum et non 
est nisi unus deus. ergo idem genuit se, quod falsum est. Ergo argumenturn. non sequitur. Ergo similiter nec tertium. 
Ad hoc dicendum. quod non est simile, quia hoc. quod dico "essentia", dicit essentiam per modum essentiae, quae 
simpliciter intelligibilis est, prout sic significantur. "Deus" autern dicit essentiam. sive formarn ut in habente. 
Plures 
autem sunt habentes divinam essentiam et ideo hoc. quod dico "deus", licet non multiplicetur 
in forma, tamen 
multiplicatur in et ideo pro diversis suppositis posset supponere hoc, quod dico "deus", a parte suppositi et a parte 
appositi'. 
"On Roland. see E. Filthaut, Roland von Creinona O. P. und die Anf nge der Scholastik hn Predigerorden d 
(Vechta i. 0.. 1936). Filthaut argues that MS. Paris Mazarine 795 is not a collection of quaestiones, but a suinma 
(pp. 38-9). 
49 For detailed comparison of Roland and William. see Filthaut, Roland von Cremona, pp. 83-91. 
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Joachim by William of Auxerre . 
50 His tone is very detached. He recounts three 
arguments supposedly used by Joachim and even adduces a fourth on his behalf, 
remarking that Peter Lombard did not provide strong enough arguments in defence of 
his position. 5' 
Roland's pupil, Hugh of Saint-Cher (d. 1263), who completed his commentary 
on the Sentences in the early 1230s, takes a similar line. 52 He takes his cue from 
William of Auxerre, but also mentions the importance of the Lombard's quaedam 
summa res to Joachim's opposition. For Hugh indeed, the concept of a summa res is 
interchangeable with the concept of something being unique. The point of Joachim's 
objection as formulated by William of Auxerre was that if the essence cannot beget 
because it is unique, the same should follow for God since he is unique. Hugh 
produces a variation on this, replacing uniqueness of something with the concept of 
the summa res: if essence does not beget essence because it is a summa res, it follows 
that God does not beget God because God is also a summa res. " Despite this slight 
variation, the thrust of Hugh's exposition-, that the word 'God' can stand for several 
things, but that 'essence' can only stand for one, the essence, goes back to William 
of Auxerre. 54 
In his Summa theologide, Albert the Great (d. 1280) follows much the same 
path as his predecessors by treating Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard as an 
'OSumma, Paris Maz. 795, fol. 6va: 'dLxit abbas loachim contra id quod dicitur in sententiis. Dicit enim ibi 
magister Petrus et bene, quod essentia non generat, et hec est ratio magistri: quia unica est essentia, quare si 
essentia generat essentiam, idem se ipsum generaret, quod est impossibile sec-undum Augustinus et rei veritatem. 
loachim autem dicebat quod essentia generabat et dicebat ita contra magistrurn Petrum: quare dicis quod essentia 
non generat, quia est unica, ergo eadem ratione debes dicere quod deus non generat, quia unicus est deus, ergo hec 
est falsa: deus generat deum. ' 
"Summa, Paris Maz. fol. 6vb: 'et ita tria argumenta sunt pro loachim. Adhuc quartum argumentum pro loachim 
potest adduci [... ] dicimus quod essentia non generat, sicut dixit Lumbardus. sed insufficienter assignavit causam. ' 
52 On Hugh, see W. H. Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher,, z Theology oj'the Hiy, 7ostatic Union (Pontifical Institute 
of Medieval Studies Toronto, 1970), pp. 13-15. 
53 Commentarius, BN lat. 3073, fol. I Orb: 'culn enim una et summa etc. Hic obiecit Iohachim <> magistro et 
dixit quod esset hereticus sic: tu dicis quod essencia non generat essenciam quia essencia est una et surnma res, 
et ita oporteret quod idern se generaret, ita deberes dicere quod deus non genuit deurn quia deus est quedarn summa 
res, id est una sola res et indivisibilis-, vel si dicas quod sic. dicas ita cw-n essencia generat essenciam et sicut ibi 
dicis quod non sequitur, ergo idern genuit se. ita dicas et hic. ' 
'Commentarius. BN lat. 3073, fol. 10rb: 'ille deceptus fuit quia deus plura supposita habet, ideo pro alio potest 
teneri in subiecto, et pro alio in predicato, sed licet essencia tanturn unum suppositurn, scilicet essenciam, et ideo 
utrobique tenetur pro eadem supposito et ideo hic sequitur quod idem gentierit se. ' 
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expression of his opposition to the view that the essence does not beget. " Albert's 
point of departure is the Lombard's discussion in Distinction V of the Sentences, 
supplemented by an extensive reading of Aristotelian natural philosophy. The divine 
nature cannot beget because it is 'indistinct' Undistincta) and common to the three 
Persons, whereas the begetter and the begotten are distinct through their relation to 
one another. 56 The point is that something which begets must be discrete, not 
abstract. Again, a nature, i. e. the nature common to several things, by definition 
subsists not in itself but through an individual and thus does not fit in with the 
singular mode of existence proper to something which begets or is begotten. 57 
Albert proceeds to list a number of objections, based on both authority (all 
from the Sentences) and reason, to the view that the essence does not beget . 
51 rhe 
penultimate objection (no. 10) is identical with that attributed by Alexander of Hales 
to Joachim, i. e. that if there is a thing which is neither begetting nor begotten, there 
will be four things in the Trinity-59But the argument which Albert himself attributes 
to Joachim is taken from William of Auxerre. 60 
The reaction of 'Fhomas Aquinas (d. 1274) to Joachim's condemnation has 
received considerably more attention than that of his predecessors. McGinn describes 
"Opera Olnnia t. 34.1, Summa Theologide (Aschendorf, 1978) 1.7, Q. 30, c. 3, art. l. pp. 231-5. 
56Ibid., p. 231.48-51: 'Adhuc, omne generans et generaturn in divinis distinctum est relatione originis: natura 
penitus indistincta est. sed semper tribus communis, natura ergo nullo modo generat nec generatur. ' 
'7Ibid., p. 231.54-9: 'natura numquam est existens per se solum. sed semper in communicatione alterius 
acceptum et ab illo nec divistim nec separaturn, tit existentiae singularis modurn habere possit; ergo impossibile 
est essentiam divinam sive naturam vel generare vel generari'. 
58jbid., p. 232. 
59Ibid., p. 232.55-63: 'Adhuc, videtur sequi inconveniens, si dicatur. quod natura divina non est gignens nec est 
genita. Secundum hoc enim in trinitate res est gignens non genita, quia pater; et est ibi res genita non gignens, quia 
filius-, et est ibi res procedens nec gignens nec genita. quia spiritus sanctus; et est ibi res nec gignens nec genita 
nec spirans nec spirata. quia essentia sive natura divina: ergo in trinitate sunt quattuor res, et sic quaternitas 
debet 
dici, non trinitas. ' Cf. Alexander of Hales. Glossa LV. 1. pp. 79-80. 
'Summa, p. 232.64-71: 'Adhuc, est obiectio Abbatis foachim: conceditur enim haec "deus deum genuit", et 
tamen "cleus" nomen essentiae est sive naturae. Quaeritur ergo: atit se deum genuit aut alium 
detim genuit? Si se, 
turic aliquid generat se. et sic essentia potest dici generare essentiarn. Si alium deum. tunc generans et genitus non 
stint unus detis, sed duo essentialiter differentes, quod est haeresis 
Arii. ' For Albert's solution. see iNd., p. 235.26- 
37. 
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Aquinas' attitude to Joachim as 'by far the most consistently hostile. "' T'llis hostility 
was at least partly conditioned by the condemnation of Gerard of Borgo San Donino's 
Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum in 1255 at a time when Aquinas was studying 
at Paris for his master's degree . 
12 Aquinas' criticism of Joachim's trinitarian doctrine 
must accordingly be seen in the context of his whole-hearted rejection of Joachim's 
entire philosophical system, particularly Joachim's theology of history and approach 
to biblical exegesis. The implication of all this is that Aquinas' critique was simply 
part of his general antipathy to the kind of extremism which he associated with 
Joachim and his followers. " Without denying this more general feature of Aquinas' 
criticism, we must at the same time take into account the important role which the 
tradition of thirteenth-century commentaries on the Lateran decree play in Aquinas' 
interpretation of Joachim's condemned trinitarian views. It would be wrong to assume 
that Aquinas' understanding of Joachim's condemnation belongs to only one strand 
of thirteenth-century thought, hostility to eschatological movements, and not to others, 
in this case the academic debate on the Trinity which had its roots in the early twelfth 
century. 
In his Summa theologide, Aquinas considers Joachim's views as part of a 
general section concerned with the controversial question of the relation between 
essence and Person in God. 6411is discussion in Articles 4 and 5 is very similar to 
Bonaventure's in his commentary on the Lombard's Sentences and belongs in general 
to the tradition of commentaries and summae. In Article 4, lie asks whether concrete 
essential nouns, such as 'God, can have Person as their supposition. 
6' The main 
illustration of this problem is again the proposition 'God begot God' and the 
objections which he lists against 'God begot God' being true also correspond to those 
UB. McGinn. 'The Abbot and the Doctors: Scholastic Reactions to the Radical Eschatology of Joachim of 
Fiore'. Church Historv 40 (1971), p. 37. 
6-'Ibid. 
63Y. -D. G61inas, 'La critique de Thomas d'Aquin sur 
F&6gese de Joachim de Flore', in Toinmaso DAquino 
nella storia del pensiero, 1, Le Fonti del Pensiero di S. Toininaso. Tolninaso 
dAquino nel suo settiino centenario 
(Naples, 1974). 368-76. 
'Sumina theologide la. 39.5, pp. 313-17. Much the same treatment of Joachim's argument, focusing on modes 
of signifying. is found in Contra Errores Graecoruin, ed. P. Gloriewx 
(Tournai, 1957), pp. 121-2. 
-'Suinina Ia. 39.4. p. 311. 
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which were standard by the last quarter of the twelfth century. T'hus, since God is a 
singular term and singular terms, according to the logicians' dictum cited by Aquinas, 
both signýfj, and stand for the same thing (terminus singularis idem significat et 
66 supponit), it foll ows that 'deus' must stand for whatever it signifies, i. e. essence. 
It would seem, therefore, that 'God begot God', is untenable by virtue of its 
consequence, that is, 'essence begot essence'. 
However, the credal statement 'God from God', which Aquinas clearly takes 
as synoynmous with the statement 'God begot God', stands in the face of all 
objections. Aquinas explains that the properties of language itself require that we 
consider not just the reality signified (res signiti-cata), but also the mode of 
67 
signifying. For just as 'man' signifies humanity subsisting in some individual, so 
'God' signifies something which has the divine essence (i. e. something distinct, like 
an individual man) and thus, according to this mode of signifying, 'God' properly 
stands for Person . 
68 MUS 'God' can stand for either essence or Person depending on 
the context, i. e. depending on how its particular signification may restrict its 
supposition. 69 
In Article 5 Aquinas considers the question, during the course of which he 
deals with Joachim's opposition, of whether abstract essential names, such as essence, 
can stand for Person . 
70 Earlier on in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas had accepted 
the Boethian definition of Person as an individual substance of rational nature and had 
placed particular stress on the individuality of Person as a hypostasis or first 
substance .7' Now he 
is asking whether an abstract ten-n (essence) can stand for a 
661bid.: 'Quia, tit sophistae dicunt, "terminus singularis idem significat et supponit". Sed hoc nomen "deus" 
videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo cum significet essentiam, 
videtur quod supponat pro essentia et non pro persona. ' 
67jbid.: *Sed in proprietatibus locutionum non tanturn attendenda est res significata, sed etaim modus 
significandi. ' 
'Ibid.: 'Et ideo quia hoc nomen "deus" significat divinarn essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen 
"horno" humanitatern significat in suppositio, alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen "detts" ex modo significandi 
habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona. sicut hoc nomen "horno. '" 
"Ibid.: -Quandoque ergo hoc nomen "deus" supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur. "deus creat", quia hoc 
praedicaturn competit subiecto ratione formae signif icatae. quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit pro persona. 
70SUinina la-39.5, pp. 313-15. Articles 4 and 5 correspond to Distinctions 4 and 5 of the Lombard's Sentences. 
71 Suinina I a-29-1. pp. 248-50. 
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concrete one (Person). Again the main proposition considered in this section concerns 
divine generation, this time whether 'essence begot essence' is true. The problem is 
that just as the Nicene creed had provided the authoritative statement 'God from God', 
which was taken to be identical with 'God begot God', so Augustine states 'essence 
from essence', which similarly, therefore, should be equivalent in meaning to 'essence 
begot essence'. Further, since God and his essence are identical, for reasons of 
consistency and of preserving divine simplicity, if 'God begets God', it should follow 
72 that 'essence begets essence'. Other arguments function on the same principle that 
for divine simplicity to be preserved it must follow that if God begets, so does the 
essence. 
Aquinas' counter- argument repeats the Augustinian principle, which had come 
to occupy such a central place in the Sentences, that the essence cannot conceivably 
beget since no thing begets itself. The introduction of this argument is Joachim's cue 
in the scenario that Thomas presents: 
We answer that the Abbot Joachim fell into error on this point. He argued that, just as we say 'God 
begot God, so we can say that 'essence begot essence'. He reasoned that, on the basis of divine 
simplicity, it cannot be the case that God is anything other than the divine essence. But in this respect 
he was deceived, because in order to take account of the true meaning of language, we must consider 
not only the thing signified, but also the mode of signifying, as has already been stated. Although God 
and the divinity are identical in terms of the thing signified, their mode of signifying is not identical. 
For the noun 'God', since it signifies one who possesses the divine essence, naturally stands for Person 
by virtue of its mode of signification. T'herefore, those things which are proper to the Persons can be 
predicated of the noun 'God', such that we may say 'God is begotten or begetting', as has been stated. 
But the noun 'essence, since it signifies the essence as abstract form, does not possess from its mode 
of signification that which would allow it to stand for Person. And for that reason, those things which 
are proper to the Persons and by which they are distinct from one another, cannot be attributed to the 
essence. For if the essence were thus signified as having these properties, there would be distinction 
in the divine essence, just as there is distinction in the things for which God supposits, that is, the 
PersonS. 73 
In its essentials, Aquinas' explanation follows that of his predecessors, even repeating 
such motifs as sed in hoc deceptus fuit. " In general, therefore, the theologians who 
discuss Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard in Sentence commentaries or theological 
, 2SUinma la. 39.5, p. 313: 'Idem est deus et essentia divina. ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed haec est vera, "deus 
generat deurn". sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, "essentia generat essentiam. " 
73jbid.. pp. 313-14. 
74 Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. 425: Tuit autern deceptits loachim', Hugh of Saint-Cher. Commerntarius, 
BN lat. 3037. fol. 10rb: 'ille deceptus fuit'. 
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Summae tend to ernphasise the issue of the generation of the essence, often, though 
not always, to the exclusion of the main points mentioned in the decree. It could be 
argued that the immediate context, namely Peter Lombard's own discussion of the 
problem in Distinction V, was bound to affect their understanding of Joachim's 
opposition in the way that it did. But Joachim's accusation of Quaternity would have 
served just as effectively as a counter- argument to the Lombard's quaedam summa 
res, not to mention being faithful both to Joachim and to the decree. What made the 
argument actually attributed to Joachim, that the essence does indeed beget, decidedly 
more attractive to theologians was that in this way the condemnation could be added 
as yet another episode in the on-going saga of the signification and use of the terms 
'deus' and 'essentia. 'nie Lateran decree seemed to provide the first known case of 
anyone actually putting forward the view that the essence begot. 
2. The Commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the Lateran decree 
Aquinas' most detailed discussion of Joachim's trinitarian theology is to be 
found in his Expositio, super secundum decretalem. " The Expositio is quite unique 
within the tradition of thirteenth-century scholastic interpretations of the Lateran 
decree in that it is, first and foremost, a fully comprehensive textual commentary, 
rather than an appropriation of the dispute for the purposes of another argument. 76 
By closely following the order and contents of the decree, the Expositio differs from 
all other scholastic interpretations by eschewing their highly selective criteria. But 
although the issue of the generation of the essence plays nowhere near the dominant 
role in the Expositio as it does in other writings, including for that matter Aquinas' 
own, there is no doubt that it still enters into Aquinas' assessment at very significant 
junctures. 
Aquinas begins by placing Joachim's doctrine, as revealed in his attack on 
Peter Lombard, in direct contradistinction to the catholic doctrine on the Trinity as 
expounded in the first decree of the Fourth Lateran Council. In the first decree the 
"Olmscub Theologica I (Rome, 1954), pp. 428-31. 
76 For the same genre, see G. R. Evans, 'The Academic Study of the Creeds in the Twelfth-Century Schools'. 
Journal of Theological Studies 30 (1979), 463-80. 
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doctrine of the Trinity is put clearly and succinctly, thus creating a frame of reference 
for the dispute between Joachim and Peter Lombard. Certainly, this is how Aquinas 
uses it for his present purposes, 'so that the intention of each might be seen more 
fully, what is stated in the preceding should be understood'. The first decree 
established the Trinity as undivided according to the common essence and distinct 
according to the personal properties. 77 Aquinas places considerable stress on the fact 
that the Persons are distinct onýv through these properties; that these properties are the 
very cause of any distinction in God. 78 
It is this principle of the first decree that what is common cannot be distinct 
and vice versa which Aquinas takes as the foundation of trinitarian orthodoxy. 
Immediately carrying on from this, he makes the following assertion about the 
impossibility of the self-generation of the essence: 'if therefore the divine essence 
begets or proceeds, it follows that just as the Father is one Person, the Son another 
and the Holy Spirit yet another, so too would their own essence or substance be still 
yet another. 79 The decree does not itself say that if the essence begot it would, like 
the Persons, be distinct; it merely reiterates the Lombard's position that the essence 
is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but it is the Father who begets, the 
Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, because there are distinctions 
in the Persons and unity in the nature. 80 Aquinas, on the other hand, uses this 
principle to eliminate the generation of the essence right from the beginning. He 
places Joachim with Arius, presumably on the grounds that both in different ways 
deny the consubstantiality of the Persons established at Nicea. Peter Lombard, on the 
77Expositio 1187, p. 428: 'sancta Trinitas sectindurn communern essentiam est individua, et secundurn 
proprietates personales discreta. ' Cf. canon 1, Concilibrum, p. 230.15-17: 'Haec sancta Trinitas secundurn 
communern essentiam individua et sectindurn personales proprietates discreta'. 
78EXPOSitio 1187, p. 428: 'persona Patris non distinguitur a persona Filii nisi patemitate, et Filius distinguitur 
a Patre filiatione, inquanturn scilicet Pater genuit Filium et Filius genitus est a Patre; et similiter 
Spiritus sanctus 
distinguitur a Patre et Filio, inquanturn procedit ab utroque. Persona igitur in divinis distinguitur, 
inquantum 
persona generat, vel generatur, vel procedit. ' Cf. canon 1. Conciliorum, p. 230.5-8: Tater a nullo, 
Filius autem a 
solo Patre ac Spir-itus sanctus ab utroque pariter, absque initio semper et fine. Pater generans, 
Filius nascens et 
Spiritus sanctus procedens'. 
79E 
ixpositio 1188, p. 428: 'Si ergo essentia divina generat vel procedit. consequens est quod sicut est alia persona 
Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti, ita etiam sit earum alia et alia substantia vel essentia. ' 
"Conciliorum. p. 2327-11-14: 'et illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens. sed est Pater qui generat. 
Filius qui gignitur et Spiritus sanctus qui procedit. tit distinctiones in personis et unitas 
in natura. * 
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other hand, upheld the Nicene creed by teaching that one essence is common to 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit and does not beget etc., but is utterly 'indistinct' 
(indistinva). ` 
Aquinas thus identifies the consubstantiality of Nicea with the quaedam summa 
res of Peter Lombard and the Fourth Lateran Council. He firstly attributes Joachim's 
attack on the Lombard to his lack of training in dogmatic theology (utpote in 
subtilibusfidei dogmatibus rudis). Accordingly, Joachim's inability to understand the 
Lombard's statement (non bene capiens verba) led him to his accusation of Quaternity 
since he thought the Lombard had made the common essence a fourth thing distinct 
from the three Persons. In particular, Joachim thought that the statement, 'the divine 
essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding' distinguished the essence 
from the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who 
proceeds, and his view that in God there was no aliqua res una which was Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. 82 . In other words, Joachim's accusation of Quaternity stems both 
from his opposition to the Lombard's position on the generation of the essence and 
to his quaedam summa res. 
The emphasis here is subtly different from that found in the Lateran decree. 
True, Aquinas is merely refon-nulating the principle established in the first decree and 
repeated in the second, that there are distinctions in the Persons and unity in the 
essence, to cover the issue of the generation of the essence. For if something begets, 
it is distinct; therefore, if the essence begets, it is distinct; but the essence is common, 
therefore it cannot beget. T'his is really the first gloss which Aquinas places on the 
text, i. e. the first consequence of this principle is that the essence is non-begetting. It 
is almost as if the principle laid down in the first decree were being used to resolve 
the dispute in the second. Further, he attributes Joachim's opposition first to the 
Lombard's denial that the essence begets, and only latterly to his concept of the 
essence as a quaedam summa res. The issues are almost impossible to separate in the 
8'Expositio 1188, p. 428: 'Quod magister Petms sequens docuit quod una est essentia vel substantia communis 
Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, quae nec generat. nec generatur, tit sit penitus indistincta, ut patet in V distinctione 
I Sententiarum eius. ' 
82EXpo, ý, itio 1189, p. 428: Tredebat enim. quod ex hoc ipso quod dicittir: Essentia divina nec est generans nec 
genita, nec procedens, distinguatur a Patre qui generat et a Filio qui generatur et a Spiritu sancto qui procedit. Et 
ideo ipse loachirn protestatur quod in divinis non est aliqua res una quae sit Pater et FilitLs et SpiritiLs sanctus'. 
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decree itself; nevertheless, the stress there is definitely on the quaedam summa res 
rather than on the essence as non-begetting. With Aquinas, this order is reversed. 
The next line in the decree had reported Joachim's denial that there was any 
res which was the three Persons, although lie conceded that Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit were one essence. 8' Aquinas, however, renders Joachim's position much more 
strictly in logical terms, translating it into an identifiable logico-semantic position: 
But so that he did not seem to diverge totally from the Nicene faith, he conceded that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one essence, one substance, one nature, as though the one essence could be predicated 
of the three Persons, so that we can say 'three Persons are one essence', but not the converse, so that it could be said, 'one essence is three Persons. " 
This constitutes a significant expansion upon the original text condemning Joachim's 
view. Aquinas has drawn out in clear-cut terms what he sees as the absurdity of 
Joachim's position (non habebat sanum intellectum). But more than that, Aquinas' 
representation of Joachim's position is exactly comparable to one of the accusations 
against Gilbert of Poitiers, that we could say 'three Persons are one essence', but not 
that 'one essence is three Persons'. In particular, Aquinas' interpretation of Joachim's 
position as recounted by the Lateran decree resembles Peter Lombard's description of 
Gilbert's view in the Sentences, of which Aquinas would certainly have been aware. 
In his account, therefore, there is an unstated link between the discredited views of 
Gilbert and Joachim which may be implicit in the decree even if it was unintentional. 
It is certainly quite reasonable for Aquinas to have drawn the inference which he did 
from the decree since anyone with any acquaintance with the importance of 
predication for the meaning of propositions would have understood the Council's 
distinction in precisely the same way. 
The consequence of Joachim's view, that 'essence' is not the subject of the 
three Persons in a theological proposition, is that the unity of the divine essence is 
83 Coneilioruin 2, p. 231.14-17: 'manifeste protestans, quod nulla res est quae sit Pater ei FilitLs ei Spiritus 
sanctus, nec est essentia nec substantia nec natura, quamvis concedat quod Pater ei Filius ei Spiritus sanctus sunt 
una essentia. una substantia. unaque natura'. 
"Eyositio 1189. p. 428: 'Sed ne videretur totaliter a fide Nicaenae Svnodi recedere, concedebat quod Pater 
et Filiws et Spiritus sanctus stint tina essentia. una substantia. Lina natura. quasi tina essentia possit praedicari 
de 
tribus personis. tit dicamtis: Tres personae stint una essentia, non autem e converso, tit dicatur: Una essentia est 
tres personae. 
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reduced from something true. real and simple to a unity of collection and 
similitude. ý': ý Aquinas I point is that it is simply not enough for Joachim to have 
conceded that the three Persons are one essence. To ensure true and proper unity of 
essence, he would have to admit the essence as the subject as well as the predicate of 
the proposition. Again, this is faithful to the decree, although rephrased in slightly 
more technical language. From a discussion in the Summa theologide oil the apparent 
impropriety of defining trinitas as a collective noun, it is clear that Aquinas, like the 
Council, understands unity of collection to be a much inferior kind of unity to unity 
86 of essence. He even cites 'populus' as an example of a collective noun signifying 
a multitude of men united by some kind of associative bond. This is the kind of unity 
meant by unity of collection. It is not appropriate to God where there is only unity of 
essence. 87 Here in the Expositio, Aquinas reproduces the analogies of collection 
allegedly used by Joachim. " 
By denying that the divine essence is non-begetting etc., and that it is not the 
three Persons, Joachim is saying that the unity of the Trinity is nothing more than the 
unity of the three Persons and there is nothing other than the three Persons. In the next 
section, Aquinas introduces a new element which is not in the Lateran account, when 
he compares the use of scriptural texts as analogies for divine unity by both Joachim 
and the Arians. '9 Singled out for particular discussion are Jn 17,22-23 and I Jn 5, 
7-8, both of which were used by the Arians - according to Hilarýy of Poitiers - as well 
as by Joachim. 90 Both Joachim and the Arians allegedly use Jn 17,22-23 to show 
that divine unity is not an essential unity in the sense of 'aliqua res', an actual thing, 
"Expositio 1190. p. 428: 'Sed in hoc ipso quod concedebat tres personas esse unam. essentiarn vel substantiarn 
vel naturarn. non habebat sanum. intellecturn. Non enim. ponebat unitatem. essentiae trium. personarum. esse veram., 
realem et simplicern. sed quasi similitudinariarn et collectivarn'. 
'6Summa la. 31.1, p. 263: 'hoc nomen "trinitas" videtur esse collectivurn. cum significet multitidinem. 
Tale 
autem. nomen non convenit in divinis. cum unitas importata per nomen collectivum sit minima unitas; 
in divinis 
autem. est maxima unitas. Ergo hoc nomen "trinitas" non convenit in divinis. ' 
87jbid: 'nomen collectivum duo importat. scilicet pluralitatern suppositorum et unitatem. quandam. scilicet 
ordinis alicuius. "populus" enim. est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum. 
Quantum ergo ad 
primurn hoc nomen "trinitas" convenit cum nominibus collectivis; sed quantum ad secundum, 
differt quia in divina 
trinitate non solurn est unitas ordinis. sed cum hoc etiam tinitas essentiae. ' 
88E,. -Cp0ý4Zitio 1190. p. 428. 
29. `9EvpO, qjtjO 1191, p. 42 
'-"For their use bv the Arians. see Hilary of Poitien 5111C trill. VIII. 11-13. CCs-I 62A. pp-322-6. 
PL 10.243-6.. 
that a unity achieved through consent and will, just as the unity of the faithful is a 
unity resulting from mutual love and charity. " Aquinas does grant, however, albeit 
somewhat grudgingly, that Joachim was unwittingly, rather than obstinately, led into 
the Arian heresy since he submitted his works for papal approval. On balance his 
reading of Joachim's concept of divine unity follows the decree apart from this section 
on Joachim's affinity with Arianism. 
In order to clarify the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, the Lateran Council, 
according to the interpretation of Aquinas, established five points (Aquinas actually 
lists six). The first two are particularly interesting for the use they make of ideas about 
universals and how these impinged on trinitarian doctrine. Firstly, the Council affirms 
the doctrine taught by Peter Lombard, narnely that the divine essence is a certain 
supreme reality (quaedam summa res) of which the three Persons are predicated both 
together and individually. 92 Aquinas is here concerned to emphasize the essential 
unity peculiar to God in contrast to all other forms of existence. In man, for example, 
the essence of the individual man Peter is not Peter, since he is composed of many 
different things. In God, however, the essence of the Father is the Father himself. 9' 
Secondly, the Council reaffin-ned that in God there is only Trinity, not 
Quaternity and also explained why Joachim's objection to Peter Lombard was invalid. 
The Council dealt with Joachim's objection by showing that only if the essence were 
distinct, rather than common, could it be numbered as a fourth thing in addition to the 
three Persons. 94 Aquinas also says that nothing can be numbered with other things 
9'Expositio 1191, pp. 429-30: Ariani titebantur illa auctoritate ill auctoritate, ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos 
unum sunt, ad ostendendum quod Pater et Filius non stint tintim nisi sectinclurn consensum amoris [... ] Unde 
manifesturn est quod foachim in erroretim Arrianortim incidit. ' 
92EXPOSitio 1192, p. 429: 'Primo enim asserit veritatern quam Magister Petrus docebat, scilicet quod divina 
essentia est quaedarn summa res incomprehensibilis cogitatu et ineffabilis; verbo, de qua vere praedicantur tres 
personae et simul et singilllatirn. Potest enim vere dici quod essentia divina est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. 
Et itemm vere dicitur: Essentia divina est Filius, divina essentia est Spiritus sanctus. ' Concilibrum 1, p. 232.6-8: 
'una surnma res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater et FiEws et Spiritus sanctus, 
tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet eanindem'. 
93EXPOSitio 1192, p. 429: 'Quod quidem in nobis non accidit: non enirn essentia Petri est Petrus, sed essentia 
Dei Patris est ipse Pater; quia Petrus est ex multis compositus, non autern persona Patris, neque persona Filii, nec 
persona Spiritus sancti. ' 
94Conciliorum 2. p. 232.8-11: 'ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quatemitas, quia quaelibet trium 
personamm est illa res. videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina. quae sola est universonim principium, 
praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest'. 
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unless it is distinct from them (nihil connunieratur a1iis n&i quod ab eLY distinguitur). 
He uses an extremely revealing analogy between different species of animal to make 
this same point: 
since animal is not distinct from man, horse and cow, each of which is a type of animal, for that very 
reason we cannot say that man, horse, cow and animal are four things, but three only, because each one 
of them is an animal. Thus, because each of the three Persons is that res, namely the divine essence 
or nature, it cannot be said that the three Persons together with that res are four, since that res is not distinct from the three Persons. 95 
And so as to prove even further that Peter Lombard had not introduced a fourth thing, 
the Council reaffirmed his view that the essence is neither begetting, begotten nor 
proceeding: 
But because Joachim believed that it would follow from the Master's statements that the essence was 
distinct in three Persons, for that reason when it says thirdly: 'and that res is neither begetting nor 
begotten nor proceeding', it shows that this does not folloW. 96 
That is, just because the divine essence is non-begetting, it does not follow from this 
that it is therefore distinct in the three Persons, i. e. that the three Persons are really 
three separate essences. And yet, the divine essence is still the Father who begets, the 
Son who is begotten and the Holy Spirit who proceeds. The distinctions introduced 
by the adjectives generans, genitus andprocedens determine the Persons only, not the 
essence. 97 Tbus Joachim's argument against the Lombard does not follow: the 
essence is non-begetting, but the Father is begetting, therefore the essence is not the 
Father. " 71iis is not an argument found in the decree nor could it be said to be 
implicit there. Rather Aquinas is drawing out the logical premise of Joachim's view 
"Exposido 1193. p. 429: 'Unde ctim animal non distinguatur ab homine, equo et bove, quorum quodlibet est 
animal, ideo non possumus dicere quod homo et equus et bos et animal sunt quatuor, sed sunt tria tantum, quia 
quodlibet illorum est animal. Ita, quia quaelibet tritim personartim. est illa res, scilicet divina essentia vel natura, 
non potest dici, quod tres personae et illa res stint quatuor, quia illa res non est aliquid aliud a tribus personis. 
' 
96Expositio 1194, p. 430: 'Sed quia loachim credebat, quod ex dictis Magistri sequeretur quod esset essentia 
distincta in tribus personis, ideo tertio curn dicit: Et illa res non est generamv neque genita nec procedens, ostendit 
quod hoc non sequitur. ' Cf. Concilibruin 2, p. 232.11-12: 'illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens'. 
97EXPOSitio 1194, p. 430: 'distinctiones importatae per haec tria adiectiva, generans, genitum et procedens, 
deterTninent ipsas personas, de quibus praedicantur praedicta adiectiva. non autem essentiam vel naturam quae non 
distinguitur. ' 
"8, C, ýypo., zitio 1194. p. 430: 'Non ergo sequitur quod loachim ptitabat: Essentia non est generans; 
Pater est 
generans; ergo essentia non est Pater'. 
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in terms of the familiar argument that if the essence and the Father are identical, and 
if the Father begets, so too must the essence. But again, Aquinas reiterates. even 
though the essence does not beget, nevertheless, the essence is the Father who 
begets. " 
The fourth point established by the Council, according to Aquinas, is that 
correct theological language has a role to play in securing orthodoxy. For in the 
divinity the masculine gender must be used to refer to distinction (alius) and the 
neuter to the common nature (idem). Aquinas' commentary constitutes a significant 
expansion on the originally brief point made in the decree that although the Father is 
alius, the Son is alius and the Holy Spirit is alius, they are not aliud. '00 The point 
is important because it expresses the necessity that language must conform to faith and 
that correct linguistic usage is a guarantee of orthodoxy. Therefore, because the 
essence is indistinct and the Persons are distinct, words signifying distinction are used 
in the masculine, and words signifying unity of essence in the neuter. 'O' 
The penultimate section reiterates the Council's position on the Father's 
generation of the Son as not entailing a division of essence. 102 Finally Aquinas, 
again closely following and citing from the text of the decree, rebukes Joachim for his 
misunderstanding of Jn 17,2220' Essentially he makes the same criticism of 
Joachim as the Council, alleging that Joachim has drawn an absolute parallel between 
divine unity and the unity of the faithful in one Church, as if there were no difference 
in the kind of unity in question in each case. 104 Joachim's interpretation of these 
pass ages goes beyond any acceptable degree of similitude between God and 
"Expositio 1194, p. 430: 'qtiia etsi essentia non generet, est tarnen ille qui generat, id est Pater. ' 
100EXpositio 1195, p. 430, citing Conciliorum 2. p. 232.14-15: 'Licet igitur alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius 
Spiritus sanctus. non tamen aliud'. 
lo'Expositio 1195, p. 430: 'in divinis masculintun genus refertur ad personam. neutrum autern genus refertur ad 
essentiam vel naturam'. 
"Expositio 1196-7, P. 430. 
103Expo, vitio 1198, P. 431. 
104Expositio 1198, P. 431: 'sic inducebat loachim ac si eodern modo accipiendurn esset hoc quod dicitur unum. 
in nobis et in divinis pemonis. ý 
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creation. "' 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the &12ositio is how much it differs from 
the Summa theologide. In these two works., Aquinas offers two quite different 
interpretations of the Lateran decree. Iii the Summa theologide, Aquinas, like his 
predecessors, couches Joachim's objection in terms of the essence begot essence 
debate. But the Expositio shows that he was intellectually capable of giving due regard 
to the main issues as discussed in the decree. 
It is of course possible that the issues raised in the Expositio had receded from 
his mind when he wrote the Summa. The discrepancy between the two works can also 
at least be partly explained by their different objectives, one to provide a literal 
commentary of Church doctrine, the other to give a systematic treatment of a range 
of theological issues in a technical language. But without underestimating the very 
different emphases of the two works, I would suggest that there is also a significant 
element of consistency between them. In the Expositio, Aquinas cannot fail to mention 
the error of Quaternity, as he does in the Summa. And yet given that it is a literal 
commentary, there is still a surprising amount of attention given over to the issue of 
the generation of the essence. Aquinas does not state explicitly that Joachim thought 
the essence did beget, but he proceeds as though this was one of the presuppositions 
of Joachim's accusation of Quatemity. That is why Aquinas spends so much time 
spelling out the principle laid down in the first decree, that what is common cannot 
beget. For this destroys the entire premise of Joachim's argument, that the essence 
must be something fourth if it is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding. The 
element of invention is undoubtedly much stronger in the Summa due to the influence 
of previous commentaries, but in the Expositio there is already a discernible 
predisposition to the later interpretation. 
3. Renewed controversy: Peter Olivi (d. 1298) 
One final episode in thirteenth-century interpretations of the Lateran decree is 
the extraordinary flurry of polemical activity surrounding Peter Olivi's position on the 
"'Erpositio 1198. p. 431: 'Non tamen est idern modus perfectionis hurnanae et divinae. quia non potest esse 
tanta similitudo inter creatorem et creaturam, quin maior inveniatur ibi dissimilitudo'. 
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question of the generation of the essence. What is so remarkable about this late 
thirteenth -century discussion is that both Olivi and his opponents regard the Fourth 
Lateran Council decree on the Trinity as the main obstacle to Olivi's view that the 
essence, in some sense, does beget. Olivi's efforts are aimed at showing that there is 
no real disagreement between his view and that of the Council, whilst his opponents 
cite the decree as the definitive statement on the non-generation of the essence. Also 
relevant from the point of view of the fon-nation of an enforceable consensus among 
theologians is the way in which masters of theology within the Franciscan Order 
appoint themselves as the arbiters of orthodoxy without, as Olivi himself complains, 
the backing of papal authority. 
Like many of his Franciscan colleagues, Olivi studied at Paris in the 1260s, 
before teaching in southern France, probably at Montpellier, in the late 1270s. '06 It 
seems that some of his views on the Immaculate Conception came under suspicion at 
this time, but it was not until 1283 that the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, 
Bonagratia of San Giovanni in Persiceto ordered an investigation of a number of 
issues. 107 This commission, which consisted of four masters and three bachelors of 
theology, all Franciscans at the University of Paris, censured several of the opinions 
imputed to Olivi. ney issued their judgement in the form of a rotulus, a no longer 
extant series of excerpts from Olivi's writings, along with a definition of the orthodox 
position on these questions, known as the Littera septem sigillorum, so-called from the 
seals of the seven authorising theologians. 'O' 
One of the principal areas of Olivi's theology thrown into doubt by the Order's 
theologians concerned the divine essence. The seven, named at the beginning of the 
106 On Olivi's life, see D. Burr, The Persecution Qf Peter Olivi, Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society 66 part 5 (1976), C. Partee, 'Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study, Franciscan 
Studies 20 
(1960), 215-60. 
"'On the events of 1283-85, the period of the first investigation into Olivi's teachings, see 
Burr, Persecution 
of Peter 01ii-i. pp-35-44. 
'"For the rotulus, see Olivi's second apologia issued in 1285, Responsio firatris Petri Ioannis ad aliqua 
dicta 
per quosdam magistros Parisiensis de suis Quaestionibus excerpta 
[Responsio III. ed. D. Laberge, AFH 28 (1935), 
p. 132.7-12: 'de quibusdam scriptitationibus seu quaestitinctilis meis 
[ 
... 
I quaedarn stint per vos vel aliquos vestrum 
excerpta. et in tino rotulo recollecta. ' The Littera septem sigilloruin 
is edited by G. Fussenegger, Uttera septem 
sigillorum contra doctrinam Petri Ioannis 0lAi edita'. AM 
47 (1954), 45-53. 
262 
L ittera 
. 
109 
affirmed (1) 'that the divine essence is one in three supposita, in no way 
divided into three parts, or repeated, unfolded, repeatedly posited, or multiplied; and 
we state and affirm the opposite view to be incorrect; and (2) 'that in the divinitv 
there is no place for a producing and a produced essence; and the opposite view is 
incorrecV. 110 It can be seen from the fact that the issue of the generation of the 
essence follows immediately upon the issue of the unity of essence that the two 
questions were regarded as interconnected. Olivi's view of the essence as replicata in 
the three Persons is taken to account for his view that the essence is begetting and 
begotten. One of the official investigators drew such a link, "' as did Giles of Rome 
(d. 1316) in his systematic Impugnatio of Olivi's errors. 
112 
That year, 1283, Olivi was summoned by the Minister General to Avignon 
where he was forced to submit to the articles of the Littera, including those on the 
generation or production of the essence, as if, he complains, 'everything there was 
satisfactory and was the pure faith or authentic definition of the Roman Pontiff or a 
general Council'. "' Indeed, one of Olivi's chief grievances concerning his treatment 
was the fact that the commission had no ecclesiastical authority with which to judge 
these matters, having the support neither of Scripture, pope, nor general CoUnCil. 114 
'09Droco, minister of France-, John of Wales; Simon of Lens; Arlotto of Prato; Richard of Middleton (d. c. 
1295); Giles of Bensa; John of Murrovalle, later Minister General during the next major prosecution of Olivi's 
teachings in 1309-11. On Richard of Middleton, see E. Hocedez, Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa 
doctrine, SSL 7 (Louvain, 1925), in whose writings, according to Hocedez. there is no personal reference to Olivi 
(p. 443). 
"OLittera, p. 51: 'Firmiter enim credimus, dicimus et tenemus: 1. quod divina essentia est una in tribus 
suppositis, nullo modo tripartita vel geminata vel replicata vel iterato posita vel plurificata-, et contrarium dicimus 
et affirmamus erroneurn. 2. Item quod in divinis non est ponere essentiam producentern et productam; et contrarium 
est erroneum. ' 
"'See the list of errors. probably by Bonagratia of Bergamo c. 1328, ed. L. Amor6s, 'Series condemnationum 
et processum contra doctrinam et sequaces Petri 16annis Olivi', AFH 24 (1931), 495-512. Like Aquinas in his 
Expositio, Bonagratia cites the Nicene definition of consubstantiality, concluding 'Ex quibus patet, quod dictus error 
dogmatizatus in scriptis dicti fratris Petri Ioannis repugnat primo, articulo fidei, qui pertinet ad divine essentie 
unitatem, in quantum dicit essentiam. divinam generare, gigni et procedere et distingui' (p. 512). 
112 Ed. L. Amor6s, 'Aegidii Romani [Iinpugnatiol doctrinae Petri loannig OI&i an. 1311-12', AFH 27 (1934), 
p. 422: Totest autem aliter articulus improbari, quia "producere", "produci" et "procedere" proprie non competunt 
essentie sed personis, quia secundum Magistrum Sententianan. et approbatur in Decretalibus, "quaedarn summa 
res est", id est divina essentia, "que nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit. "' 
113T'hiS infon-nation is provided by Olivi, Re,, zpon--zio 11, p. 133.8-15. 
114 Responsio 11, pp. 131-2. 
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Denied the opportunity to defend himself at this hearing, Olivi issued three apologetic 
texts, one in 1283 and two in 1285. "5 His 1285 Responsio was issued along with 
an Amplior declaratio exclusively devoted to clarifying his position on the generation 
of the essence. ' 16 This proved to be one of the recurring themes in the disputes 
surrounding Olivi's views which continued long after his death into the fourteenth 
century and which endured even after his views on poverty had been adopted by the 
Spiritualist wing of the Franciscan Order. ' 17 According to Ubertino of Casale (d. 
c. 1329-41), one of Olivi's supporters writing in 1311 during the second wave of 
attacks on Olivi's teachings, the question of the divine essence was one of three issues 
- the others being Olivi's views on the rational soul and Christ's side wound - which 
remained controversial from the 1283 condemnation. "' At tile same time, it was 
singled out by critics such as Augustinus Triumphus (d. 1328), one of the theologians 
commissioned by Pope Clement V in 1310 to examine Olivi's doctrines yet again. "9 
Of the twelve errors which lie attributes to Olivi, the first two concerned the 
triplication and generation of the divine essence. 120 
In his 1283 Responsio, Olivi accepted both the propositions about the essence 
laid down in the Littera, whilst pointing out that although he does not believe that he 
ke has said anything contrary, if he hasý retracts it. To the first point that the divine 
essence is one in three supposita but not divided in three parts, he consents, explaining 
that any multiplication is not in the essence itself but in the mcdes of being which the 
"50livi's first defense, Responsio quamfiecit Petrus ad litterain magistrorum, praesentatain sibi in Avinione 
[Respon, vio 11 is also edited by D. Laberge, AFH 28 (1935), pp. 126-30. 
116[Alnplior declaratiol quinti praecedentis Epistolae articuli qui est de divina essentia, ed. D. Laberge, AF71 
29 (1936), 98-141,365-95. 
117 See D. Burr. Olivi and Franciscan Poi, em% The Origins of the Usus Pauper Controi, eav (Univ. of 
Pennsylvania, 1989). 
118 Declaratio, ed. F. Ehrle as part of the series of documents, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne', 
ALKM 3 (1887), p. 191.12-15: 'Nam iHa, que impontint sibi, non inveniuntur ponderis notabilis per magistros visis 
suis dictis nisi in tribus articulis, scilicet de essentia divina. de anima rationali et de vulnere laterali'. On the events 
of 1309-11 and the Council of Vienne, Burr. Persecution ofPeter Olivi. pp. 73-80; lIefele-Leciercq VI. 2, pp. 666-70. 
"90n Augustinus. see B. Ministeri. De Aiýqwvtini de Ancona, O. ES. A (1338) Vita et Operibus. Analecta 
Augustiniana 22 (Vatican City, 1952), 7-56,148-262; M. Wilks, The Problem qf Sovereigntv in the Later Middle 
Ages. The Papal Monarchv with Augustinus Triumphus and the Public&ts (Cambridge, 1963). pp. 4-5. 
120Traetatus contra divinatores et sompniatore-v. ed. R. Scholz. Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitschriften 
aus der Zeit Ludwigs Biývern (1327-1354), Königlich Preussisches Historisches Institut in Rom 9-10 (Rome, 1911 - 
14), p. 485. Dated to 1310 by Ministeri, De Augustini de Ancona. p. 219. 
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essence receives through the Persons. 12 ' As to the second point, that the essence is 
neither producing nor produced: 
I accept this doctrine, when essence is understood in the abstract according as it is common to the Persons, and if I have said the opposite, which I do not believe so, I revoke it. I have, however, put forward the view which maintains that the essence, insofar as it is the essence of the Father, produces, 
and insofar as it is the essence of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is produced. And I do not believe that 
this is incorrect nor contrary to the decree of Lord Innocent. "' 
This implies that the issue of the generation of the essence was one addressed in the 
Lateran decree on the Trinity, but that Olivi's view can nevertheless be reconciled 
with it. Indeed, throughout his apologetic writings as well as in an earlier quaestio on 
the Trinity, Olivi regards the Lateran decree as the authoritative statement on the issue 
and he goes to considerable lengths to prove that any disagreement between himself 
and the conciliar proclamation is only apparent. 123 Particularly significant is that 
Olivi begins his detailed defence of his position on the generation of the essence with 
an extensive reference to 'the decree of Pope Innocent III % 124 Moreover, the main 
purpose of the crucial distinction here referred to and present throughout Olivi's 
writings on the subject, between the common essence and the essence of each of the 
Persons, is to avoid directly clashing with the decree. Olivi's aim is to show that the 
Council, and for that matter, Peter Lombard, is using the word essence in one way, 
in its abstract sense, whilst he, along with many sancti and doctores before him, is 
using it in another, in its concrete sense. By applying this distinction, Olivi can portray 
the apparent difference between himself and the Council as a linguistic rather than 
truly doctrinal one. His critics rejected this as an outright excuse for blatantly 
121ReSponSio 1, p. 126.8-10: 'non intellixi quod haec plurificatio vel geminatio significarent in ipsa Dei essentia 
nisi plurificationern modorum essendi, quos accipit essentia in personis% 
122Responsio 1, p. 126.14-19: 'Istam. sententiam accepto, sumendo essentiam. in abstracto prout est communis 
personis, et si contrarium dixi, quod non credo, revoco. Recitavi autem opinionern quae ponit quod essentia 
in 
quantum est essentia Patris producit, et in quantum est essentia Filii et Spiritus Sancti producitur, et 
hanc non credo 
esse errorern nec contrarium decretali domini Innocentii. ' 
"'The decree is Olivi's constant point of reference. See esp. Responsio 11, pp. 147-50; Amplior declaratio, 
'183). ed. Schmaus. Der Liber Propugnatorius, p. 176*. See pp. 98-9.368-70; Quaestio de trinitate (written before 1. 
also Ubertino of Casale, Responsio to Raymond of Fronsac and Bonagratia of 
Bergamo, ed. F. Ehrle. ALKH 2 
(1886), pp. 389,392-3. 
124 Amplior declaratio. pp. 98-9. 
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contradicting the decree. 125 
In his 1285 Responsio, Olivi dealt at greater length with the accusations 
levelled against him. He says that the source of the allegation that he had divided the 
essence into three parts were extracts made from his quaestio on the Trinity, in which 
he asks whether there is a personal production in the divinity. 126 There Olivi had 
argued that the essence could not be the essence of three supposita unless it had in 
some way the force of three essences and for this it would have to be repeated. 127 
Thus, says Olivi, he stands accused of asserting that the essence is repeated in the 
three supposita, rather than saying that the essence is one in three supposita. 128 OliVi 
counters that he has not spoken of the divine essence as repeated in any 
straightforward way (simpliciter) but according to a certain definition whereby it is 
legitimate to say that it is repeated in several supposita. 129 For any repetition 
concerns the mode of personal existence offly. "O And if his opponents charge that 
such words as replicata and gemin-ata are improper and should under no circumstances 
be attributed to the essence, then they are in the same breath also condemning the 
125Bonagratia of Bergamo, Series condeinnationum, p. 510: 'Primus error est. quod essentia divina ut est Patris 
sive in Patre generat [ ... 
] adiciens in suis excusationibus quod concilium generale positum Ertra, de summa 
Trinitate etfilde catholica, capitulo Danpnamus in quo dicitur: "quod essentia divina non est generans. genita nec 
procedens", intelligitur et debet intelligi, secundum eum, solummodo de essentia in communi, scilicet prout est 
simul communis tribus Personis, et non de essentia prout est sigillatim in qualibet trium Personarum. ' 
126 Responsio 11, p. 141.4-5: 'Post hoc ponitur aliud dictum meum sumptum ex quaestione "an in divinis sit 
personalis productiol", Quaestio de trinitate, pp. 143*-228*. 
127Responsio II, p. 141.6-10: 'divina essentia non potest esse essentia tritu-n suppositorum, nisi habeat 
quodammodo et per quamdam aequivalentiam in se vim tritim formartim seu trium essentiarum. Sed hoc non potest 
esse, nisi sit pluribus modis in esse posita. et nisi sit ter, tit ita dicam, replicata et geminata. ' Cited from Quaestio 
de tfinitate, p. 184*. 
MReSpOnSio 11, p. 142.3-7: 'Igitur in praedicitis error mihi impingitur, quia ibi ponitur quod essentia Dei sit 
replicata in suppositis. vel iterata, aut iterato posita. Quod quidern coniicio ex primo articulo litterae magistrorum, 
septern sigillis sigillatae, ubi sic dicitur: "firmiter credimus. dicimus et tenemus quod divina essentia est una in 
tribus suppositis, nullo modo triplicata'. 
129ReSponSio II, p. 142.10-15: 'ego nullum talium nominum simpliciter attribui divinae essentiae, sed solum sub 
certa. determinatione per verba sufficienter expressa, quorum aliqua etiarn in praedictis contra me excerptis sunt 
posita. Unde supra sic dictum est quod per talern modurn oportet earn in pluribus suppositis poni et replicari. ' 
BoResponsio If. p. 142.17-18: 'Ecce quod hanc replicationem noltli attribui essentiae, nisi solum respectu suarum 
existentiartim personalitim'. 
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many sancti who used similar expressions. "' Olivi cites a number of authorities in 
his favour, including Boethius, Hilary of Poitiers and Saint Anselm. From this he 
concludes: 
it is clear that the aforementioned saints and doctors have stated that the essence is repetita, replicata, iterata and geminata [ ... 
I for it is certain that those words, understood according to the aforementioned definitions, do not signify any essential diversification, numeration or mutation in the divine essence, but only its personal production or communication or its acceptance of the diverse modes of existence of the Persons. 132 
Finally, Olivi denies that this is tantamount to Joachim's error of reducing divine unity 
to a unity of will. He himself advocates a superreal (supersumma) unity of essence in 
the Persons, citing as proof a statement from his quaestio on the Trinity. 133 He 
refutes utterly the charge of tritheism (nomen triplicationis respectu essentiae). " 
If we did not know about the thirteenth-century interpretative tradition spawned by the 
decree, we might misconstrue Olivi's concern to distance himself from Joachim's 
position as simply a concern not to be identified as a Joachite, rather than participation 
in a doctrinal debate which had nothing to do with Joachim's theology of history. 135 
Olivi moves onto the second point concerning the divine essence raised by the 
U'Responsio II, p. 143.36-40: 'Forte adhuc contra me dicitur, quod praedicta verba sunt tantae improprietatis, 
quod nullo, modo nec sub aliqua determinatione debuenint attribui divinae essentiae. Sed qui hoc dicit sanctos 
arguit, et, meo iudicio, rationem dicendi cogentem non habet. Sanctos quidern arguit quia ipsi verbis et similibus 
aliquando utuntur. ' 
132RCSPOnSio 11, p. 146.26-38: Tatet igitur sanctos et doctores praedictos dixisse essentiam in personis repetitam, 
iteratam, geminatam [... I certum est enim quod verba. sub praedictis deten-ninationibus sumpta, nullam essentialem 
divers ificationern. aut numerationern aut mutationem significant in essentia divina, sed solum personalem eius 
productionern, vel communicationern. sive acceptionern diversorum modorum existendi personalium. ' 
133ReSponSio 11, pp. 146-7: 'Si vero dicatur ab aliquo mihi malivolo, quod ego dolose talibus verbis usus sum, 
quasi voluerim per hoc disseminare errorem, quem decretalis Innocentii III abbati loachim imponit, scilicet quod 
in personis divinis non est unitas essentiae secundurn rem et naturam, sed solum secundum concordiam, voluntatis 
ec, modo quo duo amici dicuntur habere unum cor, iniquissime hoc in me impingeretur, cum ego in tota quaestione 
illa et in tota quaestione sequenti, et in tota queastione praecedenti, totis viribus nitar astruere summarn et 
realissimam, immo supersummarn unitatem essentiae divinae in tribus personis. Unde, inter caetera. in responsione 
ad vigesimum quartum. argumentum dixi quod "personae divinae sunt unum et idem realiter, et conveniunt in una 
essentia numerali, quae potest dici una numero numerositate essentiae"'. See Quae, -aib de trinitate, p. 209*. For the 
same assessment of Joachim's error, see Ainplior declaratio, p. 379.19-21: 'periculum erroris illius quem decretalis 
imponit abbati loachim. quod scilicet in personis divinis sit sola unitas voluntatis et concordiae'. 
"'Responsio 11, p. 146.15. 
1350n Olivi's borrowing from Joachim's trinitarian conception of history, see Reeves. Influence, pp. 194-201. 
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Commission, his view that the essence is producing and produced. " He retorts that 
on this issue he was merely repeating the main opinions, not giving his own (absque 
assertione Utramque opinionem recitavi). 137 Even so, the view that the essence is 
producing and produced is not contrary to Innocent III's decree but on the contrary 
is necessary if the decree is to be reconciled with the statements of the Church 
Fathers. This han-nonisation is brought about by distinguishing in speech between the 
essence which is common to the three Persons and which is neither begetting nor 
begotten nor proceeding on the one hand, and the essence which is proper to this or 
that Person and which is begetting in the Father, begotten in the Son and proceeding 
in the Holy Spirit on the other. "' 'It is according to the first mode that the decree 
seems to be speaking; "9 that is, the decree correctly upholds the view that the 
essence does not beget because it is using essence in the sense of the common 
essence. In response, Giles of Rome remarked that those sayings of the Fathers which 
contain some impropriety are to be exponenda non extendenda. 140 
Olivi bases this judgement, that in the decree the word 'essence' is used in the 
sense of what is common to the Persons, firstly on the fact that the Council was 
concerned to condemn Joachim's erroneous conception of divine unity, his view that 
there is no thing which is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 141 It is only if we take the 
essence in its abstract sense that the full force of the condemnation becomes clear: 
136ReSponSio 11, p. 147.27-8. Olivi cites from his own Quaestio de trinitate, p. 185*. 
137 Responsio 11, p. 148.1. 
138Responsio 11, p. 148.3-25: 'Ista autem opinio secundum modum, secundum quem ipsam ibi recitavi, non vadit 
contra dictum decretalis Innocentii III, editae in concilio generali, sed potius concordat dicta sanctorum cum dictis 
decretalis, tollens contrarietatem quae apparenter inter dicta sanctorum et dicta decretalis esse videtur per quamdam 
distinctionem, ante me datam ab aliquibus magistris, videlicet quod est loqui de essentia. prout est communis tribus 
personis et omnes tres in se simul comprehendens, et in qualibet trium simul tota existens, et sub hoc modo sumpta 
non est genita, nec generans, nec procedens [ ... 
] Secundo modo est loqui de essentia, prout est propria huius vel 
illius personae, utpote de essentia Patris, prout est propria Patri. et prout est in eo non communicata sibi ab aliquo; 
et consimiliter de essentia Filii prout est propria Filii et prout est in eo per actum generationis communicata, et sub 
hoc modo sumpta, est secundum istos vere generans in Patre. vere genita in Filio, et spirata in 
Spirito Sancto. ' Also 
Amplior declaratio, pp. 98-9. 
"9Rcsponsio 11, p. 148.25-6: 'Sectindtim primum modum videtur loqui decretalis illa'. 
140 
linpugnati . o. p. 422. 
14tRCSpOn, ZjO 11, p. 148.27-30: 'Primo qUidem quia loquitur contra errorem ibi praernissurn. quo 
dicebatur quod 
nulla res est quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. et quod in divinis non est secundum rem aliqua una essentia 
comynunis tribus personis. ' 
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And for this reason they [lie? ] stated that to say that un(i quaedam sumnw res is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that it is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, is heretical and insane because, as they [he? ] said, it would follow from this that the common essence was a fourth Person. 
1142 
There seems to be either a scribal error or one in transcription, since the position 
described here is clearly Joachim's not the Council's, as the plural subject would 
indicate. It is probably safe to emend the passage accordingly, replacing 'they said' 
with 'he said'. In any case, the point is that precisely because Joachim is using 
essence according to its common sense, that the Council was, in condemning him, also 
bound to use it. This interpretation at least is consistent with Olivi's following remark. 
And so, he says, when the Council affin-ned with Peter that un. a quaedam res was the 
three Persons together and each of them separately, it added 'that res is neither 
begetting nor begotten nor proceeding', not meaning to deny those acts of the essence 
except insofar as it is common to the three Persons. "' A further proof that the 
Council's prohibition applies only to the common essence is that Peter Lombard can 
only be using 'essence' in this way. His argument, for example, that if the essence 
was begotten it would then be stated relatively of the Father, must only refer to the 
common essence. For if he meant to include the essence which is proper to the Son, 
he would be saying that the essence of the Son is not communicated or received and 
that the essence of the Father had no greater claim to the act of begetting than the 
essence of the Son. 144 The same distinction between the common essence and the 
142 Responsio 11, p. 148.30-4: 'Et ideo dicebant [dicebat? ] quod dicere quod una quaedam surnma res est Pater 
et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et illa non est generans, neque genita, neque procedens, est haereticum et insanum, 
quia, ut dicebant (dicebat? ], sequebatur ex hoc quod illa communis essentia esset quarta persona. ' Cf. Concilibrum, 
p. 231.9-14. 
'43Responsio 11, p. 148.37-41: 'confitemur cum Petro quod una quaedam. summa res est incomprehensibilis quae 
veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sacntus. tres res simul personae ac singillatim quaelibet earum. Et post pauca 
subditur: et illa res non est generans, nec genita, nec procedens, ex quo patet quod non negat illos actus de essentia, 
nisi prout est communis tribus'. Olivi is clearly referring directly to the decree here, Conciliorum, p. 232.4-12. 
144Responsio 11, p. 149.2-15: 'Tertio quia rationes quas magister Petrus facit ad hoc, primo Libro Sententiarum, 
distinctione quinta. non cogunt nisi solum de essentia primo modo sumpta. quod ad praesens do, verbi gratia, 
de 
prima ratione eitis qua concludit quod, si essentia esset genita, diceretur relative ad 
Patrem. et tunc ex hoc 
sequeretur quod non indicaret substantiam. Si enim haec ratio bene arguit non solum 
de essentia communiter 
sumpta, sed etiam ultra hoc de essentia, prout est propria Filio, tunc nec essentia prout est propria 
Filii debet dici 
communicata, vel data. vel per generationern accepta. Constat enim quod communicaturn refertur ad 
communicantem. et daturn ad dantem, et accepturn ad illum a quo est datum et suscepturn. 
Secundurn hoc etiarn 
essentia prout est in Patre subsistens non plus haberet ordinem ad acturn generandi active sumpturn quarn prout 
est in Filio vel Spiritu Sancto subsistens, quod ntillus concedit. ' For 
Peter Lombard's argument, see Uent. V. 1.2. 
p. 81. 
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essence proper to each Person must also be assumed in the argument that if the Father 
begot the essence he would be begetting his own cause. This is the Lombard's 
position only because he defines 'essence' abstractly as the divine nature which is 
common to the three Persons. 141 Finally, no one could seriously suppose that the 
decree intended to contradict the statements of the Fathers, many of whom stated 
expressly that the essence begets. 146 The objective which Olivi's solution achieves, 
in true Abelardian spirit, is to preserve the sayings of the Fathers in their idiom and 
the decree's in its without falling into contradiction. 147 
Thus both Peter Lombard and the Council only meant to deny that the essence 
understood in its most absolute being, not that the essence as understood by the other 
authorities, in the sense of the mode of personal existence, was begetting. 1411 In f act, 
when we are talking about the act of generation in this mode of personal existence it 
is absolutely necessary that the essence is begotten if the integrity of the very concept 
of Person is to be maintained: 
For 'Person' does not only state a personal property but along with this it also signifies some essence 
or nature. 'Merefore, to say that 'Person' is begotten is the same as to say that its essence is begotten 
with its personal property. Otherwise, if only its personal property but not its essence is begotten, then 
149 
the whole Person is not begotten. 
14 -5Amplior declaratio, pp. 373-4, citing ISent. V. 1.1, p. 82.5-6: 'Hic autem nomine esssentiae intelligimus divinarn 
naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis'; also Quaestio de trindate, pp. 202*-3*: 'Quod etiam 
Magister hoc intenderet, arguunt ex hoc, quod in principio rationurn istarum dicit se loqui de essentia. prout dicit 
unam naturarn communern tribus, et quia unam rationum suarum ostendit, qua probat, quod secundurn hoc Pater 
esset causa suae essentiae et quod geniturn esset causa existendi suo gignenti [ ... 
I et ideo videtur, quod Magister 
non intendat astruere essentiarn nullo modo esse genitam. sed quod essentia universaliter et in omnibus non sit 
genita, utpote, prout est in Patre. ' 
146ReSpo&ý, io II, p. 149.15-20: 'Quarto patet hoc, quia nullatenus est credendum quod decretalis illa intendat 
contradicere expressissirnis et quarn plitrirnis dictis diversorum sanctorum. Constat autem quod fere ornnes sacri 
doctores, scilicel Augustinus, Hilarius, Dionysius, Athanasius, et Anselmus et Richardus, in libro suo de Trinitate, 
verbis expressissimis dieunt essentiam esse genitam ab essentia'. 
147Responsio If, p. 149.21-3: 'ergo videtur quod illa positio sit magis catholica, quae simul absque omni 
contrarietate salvat dicta sanctorum in sua expressione, et dictum decretalis in sua. ' 
"Vesponsio 11, p. 150-10 -19: 'PrinIO modo solum intendit M agister Sententi arurn 
hoc negare et decretalis cum 
ipso, sicut ex dictis eorurn aperte, probari potest, et sub hoc sensu nunquarn dicunt sancti quod essentia sit generans 
vel genita vel procedens. Secundo autern modo hoc innumeris auctoritatibus et expressissimis verbis affirmare 
videntur et contra hunc modurn non loquitur decretalis, nec contra hunc modum, vadunt rationes 
Magistri 
Sententiarum, quin potius tam Magister quarn decretalis pro isto modo pro tanto faciunt, pro quanto tenent et 
asserunt quod essentia est de principali intellectu personae. * 
"Responsio II, p. 150.19-23: 'Non enirn persona solum dicit proprietatern personalern sed etiarn cum hoc 
significat aliquarn essentiarn vel naturarn. ergo dicere quod persona gignitur est 
idern quod dicere quod essentia 
eitis cum sua proprietate personali gignitur; alias si sola eitis proprietas personalis gignitur non autern essentia eius 
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Moreover, Peter Lombard himself introduced a similar distinction in order to refute 
the argument of those who said that the Father*s unbegotten wisdom by which he was 
wise was separate from the Son's begotten wisdom by which he was not wise. "O As 
the Lombard himself says, the unbegotten wisdom is understood as the Father and the 
begotten as the Son, both being one and the same wisdom which is understood as the 
common essence. "' Hence, comments Olivi, Peter Lombard understands sapientia 
in two ways: as it is proper to the Father or to the Son and thus as it is unbegotten or 
begotten; and as it is common to the three Persons and thus as it is neither unbegotten 
nor begotten. 152 Besides, this distinction between the common essence and the 
essence of each of the Persons is the only means of avoiding the entire array of 
trinitarian errors from Arianism and Sabellianism to Quaternity. "' 
Olivi's Amplior declaratio is devoted exclusively to this question of the 
generation of the essence. As in the Responsio, he runs through a series of biblical 
texts, ecclesiastical authorities and rational arguments which support his position. This 
includes an important section on Richard of Saint-Victor, in which Olivi cites 
Richard's attack on Peter Lombard's denial that essence begets essence. 154 Like 
many of his contemporaries, Olivi sensed that Richard's view was not entirely 
tunc non tota persona gignitur. ' 
"Responsio 11, p. 150.29-34: 'ponit Magister distinctionern praedictam ubi respondet quibusdarn argumentis 
sophisticis, quibus quidam, probare nitebantur quod non esset tanturn una sapientia Patris, quia, ut dicebant, Filius 
est sapientia Patris geniM qua Pater sapiens non est. Est autern et sapientia Patris ingenita qua Pater sapiens est, 
et ita Pater habet duplicern sapientiam; unarn qua sapiens est. et aliam qua sapiens non est. ' 
15'Responsio Il. p. 151.1-6: 'Una est tamen sapientia Patris. quia sapientia genita est eadem sapientia, quae et 
ea qua sapiens est, sive ea qua sapiens est intelligatur persona Patris. sive essentia Patris; quia persona Patris, quae 
intelligitur, cum dicitur sapientia ingenita, et persona Filii, quae significatur. cum dicitur sapientia genita, una 
eadernque sapientia est, quae essentia divina intelligitur communis tribus personis. ' Cited from ISent. XXXII. 
4.3, 
p. 237.28-33. 
152Responsio 11, p. 151.19-22: 'Ecce quod Magister in praedictis verbis sumit sapientiarn duobus modis, scilicet 
prout est propria Patris vel Filii, et sic dicitur ingenita et genita. et prout est communis tribus, et sic non 
dicitur 
genita vel ingenita'. 
15'Ainplior declaratio, p. 379.31 -2: 'sententia praedictae distinctionis; omnes errores praedietos patenter evacuat 
et a se manifeste excludit. ' 
259-60. 12. pp2 'Amplior declaratio, pp. 129-131. See Richard of Saint-Victor, De trin. VI.. 
2- 71 
reconciliable with the Lombard's. 155 According to Duns Scotus (d. 1308). ho"vever, 
the Lombard's position carried greater weight since it had the support of a general 
CoUnCil. 156 
Olivi*s fourth task is to establish whether any authority might seem to 
overthrow his narrow understanding of the sense in which the essence begets. He 
concludes that there are none 'unless perhaps, as it seems to some, the decree of the 
Lord Pope Innocent 111, issued in the general Council, was against it, because there 
157 it is stated that the essence is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding' . This 
must be a reference to the interpretation of the majority of Paris theologians, since 
Olivi cites some of their most characteristic arguments. Even though, Olivi comments 
somewhat wearily, he has already shown that the decree is not incompatible with the 
position he has laid out, he will nevetheless undertake to demonstrate this more 
clearly. 158 
Again, it is because the main subject-matter of the decree is the question of 
divine unity, that it only speaks of the essence as non-begetting, since only this would 
be consistent with preserving unity of nature. '59 In order to show that the Council's 
155See, for example, Matthew of Aquasparta (d. 1302) in his commentary on the Sentences (Tuderti, Bibl. Com. 
122, fol. 22a) cited by Laberge, Amplior, p. 129 note 3: 'Huius positionis fuit loachim, abbas monasterii Florensis, 
cui concordat Richardus de S. Victore in VI libro De trinitate, increpans et redarguens eumdem magistrum Petrum 
Lombardurn'; Petras de Trabibus, commentary on the Sentences (Assisi, Bibl. Com. 154, fol. 3 5a), cited by Laberge, 
ibid: 'In ista quaestione videtur esse contradictio inter Magistrum Sententiarum et Richardum de S. Victore. '; 
loannes Capreolus, Libro pritno defensionum theologide divi doctoris Thomae de Aquino in priino Sententiarum 
(Venice, 1483) V. 1, after citing Olivi's interpretation of Richard of Saint-Victor, Capreolus comments: 'maior est 
auctoritas Magistri Sententiarum in hac parte auctoritate cuiuscumque sancti, quoniam confirmata est per 
Ecclesiam', cited by Laberge, ibid., p. 389. 
156 Opera Oinnia 19 vols. (Vatican, 1950-93) IV, pp. 24-5: 'Ad dicturn Richardi. Si intendit reprehendere 
Magistrum ibi, sicut ex verbis eius apparet, curn doctrina Magistri, et praecipue ista, authenticetur per concilium 
generale, in capitulo praeallegato, nego Richardum tenendo Magistrm. ' 
157 Amplior declaratio, pp. 368-9: 'Et quidem nulla textus sacri vel sanctorum auctoritas aut Romani Pontificis 
aut universalis Ecclesiae contra hoc penitus invenitur, nisi forte, secundum quod quibusdarn videtur, decretalis 
domini Innocentii papae III, edita in Concilio generali. esset contra istud, quia ibi dicitur quod essentia non est 
generans nec genita nec procedens. ' 
"'Amplior declaratio, p. 369.13-18: 'Licet autem in quinto articulo Litterae praecedentis ostenderim quod verba. 
praedictae decretalis non obviant sententiae distinctionis superius praelibatae, quin potius ipsa distinctio plenius 
salvat et concordat dicta decretalis cum dictis sanctortim, et e converso, quam sententia praedictae distinctioni 
opposita, nihilomintis hic plenius et claritis hoc monstrare conabar. ' 
"'Amplior declaratio. pp-370-1: 'Sed ratio. propter quarn decretalis ponit in divinis; tinarn essentiam quae sit 
tres personae et qtiae in quantum talis; non sit generans nec genita, est ut salvetur unitas naturae divinae et 
distinctio 
personarum'; also Quaestio de trinitate, p. 176*: 'Loquuntur enim contra loachim, qui visus est 
dicere. quod tres 
personae non stint aliqua una. res. quae vere una et eadem sit in tribus simul, cuius contrarium secundum 
fidem 
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position is not different from his own, Olivi takes a long passage from tile decree and 
replaces the word 'essence' with the word 'God'. Following this procedure, the 
assertion that the essence is non-begetting becomes the assertion that God is neither 
begetting nor begotten nor proceeding which, he says, is clearly not the intended 
meaning. "' Of course, this is precisely the kind of device which would be 
considered illegitimate by scholastic theologians who would consider that Olivi had 
committed exactly the same error as Joachim: the word 'God' cannot indiscriminately 
substitute the word 'essence' without paying regard to the immediate context. Olivi 
even reproduces the very argument which scholastic commentators had attributed to 
Joachim, namely that if it is objected 'essence begot essence, therefore another 
essence', it should similarly apply that for 'God begot God' it follows there is another 
God. 161 Indeed, Giles of Rome in his Impugnatio against the errors of Olivi, did not 
fail to expose the central flaw of Olivi's argument from the point of view of 
grammatical theology. The comparison between the tenns 'God' and 'essence' did not 
hold since what applies to concrete words such as 'God' cannot be transferred to 
abstract words such as 'essence'. T'hus it does not follow from 'God begot God' that 
asserens Deeretalis de ista re seu essentia sic in sua tota communitate ei ambitu sumpta dicit, quod illa res non est 
generans neque genita neque procedens, ei tamen volens significare, quod ipsa, inquanturn est propria unuiscuiusque 
personae, est genita in una ei generans in alia, subiungit statim, quod ipsa est Pater, qui generat. ei Filius, qui 
generatur, ei Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit. Essentia enim, prout est ille, qui est Pater, ei prout est proprie Patris, 
idem est ornnino, ei idem, ut dicunt, est dictum: Essentia est Filius, qui gignitur, quod ei essentia. prout est propria 
Fil-Ü ei prout est Filius, gignitur. Unde ei Decretalis infra dicit ei innuit. quod Pater dedit Filio suarn substantiarn 
generando. ' Cf. Conciliorum 2, p. 232.11-18. 
'60Amplior declaratio, pp. 369-70: 'Ut igitur cuivis appareat quod verba ista non destruunt distintionern 
praedictarn sed potius salvant, repeto verba praedicta mutando nomen "essentiae" in hoc nomen "Deus". sic 
dicendo: unus solus Deus est incomprehensibilis, qui veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, tres simul 
personae ac singillatim quaelibet earumdem, et ille unus Deus. qui scilicet est simul tres personae. non est generans 
nec genitus nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat et Filius qui gignitur et Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit, ut 
distinctiones sint in personis et unitas in uno Deo, qui est tres personae. ' 
16'Ainplior declaratio, p. 373.3-5: 'si essentia genuit essentiam, ergo aliam essentiam, dicendum quod si haec 
consequentia bona est. tunc eadem ratione sequitur: Deus generat Deum, ergo alium Deum', similarly, ibid., 
p. 380.32-7: 'Et certe sicut nulla est contradictio dicere quod est Deus generans et Deus genitus et Deus Trinitas. 
quamvis in primis duabus li Deus surnatur sing6ulariter. scilicet in prima pro solo Patre et in secunda pro solo Filio, 
in tertia vero surnatur communiter, sic nec oportet quod huius praedicta respectu essentiae sibi invicem 
contradicant. ' Olivi also contravenes another axiom of grammatical theology, that 'essence' never stands for Person. 
ibid., p. 378.28-36: 'essentia stat aliquando pro tribus personis simul [... ] Aliquando stat pro duabus tanturn 
Aliquando stat pro una sola persona. ut cum dicitur essentia de essentia'. 
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'essence begot essence'. "' 
Although, according to Olivi, it is false that 'essence or God who is three 
Persons., is begetting or begotten', it is true that 'essence or God. who is ffie three 
Persons, is the Person of the Father, the Person of the Son and the Person of the Holy 
I Spirit , which is why the decree says 'that res is the Father who begets and the Son 
who is begotten' . 
16' Thus: 
it is clear from the words of the aforementioned decree that generation is not altogether universally denied of the essence of God, but only denied of it as it is common to the three Persons and 
encompassing the three together. " 
The judgement of the Fourth Lateran Council is also a consistent theme for the other 
protagonists in the controversy surrounding Olivi's views. When as Minister General, 
John of Murrovalle, one of the seven original investigators in 1283, called for further 
examination of Olivi's writings in 1309, much was made of the alleged 
incompatability of the respective positions of Olivi and the Council on the generation 
of the essence. The list of errors produced in 1311 by Raymond of Fronsac, the 
Procurator of the Franciscan Order and Bonagratia of Bergamo made several 
references to the contradiction between Olivi and the Council. 165 Giles of Rome, in 
a typically cutting remark, wrote: 
it is the doctrine of Peter Lombard, not of Peter John, that the divine essence neither begets nor is 
begotten nor proceeds, which is approved by the authority of the sacred Council. 71iis authority, after 
1621inpugnatio, pp. 428-9: 'Sed ficet hec catholice concedantur in concreto, debent catholice negari in abstracto, 
quia divinitas, id est divina essentia vel natura, nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit, ut dicit Magister in Sententiis, 
et ut Decretalis confirmat. Onmino ergo proprie dictum est quod "Dews generat Deurn"; et quod ibi dicitur "Deus 
est de, Deo, lumen de lumine, Deus verus de Deo vero". Hec ergo conceduntur in concreto quod ibi est Deus de 
Deo, et quod ibi Deus generat Deurn; sed ibi non conceditur in abstracto quod deitas generet deitatem, vel quod 
essentia generat essentiam'. 
163 Amplior declaratio, p. 371.40-4: 'Quamvis autem haec. scilicet "essentia vel Deus, qui est tres personae, est 
generans vel genitus", falsa sit. nihilominu: s haec est vera: "essentia vel Deus, qui est tres personae. est persona 
Patris et persona Filii et persona Spiritus Sancti". Et ideo bene dicitur in praedicta decretali quod "illa res est 
Pater 
qui generat et Filius qui gignitur"'. 
"Amplior declaratio, p. 372.3-6: 'Ex praedictis atitem patet quod per verba decretalis praedictae omnino 
universaliter non negatur generatio de essentia Dei. sed solum negatur 
de ea, prout est communis tribus et tres 
simul comprehendens*- 
165The document is edited by F. Ehrle in the series 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne'. ALKM 
2 
(1886), 365-74. esp. pp. 367.24-33 and 369.2-8. Also Bonagratia of Bergamo. Series condeinnationum. pp. 
510-1 1. 
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the compilers of the canonical Bible, is greater than the authority of any doctor or even saint. ' 66 
The Council's expressed position on this question, therefore, takes precedence over 
the fact that none of the Fathers stated outright that the essence is non-begetting. ' 67 
The presence of the Council's explicit judgement carries greater weight than the 
absence of the same judgement in other authorities. 
It turns out, then, that Olivi's view is substantially the same as the one being 
attacked by thirteenth-century theologians in their interpretations of the decree. As far 
as they are concerned, there is no room for a concept of the essence as begetting no 
matter how we understand the word 'essence'. They rejected Olivi's claim that the 
decree was using 'essence' only in the sense of what is common not proper to the 
Persons because they had virtually eliminated any use of the word 'essence' to stand 
for Person. 
Olivi also argued that his positive staiice on the generation of the essence was, 
in any case, an entirely different issue from Joachim's doctrine of unity of collection. 
It was not inconsistent to affirm a unity of essence and a generation of essence, a 
possibility which most other theologians did not consider. 
Do thirteenth-century interpretations throw any light on the issues which originally 
elicited the Council's clarification of trinitarian doctrine or do they represent nothing 
more than the continuation of a peculiarly obssessive debate about an issue which is 
only mentioned in the decree because it just happened to be part of a citation from the 
Sentences? 
There is no question that thirteenth-century theologians privilege one seemingly 
marginal aspect of the condemnation. They mistake the Council's affin-nation of the 
quaedam summa res as non-begetting towards the end of the decree for one of 
166hnpugnau . o. p. 431: 'Approbatur ergo sententia Petri Lombardi, non Petri loannis. quod divina essentia nec 
gignit nec gignitur nec procedit auctoritate sacri Concilii. que auctoritas, post compilatores canonis Biblie, est maior 
quam auctoritas cuiuslibet doctoris vel etiarn sancti. ' 
167 Giles of Rome, Impygnatio. p. 431: 'dato quod auctoritas nullius sancti hoc assereret, quod divina essentia 
nec gignit nec gignitur nec procedit, tamen ex quo approbatur auctoritate sacri ConciIii. que post compositores 
canonis Biblie est rnaior quam auctoritas cuiuscumque sancti'. 
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Joachim's errors rather than what it seems to be, a clarification of the doctrine of 
divine unity/generation raised by Joachim's attack. That explains why they think 
Joachim is being condemned for thinking that the essence does not beget. And even 
when theologians do address the main issues of Quaternity and unity of collection, the 
debate on 'essence begot essence' is never far away, as in Aquinas' Expositio. Only 
Olivi is able to see how Joachim's condemnation does not exclude all talk of the 
essence as begetting. His position is that (1) the doctrines of the quaedam summa res 
and the generation of the essence are not mutually exclusive; (2) this position does not 
contradict the Lateran decree; and (3) this position does not entail unity of collection. 
In principle, (1) and (3) were sustainable, but not as far as the decree was concerned, 
which is why Olivi's opponents were so persistent in drawing attention to the decree's 
prohibition of the generation of the essence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Rather than simply reiterate what has already been said, it is more worthwhile 
to use this opportunity to outline the wider significance of some of the main problems 
which I have been discussing. T'he most important general point which has emerged 
is how essential it is for the modem scholar to possess a detailed knowledge of certain 
theological issues if a number of historical 'events' and phenomena are to be 
understood. The most striking example of this, and one which I have been at pains to 
stress throughout, is the Fourth Lateran Council. It seems indisputable that what is at 
stake in the Lateran Council's pronouncement upon the Trinity is not only the 
personal orthodoxy of a few individuals, although that is undoubtedly important, but 
also a wider consensus of thought on the doctrine as it had emerged in the schools 
during the course of the twelfth century. Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard 
represented a serious challenge to this consensus, and was the immediate cause of the 
Council's statement. However, to see this as an isolated confrontation, or another 
example of Joachim's highly fertile imagination, is to dismiss both the genuine 
importance of Joachim's own concerns and the role of sustained discussion on the 
doctrine, which had been proceeding for more than a century. Such a view reduces the 
particularity of the issues themselves to nothing more than a device for issuing a 
condemnation or for raising one theologian's views per se to the status of official 
doctrine. 
If the study of trinitarian theology in this period teaches us anything it is surely 
that ideas do have a life outside the academy, and do sometimes have a 'knock-on' 
effect elsewhere. It might seem as though the only justification for the study of 
intellectual history is as an end in itself, but this strikes me as a kind of defeatism. 
Intellectual history can provide us with a deeper understanding of society at large. 
After all, the Lateran decree on the Trinity demonstrates that intellectual discussions 
could influence 'policy'. 
Another outstanding example of how a knowledge of contemporary theological 
debates is not only desirable but, in certain cases, necessary is the tradition of 
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thirteenth- century misunderstandings of the Lateran decree. It can be fairly quickly and 
painlessly established by straightforward textual comparison that th irteenth -century 
commentators concentrated on one particular aspect of the decree, and misrepresented 
its relation to Joachim. But unless one knows something of the preoccupation of 
academic theologians prior to 1215 and the extent to which they hammered away at 
certain issues, the full meaning and scale of subsequent appropriations of the decree 
could never even be penetrated, let alone understood. It is one thing to realise that 
these commentators are biased in their interpretations, another to identify the cause of 
that bias and misunderstanding in the academic tradition of thought on the Trinity 
which they inherited, and yet another still to notice that at the same time these 
interpretations were, paradoxically, implicit in the decree itself, which had rejected 
both Joachim's unity of collection and the view that essence begets essence as 
alternatives to the Lombard's quaedam suinma res. Only by entering the rationality 
of a theological system is it possible to identify and explain the various levels of 
misinterpretation to which that system is prone. 
Other examples of the tangible rewards of intellectual history could be 
enumerated. We cannot understand the true nature of the controversy surrounding 
Peter Olivil's views on the Trinity, unless we realise that he was propounding a 
doctrine, that essence begets essence, which had been ridiculed by the vast majority 
of theologians up to that time. Olivi's opponents did not isolate this issue simply 
because they wanted to attack him, but because they considered his view to be 
nonsensical. Of course, this point, once Olivi's views have been contextualised, 
appears blindingly obvious, and yet it has not been noticed before. What this suggests 
is that more attention needs to be given to the wider connotations of the specific 
issues in question. 
There is the further interrelated point that, unless we know exactly what 
theologians were talking about, we can hardly begin to say what it is we mean when 
we talk about them. This sloppiness with regard to detail accounts 
for such deeply 
entrenched ideas as the construction of a conflict between the 'followers of 
Gilbert of 
Poitiers' and 'the followers of Peter Lombard'. Theology on the Trinity in the second 
half of the twelfth century was in reality much more fluid than this. 
The Lombard 
himself was ambiguous about one of the most characteristic features of 
Gilbert's 
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trinitarian theology, namely tile need for a conceptual distinction between essence and 
Person. This ambiguity allowed subsequent theologians. Nvho were not interested in 
engaging in a polemic about tile respective merits of Gilbert's and the Lombard's 
theology, to turn a blind eye to any reservations the Lombard may have had about 
such conceptual distinctions. Their approach was overwhelmingly pragmatic and 
empirical rather than ideological: certain conceptual tools had undeniable practical 
applications. and they were not prepared to reject them simply because they had 
Gilbertine connotations. By the same token, many theologians, following the lead of 
Peter Lombard, felt that some of Gilbert's distinctions went too far in jeopardising 
divine simplicity. Distinctions between the Persons and their properties, and the 
properties and the essence were, in their view, fatuous attempts at avoiding certain 
unwelcome consequences, such as that essence begets essence. Opponents of these 
distinctions argued that it was not necessary to go down this road in order to avoid 
the conclusion that the essence begets; a clear distinction between essence and Person 
was all that was needed. The importance of this distinction between essence and 
Person was not new in itself but was given additional emphasis by the apparatus of 
supposition theory, and was also the guiding principle of the Lateran decree. 'Me 
introduction of a classification system in theological language sharpened the 
boundaries between correct and incorrect usage, and facilitated the recognition of 
theology as a science with a distinct methodology. 
This attention to detail has opened up new avenues for future research. T11is 
is particularly true of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The indications 
are that theologians during this period were still preoccupied with some of the same 
issues which had been taxing minds since the early twelfth century. A knowledge of 
these debates can help clarify some problems of intellectual orientation which have 
never been fully resolved. The most compelling case here is the anonymous Liber 
contra Lombardum, which has been dated to the early fourteenth century. In the light 
of the tradition of academic thought on the Trinity, it now seems certain that, far from 
being a belated and somewhat curious eruption of pro-Joachite feeling, the Liber is in 
fact very much part of the on-going debate about the generation of the essence. It may 
turn out that the anonymous author's opposition to Peter Lombard's position on this 
question was influenced, either directly or indirectly, by Olivi, but this still does not 
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pen-nit us regard the work as Joachite, since Olivi himself was f ar from Joachim in 
this context. The particular place of the Liber in the development of trinitarian 
theology at this time is itself probably of minor significance. What matters is that 
understanding the theological issues themselves can often provide a means of 
separating out the strands of intellectual influence which have become entangled in 
the scholar's mind; to do so must constitute an advance in clarity. 
Such insights can only be gleaned from a combination of horizontal and 
vertical approaches to a subject. Putting something in its historical context means 
precisely this. that is, looking at it from every conceivable angle, backwards, forwards 
and sideways. This is especially true of the historical study of any aspect of Christian 
doctrine. After Greek philosophy, the Cluistian traditions are the most deeply 
embedded in European culture. 'Mis makes the task in studying any element in those 
traditions both exceptionally daunting and rewarding, regardless of one's own personal 
beliefs. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Texts showing links with the Glossa super Sementias 
I. 'nie argument, Deum genuit deum, ergo se deum vel alium deum. 
Glossa, BM Royal 7F XHL 
[fol. 7val Dixit dominus domino meo, ergo se domino vel alii domino. Vel, alius 
assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominern vel aliurn hominern. 
Robert of Melun, lSent. 4. XXI, p. 143.1-4: 
Dixit Dominus Domino meo; nec ex hoc sequitur quod alii vel sibi. Nam neque sibi 
dixit quia se ipsum non genuit nec alii Domino, eo quod non est alius Dominus ille 
qui genitus est et alius ille qui genuit, sed genitor et genitus unus et Diminus [sic]. 
Anonymous Summa, BM Royal 9E XII: 
Rol. 15 lrb] Et sit obiecto argumenti hec: Dixit dominus domino meo, ergo sibi domino 
vel alii domino. 
Sententie Udonis, Munich Clm. 7622: 
VolAral Constat ergo quod deus genuit deum, nec tamen se deum vel alium deum, 
quia multe possunt dari instantie tales: filius est lumen de lumine, ergo de se lumine 
vel. alio lumine Item: Verbum assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium 
hominem. 
Peter of Poitiers, Uent. 27, p. 218.83-86: 
Deus gignit Deum, ergo se Deum vel alium Deum, feratur instantia sic: istud est 
lumen de lumine, ergo de se lumine vel de alio lumine; vel: Verbum assumpsit 
hominern, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem. 
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Magister Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799: 
[fols. 3ra-bl Dixit dominus domino, ergo sibi domino vel alii domino, vel sic: filius 
assumpsit hominem, ergo se hominem vel alium hominem. 
Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 4.4, p. 217.21-2: 
Instantia: dixit dominus domino mco, ergo sibi domino vel alii domino. 
2. Glossa, BM Royal 7F XIH: 
[fol. 7val Iste ten-ninus 'pater' in nulla significatione convenit patri in quantum non 
conveniat divine essentie, quia unam tantum habet significationem, in quantum 
personam. patris significat; sed ad predicationem illius termini de patre, sequitur quod 
pater generet; ergo ad predicationem huius de divina essentia, sequitur quod divina 
essentia gigneret. Non sequitur (7vb] et est ratio: que licet utrobique idem significat 
hoc nomen 'pater', tamen cum respective dicatur de patre, de divina essentia non 
dicitur respective. Instantia, talis: iste terminus 'habens filium, in eadem. significatione 
convenit viro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicationem. de muliere, sequitur quod 
concepisse; ergo etc. Vel ita esse eiusdem essentie cum patre, in eadem significatione 
convenit filio et filiationi, sed ad predicationem. illius de filio, sequitur quod filius sit 
in patre. 
Magister Martinus, Quaestiones, BN lat. 14556: 
[fol. 280ral Iste terminus 'paterý non convenit in alia significatione patri inquam non 
conveniat divine essentie, quia tantum unam significationem habet. Significat enim 
personam patris, sed ad predicationem illius de patre, sequitur quod pater gigneret, 
quia si aliquis est proprie generat, ergo ad predicationem illius de divina essentia, 
sequitur ipsa generat. Quidam. tamen dicunt quod isti termini 'persona', 'pater', idem 
predicant de patre et de divina essentia, respective tamen dicitur ad patreml, sed ad 
divinam essentiam. nequam dicitur respective. Unde ab eis dicitur illa predicatio, 
scilicet essemia divina est pater accidentalis, ista vero pater est pater propria quoniam 
scilicet duo predicantur coniunctim ita quod non uterque predicetur de subiecto 
divisim [ ... 
I Dicunt tamen quidam hanc propositionem 'divina essentia est pater' 
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duppliciter posset intelligi: sl enim i hoc nomen -pater' tenetur adiective, cum dicitur 
'divina essentia est pater', falsum est, est eiiim sensus: 'divilla essentia est generans': 
si vero substantive teneratur, verum est, ut sit sensus: 'divina essentia est ille quod est 
pater. [280rb] Obiecto argumenti. Iste ten-ninus 'habet filium' in eadem significatione 
convenit isti mulieri et isti viro, sed ad predicationem istius termini de muliere, 
sequitur quod ipsa. conceperit prolem, ergo ad predicationem istius termini de viro, 
sequitur quod ipsa. prolem conceperit. Ne mireris si huiusmodi instantiis repellamus. 
Anonymous quaestio, Munich Clm. 7622: 
[fol. 46rb] Iste terminus in eadem significatione convenit patri et divine essentie vel 
in diversa. Si concedatur in diversa, ergo in ea significatione qua convenit patri 
removetur a divina essentia, ergo divina essentia non est pater, quod falsum est. Ergo 
in eadem significatione convenit patri et divine essentie, sed ad predicationem illius 
termini de patre, cum dico pater est pater, sequitur ergo generat. Ergo ad 
predicationem eiusdem termini de divina essentia, sequitur, si divina essentia est pater, 
ergo generat. 
Anonymous Summa, BM Royal 9E XIL 
[fol. 151val in nulla significatione convenit patri iste terminus 'pater' in quam non 
conveniat divine essentie, sed ad predicationem istius termini de patre, sequitur quod 
pater generet; ergo ad predicationem eiusdem de divina essentia, sequitur quod divina 
essentia generet. Quare non provenit, cum de patre et non de divina essentia respective 
dicatur hoc nomen 'pater '. Obiecto. Iste terminus 'habens filium' in eadem 
significatione convenit viro huic et mulieri huic, sed ad predicationem de muliere 
sequitur quod concepit, ergo etc. Vel ita: esse eiusdem essentie cum patre in eadem 
significatione convenit filio et filiationi. Sed ad predicationem illius de filio, sequitur 
quod filius sit in patre, ergo etc. 
3. Glossa, BM Royal 7F XIII: 
[fol. 7vb] Item. Proprietas que predicatur de patre, cum dicitur 'pater generat', 
predicatur de divina essentia; igitur 'qui generat' predicatur de ea nomine. Sed iste 
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terminus 'generatio' quid significat eandem proprietatern quam hoc verbum 'generat'. 
Instantia. Species que significatur hoc iiomine 'homo', predicatur de omnibus 
hominibus; ergo omnes homines sunt homo. 
Item. Idem esse patrem est generare, ergo cuicumque convenit hoc et illud. Sed 
divine essentie convenit esse patrem, ergo generare. Non sequitur. Non enim ait 
Augustinus: 'idem esse patrem et generare', sed: 'idern est patri esse patrem et 
generare. ' Hec est intelligendum: idern essentia vel significatione, sed consecutione 
quia unurn sequitur ad aliud. Vel, idem est etc., id est eiusdem proprietatis est uterque 
terminus, scilicet 4 pater' et 'generare 
Item. Bonum est argumentum a simplici conversa: pater filii dei est deus, ergo 
deus est pater filii dei; ergo quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda, ergo divina 
essentia est pater filii dei, ergo filius dei est filius divine essentie, ergo divina essentia 
genuit filium. Ad quod dicimus quod licet argumentum bonum sit, non tamen quod 
predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda. histantia. Creator est deus, ergo deus est 
creator. Bonum est argumenturn a simplici conversa; ergo quod subicitur in prima, 
predicatur in secunda, ergo idem est deum creatorern esse et deum esse quod filium 
est. 
Item. Iste terminus 'pater filii dei' tantum. hanc personam significat, ergo in 
eadern significatione predicatur de divina essentia vel removetur de divina essentia; 
si predicatur, ergo divina essentia est pater filii; si removetur, ergo divina essentia non 
est illa persona. Instantia. Hoc nomen 'homo' significat hanc speciem homo, ergo in 
illa significatione predicatur de istis hominibus vel removetur ab illis; si predicatur, 
ergo isti homines sunt homo; si removetur, ergo hec species homo non predicatur de 
eis. Nota quod iste terminus 'pater' accipitur substantive et adiective: substantive 
accepit, dicitur de divina essentia, adiective non. Unde iste propositio 'divina 
substantia est pater' sic potest distingui: 'divina substantia est pater', id est ille qui 
habet filium, sic verum est. Sed habet filium, si non est, et ut substantive accipiatur, 
concedi potest 'divina essentia est pater filii', adiective non. 
Anonymous Summa, BM Royal 9E XIL 
[fol. 151val Item. Proprietas que predicatur de patre, cum dicitur 'pater generat', 
predicatur de essentia, ergo divina essentia generat. Obiecto. Species quod significatur 
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hoc nomine 'homo', predicatur de pluribus, ergo plura surit hoino. Item. Idem est esse 
patrem et generare. 
Resepondemus, non habet auctoritatern idem esse patrem et generare, sed idem 
est patri esse patrern et generare, id est eadem est patris proprietas paternitas [151vbl 
que generatio et eiusdern proprietatis sunt isti termini 'pater' et 'generare'. Item. 
Divina essentia est pater filii dei, ergo filius dei est filius divine essentie, divina igitur 
essentia genuit filium. Item. Deus est dominus diaboli, ergo diabolus est servus dei. 
Vel divina essentia est spirator spiritus sancti, ergo spiritus sanctus spiratur a divina 
essentia vel negetur prima. Que tamen ita probari videtur. Necessarium est 
argumenturn a simplici conversa: pater filii dei est deus, ergo deus est pater filii dei, 
ergo quod predicatur in prima, subicitur in secunda. Obiecto. Creator est deus, ergo 
deus est creator. Conveniens est argumenturn a simplici conversa, ergo quod subicitur 
in prima, predicatur in secunda. Idem est ergo deum esse creatorem et esse deum. 
quod non concedunt. 
Item. Iste terminus 'pater filii dei' tanturn hanc personam significat, ergo in 
eadem significatione predicatur de divina essentia vel removetur ab ea. Si predicatur, 
ergo divina essentia est pater filii dei; si removetur, ergo divina essentia non est illa 
persona. Obiecto. Hoc nomen 'homo' significat hanc speciern homo, ergo in ista 
significatione predicatur de istis, vel removetur ab istis. Si predicatur, ergo duo 
homines sunt homo; si removetur, ergo hec species homo non predicatur de eis. Hoc 
quod iste terminus 'pater' sive 6pater filii' substantive accipitur secundum quod divina 
essentia est pater sive pater filii dei, id est ille quid habet filium; et adiective 
secundurn quod non dicitur hic terminus de divina essentia, designato videlicet 
divinarn essentiarn habere filium sive generare. 
Anonymous quaestio, Munich Clm. 7622: 
[fol. 46val Instantia. Hec species homo predicatur de istis duobus, ergo isti duo sunt 
homo. Item. Pater filii est deus, ergo deus est pater filii. Bonum est argumentum a 
simiplici conversa, ergo quod predicatur in prima. subicitur in secunda, et quod 
subicitur iii prima, predicatur in secunda; ergo divina essentia est pater filii. Item. 
Divina essentia non est pater filii, hic removetur iste terminus 6pater', ergo illa 
propositio falsa est, ergo sua contradictoria est vera, scilicet essentia divina est pater 
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f i1ii, ergo f ilius est filius divine essentie. Non sequitur. Licet enim homo et homines 
significent eandern speciem, non tamen removetur, illa species homo non est homines, 
vel potest falsurn primum argumentum: Creator est deus, ergo deus est creator. Locus 
est a simplici conversa, ergo cum essentia divina in prima subiciatur, in secunda 
predicatur. Non sequitur, quia idem iam esset deum esse deum et esse creatorem. 
Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 4.5, p. 218.11-15: 
Plures negant hanc: essentia est pater filii; dicunt enim quod cum dico: essentia est 
pater, hoc nomen pater ibi tenetur quasi substantive, et tantum valet quantum: essentia 
est persona generans. Sed cum dico: essentia est pater filii, ibi hoc nomen pater 
intelligitur adiective, et tantum valet ac si dicerem: essentia generat filium. 
Peter of Capua, Summa, Munich Clm. 14508: 
[fol. 2rb] Nos vero sicut in subiecto, ita et in predicato concedimus divina essentia est 
pater filii, nec inde sequitur, ergo habet filium, nam coneditur secundum quod hoc 
nomen 'pater' ponitur substantive. Unde esst concedendum, ergo est persona que habet 
filium, ipse vero concludit ac si teneretur adiective. 
APPENDIX B: Peter of Poitiers and the Sententie Udonis 
Sententie Udonis, Munich Clm. 7622- 
[folAral Hac locutione fit sermo de filio; ergo illa locutione fit sermo de deo, quia de 
eo de quo fit sermo, dicitur veraciter quod sit alius a patre; ergo de eo veraciter dicitur 
quod sit alius a patre; ergo vere deus est alius a patre; sic igitur sunt plures dii. Quod 
tamen instantia potest falli: iste sacerdos cras suspendetur; hac locutione fit senno de 
isto sacerdote; ergo de quodam homine; ergo de eo de quo veraciter fit serrno. Dicitur 
quod cras suspendetur; ergo de homine. Hoc dicitur veraciter; ergo horno cras 
suspendetur. 
Peter of Poitiers, ISent. 27, p. 218.87-91: 
Item, hac propositione fit sermo de deo: Filius est alius a Patre, et pro eo est vera de 
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quo sit sen-no; ergo Deus est alius a Patre. Fallacia: iste sacerdos cras suspendetur, hac 
propositione fit sermo de homine, et de eo est vera pro quo fit senno; ergo iste homo 
cras suspendetur. 
APPENDIX C: Preposi? nus of Cremona and Master Hubertus. 
1. Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 3.8, pp. 212-13: 
Unde queritur in hoc loco utrum aliquid sit verum de essentia quod sit verum de 
persona. Et videtur quod nihil. 
Si dicas quod aliquid sit verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona, quero 
quid. Si dicas essentiam esse verum est de persona, probo quod non; quia hoc nornen 
essentia non supponit pro persona, ergo essentiam esse non est verum de persona. 
Forte dicet de essentia est verum ipsam esse, et de persona est verum ipsam 
esse, et ita idem. Sed contra sic: cum dico de essentia verum est ipsam esse, hic est 
sensus: de essentia verum est essentiam esse, et hoc est verum de persona; ergo 
essentiam esse est verum de persona; sed hoc nomen essentia non supponit pro 
persona; deinde ut supra. 
Si dicat deum esse verum de essentia et idem de persona, probo quod non. Hoc 
nomen deus significat essentiam et supponit pro ea, ergo est proprium nomen eius. 
Ergo vel tantum supponit pro ea, vel equivoce accipitur. Sed non supponit tantum pro 
ea. Ergo equivoce accipitur, cum supponat pro essentia et cum supponat pro persona. 
Ergo non idem enuntiabile quod est verum de essentia et quod est verum de persona. 
Contra. Niliil est verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona. Ergo essentia non est 
persona. 
Item, is aliqua res est persona, illa est essentia. Ergo si aliquid est verum de 
persona, illud est verum de essentia. Sed de persona patris est verum ipsam non esse 
filium. Ergo de essentia est verum ipsam non esse filium. 
Solutio. Quidam dicunt nihil esse verum de essentia quod sit verum de persona. 
Unde dicunt non sequi: ergo essentia non est persona. Instantia: aliquid est verum de 
hoc nomine albus quod non est verum de hac voce albus; ergo hoc nomen non est hec 
vox. Vel sic: aliquid est verum de hoc sacramento quod non est verum de hac specie; 
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ergo hoc sacramentum non est hec species. 
Alii dicunt quod quidquid est verum de persona, est verum de essentia, sed non 
convertitur. Unde dicunt: patrem non esse filium est verum de essentia. Ad illud 
argumentum - scificet hoc; si aliquid est verum de persona, illud est verum de 
essentia; sed de persona patris est verum ipsam non esse filium; ergo de essentia est 
verum ipsam non esse filium - sic respondent. Quidquid est verum de patre est verum 
de deo. Sed de patre est verum ipsum non esse filium. Ergo de deo est verum ipsum 
non esse filium. 
Master Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799: 
[fol. 7ral queritur an aliquid sit verum de persona quod non de essentia. Quod nichil 
probatur. Si enim dicat aliquid, queritur quid forte dicet essentiam esse est verum et 
de persona et de essentia. 
Sed contra. Quia hoc nomen 'essentiaý non supponit pro persona. Si pro 
essentia, ergo essentiam esse non est verum de persona. Quod si dicat ipsam esse est 
verum. et de persona et de essentia. Sic contra, cum dico de essentia verum est ipsam 
esse, hic est sensus: de essentia verum est essentiam esse et hoc idem verum est de 
persona, ergo de persona est verum essentiam esse. Sed hoc supram improbatum est, 
vel sic, cum dicit de essentia verum est ipsam esse hoc pronomen 'ipsam' refert 
essentiam. Cum autem dicit de persona verum est ipsam esse, tunc refert personam. 
Sed non est idem esse personam et esse essentiam; ergo non idem enuntiabile 
significatur utrobique hec enuntiabile ipsam esse. Quod si dicat deum esse est verum 
de essentia et de persona. Sic contra. Hoc nomen 'deus' proprie et principaliter 
significat essentiam et pro ea supponit; ergo est proprium nomen eius vel tantum 
supponit pro ea vel equivoce accipitur. Sed non tantum supponit pro ea, ergo equivoce 
[fol. 7rb] accipitur cum supponitur pro persona et cum supponit pro essentia non ergo 
idem enunciabile quod est verum de essentia et quod est verum de persona. Ergo 
essentia non est persona. Item. Si aliqua res est persona, ipsa est essentia; ergo si 
aliquid est verum de persona, idem est verum de essentia. 
Solutio. Quidam dicunt nil esse verum de essentia quod non sit verum de 
persona, nec tamen sequitur, ergo essentia non est persona et hoc solum tale esse. Alii 
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dicunt quod quicquid est verum de persona est verum de essentia, sed non convertitur; 
unde patrem dicunt non esse filium, est verum de essentia. Ad primum ergo 
argumenturn, scilicet quicquid verum de persona est de essentia et non e converso etc. 
Sic instant. Quicquid est verum de patre est verum de deo, sed de patre verum est 
ipsum non esse filium; ergo de deo verum est ipsum non esse filium. 
2. Prepositinus of Cremona, Summa 3.1, pp. 207-8: 
Et hoc probat auctoritas Augustini, qui dicit: 'Deo nihil aliud est esse essentiam quam 
esse personam, sed omnino idem'. Ergo, hoc nomen persona significat essentiam. 
Item, cum dico personam patris nihil aliud dico quam substantiam patris, ergo hoc 
nomen personam significat substantiam vel essentiam. Item, idcirco pater est persona, 
filius est persona, spiritus sanctus est persona, quia communis eis est id quod est 
persona. Sed nihil est eis commune nisi divina essentia. Ergo hoc nomen persona 
significat divinam essentiam [ ... 
I 
Item, pater est persona, hic est sensus: pater est essentia; filius est persona, 
similiter. Ergo cum dico: Pater et filius sunt persona, hic debet esse sensus: pater et 
filius sunt essentia. Et una est vera, ergo et alia, ergo ille due propositiones sunt vere. 
Vel sic: una est falsa, ergo et reliqua, ergo sunt simul false. 
Item, pater est persona, hic est sensus: pater est essentia. Ergo in conversa, 
scilicet hec persona est pater, hic est sensus: essentia est pater, vel hoc nomen persona 
improprie accipitur in predicato. Sed non accipitur improprie. Ergo cum dico: persona 
est pater et filius., hic erit sensus: essentia est pater et filius. Sed hec est vera: essentia 
est pater et filius. Ergo aliqua persona est pater et filius. 
Master Hubertus, Summa, Munich Clm. 28799: 
[fol. 5val questio utrum idem sit deo esse essentiam quod esse personam. Quod 
probatur auctoritate Augustini qui ait: deo nichil est aliud esse essentiam quam esse 
personam, sed ominino idem. Idem alibi: cum dico personam patris nil aliud dico 
quam substantiam patris. Item. Iccirico pater est persona, filius est persona, spiritus 
sanctus est persona, quia commune esse eis id quod est persona. Sed nichil est eis 
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commune esse nisi sola divina essentia, ergo idem est deo esse personam quod esse 
essentiam [... ] Item. Cum dico pater est persona, hic est sensus: pater est essentia. 
Similiter, cum dico filius est persona, sensus est: filius est essentia. Ergo cum dico 
pater et filius sunt persona, hic est sensus: pater et filius sunt essentia; sed una est 
vera, ergo et alia. Ergo ille due similes sunt vere, vel si una est falsa et reliqua. Item. 
Pater est persona, sensus est: pater est essentia, ergo in eius conversa, scilicet persona 
est pater, sensus est: essentia est pater vel hoc nomen 'persona' improprie accipitur 
in predicato; sed non ponitur improprie, cum nichil ibi ponatur quod trahat ad 
improprietatem, ergo cum dico persona est pater et filius, sensus est: essentia est pater 
et filius, ergo et hec: persona est pater et filius, ergo aliqua persona est pater et filius. 
APPENDIX D: Gamier of Rochefort's borrowing from Petrus Alfonsi 
1. Gamier, PL 205.717A: 
Octavarn vero, quod est, 'Elohim', idem est, ac si dicerem, 'Dii nostri', et cuius 
11 singulare est 'Eloah . 
Alfonsi, Dialogus, pp. 75.36-76.1: 
'Eloym' enim pluralitatem demonstrat, cuius singulare est 6eloa'. Cum autem dico 
'elohay', tale est, ac si dicerem 'dei mei', pluralitatem signando deorum et unam 
tantum dicentis personam, cum vero 'elohem' dico, quasi dicerem 'dii nostri'. 
2. Gamier, PL 205.217A: 
Hinc etiarn Laban ad lacob ait: 'Cur furatus es elohim' 
(Gen 31,30), id est deos 
meos. Et Moyses: 'Non habebis elohirn elim' (Exodus 20,3), 
id est deos alienos. Lot 
quoque illos duos, qui cum eo loquebantur, angelos, Adonai appellavit, 
id est Domini 
mei. 
Alfonsi, Dialogus, pp. 76.33-77.3: 
invenimus in Genesi Loth angelos appellasse 'adonay', hoc est 'domini me, 
', quia 
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angeli duo profecto erant. Et alias in eodem libro Laban increpans lacob ait: 'Cur 
furatus es eloay? ' (Gen 31,30), hoc est 'deos meos'. Et in Psalmo invenitur scriptum: 
'Ego dixi elohim atem', id est 'dii estis'. Et ad Israeliticurn populum dorninus per 
Moysen loquens ait: 'Non habebis heloym herim', hoc est 'deos alienos'. 
3. Gamier, PL 205.717BC: Unde cum dixisset Dominus ad lacob: 'Surge et ascende 
in Bethel et habita ibi et fac altare Deo, qui apparuit tibi' (Gen 35,1), hic singulariter 
ponitur, 'Eloe niglu', id est Deus apparuit. Sed cum postea Scriptura dicit, quod. Iacob 
edificavit ibi altare et appellavit nomen loci Bethel, quia ibi apparuit ei Dominus, cum 
fugeret fratrem suum. (Gen 35,7), hoc in. Hebraicopluraliterponitur. Habetur quippe, 
Elohim niglam',, quod pluraliter dicitur, 'apparuerunt'. Nam si singulariter dicere 
vellet, 'nigla' id est 'apparuit', posuisset. Similiter quando David Deum laudans 
diceret: 'Que est ut populus tuus gens in terra, propter quam ivit Deus, ut redimeret 
earn sibi in populumý (H Kings 7,23), hic et 'Deus'et 'ivit" in Hebraico pluraliter 
ponitur, scilicet 'Elohim. alchu', quod 'iverunt' significat, cuius singulare est 'halac', 
id. est ivit. 
Alfonsi, Dialogus, pp. 77.32-78.2: Est enim scriptum in Genesi: 'Loquutus est dominus 
ad Iacob: Surge et ascende Bethel et habita ibi facque altare deo, qui apparuit tibi, 
quando fugiebas fratrem tuum. ' (Gen 35,1). Hic quippe et nomen dei et actus 
singulariter profertur. Deinde scriptum est in eodem libro preceptum domini lacob 
implesse. Sequitur enim: 'Edificavitque ibi altare et appellavit nomen loci Bethel, id 
est domus dei. Ibi enim apparuit ei deus, cum fugeret fratrem suum. ' (Gen 35,7). Hic 
autem et 'deus' et 'apparuit' in Hebraico pluraliter profertur. Habetur quippe ibi 
'elohym' et 'niglu Y quod pluraliter 
'apparuerunt' significat. Si enim singulariter 
'apparuit'dicere vellet, 'nigla'posuisset. Item etiam in libro Samuelis David laudans 
deum ait: 'Que est ut populus tuus gens in terra, propter quam ivit deus, ut redimeret 
eam sibi in populum? ' (11 Kings, 7,23). Hic etiam similiter et 
'deus' et 'ivit' in 
Hebraico plurale est. Hic enim similiter habetur 'helohim' et 'halchu', quod est 
'iverunt', cuius singulare est 'halach'. 
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